Report on the Committee Stage of the Assembly Members (Remuneration Board) Bill

Ordered by the Ad Hoc Committee on the Assembly Members (Remuneration Board) Bill to be published on 8 April 2025.

Report: NIA 80/22-27

Ad Hoc Committee on the Assembly Members (Remuneration Board) Bill.

Contents

Powers and Membership

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms used in this Report

Executive Summary

Introduction

Consideration of the Bill

Clause-by-Clause Consideration of the Bill

Links to Appendices

Appendix 1: Memoranda and Papers from the Assembly Commission

Appendix 2: Memoranda and Papers from Others

Appendix 3: Minutes of Proceedings

Appendix 4: Minutes of Evidence

Appendix 5: Written submissions

Appendix 6: Research Papers

Appendix 7: List of Witnesses who gave evidence to the Committee

 

Powers and Membership

Powers

Under Standing Order 53 ad hoc committees shall be established from time to timeto deal with any specific time-bounded terms of reference that the Assembly may set. The Assembly shall decide the membership of any such committee and may directits method of operation.

The Ad Hoc Committee on the Assembly Members (Remuneration Board) Bill was established by resolution of theAssembly on Monday 17 February 2025 in accordance with Standing Order 53(1).

The remit of the Committee was toconsider the Assembly Members (Remuneration Board) Bill and to submita report to the Assembly by 1 April 2025.

Each ad hoc committee may exercise the power in section 44(1) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998[1] as follows:

“(1) The Assembly may require any person—

(a) to attend its proceedings for the purpose of giving evidence; or

(b) to produce documents in his custody or under his control,relating to any of the matters mentioned in subsection (2).

(2) Those matters are—

(a) transferred matters concerning Northern Ireland;

(b) other matters in relation to which statutory functions areexercisable by Ministers or the Northern Ireland departments.”

 

Membership

The Committee has 7 members, including a Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson, and a quorum of 5 members. The membership of the Committee is as follows:

• Mr Phillip Brett, MLA (Chairperson)
• Ms Cathy Mason, MLA (Deputy Chairperson)
• Ms Paula Bradley MLA
• Mr Pádraig Delargy MLA
• Mr Daniel McCrossan MLA
• Mr Gary Middleton MLA
• Mr John Stewart MLA

 
List of Abbreviations and Acronyms used in this Report

CSP - NI Assembly Committee on Standards and Privileges

Commission - NI Assembly Commission

ESR - Examiner of Statutory Rules

IFRP - Independent Financial Review Panel

IPSA - Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority

IRBS - Independent Remuneration Board of the Senedd

MLA - Member of the Legislative Assembly

MP - Member of Parliament

NISRA - Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency

SSRB - Senior Salaries Review Body

“the 2011 Act” - The Assembly Members (Independent Financial Review and Standards) Act (Northern Ireland) 2011

“the Bill” - The Assembly Members (Remuneration Board) Bill

“the Committee” - The Ad Hoc Committee on the Assembly Members (Remuneration Board) Bill

RaISe - NI Assembly Research and Information Service

 

Executive Summary

Background

1. This report details the Ad Hoc Committee on the Assembly Members (Remuneration Board) Bill’s consideration of the Assembly Members (Remuneration Board) Bill (the Bill).

2. The Assembly Members (Independent Financial Review and Standards) Act (Northern Ireland) 2011[2] (the 2011 Act) established the Independent Financial Review Panel (the IFRP) and conferred on it the power to make determinations in relation to Members’ salaries, allowances and pensions.

Principles of the Bill

3. The Bill renames the IFRP as the Remuneration Board and removes its power and responsibility for determining the allowances payable to Members. The Bill inserts provision for temporary appointments to the Board and removes the bar on former Members being members of it. The Bill requires the Board to have regard to the salaries payable to members of certain other legislatures. The Bill also makes provision in relation to the timing of determinations, their publication in draft, and consultation on draft determinations and other matters.

Committee Consideration of Key Issues

Clause 1

4. The Committee was of the view that the inclusion of the word ‘independent’ in the title of the Bill would emphasise that decisions will be made independently of the Assembly and the Assembly Commission.  Written evidence from the Independent Remuneration Board of the Senedd and oral evidence from the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority confirmed that the names of both organisations were deliberately chosen to stress the independent nature of both organisations.  The Assembly Commission supported the Committee’s proposal to make an amendment to Clause 1 to include the word ‘independent’ in the title of the Board.  The Committee therefore, agreed to bring forward an amendment to that effect.

Clause 3

5. The Committee noted evidence from the Independent Remuneration Board of the Senedd that the Board must have regard to the principle that decisions must be appropriate in the context of Welsh earnings and the wider financial circumstances of Wales.  The Committee also noted that in Scotland, determinations should reflect any increase in the index for mean annual earnings of public sectors, full-time workers in Scotland.  The Committee further noted that, annual increases in pay for MPs are linked to a measure of earnings growth in the public sector.

6. At its meeting on 18 March, the Committee agreed to make a recommendation in the report that, in making determinations on MLA salaries, the Remuneration Board should have regard to the current financial circumstances in Northern Ireland, including earnings.

 

Clause 4

7. The Assembly Commission informed the Committee that there had been an issue with Clause 4 in that provision for temporary appointments as drafted, could result in more than one former Member sitting on the Remuneration Board.  The Commission brought forward an amendment which, it informed the Committee, makes clear that only one former member could ever be a member of the Board at any one time.  The Committee was also informed that, while the Bill still includes provision for the Assembly Commission to make an order in relation to temporary appointments, that has been retained as a precaution for unforeseen circumstances.

8. The Committee agreed to support the Assembly Commission’s amendments to Clause 4.

 

Salary Increase Opt-Out

9. The Committee considered whether or not it would be possible to make provision in the Bill to enable Members to opt out of receipt of a salary increase if proposed by the Remuneration Board.  The Committee discussed the matter with the Assembly Commission at its meeting on 25 March.  The Commission advised the Committee that, under section 47 of the Northern Ireland Act, the Assembly is required to pay Members any such salaries as are determined. Therefore, there cannot be a provision in the Bill for Members to opt out. It is an excepted matter, therefore it is outside the remit of the Assembly to make such a provision in the Bill.  The Commission went on to state that it is, however, open to Members what they choose to do with the salary, or how they choose to spend any salary that they receive.

 

Introduction

10. The Assembly Members (Remuneration Board) Bill[3] was introduced to the Northern Ireland Assembly on 4 February 2025 and was referred to the Ad Hoc Committee on the Assembly Members (Remuneration Board) Bill (the Committee) for consideration in accordance with Standing Order 33(1) on completion of the Second Stage of the Bill on 17 February 2025.  The Committee was subsequently appointed by the Assembly under Standing Order 53(1).

