Committee on the Preparation for Government

Minutes of Evidence Wednesday 9 August 2006

Members in attendance for all or part of proceedings:
The Chairmen, Mr Francie Molloy and Mr Jim Wells
Mr Fred Cobain
Mrs Arlene Foster
Mrs Dolores Kelly
Mr Gerry Kelly
Mr Danny Kennedy
Mrs Naomi Long
Mr Raymond McCartney
Mr Alan McFarland
Mr Alban Maginness
Mr Alex Maskey
Mr Sean Neeson
Mr Peter Weir
Mr Sammy Wilson

The Committee met at 10.06 am.

(The Chairman (Mr Molloy) in the Chair.)

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): I remind members, as usual, to switch off their mobile phones, as they interrupt recording, and we have lost some proceedings before because of them. We will break for lunch at 12.20 pm, which we will have in this room. Jim Wells will chair the afternoon session, as I am going to a wedding. I have to get my priorities right.

Are substitutes present?

Mr McFarland: Mr Chairman, we expect Mr Kennedy shortly; Mr Cobain is standing in for Mr McNarry today.

Mr G Kelly: I have no idea who I am deputising for; I just came along. [Laughter.]

Mr Raymond McCartney: I am deputising for Martin McGuinness.

Mr A Maginness: I am standing in for Mark Durkan.

Mrs D Kelly: I am standing in for Alasdair McDonnell.

Mr Neeson: David Ford sends his apologies.

Mrs Long: I am here as me.

Mrs Foster: I am here for Lord Morrow; Sammy Wilson will be joining me soon for Ian Paisley Jnr; and Peter Weir will be here for Rev McCrea.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Do members have any relevant interests to declare?

Mrs D Kelly: I am a member of the Northern Ireland Policing Board.

Mrs Long: I am a member of Belfast District Policing Partnership (DPP).

Mrs Foster: I declare Policing Board membership.

Mr Cobain: I too declare Policing Board membership.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Gerry, do you have any interests to declare?

Mr Cobain: The Policing Board. [Laughter.]

Mr G Kelly: How did you hear?

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Our next agenda item is the draft minutes of last week’s meeting. Are members content?

Members indicated assent.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Under “Matters arising”, Mr Wells wrote to the Secretary of State seeking his attendance at this Committee. However, we have not received a reply. There has been communication between the Committee Clerk and the Northern Ireland Office (NIO), but there has been no reply.

We also have the revised list of law and order issues, which was agreed at last week’s meeting. The first heading on the revised list is “Devolution of policing and justice”; the second is “Policing”, under which are “Intelligence Services”, “Policing issues” and “Police Ombudsman”; the third heading is “Justice issues”, under which fall “Community Restorative Justice” and “Residual justice issues”; the fourth heading is “Rule of law”, under which come “Criminality”, “Decommissioning” and “Paramilitarism”.

Members should be aware that those issues will be discussed in the following sessions, so we will try to avoid straying into them today.

Today, we will discuss two sections of the revised list: devolution of policing and justice; and the Northern Ireland Office discussion paper ‘Devolving Policing and Justice in Northern Ireland’. It is up to members how we handle this, but it has been suggested that the discussion on devolving policing and justice be separated into two categories: the option for ministerial and departmental structures; and matters for devolution. Are members content?

Members indicated assent.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Everyone has a copy of the discussion paper, which contains the models. I suggest that members discuss the paper, and then I will take proposals arising from that discussion, rather than interrupting the discussion with proposals that may be counteracted later on. We will take it as we go, but if members are happy to have the general discussion followed by proposals and recommendations at the end, we will proceed.

Mrs Long: There are three issues around the devolution of policing and justice matters: the struct­ures; matters which will be devolved; and the timing of devolution. There are, therefore, three components to be discussed. We have decided how to deal with the first two, but when will we discuss the timing?

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): The timing should be the next issue to be discussed.

Mr G Kelly: I hazard a guess that the longest discussion will be on the NIO discussion paper, so it might be helpful to discuss the timing first or second.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Are you suggesting that we discuss timing in the first session?

Mr G Kelly: I am open to that, but since you suggested discussing the models first, let us do that. However, timing is relevant and, I hope, discussions on it will not take as long as those on the actual discussion paper will take.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Nothing is ruled out in these discussions, and I have said that from when the PFG Committee meetings started. Both Chairmen are content to permit discussions on whatever members think relevant.

Mr McFarland: Following the meetings of the past six weeks, it is obvious that a number of parties are still not confident that the background scenario is one in which the devolution of policing and justice or devolved government could be easily dealt with at present. Part of the reason why members were content that the “Rule of law” was put at the end of the list was because they realised that it would cause the drama. Members will be asking if the conditions are right for the devolution of policing and justice, and they will be stating whether they are comfortable and confident that all the parties have fulfilled their obligations to enable it to occur.

The question of timing, one would argue, is directly related to that confidence and the last issue on the list, “Rule of law”. Therefore, while timing is important — and I understand that it must be discussed — it would be beneficial to tease out the practical steps that are not directly related to whether parties feel comfortable to have devolution of policing and justice yet. One could argue, therefore, that timing is directly related to the last topic for discussion, “Rule of law”, and it could be discussed alongside criminality, decommissioning and paramilitarism. Those areas will all have an important bearing on when parties will feel comfortable with the devolution of policing and justice. We must remind ourselves that none of this will happen until there is an Assembly vote on the issue.

It makes sense to leave the discussion on the timing of devolution of policing and justice until the end of today, or perhaps until we discuss “Rule of law”, which impacts on timing. The Committee can discuss detailed structures without prejudice, but, as soon as we begin to discuss timing, we will enter into other complex issues that may interfere with the flow of our day.

10.15 am

Mr G Kelly: Was it agreed that the devolution of policing and justice would take place midway through a sitting of the Assembly, or in an equivalent period? Have we moved away from that?

Mr McFarland: The Committee has worked hard to deal with the straightforward matters, and the more fundamental issues have been put off until the end. The DUP has spent six weeks having a go at Conor and Martin over various matters, including whether para­militarism and criminality have stopped. Such matters cannot be resolved in advance of the publication of Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) reports confirming that they have stopped. We can sit here all day arguing about that; we have done that, and those discussions have been reported in Hansard. All parties have stated their positions on the issue.

If we try to address the timing issue, the question will arise about whether other parties feel that Sinn Féin is ready to address policing, and whether Sinn Féin is ready to address policing and support the rule of law. If Sinn Féin says that it is ready, the DUP will say that it is not, and we will not get anywhere. I suggest that we stick to the business of examining the models, as that is philosophical and uncontentious. If we started with timing, we would spend the next two hours having a barney, rather than getting on with some solid work.

Mr G Kelly: If Mrs Long and the other parties are content, I am happy to discuss the models, and then we can come back to the other issues.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Sammy, do you have any interest to declare?

Mr S Wilson: No.

Mr Neeson: I was a member of the Police Authority for Northern Ireland before the ceasefires.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Those issues are relevant to all the parties.

Mrs Long: With regard to the options for ministerial and departmental structures, the Alliance Party wishes to comment on the four models.

The Alliance Party believes that the Patten Com­mission proposals represented a fundamental review of policing and the creation of a single professional police service. Those proposals have been largely implemented. Therefore, we would like to see progress, with all parties accepting the rule of law as the baseline and becoming involved in the various structures and offering their unequivocal support to the police.

Unlike other parties, the Alliance Party does not simply view this as an issue for Sinn Féin, which is the most notable absentee from the Policing Board. Other parties must also show their support for the rule of law when it is exercised. Often, parties are critical of how the police exercise the rule of law in their communities, but, when they exercise it in someone else’s community, they are supportive of it. We would like people’s approach to policing to be consistent.

The Alliance Party believes that it would be unhelpful if policing and justice were to become politicised by its devolution and become an issue of contention. Policing and justice will cut right to the core of people’s sense of security, and, from that perspective, it is important that the entire community has confidence in how it is devolved, operated and managed.

The structural issues relating to the devolution of policing and justice cannot be divorced from those concerns that the Alliance Party raised during the institutional strand of discussions: different sections of the community will still perceive that there is the potential for policing and justice matters to be devolved into the wrong hands. That concern cuts right across the community, not only one section.

The Alliance Party’s preference is for policing and justice to be devolved in the context of an Executive that assumes collective responsibility and within which there is a higher degree of accountability over ministerial decision-making and decision-taking than under the previous arrangements. It is also important that matters relating to the accountability structures between the Executive and the Assembly are resolved.

I wish to comment on the four models of ministerial and departmental structures that have been proposed. It is worth noting that in Iraq, where there is collective and ethnic tension in regard to policing, much pressure was applied to ensure that policing and justice matters were not placed into the hands of any particular section of the community, but were taken on by a neutral body.

The existing Executive structures are inadequate to deal with devolution, because they provide few incentives for moderation and accommodation. Therefore, the review of the institutional dimension is critical in getting the devolution of structures right. None of the structures offered in the joint declaration provides an ideal way forward. I assume that the Committee will consider each model in detail, but I will take a cursory look at them now.

If, as suggested in model 1, policing and justice were devolved to a single Department under the current arrangements, without the Executive having full collective responsibility, the fear throughout the community would be that policing and justice matters could somehow be manipulated, or that the Minister could interfere, with little recourse, in operational matters.

Model 2 suggests a single justice Department with two Ministers. That throws up the same questions that we have already discussed relating to the unwieldiness of OFMDFM structures in the last Assembly, and to productivity having been fairly low in comparison to the amount of effort made. A single Department with two Ministers is also something of a curate’s egg. In the institutional format of this Committee, we talked about trying to strip away some powers and vest them back in other Departments. That would conflict with giving policing and justice to a Department led by two Ministers.

Model 3 proposes extending the remit of OFMDFM to cover policing and justice. Although a single justice Department with two Ministers operating in conjunction may give people a sense of confidence, as the two Ministers would have to agree on every decision, it is unlikely to prevent a political tug of war.

The Alliance Party’s concern about model 4, which suggests two distinct Departments with separate functions, is twofold. First, there is already a division between the powers to be devolved and those that Westminster will retain. Model 4 involves a further split between a policing Department and a justice Department. The substantial capacity for confusion among the general public as to where the remit for individual issues of policing and justice would lie would be unhelpful.

Furthermore, that model would not address the specific concern about the unfettered power of Ministers in each Department. Although policing and justice would be divided between two Departments, each with a lower remit, the powers to take decisions without recourse to colleagues would be the same. Therefore, model 4 does not address the structural issue.

Currently, the Alliance Party is not particularly exercised about the matters to be devolved and is fairly happy with the list that has been drawn up. However, we have a concern about issues relating to security and the security services.

The policing and security structures in Great Britain are not as politically accountable as the proposed structures in Northern Ireland, and the Alliance Party is therefore concerned about the retention of security issues, such as MI5 and so on, because of that lack of accountability.

There is a significant disparity in how republican terrorism and loyalist terrorism are viewed. The Government view republican terrorism as a national security threat to be dealt with by MI5. Loyalist paramilitarism, however, is seen more as criminal activity and is dealt with by the police at a local level and under the devolved structure as it is not perceived to be a threat to national security. However, the Alliance Party sees no difference between them. Its main concern is that there is a disparity in how the two are dealt with; it wants to see that disparity resolved so that people will have confidence that the paramilitary threat is being dealt with in the same way and through the same accountable structures — regardless of where it emanates from.