11. The Committee had not yet been appointed in advance of the plenary debate at Second Stage and was not, therefore, represented in the debate.  In the course of the debate, representatives from the Commission outlined the history and context of issues identified which have given rise to the introduction of the Bill before covering the principles of the Bill in more detail[4].

12. The purpose of the Bill, which contains 11 clauses, is to:

• Rename the IFRP as the Remuneration Board and remove its power and responsibility for determining the allowances payable to Members;
• Insert provision for temporary appointments to the Board and remove the bar on former Members being members of it;
• Require the Board to have regard to the salaries payable to members of certain other legislatures;
• Make provision in relation to the timing of determinations, their publication in draft, and consultation on draft determinations and other matters.

13. Further information on the background and policy objectives of the Bill are included in the Bill’s accompanying Explanatory and Financial Memorandum[5]

 

Committee Approach

14. A public notice inviting written responses, through Citizen Space, to the Call for Evidence on the Bill was placed in the Belfast Telegraph, Irish News and News Letter.  In addition, the Committee invited views from a number of key stakeholders.  The Committee received 74 written submissions in response to its Call for Evidence. These are at Appendix 5.

15. During the period covered by this Report the Committee considered the Bill and related issues at 9 committee meetings.  Relevant Minutes of Proceedings are at Appendix 3.

16. The Committee sought and received approval of the Northern Ireland Assembly in Plenary Session on 25 March 2025 to extend its consideration and scrutiny of the Bill to 16 May 2025.

17. The Committee received oral evidence from the Assembly Commission and the Westminster Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority.  Minutes of Evidence of all oral evidence sessions are at Appendix 4.

18. Two research briefings from the Assembly Research and Information Service (RaISe) were also considered.  Research papers relating to these briefings are at Appendix 6.

19. The Committee received written evidence from:

• The Assembly Commission;
• The Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority;
• The Independent Remuneration Board of the Senedd;
• The Houses of the Oireachtas Service; and
• The Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body.

20. Written evidence and papers from the Assembly Commission, including its response to the issues raised in written submission are at Appendix 1.  Evidence from others is included at Appendix 2.

21. The Committee explored the issues raised in the evidence it received with the Commission both in writing and in a further oral evidence session.

22. The Committee received legal advice from the Examiner of Statutory Rules (ESR) on the Delegated Powers Memorandum[6] in relation to delegated powers at Clause 4 of the Bill.  The ESR had no issues of concern to raise in respect of the delegated powers.

23. The Committee carried out deliberations on the Clauses of the Bill at its meetings on 18 and 25 March 2025.  This was followed by formal clause-by-clause consideration of the Bill at the Committee meeting on 1 April 2025.

24. The following section of the report sets out the Committee’s consideration of the provisions of the Bill and outlines the amendments the Committee wishes to see made to the Bill.

Consideration of the Bill

Purpose of the Bill

25. Section 40(4) of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 requires the Northern Ireland Assembly Commission (the Commission) to provide the Assembly, or ensure that the Assembly is provided, with the property, staff and services required for the Assembly’s purposes.  Section 47 of the Act permits the Assembly to make provision for the delegation of its requirement to pay salaries to Members and to pay allowances to Members to a body established by an Act of the Assembly or conferred on the Commission by a resolution of the Assembly.  Section 48 permits the Assembly to provide for the payment of pensions to former Members and makes similar provision for delegation.

26. The Assembly Members (Independent Financial Review and Standards) Act (Northern Ireland) 2011 (the 2011 Act) established the Independent Financial Review Panel (the IFRP) and conferred on it the power to make determinations in relation to Members’ salaries, allowances and pensions.

The Bill renames the IFRP as the Remuneration Board and removes its power and responsibility for determining the allowances payable to Members. The Bill inserts provision for temporary appointments to the Board and removes the bar on former Members being members of it. The Bill requires the Board to have regard to the salaries payable to members of certain other legislatures. The Bill also makes provision in relation to the timing of determinations, their publication in draft, and consultation on draft determinations and other matters.

General Remarks

27. Because all MLAs have an interest in the outcomes of this legislation, this put added responsibility on all members of the Committee to act, and to be seen to be acting impartially, and to ensure that the Committee objectively scrutinised the provisions in the Bill.  The passage of the Bill and the work of the Committee in scrutinising the provisions in the Bill were recognised by members as matters of considerable public interest.

28. At the first meeting of the Committee on 18 February, the Chairperson outlined the Committee’s commitment to carrying out its role and responsibilities with impartiality and with integrity.  Members agreed that the Committee would engage with the Bill sponsor, the Assembly Commission, in the same rigorous and impartial manner a statutory committee of the Assembly would engage with an Executive department in the scrutiny of a departmental Bill.

29. The Committee recognised that it was essential that the Committee undertook robust and independent scrutiny of the provisions of the Bill to ensure an outcome that enhances and safeguards public confidence in the independence of the process for determining MLA salaries and pensions.

Clause 1: Independent Financial Review Panel renamed as Remuneration Board

30. Clause 1 renames the Independent Financial Review Panel (the Panel) as the Remuneration Board (the Board).

31. At both the Second Stage debate and in written evidence to the Committee, the Commission outlined that the name ‘Remuneration Board’ reflects the focus that the new independent body will have on salaries and pensions.

32. A RaISe research paper, considered by the Committee on Tuesday 25 February 2025 set out:

• The Independent Remuneration Board of the Senedd is responsible for making determinations about pay and allowances for Members of the Senedd in Wales;
• The Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA) is responsible for making determinations on pay and allowances for Members of Parliament (MPs) in Westminster;
• The Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body is responsible for determining salaries and allowances payable to Members of the Scottish Parliament; and
• The Department of Public Expenditure is responsible for setting the salaries of Members of the Oireachtas and office holders.

33. In its written evidence to the Committee, the Welsh Independent Remuneration Board of the Senedd (IRBS) emphasised the reference to ‘Independent’ in the Board’s title. This was amended, at the request of the Board’s then chair, from ‘National Assembly for Wales Remuneration Board’.  The evidence stated that this reflected the existing provisions in the Measure[7] which state in Section 2(1) that the ‘Board is not, in the exercise of its functions, to be subject to the direction or control of the Senedd or of the Senedd Commission.’  The IRBS submission went on to state that this independence is valued by Members of the Senedd as it clarifies that they are not responsible for, nor able to influence, their own remuneration.  This independence does however, on occasion, raise questions about the Board’s accountability to the Senedd.  The Board engages with Members, the Senedd Commission and stakeholders, consults on its proposals and publishes evidence for its proposals and decisions.

34. In oral evidence to the Committee, the IPSA Chairperson stated that the behaviour, communication and the independent nature of IPSA are considered more important, or at least as important, as the brand.  He stated that the name was chosen deliberately to convey that message that IPSA’s decisions are not being made by Parliament.

35. In the Call for Evidence, a number of responses suggested that the name of the Board is of little or no consequence.  One respondent indicated that retaining the word ‘Independent’ in the name would help clarify its status.

36. At its meeting on 18 March 2025, the Committee noted that the reason why the Independent Remuneration Board of the Senedd and the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority titles included the word ‘Independent’ was to clearly convey the message that their respective legislatures have no control or influence over decisions on determinations.  The Committee agreed to discuss with the Commission the option of bringing forward an amendment to Clause 1 to include the word ‘Independent’ in the title of the Remuneration Board, in order to convey the clear message that its decisions will be made independently of the Assembly and the Assembly Commission.

37. During oral evidence at the Committee meeting on 25 March 2025, the Commission acknowledged the Committee’s intention to seek an amendment that would insert the word ‘independent’ into the title of the Board.  The Commission stated that it has been carefully guarding the independence of the Board and has particularly focused on the detail of how that independence can be embodied in the Bill.  The Commission stated that it was for this reason that Commission members did not support the suggestion from the Committee on Standards and Privileges that temporary appointments could be voted on by Members on the Floor of the Assembly.  The Commission witness went on to state that the Commission is:

“…reluctant to include too many provisions in the Bill in relation to the Board's operation, lest it take away from allowing the board to make its own decisions and to function independently.”

38. When asked for its views on bringing forward an appropriate amendment, the Commission informed the Committee that it agrees that having the word ‘independent’ in the title would emphasise the point, and the Assembly Commission is willing to accept the Committee's view on such an amendment.  The Commission was, therefore, content for the Committee to bring forward an amendment to Clause 1 to include the word ‘independent’ in the title of the Remuneration Board.

39. During its deliberations at the same meeting, the Committee acknowledged that the Commission is content for the Committee to bring forward an amendment to Clause 1 to include the word ‘independent’ in the title of the Remuneration Board and subsequently agreed to bring forward an amendment to Clause 1 to that effect.

 

Clause 2: Removal of function of determining allowances

40. Clause 2amends the 2011 Act to remove from the Panel responsibility for making determinations about allowances payable to Members and former Members.  The Board will continue to be responsible for salaries and pensions.  In consequence, the clause changes the Board’s objectives to remove reference to the provision of adequate resources to Members for the exercise of their functions.

41. Commission members informed the Assembly during the debate at Second Stage that, since the Assembly voted by resolution in June 2020 to give the Assembly the function of determining the allowances for staffing and office cost expenditure that Members reclaim, the Assembly Commission has published two determinations enabling it to address a range of issues that, in its view, are either insufficiently addressed or not at all addressed by the determinations that the IFRP made.

42. In written evidence, which was considered by the Committee at its meeting on 20 February, the Commission stated that the provision under Clause 2 ensures that the Board does not have the power to determine the staffing and office cost expenditure that can be reclaimed by Members and the allowances payable to former Members who have resigned or have lost their seat.

43. In oral evidence on 20 February 2025, representatives from the Assembly Commission reminded the Committee that on 30 June 2020, the Assembly passed a resolution to give the Assembly Commission the power to make determinations on Members’ allowances.  At that time, the Assembly agreed that decisions on salaries and pensions should be made by an independent body.  It was outlined to the Committee that “this has been the settled, practical position in law, of the Assembly for some five years”, although technically, the IFRP retained the power to make determinations on allowances for Members’ offices under the 2011 Act.  Advice to the Commission is that the legal position needs to be regularised by reflecting the Assembly’s decision in law so that there are not two bodies operating simultaneously, with the power to make determinations in respect of Members’ allowances.

44. During questioning, Commission representatives highlighted a number of issues in relation to the 2016 Determination in respect of Members’ allowances which were addressed through the 2020 determination.  These included:

• Members not being permitted to advertise their phone number or email address on office signage;
• Restrictions on maternity leave which has inhibited party support staff from taking their full allowance;
• Restrictions on allowances that led to heating and energy costs exceeding allowances, resulting in Members/parties having to fund costs themselves;
• Restrictions on running costs for constituency offices; and
• Restrictions on provision for disability access to constituency offices.

45. Commission representatives went on to inform the Committee that the Bill also establishes the Remuneration Board to maintain an independent body to determine Members’ salaries and pensions.  It was emphasised that the legislation was not in relation setting Members’ salaries.  It was stated that:

“the core principle of the Bill for the Assembly Commission is that the salaries and pensions of Members should be decided completely independently.  At no time has the Assembly Commission discussed or sought to agree what the salary of a Member should be, nor will it.  We are whole-heartedly agreed that an independent body alone should decide what that is, and that is what the Bill provides for.”

46. The Remuneration Board will consist of a chairperson and two other members.  This is established in the 2011 Act.  Commission representatives were asked why three was considered the most appropriate number.  The Commission is of the view that a Board of three is more manageable than a larger number and gives both independence and a sufficiently broad spectrum of members with professional experience.  There is also the requirement to provide value for money in public spending by not having a Board that costs more than is considered necessary.

47. In its consideration of Clause 2, the Committee referred to the RaISe research considered by the Committee on Tuesday 25 February 2025 in regard to the functions of IPSA, the IRBS, the Scottish Parliamentary Corporate Body and the Department of Public Expenditure in relation to their responsibilities in respect of determinations on allowances payable to members of those legislatures.

48. In its written evidence to the Committee the IRBS stated that it has functions for setting Members’ remuneration, pensions and all other allowances. The Senedd Commission is responsible for administering the Board’s determinations.

49. A significant majority of respondents to the Call for Evidence (81%) agree or strongly agree that it is appropriate for the determination of Assembly Members' salaries and pensions to be made by an independent panel/board rather than by the Assembly Commission.

50. On the question of whether it is appropriate for the determination of adequate resources required by Members for the exercise of their functions to be made by the Assembly Commission rather than by an independent panel/board, opinions are more divided with just almost 53% disagreeing that this provision is appropriate and 29 responses (39%) either agreeing or strongly agreeing with the provision.  A number of respondents who disagreed with the provision questioned the independence of such an approach and called for determinations to be made independently of the Assembly and the Assembly Commission.