The Alliance Party has more detailed papers on this issue, and it is happy to submit them for consideration, but, as an opening statement, that is probably more than enough.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Can members keep to the first part? The models are divided into two parts, and the matters for devolution are in the second part.

Mrs Foster: Like the Alliance Party, the DUP believes that this issue must be set in the context of an institutional review, accountability structures, and the scaling-down of Departments to make way for whatever will be proposed on policing and justice. That is an acknowledgement of what the DUP has been saying about timescale, and I note what Alan said about that. If we had started off with a timescale, there would have been a brief discussion, Chairman. The Committee organises itself on consensus, and as far as the DUP is concerned, the timescale — if put in place — would have done more damage to confidence in the DUP’s community than anything else. It is not about a timescale; it is about gaining the confidence to put structures in place.

The DUP has difficulties with all the various models that have been put before the Committee, and that is what we are here to discuss. The DUP also believes that there would be difficulties about agreement and that the problems that have arisen with OFMDFM would also arise with a single justice Department. It would be unwieldy and would, in many cases, lead to deadlock. We were all aware of the unfettered powers of Ministers in the previous Assembly, and a single justice Department would bring difficulties.

OFMDFM’s remit is large enough already, without extending it to cover policing and justice. Putting something as important as policing and justice into OFMDFM would be a non-starter.

Policing and justice are inextricably linked, and dividing them into two distinct Departments would lead to severe difficulties — especially if one were held by a unionist and the other by a nationalist or republican. That must be addressed.

We are dealing solely with ministerial and depart­mental structures. However, in relation to policing, Naomi was right when she said that GB does not have the same accountability structures as Northern Ireland does. Following the Patten Report, policing here is one of the most scrutinised — if not the most scrutinised — matters in the world, with the Police Ombudsman, the Oversight Commissioner and the Policing Board.

Many policing matters have been sorted out. The Committee may take that into account in considering departmental structures. The DUP is suggesting a single justice Department with senior and junior Ministers, the junior Minister having responsibility for policing. Policing relates mainly to operational matters; justice would be the more senior portfolio. That is something to be discussed. My party will not be prescriptive about that. Those are my initial thoughts.

10.30 am

Mr G Kelly: I begin by putting the discussion into context. When we are talking about models, the context must be borne in mind. The Alliance Party and the DUP have discussed institutional problems and their difficulties with Executive power. Transfer of power is the mainstay of the model of policing envisaged by the Patten Commission. Without that, the potential for a new beginning for policing is seriously undermined. In paragraph 7 of the policing and justice section of the Good Friday Agreement, the two Governments agreed to a transfer of powers on policing and justice. From Sinn Féin’s point of view, that requires taking power away from London and out of the hands of the British securocrats in Whitehall and Stormont Castle.

Recommendations 20 and 21 of the Patten Report of 1999 explicitly recommended the transfer of powers to enhance, not diminish, the new arrangements for policing. The ‘Review of the Criminal Justice System in Northern Ireland’ in 2000 also supported the transfer of powers to local democratically accountable arrangements.

The Patten Commission envisaged that the transfer of powers would have positive implications for policing arrangements in many ways, for example, the appoint­ment of chief police officers and civilian equivalents would become subject to approval by members of the power-sharing Executive, who would also be empowered to call upon the PSNI Chief Constable to resign in certain circumstances. The Patten Commission also foresaw the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister as jointly assuming responsibilities previously exercised by the British Secretary of State following the transfer of powers, such as the appointment of independent members of the Policing Board, determining the remuneration and expenses of board members, and so on.

The key distinction between Sinn Féin’s position and those of other parties is that Sinn Féin wants to achieve that which was set out in the agreement as the basis for a new beginning for policing. For that to happen, agreement on a time frame is needed. This is important. Previous negotiations were already centring what that time frame should be. Agreement is also required on the departmental model, which we are dealing with now, and, perhaps most importantly, the powers to be transferred. Unlike Mrs Long, I believe that there are issues in the document that will necessitate the longest discussion we will have. The first step in the enactment of the necessary legislation was taken a week or two ago, and Gerry Adams has said that he will go to our party’s national executive and call a special Ard-Fheis.

Sinn Féin has been pressing the British Government to honour its commitments by transferring power to local democratically accountable arrangements under an Assembly. However, the all-Ireland arrangements are also important. They are interdependent institutions, set up under the Good Friday Agreement, and must also become a part of the Committee’s discussion.

A huge issue, which is getting bigger, is Peter Hain’s statement that MI5 should have primacy in policing the Six Counties. That is after the long negotiations that have taken place and would be a reversal of the Patten recommendations. It is not only Sinn Féin that strenuously opposes that. The SDLP has spoken publicly about it. The Irish Government, the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, the Oversight Commissioner and the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission are now forcefully voicing their opposition. Sinn Féin wants to see the role of British securocrats in our country reduced and ended; not supported and expanded. That should apply not only to MI5 but also to those anti-agreement elements and securocrats still operating in the PSNI and in other associated agencies.

Fundamental principles should underpin the transfer of power: a speedy, time-bounded process; maximum transfer of powers on policing and justice in so far as they relate to the island of Ireland; democratic accountability within the Six Counties and in all-Ireland arrangements; freedom from partisan political control; entrenchment and primacy of human rights; and the safeguarding and demarcation of roles and responsibilities.

The following items will also necessitate long discussion, depending upon which type of ministry is decided upon: the Northern Ireland Policing Board; the Police Ombudsman for Northern Ireland; the Chief Constable of the PSNI; and the number of protocols necessary in implementing and validating the transfer of powers.

With regard to the type of models that have been proposed, and in the light of all the issues that have been raised previously, I should say from the outset that, from Sinn Féin’s point of view, trust is an issue. Whatever happens in the longer term, we must take some sort of shared approach to this matter. Naomi talked about neutrality, but the fact remains that sections of the community are affected by this matter in different ways and should therefore be involved in this. While Sinn Féin is very open to discussing different models, the party’s immediate attitude is that a shared approach must be adopted so that both sections of the community — in political terms — can be involved. We are open to suggestions as to what the combination should be; although, unlike the DUP, I think that the suggested model of a single ministry with two Ministers is possibly pushing slightly ahead.

Mr A Maginness: It would be premature to be prescriptive this morning. In effect, a number of different models have been proposed by the British Government, but it is very difficult to evaluate them without agreeing a set of principles, which can then form a basis for evaluating individual models and reaching a collective conclusion on one of the models under discussion today, or another model. The SDLP believes that we must get the principles right before we can construct a model that could be blessed by consensus around this table.

The whole discussion on the devolution of policing and justice powers must be viewed in the context of power sharing and partnership. The Executive, and the parties within it, must be generally supportive of the different Ministers and Departments, so that there can be collective goodwill and a sense of shared responsibility. A sense of shared responsibility creates partnership, that partnership creates goodwill, and, in turn, that goodwill creates good government for all the people of Northern Ireland. That is an opening contextual basis for discussing policing and justice, and devolution.

The SDLP also believes that the current policing institutions — the Policing Board, the DPPs, the Police Ombudsman and the Police Oversight Commissioner, whose office will exist until the end of May 2007 — should continue as at present in the event of devolution of policing powers in the future. That is an important principle to assert; there should be no interference with what is presently established.

The devolution of powers must not only involve strand one of the Good Friday Agreement, which deals with Northern institutions, but also strand two, which deals with North/South institutions. The latter is part of the current basis for government on the island, and therefore should be the basis for the administration of justice and policing on the island.

The fourth principle concerns the need for detailed consideration of the future structure of the justice Department or Departments, the number of Ministers, etc. That must be consistent with the second principle on the protection of the present institutions. That should also be consistent with the Patten Report.

The fifth principle is that there is a range of important and sensitive powers held by the British Government that the SDLP believes should be devolved, with necessary cross-community protections. Those would include: appeal powers by the Chief Constable against a ruling of the Parades Commission — a power that has not been used to date, but is still a residual power held by the Secretary of State; the protection of fifty-fifty police recruitment, which currently requires renewal every three years; and protection against a devolved Minister from one community vetoing a Policing Board inquiry without cross-community agreement. The SDLP emphasises the importance of those sensitive and potentially crucial powers that are held by the British Government.

The sixth principle is that the gathering and managing of all intelligence must remain with the PSNI. The SDLP has been very firm on that point. That includes national security intelligence, the threats presented by organised and serious crime, and international terrorism. It is important to develop and maintain confidence in policing. If intelligence gathering were removed from the PSNI, which would be left with a fairly minor residual function, PSNI capacity would be effectively weakened. The SDLP believes that that would be wrong.

The seventh principle is that — independent of the requirement for elements of justice and policing powers to be devolved — there are particular issues that require all-Ireland integration as part of strand-two arrangements. The SDLP believes that an all-Ireland assets recovery agency should be created and that there should be an upgrading of all-Ireland mechanisms to address organised crime. The SDLP believes that that is of critical importance.

The eighth principle is that the British Army and security services should have no role in the North aside from that outlined in the Hillsborough declaration and in the Patten Report. In particular, the British Army should have no function in relation to intelligence gathering, management, or other intelligence capacity. That should be a principle that parties should adopt as a prerequisite for proper negotiation on the devolution of justice.

Our ninth principle is that there is a requirement for the transfer of powers to the maximum threshold. That would be healthy for the credibility and authority of a restored Assembly and would protect against undue influence from the Government or agencies in London. After examination of the discussion paper, the SDLP believes that that area must be fully assessed and robustly challenged to ensure the maximum transfer of powers. That should include matters where constitutional conventions exist or where issues are not fully governed by statute.

The tenth principle is that there should be a fixed and firm deadline for the devolution of justice. That would create a degree of certainty, avoid doubt, and create momentum. At an earlier stage, the SDLP argued that a target date of six months was realisable. Arguably, a more limited time frame is now justified.

10.45 am

The devolution of justice is a further test against which to judge each party and against which each party can judge itself. We strongly urge other political parties, the Governments and other interested parties to adopt the principles that we suggest. That is the best way to ensure that, should the devolution of justice arise, it is done correctly. If we get the principles right, we can move on to considering the specifics of the modalities and search for as wide an agreement on a preferred modality as possible within the context of these political discussions.

Mrs Foster: Will the SDLP share its paper with the rest of us?

Mr A Maginness: We will present it in due course.

Mrs Foster: Does that mean that it is not sharing it at this time?

Mr A Maginness: No, not at the moment — we may want to make some adjustments to it.

Mrs Long: We discussed the submission of papers. The Alliance Party is happy to submit one, if it is decided that that is necessary. It may be worth discussing at the end of this initial session whether parties want to present written papers.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): I do not want to disrupt Alan’s flow, so please continue.

Mr McFarland: It was agreed at the previous meeting that if parties had papers they should circulate them. Some have; others have not. If parties have a tome of wisdom, they should circulate it.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): It was not a precondition.

Mr McFarland: I know that.