51. The Committee sought further clarity on why the Commission considers it necessary to remove responsibility from an independent board for making determinations in relation to Members’ expenses.  The Commission responded that it was the Assembly's will that the expenses should be taken back and that has been determined.  For this reason, the Bill is specifically about salaries only, and is not looking at the wider aspect of business.

52. The Commission also emphasised the point, as highlighted during the debate at Second Stage, that there were some matters on which the Commission could not wait any longer, either for a panel to be reconstituted or for a new panel to be set up.

53. The Commission agreed that differing views exist in regard to how determinations should be made on Members' allowances and that there is a lack of awareness among the public about what office costs are.  The Commission acknowledged that the service provided to the public was diminished as a result of the 2016 determination.

54. It was stated that there is a cost whenever a panel meets which would have the potential to increase if the Remuneration Board was required to consider the finer detail of Members’ expenses.  The Commission’s view was that significant changes have already been made to the 2016 Determination on Members’ expenses and that retaining provision under the 2011 Act for the Remuneration Board to make determinations on Members’ expenses could result in the Board being bogged down with work, which would result in considerable costs to the public purse.

55. Having considered the evidence, the Committee had no further issues to raise in relation to Clause 2.

 

Clause 3: Consideration of salaries in other legislatures

56. Clause 3 amends the 2011 Act by introducing a new provision requiring the Board to have regard to the salaries payable to members of certain other legislatures. These legislatures are: The House of Commons, The Scottish Parliament, Senedd Cymru (the Welsh Parliament), Dáil Éireann (the House of Representatives of Ireland) and Seanad Éireann (Senate of Ireland).

57. At Second Stage, and in written evidence to the Committee, the Commission stated that it is not unusual in public and private sector organisations for benchmarking exercises to be used as part of an evaluation process to ensure that relevant, comparable roles are taken into consideration when examining appropriate levels of remuneration.  It was further stated that:

• Benchmarking comparisons will be made with other legislatures on these islands, the members of which conduct similar roles to Members here;
• The requirement for the Remuneration Board to give due regard to the position in other legislatures simply provides that benchmarking take place without limiting the Remuneration Board in any way from considering other factors that it considers to be relevant;
• It is expected that having regard to the salaries paid to members of other legislatures will be one of a number of elements that the new Remuneration Board will consider; and
• Ultimately, as the Remuneration Board will be independent, it will be for it to decide the range of factors that it wishes to consider, the weight that it gives to benchmarking against other places and the view that it takes on appropriate salary levels.

58. In its written evidence the Commission outlined that, as there is only one legislature in Northern Ireland, it is logical for the Remuneration Board to begin with a benchmarking comparison alongside the other legislatures in these islands where legislators carry out comparable roles.

59. Written evidence from the Commission also outlined that The Remuneration Board will also need to be mindful of its duty under Section 2(2) of the 2011 Act to exercise its functions with a view to achieving the objectives of:

a. Ensuring probity, accountability and value for money with respect to the expenditure of public funds;

b. Securing for Members of the Assembly a level of remuneration which:

i. Fairly reflects the complexity and importance of their functions as members of the Assembly; and

ii. Does not, on financial grounds, deter people with the necessary commitment and ability from seeking election to the Assembly.

60. During oral evidence to the Committee, Commission representatives expressed the view that it is reasonable to assume that anyone looking at any form of employment would benchmark against something comparable rather than to have regard to any unrelated form of employment.

61. It was emphasised that the term "have regard to", does not indicate that this provision must be adhered to but merely suggests that the Remuneration Board compares determinations and considers the salaries in those other legislatures in relation to their function.  It was suggested that it would leave the Commission open to criticism if it were to propose that the Remuneration Board should have regard to an unrelated form of employment.

62. It was also highlighted that in its previous determination, the former IFRP had regard to another place, compared MLA salaries with those salaries and suggested that MLA salaries should be 65% of that figure.  It was stressed that as the previous panel had already had regard to another place and that it is reasonable for the Commission to assume that the Remuneration Board should also have regard to other legislatures.  It was, however, highlighted that the Commission would have no say in whatever conclusion the Remuneration Board comes to.  The Committee was further informed that, while the Bill requires that the Board give regard to those salaries, it does not prevent it from taking into consideration any other circumstances or factors that it feels are relevant to making the decision on salaries.

63. RaISe Research considered by the Committee on Tuesday 25 February 2025 outlined that:

• The Remuneration Board in Wales must have regard to the principles that:
  • financial support and remuneration for Members should support the strategic purpose of the Senedd and facilitate the work of its Members;
  • decisions must be appropriate within the context of Welsh earnings and the wider financial circumstances of Wales;
  • the system of financial support for Members must be robust, clear, transparent, sustainable, inclusive, and represent value for money for the taxpayer.
  • IPSA’s pay decisions should follow the guiding principle that the outcome should be fair to both MPs and taxpayers, having regard to the experience of constituents and MPs’ overall remuneration.
  • The Scottish determinations should reflect any increase in the index for mean annual earnings of public-sector full-time workers in Scotland as provided for by the Office of National Statics’ Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings.

64. In written evidence to the Committee the IRBS noted that it does not have a similar duty to have regard to the salaries payable to members of other legislatures but emphasised that, in the course of reviewing Members’ remuneration, the IRBS considers a wide range of evidence including the salaries of other UK legislatures, other elected representatives and roles, and considers the context of Welsh earnings and the wider financial circumstances of Wales.  As a result, annual indexation of Members’ salaries is linked to changes in the average salaries in Wales.

65. In its oral evidence, IPSA conceded that there is no single, simple approach to determining the level of pay that has stood the test of time. The IPSA Chair stated that the principles and process by which the decisions are made is key. He considered these to be important components of IPSA’s work.  It is considered essential that IPSA demonstrate fairness to both Members and taxpayers whilst also ensuring that people from all backgrounds, including those without independent wealth, are able to become parliamentarians.  He stressed the need to demonstrate transparency; explicability; and the independence of IPSA as the decision-making body. 

66. The IPSA Chair went on to outline that, in his view, the arrangements need flexibility.  He stated that, in the past, IPSA has linked annual increases in pay to a measure of earnings growth in the public sector.  He informed the Committee that, although this had worked for a period, for many reasons, that approach no longer works.  He stated that IPSA has taken a more tailored approach in recent years as it is considered important to have the capability to respond to the economy and circumstances faced by constituents.

67. IPSA benchmarks informally against similar roles in G7 economies. In the last year, IPSA published where Westminster MPs’ pay sits relative to economies such as Germany, Canada, France, New Zealand and other developed economies.  The IPSA Chairperson conceded that the roles are not entirely the same but it is a useful guide and is not the sole reference point for making determinations.  He informed the Committee that IPSA compares more widely across senior public sector roles.  It also closely watches what the Senior Salaries Review Body (SSRB) in the UK is recommending and what its analysis is including the level of pay for senior civil servants and the wider remuneration for MPs including the comparability of the pension arrangements.

68. In the Call for Evidence, 69% of responses either disagreed or strongly disagreed that the Board should have regard to the salaries paid to members of other legislatures.  Just over 62% of respondents also disagreed that the legislatures listed were the appropriate legislatures with which to make comparisons.  Many comments cited differences in the powers of these legislatures as a reason why it was not considered appropriate.  The provision was supported by 19 respondents (25%).  A number of responses expressed the view that the devolved powers of the Northern Ireland Assembly are not as wide-ranging as other legislatures.  Research from RaISe, which was considered by the Committee at its meeting on 18 March 2025, demonstrates that, whilst there are a number of differences between the powers of devolved legislatures, there are clear similarities in the breadth and depth of devolved powers across the three legislatures.

69. Some suggestions included in the Call for Evidence included:

• Having regard to the financial state of the electorate;
• Including a comparison to public sector pay;
• Removing reference to the Oireachtas and/or Westminster as some respondents did not consider these relevant comparators.

70. At its meeting on 18 March, the Committee agreed that, in making determinations on MLA salaries, the Remuneration Board should have regard to the current financial circumstances in Northern Ireland, including earnings.  The Committee further agreed to make a recommendation to that effect in its report.

 

Clause 4: Temporary Appointments

71. Clause 4 inserts a new provision in the 2011 Act, to permit the appointment of a temporary Chair of the Board, and temporary members of the Board, pending the appointment of replacements.

72. The Commission outlined for the Assembly that temporary appointments lapse after 12 months but may be renewed, ensuring continuity in the functioning of the Board.  Other provisions of the Bill provide for the Board to approach the dates of publication of determinations in a structured way. The House was further informed that the absence of full membership of the Board would be undesirable.

73. The Commission informed the Committee in written evidence that Clause 4 will also provide the Assembly Commission with an order making power to allow it to make further provision about temporary appointments.  Any order would have to be approved in draft by the Assembly before it could take effect.  At its meeting on 4 March 2025, the Committee received legal advice from the Examiner of Statutory Rules (ESR) on the delegated powers memorandum.  The ESR had no issues of concern to raise in respect of the delegated powers.

74. During oral evidence, Commission representatives informed the Committee that it was considered reasonable to allow for temporary appointments to be made.  Since the 2011 Act was made, the Commission had become aware of problems that have arisen in other areas because there was no provision for temporary appointments.  It was stated that the Commission’s intention is to make the 2011 Act more robust in that area.  It was further stated that the process for temporary appointments would follow the same procedures as for permanent appointments.

75. In consideration of the delegated powers under Clause 4 in respect of temporary membership of the Remuneration Board, the Commission was questioned on the procedure for bringing delegated legislation to the Assembly in the event that the need arises.  Standing Order 43(1) requires that every statutory rule or draft statutory rule which is laid before the Assembly and which is subject to Assembly proceedings, shall stand referred to the appropriate committee for scrutiny.  The Committee was informed by the Commission that it had not yet confirmed which Assembly committee would scrutinise a statutory rule which is brought to the Assembly under Clause 4.  The Chairperson asked the Commission to give some thought to which Assembly committee would scrutinise such a statutory rule, should the need arise.  In its response, which was considered by the Committee at its meeting on 11 March 2025, the Commission stated that it proposes that the Audit Committee would undertake this function, as the Audit Committee has an existing role regarding the Assembly Commission’s responsibilities, specifically to undertake the scrutiny of the Assembly Commission’s budget.

76. The Commission highlighted a potential problem with the legislation as drafted in that under current provisions in the Bill, a temporary appointment may be made without regard to the provision of not being allowed to have more than one MLA on the Remuneration Board.  The Commission informed the Committee that it was minded to bring an amendment to this provision, however, the wording of the amendment had not yet been drafted.

77. RaISe Research considered by the Committee on Tuesday 25 February 2025 did not outline provision for temporary appointments to the independent bodies in Westminster or Wales, however:

• The Independent Remuneration Board of the Senedd consists of the Chair and four other members and the validity of the Board is not affected by a vacancy or a defect in the appointment of a member;
• IPSA consists of a Chair and four other members.

78. In its written evidence, the IRBS stated that in Wales a provision for temporary appointments is not set out in the Measure. The Board has had temporary chairpersons in the past due to the resignation of a Chair.  Temporary chairpersons have been chosen from within its existing membership.  The response did, however, go on to state that flexibility for temporary appointments would be beneficial as, due to resignations the Board had at one time been down to the minimum number of three members to achieve a quorum.  This was during a particularly busy period in the Board’s term while the public appointments process was underway.

79. At its meeting on 4 March 2025, the Committee considered correspondence from the Committee on Standards and Privileges (CSP).  CSP noted that Clause 4 includes a delegated power in relation to the appointment of temporary members to the Remuneration Board by way of draft affirmative resolution Standing Order.  CSP pointed out that, under the Assembly Members (IFRS) Act (NI) 2011, the same Act that the Bill proposes to amend, a temporary Commissioner for Standards may be appointed through a much simpler process via a motion on the Floor of the Assembly. 

80. The Committee sought the views of the Assembly Commission on the differences between the two offices regarding the processes for making temporary appointments.  In response the Commission informed the Committee in writing that it does not believe that this would be an appropriate model in relation to the Assembly Members (Remuneration Bill) as the core purpose of the Bill is to ensure that salaries and pensions are determined independently from Members of the Assembly.  The response went on to state that, as pointed out when the Commission gave oral evidence to the Committee:

“the Assembly Commission itself are standing aside from the recruitment process for the Remuneration Board in recognition of its independence and that the Clerk/ Chief Executive would oversee it. It would therefore run completely contrary to that independence, and the procedure for regular appointments to the Remuneration Board, if the name of a temporary member of the Remuneration Board had to go to the Floor to be voted upon by all Members in order for that person to serve with the agreement of Members.”

81. In the Call for Evidence, this provision was supported by just over 52% of respondents with just over 35% disagreeing or strongly disagreeing.  In consideration of the comments, there was no clear consensus on the reasons why this provision is either supported or opposed.