It is worth reminding ourselves of the context of all this, because it is key to the discussions. The first point is that none of this will get up and running until the Assembly is up and running. For that to happen, there has to be agreement between the DUP and Sinn Féin, and the DUP has to accept that Sinn Féin has met all the commitments that the DUP believes that it should. In theory, we are discussing this matter against a background of a new era of harmony. That does not mean that there are not any safeguards, but that is the context in which all this will happen. Current difficulties may not exist when we get to that stage. We must remind ourselves that what we are talking about can be triggered only by cross-community vote in the Assembly; therefore everybody must be in agreement. It is important to keep that in mind.

There is clearly a question about the number of Departments. All the parties are agreed — and it is in legislation — that there cannot be any more than 10. Therefore if there is to be a Department or Departments for policing and justice, then either the law must be changed to allow 11 or 12 Departments, or we consider a regrouping of the Departments to make them more effective and efficient. Every party that contested the previous election said that it wanted to look at that issue, which cross-fertilises into the institutional talks that we have on Mondays.

There is a fair amount of agreement that it would be more efficient to have policing and justice together in the system. In England, where those functions are separate, consideration is being given to drawing the two together to make them more effective and efficient. In that case, it seems daft for us to split them. The Government also expressed that view in their paper, which suggests strongly that those functions should be kept together as an entity.

The other thing to remember — and I think that this was brought out in the paper that has been prepared for us — is that much of policing and justice is not under anyone’s direct control. The Chief Constable is inde­pendent, so we cannot interfere in his operational policy.

The Policing Board is probably the biggest conun­drum. Ten Assembly Members sit on the Policing Board. If there were a Department for policing and justice, it would presumably need a Committee, so that would account for another 11 Members. That adds up to 21 MLAs. The question is whether the same people could sit on both.

Mr S Wilson: The rest could be fitted in somewhere.

Mr A Maginness: We will run out of Members.

Mr McFarland: Are we perhaps looking at having a Policing Board that is made up of independent members? A Policing Board with agency status would conduct the hands-on, day-to-day work, but the Committee with responsibility for policing and justice would supervise it. Some fairly major issues must be sorted out down the line. The Northern Ireland Prison Service operates independently, as does the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI), and the criminal justice and legal profession has always been, as Arlene will confirm, a slightly ethereal world.

Mrs Foster: I will not confirm that.

Mr McFarland: The judiciary is independent and almost runs itself. Of course, input is provided when selecting people for positions, and so forth, but, by and large, the Northern Ireland Court Service and the courts system operate independently. We are discussing organisations that are already well on their way to being stand-alone agencies, unlike, for example, at the Department for Regional Development (DRD) or the Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety (DHSSPS), where the Minister is in the middle of everything and has a direct input. A Minister would not be able to wade into and tinker with policing and justice at will; that is not the way in which policing and justice work. We should bear that in mind.

The issue of cross-border policing and justice between two sovereign Governments must be debated. How do we deal with two police forces and two justice systems on the island? As far as I can see, there is a major drive on the part of the two Governments to slot in as many cross-border policing and justice measures as possible before any of those heathen MLAs from Northern Ireland get their hands on policing and justice. There seems to a major push to implement cross-border agreements, policies and protocols before the Assembly is given responsibility for policing and justice.

What safeguards will be in place? Let us say that the DUP and Sinn Féin hold the posts of First Minister and Deputy First Minister respectively and are hugging each other in Government, and all the problems that those parties had with each other have been resolved.

Mr S Wilson: An ethereal world.

Mrs Foster: He is back in dreamland.

Mr McFarland: It will still take the communities some time to accept that one or other — or, indeed, any — of the parties can be allowed unfettered access to the post of Minister for policing and justice. Therefore, safeguards are necessary.

Do we have only one Department, dealing with both policing and justice? Could we afford to have two Ministers at a time when we are downscaling Depart­ments and complaining about costs? How could we justify having two Ministers, each on £76,000, or whatever a Minister is paid these days?

Do we give the policing and justice portfolio to the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister? As some colleagues have already described, the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister in the previous Assembly lived in a schizophrenic world in which they were the ambassadors for and the face of the Assembly, opening shopping centres and glad-handing the world, while, at the same time, trying to run a Department that had responsibility for odds and sods and had to carry out other strange functions. At Monday’s meeting of the PFG Committee dealing with institutional changes, it was pointed out that we are required to completely re-examine OFMDFM’s responsibilities. Therefore it would appear slightly overenthusiastic to give the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister responsibility for policing and justice on top of all their other responsibilities.

If we opt for one Department, how do we provide safeguards? Two Ministers would prove quite expensive. We could decide to have a Minister and a junior Minister, and to alternate their roles. Should that junior Minister be what might be termed a “super junior Minister”, who would have access to all the papers? Although only one Minister would be paid £76,000, the Minister and the “super junior Minister” would be required to operate in the same way in which the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister operated. The “super junior Minister” would have to agree any changes that the Minister proposed. That would provide a safeguard.

There are both costs and benefits with all of those models, and we will need to tease those out as we proceed.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Danny, you have just come in recently. Members of the Policing Board and other organisations have been making declarations of interest.

Mr Kennedy: I am a member of the Policing Board.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Thank you. Members, we have had discussions on the issues. Have we any definite proposals?

Mrs Long: That might be somewhat premature. I would like to go back on a few things that have been said. First of all, I wish to confirm, in case it was not explicit in my original statement, that Alliance is in favour of the devolution of policing and justice. As someone who is always slightly sceptical, I have a tendency to focus on the problems and on trying to resolve them. The questions for us are: “How?”, “What?” and “When?”, not whether it should happen. I want to make that quite clear.

The SDLP said that there should be a firm time frame, and there has been some discussion about that. We believe that to set a firm timescale would be counterproductive. We need to set a target date so that people can see when it may be able to happen — two years from the restoration of devolution seems sensible. That would allow time for devolution to establish itself and become stable. However, we do not want to be prescriptive about it. I am intrigued that the SDLP has said that it thought that it could happen in fewer than six months, yet today it said that it would be premature to discuss the structures. If we are not prepared to do that in some detail now, I do not know how we could be ready for policing and justice to be devolved in fewer than six months. I would like to explore that a bit.

With regard to the neutrality of the Department — and I think Gerry Kelly raised this — it is not just about the Ministers having no political affiliations or opinions; that is not conceivable. We are talking about the community having confidence in Ministers discharging their duties in an impartial way, particularly given the sensitivities of those roles. We are not talking about which Ministers could hold the posts; we are talking about how they would discharge their functions. That is why we feel that the ministerial code and Pledge of Office are important. People from the unionist community, for example, do not lose interest in policing and justice simply because a republican or nationalist happens to head that Department, just as they do not lose interest in education or any other matter. It would be important for the Ministers to discharge their functions in a neutral way, as opposed to the individuals being politically neutral.

Those are the main issues that I felt that I should come back on in order to clarify Alliance’s position.

Mr A Maginness: We want agreement on the principles. Once they are agreed, the chosen model can be worked on and there would be a greater chance of agreement there — it is as simple as that. Without having agreed principles, it would be premature to decide on the model.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Mr Maginness listed a set of principles. Does the Committee want to explore further the matter of what principles it would want to put in place before it talks about the models? Do we want to deal with that in more detail?

Mrs Foster: You cannot take the all-Ireland devolution of powers as a principle in a vacuum; you need to know what powers you are going to put in. It strikes me that that goes entirely against the principle of consent that was meant to underlie the Belfast Agreement. I do not see any possibility of agreeing principles such as that. That is why I asked to see the SDLP paper. I am not being prescriptive in any way, but you cannot just state blandly and in a vacuum that you want to see the devolution of powers to all-Ireland institutions.

11.00 am

Mr A Maginness: We are willing to share our thoughts on the principles that I have briefly outlined as soon as we can, and further discussion might come from that. Equally, we would like the other parties to put their thoughts on paper to allow us to evaluate them and to judge them against our thoughts. It would be good if parties submitted in writing the principles on which they feel that the model for the devolution of policing and justice should be based.

Mr McFarland: The difficulty is that the Committee has a fortnight, or perhaps three weeks, comprising two or three meetings, to get through its entire remit. At that point, it is expected to produce a report to be debated in the Assembly, and, as Peter Robinson said at the last meeting, the report may well form the basis of discussions and talks in the autumn. If nothing else, it will clarify the minds of the five parties as to what is not possible. We may well have to negotiate what is possible, and the report would be helpful for that.

During the review in 2004, the parties were able to exchange papers and parse them and examine them, but the essence of having the parties in the same room is that we can actually discuss these issues. There is no time to pass papers round and for the parties to examine them. We need to have a discussion. We may need to pause and park issues from one meeting to the next, but the momentum must be kept up.

At Monday’s meeting it was clear that certain issues could not be decided: either the Committee needed further advice on them or they were too complex. Those issues were parked and the Committee moved to the next item on the agenda. The idea is to filter out a common understanding of what is not achievable. That leaves the Committee a number of options. Members may not be able to decide those here, but at the negotiations in the autumn, the subjects for discussion will be fairly clear, which will be quite helpful.

The danger of having papers is that MLAs are quite busy. The idea behind being in a room together was to give momentum to the discussion.

Mr S Wilson: If members want to have a productive discussion rather than simply talking in generalities, Mr McFarland’s suggestion of filtering the issues on which we can have sensible discussions from the party wish lists that we know we will not reach consensus on — or that we know will be decided above our heads — is useful.

Mr Maginness has been the most specific on the principles. We might as well cut to the chase: there are a number of issues on which it would be pointless for the Committee to expend a great deal of time. We would not get very far with them.

The first issue relates to the discussion at the start of the meeting. There is no point in our having a long discussion about timing and setting a maximum period for devolution. From a unionist perspective, the devolution of policing and justice will not occur until there is sufficient confidence that the context and atmosphere have changed. It will not be achieved by the setting of a deadline of six months or two years. Deadlines can be counterproductive. Devolution of policing and justice will depend on how parties behave. I do not want to get into a wrangle with Sinn Féin, but it will depend on that party’s attitudes to the police and security. It would be a waste of time for the Committee to have a long discussion on that issue.

The second point is exercising both Sinn Féin and the SDLP. I do not know whether there is any point in having a long discussion about intelligence-gathering. As I understand it, that decision has already been made. Protocols have been put in place between the police and MI5 to ensure a flow of information. We can discuss it, and members can express their views, but we will be wasting our time, because that is fairly well advanced.

When this first came up at the Policing Board we had some discussion about it; I am no longer on the Board, but the matter has moved on. The Police Service of Northern Ireland would be the only service in the United Kingdom to retain national intelligence-gathering within its remit. I do not see that happening. Any argu­ment that we could have would be fairly contentious, and what would be the point?

Alban Maginness is obviously keen to add another political layer to cross-border police co-operation. He mentioned it two or three times, as did Sinn Féin. We are not against cross-border co-operation on policing or asset recovery. Wherever we can learn from the Republic and harmonise what we do with what happens in the Republic to make policing and dealing with organised crime more effective, we are happy to do. However, it must be in the context of co-operation between our police service and justice system and the guards. There does not need to be a political layer at strand two laid down for that.

From my own experience in the Policing Board, I think that what probably works more effectively is when individual officers from the two police services on the island decide to work together on projects and ventures. To introduce a further political layer in strand two would be counterproductive. Much good work is being done and is getting support from both nationalists and unionists in the structures that exist.

Mr G Kelly: I do not want to get into a wrangle between Sinn Féin and the DUP either, but a couple of things need to be said. The DUP position on the devolution of policing is the same as its position on the institutions. We should not talk as if this is a clear issue that only deals with policing. The DUP is demanding all sorts of things before the institutions are set up, and, if the institutions are not set up, the argument over models can become redundant.

Mr Wilson mentioned intelligence-gathering. The original statement was made by Paul Murphy. The matter is at an advanced stage, but the issue is not about the flow of information; it is about accountability. It is not only national security, to use the British term; they have talked about becoming involved in areas such as serious crime. They have talked about a difference between gathering intelligence on republicans and gathering intelligence on loyalists. I find it hard to accept that any party in an Executive would give up easily the necessary accountability for the area that they represent and over which they pass laws.

I also take a different view on the cross-border issue, as might be expected. Sammy Wilson needs to say what he means. This ministry will be a Department in an Executive. Every other Department is involved in the North/South Ministerial Council; is he arguing that this Department should not be involved? If he is talking about the cross-border implementation bodies or areas of co-operation, let him say either that he agrees that it should be an area of co-operation or that it should be an implementation body, which is more formal. I do not think that anyone will argue about the practicalities of what it means if someone says: “This is what it means practically and this would work better, or that would work better”.

To take a position that runs contrary to what happens with every other Department and rule out the all-Ireland aspect, especially at this stage in this discussion, is putting a brake on the discussion rather than having a sensible debate.

Mrs Foster: Regardless of who is Minister with responsibility for policing and justice in whatever departmental structure is agreed, they will not be responsible for national security — that is an excepted matter. That is why MI5 will retain primacy over national security.

Mr McFarland: There should not be a problem with MI5’s position because, following this, the only thing that MI5 will be dealing with will be al-Qaeda terrorism. Republicans will be completely peaceful.

Mr Kennedy: It did not seem like that in Newry last night.

Mr G Kelly: Danny makes a fair point. It has been said that MI5 is taking over responsibility for serious and organised crime, so the definition of national security is not as narrow as Mr McFarland makes it. I also have a difficulty with accepting who decides what national security encompasses. To give an easily understood example: is a PSNI officer who is doing work for MI5 still accountable to the Chief Constable and the Police Ombudsman as regards investigations, or are they taken entirely outside that accountability structure, because it is an excepted matter, and can do anything that they want. If that is the case, we are travelling backwards in time.

Therefore, “national security” will not mean the same here as it does from the British point of view. The British Government have made statements — I have not made them up — about serious and organised crime coming under national security. They have singled out two sections of intelligence-gathering — loyalist and republican — and have said that the Committee’s opinion does not count; the Executive do not count; none of us will count; and they will do whatever they want.

As a republican, I want MI5 to go. However, even if I were not a republican but merely someone involved in a democratic institution, I would want to know what the accountability mechanisms would be. I am surprised that unionists do not want to know that as well.

Mr McFarland: Serious and organised crime is a matter for the Chief Constable and the PSNI. I think that Gerry is concerned that an overlap may be construed as occurring when a republican organisation is involved in organised crime, for example. However, we are trying to get to a stage where republicans are not involved in serious and organised crime. The DUP and the Ulster Unionist Party have made it clear that we are not getting involved in Government with Sinn Féin while republicans remain involved in organised criminality.

Devolution can only happen if those involved in organised crime are unconnected to republicans or, indeed, loyalists. By then, it is envisaged that only “ordinary” criminals will be involved in criminality and that they will be dealt with by the police. There may be a period during which some people who were active republicans, and whose activities were not sanctioned by the leadership, cannot give up criminality. In such cases — as Martin McGuinness and Gerry Adams have said publicly — let the authorities deal with them.

If, by then, MI5 is dealing with national security issues, threats by al-Qaeda and other external issues, we will be in the same position as the rest of the United Kingdom. Sinn Féin does not believe that we are the same as the rest of the UK, but that is how the agreement worked. Until we get consent from the people of Northern Ireland, we will remain part of the UK, and, under UK law, MI5 deals with national security.

At the last meeting, I said that this has all come about because of the enormous fuss that Sinn Féin and the SDLP made about Special Branch. They went on and on about Special Branch for four or five years. The Government clearly listened to them and removed responsibility for investigating republican activity from Special Branch, because it upset nationalists and republicans, and gave it to MI5. One could argue that they have been hoist by their own petards. Logically, when republican criminality ceases, the fact that MI5 will be dealing with al-Qaeda should not exercise republicans.

11.15 am

Mr G Kelly: I do not want to accuse Alan of being naive, but if Gerry Adams’s phone is bugged it will not be because he is in al-Qaeda. If a conversation between a British Minister and Martin McGuinness is bugged, I presume that it will not be because the British Minister is in al-Qaeda. It would be for some other purpose. Forgive me, but it is simply naive to think that everything will be hunky-dory because the issue in the North has been sorted out.

I ask Mr McFarland again: is it acceptable that a PSNI officer — for whom certain members fought quite hard, argued for, and agreed accountability measures for — can be taken outside those account­ability mechanisms?

It is not only Sinn Féin and the SDLP that are worried about that. The Oversight Commissioner and the Police Ombudsman are also worried about it. The type of accountability that we are discussing does not cover repo powers and other powers. The Assembly should be given power to do something about that. Mr McFarland is accepting that this matter should be simply handed over to MI5 and that things will be OK.

Mr McFarland: My understanding is that PSNI officers who are involved in intelligence-handling for MI5 will remain part of the PSNI and under the supervision of the Police Ombudsman. There is no question of any PSNI officer not being supervised by the Police Ombudsman. She may be trying to extend her empire to include MI5 operatives here, but that is a different issue entirely. She also attempted to extend her empire into supervision and surveillance of the Army here. It has been reduced to garrison status and although most of the soldiers’ families are here, the soldiers themselves are in Afghanistan or Iraq. Alban Maginness raised an issue about the Army, but that will probably not be an issue in a few years.

We must be clear about whether there is a problem. Protocols are being developed, and there are issues about them. The Policing Board, of which I was a member until April, is taking a very close interest in them. The Intelligence and Security Committee at Westminster and the Police Ombudsman are also interested in what the protocols will be.

There are issues about the production of intelligence, who handles it and what the protocols will be. For example, if information on organised crime is uncovered by MI5, can we guarantee that it will be passed to the Chief Constable? That is technically what the protocols will ensure. The protocols will be safeguard mechanisms, and there is a need for them. We do not want any organisation to withhold information for political reasons because it does not suit.

I heard an accusation on the radio this morning that the Bloody Sunday Inquiry is being prevented from publishing its report because it may interfere with the political process. If information has been gathered on organised crime that may reflect badly on republicans, it would be wrong for MI5, under Government influence from London, to withhold that information and not pass it to the PSNI.

Colleagues who are still sitting on the Policing Board can keep me right on the date, but I believe that those key protocols are due to be introduced by November. I agree with Mr Kelly that it is vital to get the protocols right. However, his fears are greater than they need to be.

Mrs D Kelly: Members seem to forget that the British Government had the choice either to agree with Patten, whereby national security remained the responsibility of the Chief Constable, who would then report to the Secretary of State, or to decide that MI5 should have supremacy. The British Government chose the latter option. The earlier comments about the Ombudsman and PSNI officers were unfair.

The real problem concerned the handling of agents: what they were allowed to do and the level of criminal activity in which many could become involved. Many people who examine the handling of both republican and loyalist agents will wonder whose war it was. Did the situation here merely provide a training ground for many British policies?

We are straying from the agenda and getting bogged down in the question of MI5, as opposed to discussing models and principles. The MI5 debate is important, but it is not right to say that the British Government did not have the choice of adopting an alternative approach — they could have been true to Patten.

Mr McFarland: As the Policing Board is true to Patten.

Mr Kennedy: As, indeed, is fifty-fifty recruitment.

Mrs Long: Alan has said that the restoration of devolution would happen in the context of an end to paramilitarism. However, we must bear in mind that it could happen in the context of ongoing paramilitarism.

The Alliance Party raised the issue of the different approaches to — and responsibilities for — republican and loyalist terrorism. The former would be addressed at a UK level, because it is also seen as a threat to national security, whereas the latter would be addressed at a Northern Ireland level, because it is seen to be more characterised by criminal activity.

That differentiation would remain even if everyone were confident that the IRA had completely disappeared, because any remaining republican dissidents would be perceived as a threat to national security. Therefore, republican paramilitarism would be dealt with differently from loyalist paramilitarism, which could continue in the context of devolution, as it did previously.

Attempts to ensure that all paramilitarism is dealt with in a fair and equitable manner and that the accountability structures are balanced and equal are not of concern only to those with a particular interest in paramilitarism. It is in everyone’s interest to know that when paramilitarism becomes a threat to society, it will be properly dealt with and that accountability structures are in place.

The Alliance Party has already expressed its concerns about the lack of UK-wide accountability structures. Part of the solution lies in more generalised reform of UK structures for tackling issues such as terrorism and national security. Although this Committee has no control over that, it must be part and parcel of our discussions.

The context in which loyalist and republican paramilitarism may be treated as two completely different entities does not exist in Northern Ireland, because both threaten the stability of the society in which we live. The difficulty in regard to intelligence-gathering and defining where the PSNI remit ends and the MI5 remit begins is that none of the paramilitary organisations operating in this region can be easily separated into those with criminal empires and those without.

There will be some crossover, because some of the criminal activity that the PSNI will be tackling is directly related and inextricably linked to a paramilitary organisation and its orchestration of such activities. It would, therefore, be difficult to see where that division starts. This area needs further exploration, because it comes down to the rule of law and people’s under­standing of that. One cannot simply say that the problem will be resolved because paramilitarism will not exist after the restoration of devolution.

We must have structures that can withstand any resurgence of post-devolution paramilitarism, although we hope that that will not be the case. We would prefer devolution without any paramilitary threat. However, the structures must be robust enough to deal with that threat, should the need arise.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Can we conclude discussions on this section? We are talking about various subjects, and it is unlikely that we will get consensus on the form of the models at this stage. Alban Maginness suggested a discussion about the principles. Do members agree that we should set first out the principles that would govern the type of model?

Mr Cobain: Alban Maginness made the point that we do not have the time for that. Three meetings have been allocated to discuss policing and justice, and I have not yet seen the principles. We talked about discussing the principles next week. We cannot progress until we discuss the principles. We are still discussing the models, and that leaves only one week.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): We are discussing the models this morning, although members may be straying from the point.

Mr Cobain: Alban Maginness’s point is that we cannot move on and discuss the models until we agree the principles, and the principles lead on to the discussion about the models. We are discussing the models this morning, but, as far as Alban is concerned, it is akin to putting the cart before the horse. I want to discuss the models this morning so that we can reach some consensus. We have spent an hour and a half talking about an issue over which we have no control. I want to spend the rest of the day talking about issues over which we do have some control, such as models for the devolved institutions.

Mr S Wilson: The Committee does not have the SDLP’s paper, but I listened carefully to the 10 principles enunciated by Alban Maginness. I am not sure how many of them — if any — would inform us about the shape of the Departments or the models that we need. Some examples of those principles are: no role for the Army in intelligence-gathering — that is his view, but I do not know how that informs us about which models might be most suitable; protection of the present institutions in policing — again, I am not sure how that informs us about models 1, 2, 3, or 4; intelligence-gathering capacity to remain with the PSNI; and an all-Ireland assets recovery agency. I jotted down some points on Alban’s list, but I cannot make out some of my own writing.