82. At its meeting on 25 March, during oral evidence, the Committee considered amendments to Clause 4 brought by the Assembly Commission.  The Commission informed the Committee that the amendments make clear that only one former member could ever be a member of the Board at any one time.  The Committee was also informed that, while the Bill still includes provision for the Assembly Commission to make an order in relation to temporary appointments, that has been retained as a precaution for unforeseen circumstances. However, the necessary detail relating to temporary appointments is now mostly in the Bill.  The Commission also reiterated its position that the Audit Committee would be responsible for taking forward scrutiny of any subordinate legislation arising from the provisions at Clause 4 as it already has a formal role in relation to the Assembly Commission.

83. The Committee agreed to support the Assembly Commission’s amendments to Clause 4.

Clause 5: Membership

84. Clause 5 amends the 2011 Act to remove former membership of the Assembly as a ground for disqualification from membership of the Board.

85. During the Second Stage debate and in written evidence to the Committee, the Commission emphasised that there will be an open recruitment process for the Board, independently overseen by the Clerk/Chief Executive of the Assembly, who will form a panel of internal and external people of appropriate experience. The recruitment panel will not involve members of the Assembly Commission or Members or former Members of the Assembly.

86. It was further stated that the Assembly Commission considers that allowing for the insight of a former Assembly Member's first-hand experience could add value to the Remuneration Board's work while retaining a balance of perspective on the Board by allowing only one former Member to serve on the Board at a time.  The Commission also stated in written evidence that the provision does not require a former Member to sit on the Board, but had confirmed in the debate at Second Stage that having a former Member on the Board would follow the procedures in place for the Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority (IPSA) which is legally required to appoint a former MP to its Board.

87. During the wind on the debate at Second Stage the Commission emphasised that the pension of a former Member who has left the Assembly at a given time will not be subject retrospectively to decisions on pension arrangements.  It was also highlighted that any pension determination is likely to be largely based on the advice of pension experts, such as actuaries, rather than on the view of a single member of the Board.

88. In written evidence to the Committee, whilst emphasising that the provision is not out of step with other legislatures, the Commission outlined that there was a perception that there were a number of decisions made by IFRP which did not reflect the realities of the role of an MLA on the ground.  The Assembly Commission considers that allowing for the insight of a former MLA’s first-hand experience could add value to the Remuneration Board’s work, while retaining a balance of other perspectives on the Board by only allowing one former Member to serve on the Board at a time. 

89. In its oral evidence to the Committee, the Commission highlighted the requirement for the Westminster Independent Parliamentary Standards Authority to have a former MP on its panel, but stressed that, whilst removing the disqualification of a former MLA from sitting on the Remuneration Board, there would not be a requirement for a former Member to sit on the Board.  The Committee was informed that IPSA was considered a best-practice model and that, whilst the provision in Clause 5 permits a former MLA to sit on the Remuneration Board, it does not go as far as the IPSA model which has a requirement to have a former MP on the panel.

90. The view of the Commission is that a former MLA will have insights into the MLA role which others may not have, although a former MLA, if appointed to the Remuneration Board would only be one of three Board members.  The Commission stressed that it will have no role in drafting the criteria for an open appointment process.  It will be for the Clerk/Chief Executive of the Assembly and other professionals appointed by the Clerk/Chief Executive to determine the appointments process.  It would be the responsibility of the Clerk/Chief Executive to establish a panel of suitably qualified individuals and to agree the appropriate selection criteria with that panel.  It was stressed that this procedure is in line with how any recruitment competition is progressed, where a suitably qualified selection panel establishes the criteria for the appointment.  It was further stressed that Commission members want no part in the process and wish to avoid any perception that there is any Commission interference in the selection process.

91. In response to a question in relation to the possibility that a former MLA sitting on the Remuneration Board may have influence over their own pension entitlement, the Commission reiterated that, where a Remuneration Board determination resulted in changes to pensions, these would not be applied retrospectively.  From oral evidence received from IPSA, that organisation does seem to have responsibility for making decisions which impact on the pensions of former pensions.  IPSA Chairperson stated:

“if there is any decision in front of our board where there might be a perception of a conflict of interest, by having any one member of the board but, obviously, in particular to your question, the former MP, then they will recuse themselves and, as Chair, I make sure that that happens. That has been particularly important and publicly minuted in relation to our decisions on the parliamentary pension fund.”

92. RaISe Research considered by the Committee on Tuesday 25 February 2025 outlined that in Wales, there is a number of reasons why a person would be disqualified from membership of the Board.  These include: a current Member of the Senedd, a candidate for election as a Member of the Senedd; a person whose name could, if the seat of a Member of the Senedd became vacant, be required to be notified to the Presiding Officer to fill a vacant seat.  The list does not, however, include former Membership of the Senedd as a reason for disqualification from the Board.

93. The same research outlined that the membership of IPSA requires its membership to consist of:

• At least one member who has held (but no longer holds) high judicial office;
• At least one member who is eligible for appointment as a statutory auditor; and
• One (only) member who has been (but no longer is) an MP

94. The research further outlined that, in Wales, a member of the Board may hold office for a fixed term of five years and no person may be appointed to the Board on more than two occasions.  IPSA members are also appointed for a fixed term of up to five year and can be reappointed for a further term of up to three years.

95. In oral evidence, IPSA outlined that an MP cannot join the Board if they have served more recently than five years ago.  This was subsequently clarified in correspondence which stated that, this is not the case in relation to the statutory requirement to have a former MP on the Authority but that any additional members who are former MPs must not have been an MP within the five years prior to appointment.

96. It was stated that having a former MP on the Board has been helpful in two respects: firstly, there has been commentary that IPSA is not sufficiently informed about the day-to-day role of an MP and it has been helpful to have a former Member to bring their experience to the table.  In addition, it is considered helpful to have a former MP to help IPSA consider the public reputation consequences of the decisions that it makes.  It was stressed that appointments to IPSA are made through a fair and open appointments process.

97. In its written evidence, the IRBS stated that, in the past, candidates with political experience have been sought when recruiting new members to the Board.  This has been valuable in providing particular experience and perspective to the Board’s discussions and in developing relationships between the Board and Members.

98. Clause 5 has generated the greatest negative response to date in the Call for Evidence with more than 82% of respondents either disagreeing or strongly disagreeing with the provision.  Perceived conflict of interest was the most common reason put forward in comments for opposition to this Clause.  In a number of comments, it was highlighted that decisions on pensions would be a clear conflict of interest for a former MLA.  As stated previously, the Commission has outlined that, where a Remuneration Board determination resulted in changes to pensions, these would not be applied retrospectively.

99. At the Committee meeting on 25 March the Committee raised the concern that a former Member could, potentially, sit on the Remuneration Board and subsequently stand for election having been part of the Board that determined the salary of MLAs.  The Commission was asked for its views on whether a former MLA could be disbarred from standing again having sat on the Remuneration Board. 