Some of those matters may exercise the SDLP. However, to come back to Fred Cobain’s point, we could discuss those matters for one or two days, but would we be any nearer to a conclusion on whether model 1, 2, 3 or 4 — or some other model — would be the most appropriate? I agree with Fred Cobain; we might have an interesting discussion if we started to go through the principles, or if we produced our own principles.

We are up against a tight timescale of three weeks, when we may not be any further forward. However, if that is our objective, rather than having a good chinwag about the issues, we should steer away from that route.

Mr G Kelly: The discussion was about the models. It would be better if we had a discussion on the principles surrounding the models. Must policing and justice be shared among the parties in the medium to long term? There are four models. Could some of the models be ruled out? Everyone is opposed to the model of extending the remit of OFMDFM to cover policing and justice, so that could be ruled out for a start.

I get the impression that everyone is arguing against the fact that the Minister might come from a specific party; that is a matter for d’Hondt.

Is there a view that there should be some sort of shared approach to policing and justice? Do those have to be dealt with as one? That might at least narrow it down.

11.30 am

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): I take it from the views expressed, by the Democratic Unionist Party in particular, that there is not the consensus that we need to deal with the principles before we move on to the models. We should look at the models one by one.

Mr S Wilson: We want to get down to business, Chairman.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): I am all for that. By all means, let us cut to the chase. What should the Committee rule in and rule out? That is on the basis of the structures being in place, not on the preconditions.

Mr S Wilson: There has been a degree of consensus that at least two models could be ruled out. Almost every party has said explicitly that the Committee should try to cut back the remit of the Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. That structure did not work very well — it was a mishmash. To narrow the discussion down, model 3 could be taken out; no one feels any attachment to it

Mr McFarland also made a point about this. The Committee is probably being directed away from recommending two distinct Departments. Members’ instincts would be to reduce the number of Depart­ments rather than manufacture more. The Committee should focus on models 1 and 2 and rule out models 3 and 4. My party is happy to do that because one has been shown not to work, and the other one runs contrary to our ideas for slimming down Government.

Mr Neeson: Following on from what Mr Wilson said, there is a form of consensus that a single Department would be the most suitable option. If members could agree on that, we can move forward.

Mr G Kelly: That is the reason why I raised the matter. There were discussions about that among some parties, although those probably did not include the DUP. We have no attachment to models 3 and 4.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): The proposal is that models 3 and 4 be excluded from discussion. Are members agreed?

Members indicated assent.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): We have narrowed down the discussion to models 1 and 2, unless any party wants to suggest a completely new model.

Mr G Kelly: We have agreed one principle. It is shared.

Mr Kennedy: The Swedish model, no?

A Member: We are all agreed on that. [Laughter.]

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Hansard is still recording proceedings.

Let us focus on which of the two models members prefer.

Mr Neeson: One important aspect that the Committee needs to consider is that, whichever model is chosen, there must be acceptance of collective responsibility. When we had devolution before, there was no collective responsibility.

Equality is another consideration. In the last Assembly, voting was largely on sectarian lines. I refer in particular to the debate about maternity services and whether they should be located at Belfast City Hospital or at the Royal Victoria Hospital. If we are to move forward, any agreed set-up must be based on collective responsibility, equality and, to a certain extent, neutrality.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): That strays into the old issue of the institutions and the need for collective responsibility within them. Can the Committee focus on the two models under discussion in particular? The difference is that one model proposes two Ministers and the other proposes one Minister and a junior Minister.

Mrs Long: Sean said that the context would predetermine the outcome. If the Alliance Party were asked to state its preference, it would opt for a single ministry with a single Minister. However, that would have to be in the context of an Executive with collective responsibility and the right accountability structures so that, if Ministers took decisions or were seen to apply pressure or to act beyond their remit, they could be stopped.

That was not the case in the previous Executive, and it remains to be seen whether it will be the case, as changes to the institutional arrangements are still being discussed. We cannot prejudge the outcome of those discussions. Nonetheless, the Alliance Party would prefer an Executive with some type of collective responsibility and sense of direction.

Our party believes that the proposed Department should be headed by a single Minister, who would no longer act on behalf of his or her party but as a member of a collective Executive. That is completely different from a mandatory coalition Government, with a single Minister, in charge of a Department, yet acting in his or her party’s interest, and with no accountability structures in place to inhibit that in any way. In that case, model 2 would be the preferred option.

Mr S Wilson: Naomi, can I interrupt? A fairly strict ministerial code is needed to ensure that there is confidence in that Minister.

Mrs Long: Absolutely. The Alliance Party stated that the ministerial code and the Pledge of Office would have to be strengthened in order to achieve that. Model 2 must be considered. Institutional arrangements cannot be divorced from this discussion because we are essentially discussing institutional arrangements for a particular Department — albeit one of the most sensitive ones. We must consider this matter in that overall context.

The Alliance Party’s position is reasonably clear. We now need to hear how other parties feel about collective responsibility because that cannot be divorced from the issue of policing and justice.

Mr Maskey: It is good that the Committee has narrowed its focus on this matter. A fairly clear consensus seems to be emerging that models 1 and 2 are preferable. However, as Gerry Kelly said, we should not dismiss any option at this stage of the game, because the context may change. There may or may not be a reduction in the number of Departments — that has not yet been decided. In a sense, therefore, this is a hypo­thetical, without-prejudice discussion. Nothing should be ruled out because it might be decided in the fullness of time that the separation of ministries is a good idea.

The clear attraction of models 1 and 2 is that one Department will be created to focus on these very important issues. Sinn Féin’s reading of those models is that they include an element of joint working between both communities, which is very important as regards the partnership element embodied in the Executive.

I do not know how much more detail can be covered in this discussion. However, if members feel that models 1 and 2 are looking good — if I may put it that way — and if the Committee could set that aside for a moment, it would be a good idea to begin discussing the transfer of powers. It was said that a time frame could not be agreed. I do not think that anybody here wants to set a date. However, we could start to discuss the transfer of powers in principle. Sinn Féin certainly wants powers to be transferred as soon as possible.

Are members prepared to discuss the transfer of powers? I am not saying that they must commit to a time frame. However, if everything was all right and all things were equal — without prejudice to what anybody thinks that that may be — are members generally in favour of an early transfer of power?

Mr McFarland: As the Committee will recall, our task is to mine down into the issues. That is going fairly well. As regards having one Minister or two, I am thinking about the public’s view of the Assembly. Currently, the perceived wisdom is that we are a complete waste of time and rations and cost a fortune. Members probably saw last night’s ‘Belfast Telegraph’, in which there was yet another attack on our pensions. The article said that the only part of the Assembly that has continued to work during suspension is the section that deals with Members’ pensions.

Mr Maskey: It does not look as though you will be needing one anyway.

Mr McFarland: How can we argue that there is a need for two Ministers on the grounds of effectiveness and efficiency? That troubles me slightly.

If we are going to have trouble explaining to the public that there is a need for two Ministers, we are back, in theory, to the suggestion that there should be only one. There are several options as regards having one Minister. Logically, in a new Assembly the d’Hondt system would be run and one party would choose policing and justice as its favourite ministry. It would then be logical for that ministry to be selected as part of the pecking order. However, that does not get us away from the difficulties regarding safeguards. Although we might have Utopia, with agreement, collective responsibility, the ministerial code, and with parties being comfortable — halcyon days ahead indeed — the difficulty is that our communities have not yet reached that point.

The republican community is still fairly far away from full inclusivity on policing, and unionists are still fairly far away from full inclusivity for republicans. Indeed, republicans and nationalists are still fairly far away from inclusivity for loyalists. Such issues will not be resolved quickly, and we will end up needing some safeguards, as much for public perception and protection as for ourselves as parties.

What if we decided that it would be healthy for the Assembly if Ministers took turns within a term of office? If you need a safeguard then you are into the area of having some form of junior Minister. There are two options. First, you could have a junior Minister who is a “super junior Minister” and sees all papers, and who, as with the arrangement for the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, would have to agree matters with the Minister. It would be an arrangement that involves a safeguard and some form of agreement.

Secondly, you could have a system whereby you rotate the office. The difficulty with that is that you would have to change a Minister’s pay and status perhaps every six months or every year. For example, a short time ago Gerry Kelly might have been Minister for policing, and we might have booked him to go to some kind of function in Rosemount in Derry next year. Then we find that Sammy Wilson turns up because he has become Minister of policing in the interim. That could lead to a lot of confusion, and it might take you back to having a Minister who is slotted in under the d’Hondt system —

Mr S Wilson: Mr McFarland has outlined issues such as pay and engagements. However, the real difficulty is that no one would be able to get a handle on the job because he or she would be doing it for such a short time. The ministry would be very ineffectual.

Mr McFarland: Sammy is right; turnover is an issue.

Mrs D Kelly: Just like the DUP the last time around.

Mrs Foster: It keeps the continuity, Dolores.

Mrs D Kelly: Revolving-door ministries.

Mr McFarland: There are issues about whether you go for “super junior Ministers” who have blocking and safeguard powers or for the turnover system, which has the drawbacks that I described. It strikes me that that is the ground that we are on.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Is it possible to tie this down to one model?

Mr S Wilson: You are very ambitious, Mr Chairman.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): I know, but you have to be at this stage.

Mrs Foster: I do not see them as two separate models. Both provide for a single justice Department. The difficulty arises in deciding whether there is a single Minister, a Minister and a junior Minister, or two Ministers in the one Department. We have reached some degree of consensus in so far as people have indicated that there should be a single Department. Frankly, that is as far as we can go.

11.45 am

Mr A Maginness: On examination, models 1 and 2 are essentially the same; the difference is marginal. The rotation of the Minister in the first model is similar to Ministers acting jointly in the second. One of the important questions is: what mechanism will be used to appoint the Ministers? Will a straightforward d’Hondt procedure be used, or will the process be similar to the appointment of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister? That must be thrashed out.

Essentially, models 1 and 2 are variants of the same model; they are the same in substance and in practice. However, that reflects my earlier point about shared responsibility and Mr Neeson’s point about collective responsibility. A measure of trust is being placed in the Minister or Ministers to carry out their duties and to defend the interests of the people who elected them.

It would be very difficult for the parties represented here to come to a specific conclusion about models 1 or 2. We have general agreement on having one Department and on a form of sharing within that Department. That is a major step forward in trying to achieve consensus on the modality.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): I ask members to address that issue as we proceed. Do we have agreement that the ministerial arrangements in a single Department should be addressed at a later stage? That discussion will include the ministerial code and various connected issues.

Mrs Long: As I have already stated, the Alliance Party would be happier with a single ministry. Model 1 is not actually a model; it is a series of options for a model. Therefore, we are talking about a single justice Department with a single Minister. Then come the different options about how that Minister would work. The second model offers joint ministerial power, so there is only a slight difference. Alban is right to say that we are talking about the checks and balances that are needed in a single ministry. The later discussion will need to focus on that.

The difficulty is that we often design unwieldy architecture to try to create accountability in situations in which we do not have confidence. That is the experience with the Good Friday Agreement. The principles in that were correct — and they are still valid — but some of the architecture was very unwieldy.