100. Commission informed the Committee that the issue of who can stand in Assembly elections is an excepted matter and the Assembly has no control over who may or may not stand for election.

101. Having considered the evidence, the Committee had no further issues to raise in relation to Clause 5.

 

Clause 6: Determinations

102. Clause 6 deals with the manner in which the Board makes determinations in respect of salaries and pensions. Subsection (2) requires determinations to be made at least 6 months before the date of the poll for the Assembly elections. Subsection (3) requires determinations to be published in draft and made the subject of consultation. Subsection (4) requires consultation before the Board issues determinations more than once in respect of an Assembly, or otherwise than in accordance with the timing rules set out in subsection (2).

103. The Commission informed the Assembly during the Second Stage debate and in its written evidence to the Committee, that the purpose of including the provision for determinations to be made at least six months before the date of an Assembly election is so that those considering standing for election have notice of the remuneration that they would receive if elected.  It was also outlined that Clause 6 allows the Assembly to achieve a balance between making determinations in response to necessary circumstances and ensuring value for money on the basis that members of the Remuneration Board will be paid for the number of days that the work requires.

104. In its written evidence to the Committee, the Commission highlighted that the provisions at Clause 6 provide for publication of determinations in draft and for consultation to take place on these drafts before a determination is made.

105. In its oral evidence, the Commission was questioned on the requirement in Clause 6(2) for the determination to be made at least six months before the date of an Assembly election.  The Commission responded that the determination could be made earlier than six months before the election and outlined that the six-month deadline is to enable potential candidates to be informed before making the decision to run for election.  This is so that potential candidates would know what to expect before they put their names forward for election. 

106. When questioned on the provision in Clause 6 for the Board to consult whomever it considers appropriate, the Commission responded that this provision is necessary in order to uphold the independence of the Board.  The Commission considers it important that the Board has that autonomy rather than it being for Members to specify how it carries out its work.

107. RaISe Research, considered by the Committee on Tuesday 25 February 2025 outlined that in Wales, the Board may not make more than one determination per Senedd session, unless it believes there are exceptional circumstances to allow it to do so.  To ensure that the remuneration package is sufficient, the Board undertakes an annual review and regularly considers if any changes to the determination are required in advance of the next financial year.

108. In Wales, the Board is generally required to consult those who may be affected by its decisions before it exercises any of its functions.  The consultees are:

• Members of the Senedd;
• Staff employed by Members of the Senedd (or by groups of Members);
• Relevant trade unions; and
• Such other persons as it considers appropriate.

109. In its written evidence to the Committee the IRBS stated that there is a requirement that determinations are made so far as is reasonably practicable before the end of the term of the Senedd which precedes that in relation to which they are to have effect.  In practice, the Board has previously published its Determination in the Summer before the start of the new term the following May.  The response stated that this has provided clarity to candidates about their salaries, pensions and any support they may be entitled to in advance of standing or being elected and has assisted the Senedd Commission to plan its budget assumptions for the first year of the new term, as its budget is set in the early autumn in advance of the next financial year.

110. Although consultation on determinations is not required in Wales, the written evidence highlighted that the Board consults with Members, staff, unions, the Senedd Commission and the public on all proposed changes to the Determination.  Periodic informal ‘drop-ins’ are also held with Members to hear their views and the Board meets with a Members’ Representative Group and a Support Staff Representative Group which includes trade union representatives.  The Chair also meets regularly with the Chief Executive and Clerk to the Senedd Commission to discuss areas of shared interest.

111. RaISe research outlined that, in Westminster, in reviewing a determination and before making its first determination, IPSA must consult:

• The Review Body on Senior Salaries,
• Persons appearing to IPSA to represent persons likely to be affected by the determination or the review,
• The Minister for the Civil Service,
• The Treasury, and
• Any other person IPSA considers appropriate.

112. In its oral evidence, the IPSA Chair informed the Committee that it has been important to ensure that IPSA has the means to consult on and communicate its determinations, as well as the obligation to do so.  He stated that it is incumbent on bodies such as IPSA to explain and communicate to the public, in very clear terms, why it is necessary to support the parliamentary work of Members and how decisions are made on their pay.  IPSA representatives informed the Committee that, as well as statutory consultees, IPSA speaks routinely to all the political parties and to stakeholders more broadly. This may include round table meetings with experts, both international and national, and consultation with colleagues at the Northern Ireland Assembly and in Scotland and Wales along with a range of informal ways in which views are established.  IPSA also actively seeks the views of stakeholders and wider society.  Representatives stated that IPSA makes an effort in consultations to get out and talk to people and discuss the issues with them.

113. In the Call for Evidence, a significant majority of respondents supported the provision for determinations to be made at least 6 months before the date of the poll for the Assembly elections.  Almost 88% of respondents agree that provision should be made to require determinations to be published in draft and made the subject of consultation.  There was also strong support for the provision that consultation should be undertaken before the Board issues determinations more than once.  A suggestion was made in comments that provision should be made to include a requirement for meetings of the Remuneration Board to have published minutes of all meetings and any evidence received.

114. During oral evidence at the Committee meeting on 25 March, the Commission was questioned on whether it would be appropriate for the minutes of Remuneration Board meetings to be published and communicated to the general public. The Commission responded that the IFRP published the minutes of its meeting and that the Commission would be broadly content for this practice to continue.

115. Having considered the evidence, the Committee had no further issues to raise in relation to Clause 6.

Clause 7: Minor and consequential amendments

116. Clause 7 makes further minor changes to the 2011 Act and other legislation. Paragraph (1) corrects an out-of-date gendered pronoun and, in accordance with good legislative practice, replaces it with a non-gendered one. Paragraph (2) updates the 2011 Act consequent upon changes made by other legislation.  Previously section 12(3) of the 2011 Act prevented an MLA being paid a salary as a member of either House of Parliament.  Double-jobbing as an MLA and an MP is now prohibited under section 3 of the Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2014.  It is therefore unnecessary to prohibit payment of a salary as MLA and MP, so paragraph (2) removes this salary prohibition.  It remains possible that an MLA could be paid a salary as a member of the House of Lords, so this aspect of the prohibition remains.  This is a minor amendment to reflect this existing change to the law.  Paragraph (3) makes the necessary changes to legislation consequent upon the name of the Panel becoming the Board.

117. In the course of the debate at Second Stage, and in written evidence to the Committee, the Commission outlined that Clause 7 makes minor and consequential amendments, including amendments throughout the 2011 Act to reflect the change of the name from ‘Panel’ to ‘Board’.