Public confidence is a key issue when considering the rotation of Ministers. We said in our initial statement that that confidence is important because it goes to the core of people’s sense of security. We should also bear in mind that that relates not only to unionists’ or nation­alists’ sense of security: it relates to the sense of security of those of us who are neither unionists nor nationalists, people who come to Northern Ireland as foreign nationals, and those who are from ethnic minority backgrounds and who may not judge the matter in the same way as others. All of those people need to have confidence in policing and justice. Therefore, wider community confidence must be considered.

The Alliance Party does not believe that a rotating ministry sends out a particularly confident message. We are concerned that it looks almost as though one is playing games with one of the most important Depart­ments. There is something about the idea of Ministers coming and going on a six-monthly or annual basis that suggests an impermanence and lack of direction in policing and justice. That may not be the case, but that is what it would suggest to the public. When we are looking at the structures and considering accountability, we need to look at public confidence in those structures so that people feel that the Executive is taking those matters seriously.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Arlene made the point earlier that the furthest that the parties can go today is to reach consensus on whether to have a single Department for policing and justice. Ministerial arrangements would require further discussion.

Mr McFarland: Can we agree that no party would be happy for there to be a single Minister running a policing and justice Department unfettered? Therefore can we remove option 1 from model 1? Is that generally agreed?

Mrs Long: No. Chairman, we have stated that that would be our preferred option if the accountability mechanisms in the Executive and the Assembly were correct.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Therefore we do not have agreement on that.

Mrs Long: Yes.

Mr McFarland: There is another issue here. Most of the options in model 1 are to do with the Minister and/or junior Minister being elected under the d’Hondt system. I notice that option 5 is unrelated to d’Hondt. Presumably, the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister would appoint, after agreement, those from their respective parties who will look after policing and justice. It is important to make clear that model 1 deals with two separate appointment systems: one employs d’Hondt and the other is that the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister divide up the posts between their parties.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): That is set out in the 2006 Act.

Mr McFarland: Yes, it is, but the distinction does not necessarily jump off the page. Option 5 would mean that the two biggest parties decide who will have responsibility for policing and justice, and the other options mean that everybody has an opportunity, under d’Hondt, to go for the portfolio. The two largest parties have a choice as to whether they choose policing and justice early on and therefore get it, or risk another party getting it.

When we look at the matter in due course, whether that be in October or whenever, it is important that we separate those two outcomes. The smaller parties may be unhappy with the DUP and Sinn Féin carving up policing and justice between them.

Mr A Maginness: May I just comment on that without prejudice to any final position that the SDLP might adopt? There is an implicit assumption here, which we do not necessarily accept, that, given the Assembly’s present configuration, either the DUP or Sinn Féin should run a Department of justice. We certainly would not heed that position. We would say robustly that all parties on the Executive should at least have an opportunity to be appointed or elected as a Minister for justice and policing. I make that point because of the language that is used in option 2 of model 1. It reads:

“A single Minister acting on his/her own but rotating between the parties at set intervals”.

People usually use “between” when they mean “among”; however, it should be “among” in this instance, because to use “between” is to assert that only two parties provide the Minister.

If we are to embrace the concepts of collective responsibility and shared responsibility, it is important that parties should not be excluded from holding the policing and justice portfolio.

Mr G Kelly: To some extent, I agree with Arlene Foster. I do not think that we necessarily need to get into that level of detail. It is important that those points have been raised, but in order to get into or, at least, to come to an agreement on the detail that Alban and Alan talked about, we must realise that all the options in model 1 are interconnected.

At this stage, it is enough that most parties agree on a shared approach. That is not being prescriptive, because we must talk about time frames and what exactly is to be transferred, and all that has an impact. Naomi has an entirely different view on the overall institutional arrangements, which could also have an impact. We could end up agreeing clear details, which could go into the middle of negotiations and come to nothing. It could look as if parties had reached agree­ment on details but wanted to reverse them. A Department for policing and justice must have a scrutiny Committee, and the relationship between that Committee and the Policing Board is important. Alan said earlier that it could be a Mickey Mouse ministry. However, a Minister can make laws, and the Executive can make laws, so it will be an important ministry.

I am happy if there is agreement that we are moving towards a shared model. The responsibilities and structures of OFMDFM are already agreed. Members have said that policing and justice should not be in OFMDFM’s remit because that Department already covers too many areas —that is the position of all the parties — but that does not wipe out the OFMDFM model of jointery. I am not worried about the unwieldiness. Let us find out the issues on which we can agree on and work out the rest later.

Mr Neeson: Alan raised a useful point. We have been discussing the need for a Minister to have the confidence of the public. It is also important that a Minister has the confidence of the Assembly. Whatever mechanism is chosen to appoint a Minister, it is important that he or she should have that confidence.

Mr S Wilson: We do not want to go any further than we have gone today. Say we had gone for the last option on which Alan had a query, and an appointment were made by the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister — that should be subject to a cross-community vote by the Assembly.

Mr Neeson: It is important for any appointment to have the support of the Assembly.

Mrs Foster: I was going to make that point. If there were one Minister, he or she could be straightforwardly appointed using d’Hondt. There could be a cross-community vote or there could be an OFMDFM appointment, subject to a cross-community vote. The cross-community-vote option would not exclude parties such as the SDLP and the Ulster Unionist Party from taking the ministry. I do not want to be prescriptive or exclusive about our list of issues for appointing a Minister, but we could put down a heading “Appointment Structure” and list the different options.

Mrs Long: That would fit in entirely with what the Alliance Party has been saying about the institutional strand. The Executive should be endorsed by a cross-community vote as part of that overall package, particularly in relation to justice issues.

Mr G Kelly: I do not want to prolong this discussion, but sometimes people take consensus as meaning assent. The DUP and the Alliance Party arguments about the institutions do not correspond to Sinn Féin’s position. The idea that a Department for policing and justice should have a cross-community vote — whereas, for example, the Department of Education should not — is a new configuration for which the DUP has been arguing for some time; Sinn Féin is against that proposal. We are straying into a different process.

Mrs Long: Can we have some clarity on this issue? Reference has already been made to OFMDFM structures, and you are arguing that that Department requires a cross-community vote, separate from the rest of the Executive.

Mr G Kelly: That is not what I said.

Mrs Long: That is the argument that has been made in the institutional structures strand. OFMDFM is already distinctive because of the importance of its particular roles. We are not arguing for specific arrange­ments for the policing and justice ministry. Our view is that the entire Executive should be endorsed by a cross-community vote.

12.00 noon

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Can we keep the two issues separate?

Mrs Long: The two issues are completely inter­dependent. It is impossible to keep them separate.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): With due respect, it is possible. They are separated into institutional issues and law and order issues because there are separate groupings to deal with them. It could be interpreted that these discussions involve matters that are not within the Wednesday remit.

Mrs Foster: I am not making a determination. I am just highlighting the options that may be available.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): We will leave that issue to Monday’s meeting, which will deal with the institutions.

Mr McFarland: Are we agreed, therefore, that there is another option, which Naomi mentioned? Parties would nominate MLAs to the policing and justice ministerial positions, subject to a cross-community vote, in the same way as for the posts of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. Is that the proposal?

Mrs Long: That is not a new proposal. It is included in the Alliance Party’s proposals for the institutional changes. Although members have been advised that we are not to refer to those proposals at this meeting, I fail to see how we can discuss the devolution of policing and justice without referring to the institutional arrangements. I understand, however, the need to confine the discussion.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): At this stage, we are dealing with the models.

Mr McFarland: When we deal with policing and justice, if we decide to opt for a joint ministry, is it proposed that we would structure it in the same way as the joint team in the Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister?

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): That matter is for the Preparation for Government Committee dealing with institutional changes to —

Mr McFarland: No. Hold on. I am saying that there are several options, one of which would be to use the same appointments process as exists for the posts of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. Parties would nominate their candidates, and MLAs would vote —

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): That is stipulated in legislation.

Mr McFarland: I understand that, but, as members know, it is up to the Preparation for Government Committee to propose anything that its members wish. The Secretary of State has said that on numerous occasions. If the Committee decides to go in a particular direction, that is permitted.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): However, the Secretary of State did not say that he would agree with the Committee’s decisions.

Mr McFarland: I know that he did not say that he would agree with the Committee, but the Committee is free to make proposals as its members see fit.

If the Committee agrees to opt for two Ministers for policing and justice, rather than allowing for the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister to appoint them, will those appointments be made by MLAs in the Chamber in the same way as for the appointment of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister? Would Members be allowed to jump up and nominate, for example, Ian Paisley and Gerry Adams for the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, and Sammy Wilson and Gerry Kelly as Ministers for policing and justice? As is the case with the posts of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, would there be a cross-community vote? Is that a suggested option for the appointment of the Ministers for policing and justice?

Mr G Kelly: We are miles ahead of the earlier discussion on which we had reached some sort of conclusion. We have shot off on a tangent. There is a fair amount of consensus for the concept of a single Department on a shared ministerial basis, which is far enough to be going for now. There was not a particularly deliberate attempt to do it, but we have ended up in a whole different discussion on the institutional —

Mr McFarland: No, Chairman, I am not —

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Hold on for a second, please.

Mr G Kelly: If Mr McFarland has another option, he should produce it and say that it is another option.

Mr McFarland: I thought that Naomi was suggesting that the two policing and justice Ministers were —

Mrs Long: May I clarify?

Mr McFarland: If that is not the case —

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): One member at a time, please.

Mrs Long: I was not suggesting that; I was responding to a comment made by Arlene Foster, who said that there would be a number of options to ratify the appointments. May I also —

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): We agreed that the Committee would return to that issue.

Mrs Long: Yes, we did, but I want to make it clear that the concept of a single ministry, not necessarily headed jointly, was agreed by assent. I want to make that clear because —

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Nothing has been agreed yet.

Mrs Long: Gerry Kelly inferred that a single ministry had been agreed.

Mr G Kelly: Nobody has said —

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): I wish to make this clear: nothing has yet been agreed.

Mr A Maginness: Our discussion is becoming a bit raggedy. At this point, we must not be overambitious. Members have agreed on a single Department.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): We have not actually agreed on that. We are trying to get to that stage.

Some Members: We have.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): We have a proposal.

Mr A Maginness: We have not yet formally agreed on that. It might be wise to not formally agree until —

Mr McFarland: Until everything is agreed. [Laughter.]

Mr A Maginness: By discussing methods of selection by the Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, or by the Assembly, we are getting too far ahead of ourselves. We need to consult within our parties before we plough ahead.

Mr Weir: Nothing has been agreed or ruled out on models 1 and 2. Confusion has arisen because there are two sets of options. There seems to be broad agreement that a single Department is needed, whether responsibility is shared or not. There are a range of options for how that single Department should be run, which are outlined under models 1 and 2. That can range from a single Minister acting alone to two Ministers. There are options as to how the Department should be run, and there is a separate issue about how the Minister or Ministers should be appointed. Those two matters are becoming meshed together and confused. The second issue flows from the first, to some extent.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Mr Kelly’s proposal was that we agree on a single Department with shared ministerial responsibilities. Do we have consensus on that?

Members indicated dissent.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): We do not have consensus. Mrs Foster proposed that we agree on a single Department, but that the ministerial arrangements need to be addressed later.