118. At its meeting on 18 March 2025, the Committee noted that, should it bring forward an amendment to Clause 1, this would require consequential amendments to Clause 7. 

119. At its meeting on 25 March, the Committee agreed to support two minor amendments to Clause 7 which are consequential to the Committee amendment to Clause 1, to add ‘Independent’ to the title of the Remuneration Board.

 

Clause 8: Continuity of the law

120. Clause 8 makes provision for continuity of the law, so that the existing determinations continue to have effect until expired, revoked or superseded.  The clause also ensures that the references to the Panel by its present name will continue to have effect.

121. At its meeting on 18 March 2025 the Committee noted that, should it bring forward an amendment to Clause 1, this would require a consequential amendment to Clause 11.

122. At its meeting on 25 March 2025 the Committee agreed to support a minor amendment to Clause 8, which is consequential to the Committee amendment to Clause 1, to add ‘Independent’ to the title of the Remuneration Board.

 

Clause 9: Interpretation

123. Clause 9 provides the Bill’s interpretation clause.

124. The Committee supports Clause 9 as drafted.

 

Clause 10: Commencement

125. Clause 10 provides for the Bill to come into force on the day of Royal Assent.

126. The Committee supports Clause 10 as drafted.

 

Clause 11: Short Title

127. Clause 11 provides the short title of the Bill.

128. At its meeting on 18 March 2025 Committee noted that, should it bring forward an amendment to Clause 1, this would require a consequential amendment to Clause 11.

129. At its meeting on 18 March the Committee agreed a minor amendment to Clause 11, which is consequential to the Committee amendment to Clause 1, to add ‘Independent’ to the title of the Remuneration Board.

 

Committee Recommendation

130. At its meeting on 18 March, the Committee agreed that, in making determinations on MLA salaries, the Remuneration Board should have regard to the current financial circumstances in Northern Ireland, including earnings.

131. The Committee, therefore recommends that, when making determinations on Members’ salaries and pensions, the Remuneration Board must have regard to the wider financial circumstances of Northern Ireland including earnings as measured by the Northern Ireland Statistics and Research Agency (NISRA) Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings.

 

Clause-by-Clause Consideration of the Bill

132. Having considered the written and oral evidence received on the Bill, the Committee undertook its formal clause-by-clause consideration at its meeting on 1 April 2025.  The related Minutes of Proceedings of the Committee’s clause-by-clause consideration are at Appendix 3 and the Minutes of Evidence of the proceedings are at Appendix 4.

133. The Committee agreed to an amendment to Clause 1 to include the word ‘Independent’ in the title of the Remuneration Board.  In agreeing this amendment, the Committee recognised that this would result in consequential amendments to Clause 7, Clause 8 and Clause 11.

134. The Committee supported an Assembly Commission amendment to Clause 4 to make further provisions for temporary appointments to the Remuneration Board.

135. The Committee supported all other Clauses in the Bill, however, in supporting Clause 3, the Committee recommended that the Remuneration Board must have regard to the wider financial circumstances of Northern Ireland including earnings.

 

Clause 1: Independent Financial Review Panel renamed as Remuneration Board

136. Agreed: the Committee is content with Clause 1 subject to the Committee’s proposed amendment to add ‘Independent’ to the title of the Remuneration Board so it becomes the ‘Independent Remuneration Board’ as follows:

Clause 1, Page 1, Line 3

After the second ‘the’ insert ‘Independent’.

Clause 2: Removal of function of determining allowances

137.  Agreed: the Committee is content with Clause 2 as drafted.

Clause 3: Consideration of salaries in other legislatures

138. Agreed: the Committee is content with Clause 3 as drafted.

 

Clause 4: Temporary Appointments

139. Agreed: the Committee is content with Clause 4 subject to the Northern Ireland Assembly Commission’s proposed amendments to ensure that the full suite of disqualification and termination provisions in Part 1 of the 2011 Act are also applied to temporary appointments, and to make clear that only one former member could ever be a member of the Board at any one time as follows:

Clause 4, Page 2, leave out lines 39 to 41 and insert—

‘(9) Subject to the preceding provisions of this section, a temporary appointment is to be treated for all purposes (including, for example, for the purposes of section 5) as if it were an appointment under section 4(1).’

Clause 4, Page 2, Line 41, at end insert—

‘(10) But an order under subsection (7) may disapply or modify a provision of this Act (other than section 4(4)) in its application to a temporary appointment.’

Clause 5: Membership

140. Agreed: the Committee is content with Clause 5 as drafted.

 

Clause 6: Determinations

141. Agreed: the Committee is content with Clause 6 as drafted.

Clause 7: Minor and consequential amendments

142. Agreed: the Committee is content with Clause 7 subject to the Committee’s proposed consequential amendments as a result of the Committee’s agreement to Clause 1 as follows:

Clause 7, Page 3, Line 34

Before ‘Remuneration’ insert 'Independent'

Clause 7, Page 3, Line 39

After ‘The’ insert ‘Independent’.

Clause 8: Continuity of the law

143. Agreed: the Committee is content with Clause 8 subject to the Committee’s proposed consequential amendment as a result of the Committee’s agreement to Clause 1 as follows:

Clause 8, Page 4, Line 21

After the second ‘the’ insert ‘Independent’.

Clause 9: Interpretation

144. Agreed: the Committee is content with Clause 9 as drafted.

 

Clause 10: Commencement

145. Agreed: the Committee is content with Clause 10 as drafted.

 

Clause 11: Short Title

146. Agreed: the Committee is content with Clause 11 subject to the Committee’s proposed consequential amendment as a result of the Committee’s agreement to Clause 1 as follows:

Clause 11, Page 4, Line 33

Before ‘Remuneration’ insert ‘Independent'.

Long Title

147. Agreed: the Committee is content with the Long Title of the Bill as drafted.

 

Links to Appendices

Appendix 1: Memoranda and Papers from the Assembly Commission

View Memoranda and Papers supplied to the Committee by the Assembly Commission

Appendix 2: Memoranda and Papers from Others

View Memoranda and Papers supplied to the Committee by other individuals or organisations

Appendix 3: Minutes of Proceedings

View Minutes of Proceedings of Committee meetings related to the report

Appendix 4: Minutes of Evidence

View Minutes of Evidence from evidence sessions related to the report

Appendix 5: Written submissions

View written submissions received in relation to the Call for Evidence

Appendix 6: Research Papers

View Research Papers produced by the Assembly Research and Information Service (RaISe) in relation to the report

Appendix 7: List of Witnesses who gave evidence to the Committee

View a list of witnesses who gave evidence to the Committee