Mr G Kelly: We are dealing with concepts. A number of people, including DUP members, have said that they want to go back to their parties on this matter. However, there is a fair degree of consensus on the concept, although there is some disagreement about whether responsibility should be shared. I am happy enough with that.

Mr Maskey: Most members talked about models 1 and 2. The first bullet point refers to a single Minister acting alone, but it goes on to refer to rotation. There must be some sharing of responsibility.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): We do not have consensus on that at this stage. We seem to have consensus that there should be a single Department, with the ministerial arrangements to be sorted out at a later stage.

Mr Maskey: If people want to decouple the concept of a single Department from the notion of sharing responsibility, that is different option from what is proposed.

Mrs D Kelly: We have agreed that there should be sufficient safeguards for both communities to have confidence.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Have we agreed that there should be a single Department?

Members indicated assent.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Does the Committee want to come back to the ministerial arrangements at a later stage and leave the issue of mechanisms to the PFG Committee dealing with institutional arrangements?

Mr G Kelly: Although we do not want to enter into a long, drawn-out discussion on timing, the issue is affected by it. Those matters are all parts of one discussion. We have gone some distance on this matter; let us deal with some of the other issues.

Mr S Wilson: We must come back to this matter; we cannot leave it as vague as it is at present. It could be discussed at our next meeting.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Have we agreed to return to the question of ministerial arrangements, and to pass the issue of structures to the PFG Committee dealing with institutions?

Members indicated assent.

Mrs Long: If we are to come back to this matter, can we also agree when we are coming back to it? It is important that everyone should come prepared for that discussion so that we do not end up doing what we have done today, which is to go around the houses with no outcome.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): The Clerks will try to arrange that. Timing is the other issue.

Mr Kennedy: It may be important to have a preliminary discussion at least to expand on this matter before we refer anything to the PFG Committee dealing with institutional matters, because matters are slightly vague at the moment.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): We will meet again first.

Mr Kennedy: Will the matter be referred to the PFG Committee dealing with institutional matters after that?

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Yes.

What about the issues of the timing of the devolution of policing and justice?

Mr G Kelly: In 2003 and 2004, there was some idea of a time frame. Sinn Féin wanted a fairly sharp time frame of around 12 months, and there were arguments and discussions on a two-year time frame years. As Alban pointed out, the SDLP wanted a time frame of six months and then 18 months, and there should be some discussion on that. Some people argue that time frames are not helpful, but, in the negotiation process, time frames have been important in moving the process on, although there have been some exceptions.

Mr McFarland: What was the agreed timescale within the comprehensive agreement? I believe that the DUP had agreed to a timescale for the devolution of policing and justice.

Mrs Long: The timescale was two years from restoration.

Mr G Kelly: Naomi is right. The DUP will speak for itself, but the timescale was two years from restoration or halfway through a four-year Assembly mandate.

Mrs Foster: I do not want to labour this point, but Alan is fully aware that the DUP did not sign up to the comprehensive agreement. Unfortunately, I must reiterate that every time that Alan says so. He knows full well that the comprehensive agreement is the two Govern­ments’ document, and that neither the DUP nor Sinn Féin signed up to it. He can keep making that point ad nauseum or he can deal with the realities.

Mr S Wilson: The DUP has made its position clear, and there are three strands attached to it. First, we want to see the devolution of policing and justice. Secondly, we do not believe that there is any point in moving towards devolution of policing and justice if we do not have confidence in the behaviour of those who represent republicans. Thirdly, certain things still have to be done. The quicker that they are done, the better.

That answers Alex Maskey’s earlier question when he asked whether the Committee could at least take a view on whether we want devolution of policing and justice as quickly as possible. Those were not his exact words, but it was something along those lines. We do.

If our indication that we want the devolution of policing and justice to happen sooner rather than later helps to affect Sinn Féin’s behaviour, we will be more than happy, and the community will be more than happy. However, if a timescale is set — and this is the difficulty — people are not encouraged to address the issues that are preventing the devolution of policing and justice; they just sit and wait for the specified time. However, if devolution of policing and justice is based on certain conditions being met, those who make the decisions are encouraged to move towards meeting those conditions.

12.15 pm

Therefore, the DUP’s position on achieving the devolution of policing and justice is a positive one. We have stated the conditions that must be met, and they have been well articulated. I could go into detail, but that is not necessary. If those conditions are met, the DUP will be up for the devolution of policing and justice. If they are not met, it will not happen anyway, because there will not be sufficient votes in the Assembly or sufficient confidence in the community to make it happen.

Mr G Kelly: I am trying to resist reacting to the DUP being judge and jury on when it thinks that Sinn Féin, or anyone else, has reached the mark that it has set. The difficulty is that the DUP has set an arbitrary mark as a precondition. Nevertheless, Arlene and I have agreed on a great deal today. She is correct in saying that no one signed up to the comprehensive agreement.

In fairness to Mr McFarland, however, he merely stated the point that had been reached in discussing the devolution of policing and justice — he did not mention an agreement. The DUP’s view was that it would happen at some time around two years after restoration, but Sinn Féin wanted it to happen sooner. Let us deal with some sensible time frame.

The preconditions that the DUP set down are also the preconditions for setting up the institutions. We will not resolve this matter unless the institutions are restored anyway, so there will be a time frame after that. It is not the same discussion. However, one may assume that, at that point, the DUP will have accepted that we are in an entirely new situation and, therefore, the time frame will not be an unlikely discussion. The time frame that we are discussing is in the context of the institutions being set up, so what is the problem?

Mr McFarland: I stand to be corrected on this, but I recall Dr Paisley saying in Downing Street that there was only issue left to be resolved, and that was decommissioning. That is why I keep raising the matter.

The Committee has spent six weeks with William McCrea telling us that we should all keep our hands off the comprehensive agreement, because it was a DUP deal with the Government, and the Government would deliver on it in the autumn. In the House of Commons, Minister Hanson also said that it was a DUP deal, and that he would deliver on it in the autumn. Since then, Peter Robinson and Arlene Foster have said that that is not the case. While that is encouraging, it is also confusing.

Dr Paisley stated that decommissioning was the only outstanding issue, and the DUP agreed to begin modality discussions in February. Within two years, or halfway through an Assembly mandate, devolution of policing and justice would take place. That is not to say that the DUP has not changed its mind, but, at that time, that was its position.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): We do not wish to get into that debate again.

Mrs Foster: I wish that Alan would read our statement in the comprehensive agreement, as there is no mention of time limits in it. I will share that with him over lunch if he wishes, but it will probably give him indigestion. [Laughter.]

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Is there agreement that we should set a time frame in the context of the date of restoration?

Members indicated dissent.

Mr Weir: The DUP has stated its position that the conditions are qualitative, rather than quantitative.

Mr G Kelly: Can I seek clarification on that?

Mr Weir: The DUP wants devolution, but it can only be in a context in which there is trust in the community. We do not accept a specific time frame.

Mr G Kelly: When the institutions have been set up, does the DUP agree that it will have accepted that Sinn Féin is ready for Government?

Therefore, if Sinn Féin is ready for Government, the logic is that it is also ready to be involved in policing. That is the DUP’s view. Sinn Féin is ready any time. Where is the logic in the DUP’s position of not agreeing a time frame for the restoration of the institutions now, and that it will still not agree a time frame, even when the institutions have been set up?

Mrs Long: The question is whether to set a deadline or outline a potential time frame. My understanding was that the comprehensive agreement set a two-year target. Setting a target is slightly different to setting a deadline and saying that devolution of policing and justice will happen in two years. Both the comprehensive agreement and the Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2006, which includes controls for each of the four models, take into account that the conditions in society must be right.

This should not be about targeting individual parties, in this case Sinn Féin. All parties must make it clear to the community that they have given their commitment to policing. However, simply sitting on a Policing Board while hotly criticising the police and playing games with policing issues does not fulfil that requirement.

It is not a question of whether a particular party is fit to have the policing ministry, but whether the institutions are sufficiently robust and stable to take on one of the most contentious and sensitive issues to be devolved. Therefore, a two-year time period would ensure that we had lived through most of what was required to know that that was the case. From the Alliance Party’s perspective, it is not simply about saying whether an individual party is fit to take the ministry, but whether the institutions can withstand the pressure.

Mr A Maginness: The discussion today has been useful.

First, it has been useful to hear Sinn Féin’s view that there is no obstacle to embracing policing or justice arrangements, other than the devolution of those powers to the Assembly. Secondly, the DUP’s statement that timing was not the issue, and that a qualitative assess­ment was necessary, was useful, although the SDLP does not necessarily accept that. The DUP is saying that it is happy for policing and justice to be devolved to the Northern Ireland Assembly, if Sinn Féin fulfils certain conditions.

If those statements are definitive, they are important. It means that timing is not a problem, other than in relation to the administrative and operational problems that would arise with the actual transfer of policing and justice powers to Northern Ireland. I do not know how that would be carried out; it is an administrative operation that may take a certain amount of time. Nonetheless, if everything were in order, both the DUP and Sinn Féin agree that timing is not really the problem.

Both Sinn Féin and the DUP are uncomfortable about mentioning the comprehensive agreement: perhaps a DNA test of that agreement should be carried out to see exactly who its parents are.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): May I remind members — and it may speed things up — that the food is outside. [Laughter.]

Mr G Kelly: I thank Alban for summing up Sinn Féin’s position.

There is nothing new in Sinn Féin’s statement that it perceives the transfer of policing and justice powers to be the key and core outstanding issue on policing. However, it is totally erroneous to say that the time frame is irrelevant. That could lead to a situation where, 10 years after the decision has been made, powers are still being transferred.

I was at a debate with Nelson McCausland last night during which he said that criminality, equality and human rights were now the key issues that the DUP had to sort out before that point was reached. That is hilarious. We are getting mixed messages. The main issue concerning the transfer of powers is accountability.

We must agree the time frame. We must also get to the discussion paper containing the detail of what is transferred. We have not even started on that discussion paper, but I hope that we will some time soon. The people who are against the transfer of powers, especially within the system, have been spending their time trying to shift the status of powers from reserved to excepted, making that transfer ever more difficult. Considerable debate is still needed.

Mr Kennedy: We would do well to remind ourselves that the Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2006 confirms that the devolution of policing and justice, and when that happens, is a matter for the Assembly to determine.

Mr Maskey: Gerry Kelly was very clear when he tried to focus on the DUP’s position on timing. Sammy Wilson said that the DUP wanted the transfer to happen as soon as possible. Sinn Féin does not agree with the DUP’s argument on timing and so-called benchmarks. This discussion is in the context that the institutions will be up and running, so we will have already met all the benchmarks that the DUP has set up. Let us presuppose that we have already got over all the obstacles and that the institutions are up and running. The timing is important, because we need an indication from parties as to what they feel the time limit could be. It is not a matter of a deadline; it is about how long we think that it will take. We must to do whatever is practical to make the transfer of power a reality.

We must decouple the argument from the need to be satisfied. In other words, from the DUP’s point of view, it must satisfy itself that its conditions have been met. This discussion should concern the context of functioning institutions. We must focus the discussion or we will never resolve that issue. That is why we are having this conversation on policing and justice.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): We have a proposal that the date for devolution of policing and justice should be set when the conditions have been agreed between the parties.

Mr Maskey: My point — and the point that Gerry Kelly made and on which he tried to get a response from the DUP — was that this discussion should presuppose that those conditions have already been met, whatever they are. Obviously, Sinn Féin does not agree with all those conditions, but this discussion should be set in the context that the institutions are fully functioning. Therefore, there is no reason why any party would not want the transfer of powers. We should be discussing the practical steps that need to be taken to secure the transfer of powers and how long we think that will take.

Mr S Wilson: There are certain requirements that the DUP feels are necessary for devolution, and Gerry Kelly seems to know them very well. Naomi Long put it very well when she said that this would probably be one of the most difficult and most contentious issues that the Assembly will have to handle.

Given the special significance of policing and justice, the problems associated with that in the past, the functioning of the Assembly, the powers that it will have, how parties handle those powers and how they handle the situation after devolution will provide a measure of confidence, or lack thereof, within the community as to whether or not devolution can take place.

12.30 pm

A decision on when that level of confidence has been reached will depend on all of the following variables: how the Assembly functioned; how the parties behaved in the Assembly; and what has been happening in the community. That is why it is impossible to attach a timescale to the devolution of policing and justice.

Sinn Féin sought an assurance, but the best that our party can do at the moment is to say that we are not being obstructionist, nor are we seeking an excuse to delay devolution of policing and justice for 10 years, as Mr Kelly said. Our stance is aimed at ensuring that, when this important function is devolved, the situation will be workable, will not create difficulties, and the parties and the community are comfortable with it.

The assurance that I have given is the best that can be hoped for at present. My party wants the devolution of policing and justice to happen as soon as possible, but not in a context in which it will create political difficulties and difficulties for the Assembly. I do not believe that setting deadlines or timescales — whatever euphemism is used for fixing a date to which everyone will point — is the best way of ensuring that people meet the conditions for confidence-building.

Mr G Kelly: My difficulty, as we get further into the mire, is that we now have two sets of preconditions from the DUP: one for setting up the institutions, and another for deciding when people are fit for govern­ment. The DUP will decide arbitrarily when those preconditions are met. We are trying to secure an agreed time frame for all the parties that would sit in an Assembly. That is not an imposed time frame, yet the Committee cannot agree even an indicative time frame.

Mr S Wilson: Let us stop at that point. All parties and the two Governments agreed that policing and justice would be devolved a step after the Assembly was set up. Everyone recognised that there was some­thing different about policing and justice, which meant that they could not be a part of the initial package. We all know why they are so significant. This is not a new set of preconditions. It is an acceptance of a position that everyone has taken: given the significance of policing and justice, devolution of those issues should take place a step after restoration.

Mr G Kelly: It is a new bar.

Mr S Wilson: Not at all.

Mr G Kelly: To return to Mr McFarland’s point, the DUP were in those negotiations and clearly understood the time frame. The DUP will not agree even an indicative time frame. I repeat this with some sadness: even by its own criteria, the DUP is declaring that it does not care up to what bar Sinn Féin, the nationalist people or the republican people measure. After the institutions have been restored, the DUP will put Sinn Féin through all that again, and the DUP will be the arbiter of when the bar is met. Never mind the Assembly — the DUP will decide when devolution of policing and justice will take place. The whole idea of the step-by-step approach that Mr Wilson mentioned was precisely the steps that were needed. That was how the time frame was worked out. People were already working on the basis of a time frame.

Mr Weir: The legislation states that the Assembly will decide when policing and justice will be devolved, and we are happy to stick with that. I am not going to flog a dead horse; there comes a stage where the argu­ment goes round in circles. Policing and justice have been treated separately throughout this entire process. As part of the Belfast Agreement, they were not devolved in 1998. Far be it from me to defend the Belfast Agreement. [Laughter.]

Mr G Kelly: Is that on the record?

Mr Weir: I am more than happy for the phrase: “Far be it from me to defend the Belfast Agreement” to be on the record.

When the initial institutions, including the Executive and the Departments, were set up in 1999, policing and justice powers were not devolved because it was felt that they were a separate issue; those powers were clearly beyond those given to the other Departments. The same approach was taken on each occasion that other institutions were set up between 1999 and 2002. The idea that the issue of policing and justice is not separate and different from the issues dealt with by run-of-the-mill Departments is not accurate, politically or historically. The DUP has made its position extremely clear on that.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): I do not think that the Committee is going to reach consensus on this matter.

Mrs Long: For policing and justice powers to be devolved, the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister must put a motion jointly to the Assembly, which would be subject to a cross-community vote. The Secretary of State would then have to ensure that the appropriate conditions were in place, and a vote would be held in Westminster. That is laid out in the Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2006. Therefore, the powers cannot be devolved unless they achieve cross-community confidence.

Taking that as read, is it possible to set a target date by which policing and justice powers can be devolved? It is possible to suggest that conditions must be right and, at the same time, suggest that a target date should be set — those propositions are not mutually exclusive. Setting such a date puts down a marker — members are not saying that devolution of those powers will happen in two years’ time, but simply that it is their wish that it should happen then. It shows that they are prepared to commit to working towards it. That is important for those who believe that the issue of devolution is a key part of this negotiation process. Indicating at least a willingness to move forward does not mean that in two years’ time all the other locks can be unpicked. It is simply a matter of showing willing, and it is important that members are willing to set a date.

I do not want to set a prescriptive date or deadline. It would be pointless to suggest that if this issue were not cleared up in two years’ time, the entire matter should fall apart on that hook. However, it is important to set a target towards which we can work in respect of the legislative framework, and so on. At a certain point, the Secretary of State will also need to introduce legislation to allow for policing and justice powers to be devolved. A process must be entered into, and a two-year target is not an unreasonable one.

Mrs D Kelly: Naomi has covered the theory of the restoration of the institutions quite well. However, for the past 10 minutes we have heard the DUP and Sinn Féin grant mutual vetoes to each other. On the one hand, the DUP says that if Sinn Féin signs up to policing, it will have confidence in Sinn Féin’s ability, and Sinn Féin says that it will not sign up to policing unless a date for devolution of policing and justice powers is established. Therefore, they seem to be giving each other a by-ball.

Mrs Long: Chairman, I am still not clear what the very vague term “sign up to policing” means.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): We must draw this matter to a conclusion because we are running way over time.

Is there consensus that a target date for the devolution of policing and justice should be set at two years after restoration?

Members indicated dissent.

Is there consensus that the devolution of policing and justice should occur as soon as possible?

Mrs D Kelly: Chairman, I think that the consensus —

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Do we have consensus or not?

Members indicated dissent.

Mr Weir: Who said no?

Mr G Kelly: I did.

Mr A Maginness: Chairman, could you repeat the question?

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): I asked whether the devolution of policing and justice should occur as soon as possible.

Mr G Kelly: That does not mean anything.

Mr A Maginness: I think it could mean something.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): We do not have consensus on it.

Mr McFarland: My sense is that this will play a key part in the October discussions.

The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Mr Jim Wells will take the chair after lunch.

The Committee was suspended at 12.39 pm.

On resuming —

1.09 pm

(The Chairman (Mr Wells) in the Chair.)

The Chairman (Mr Wells): First, I wish to apologise. I intended to be present a bit earlier this morning, but I had a meeting with the Speaker that overran, so I did not arrive until the tail end of the previous discussions. The Committee Clerks have brought me up to date with what took place, but forgive me if I do not completely follow members’ train of thought for a few moments.

I do not know whether there have been any changes in personnel over the lunch break, but I understand that we are up to the issue of matters to be considered for devolution, which is paragraph 12 of the NIO discussion paper.

Alban, your team looks a bit thin. Are there more to come?

Mr A Maginness: Yes. Alex Attwood has been held up at a Policing Board meeting. Dolores Kelly should be here in a few minutes.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are you happy to proceed alone? You can handle that.

Mr A Maginness: Yes.

Mr Maskey: Gerry Kelly has been delayed. He will be here.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Members have before them a list of the matters that are to be considered for devolution to a Minister for policing and justice, when he or she is appointed. Without discussing who should be the Minister, when policing and justice powers should be devolved and what must happen before they are devolved, it would be best to go through these matters and ask members whether they are content that these issues be included within the remit after the afore­mentioned has been sorted out.

We will then move on to those issues that have been excluded. We need to check whether members are content that the matters identified in paragraph 12 are in line with their views.

The first matter is “Criminal law and creation of offences and penalties”. Does anyone have any strong feelings about that power eventually being devolved to a Minister?

Mr McFarland: It strikes me that the matters identified in paragraph 12 all fall within the remit of policing and justice. There is probably not a great deal of contention in them. The paragraph on areas in which the devolution of functions would not be possible, may not be appropriate or should be subject to further consideration is perhaps more important.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): That is my reading of it, Alan, but I did not want people to say that I did not give them a chance to state their point of view on one particular issue. The subjects all look pretty innocuous, but I do not know parties’ positions on them. Does anyone want to point out anything with which he or she has a difficulty?

Mr McFarland: As Mr Molloy said earlier, parties have the option of adding to and modifying the list as we progress. If an issue that pertains to one of these matters has not been spotted now but arises later, it is up to parties to raise it.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): In my experience, the fact that parties have not responded does not mean that they have had a diligent meeting, worked it all out and reached that position. Sometimes the speed at which this Committee moves means that the issue is overlooked.

I take it that the various parties’ silence means that, if and when policing and justice is sorted out, you are happy enough with the powers listed in paragraph 12 being devolved?

Members indicated assent.

Mr A Maginness: The Court Service is currently an agency. If the powers outlined in 3(k) of paragraph 12 were devolved, would that change? Can you provide clarification on that?

The Chairman (Mr Wells): No, it would change. A devolved Minister rather than a direct rule Minister will head the Court Service.

Mr A Maginness: On the judicial responsibilities of the Lord Chancellor, my understanding is that the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland is the head of the judiciary; it was formerly the Lord Chancellor. May I receive some clarification on that?

1.15 pm

I do not expect an answer now, but a change was made. I am not certain as to what that change means in practical terms. If, for example, an individual had wanted to query a judge’s performance in court, he or she would have written to the Lord Chancellor. It is now the Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland’s office that replies. What is the significance of that change? Perhaps there is no significance at all. Could I receive clarification on that?

Mrs Foster: It might have more to do with changes that have been made to the Department for Constitutional Affairs at Westminster.

Mr A Maginness: That could well be the case.

Mr McFarland: Mr Chairman, paragraphs 15.4, 15.5 and 15.6 in ‘Devolving Policing and Justice in Northern Ireland: A Discussion Paper’ relate to that.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): I am conscious that I am surrounded by a posse of barristers and solicitors, so I will be very careful to seek out the explanations that you have requested.

Mr McFarland: At paragraph 15.4, it says:

“The Lord Chancellor is responsible for the administration of the Northern Ireland courts.”

Paragraph 15.6 states:

“The Lord Chief Justice of Northern Ireland, as head of the Northern Ireland judiciary, is responsible for functions relating to sittings of courts and the times and places of those sittings”.

Therefore there may a dual role. The Lord Chancellor’s slice of those duties passes to a Northern Ireland Minister for policing and justice upon devolution.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Either way, Alban, do you foresee a concern from the SDLP on the matter?

Mr A Maginness: I am merely seeking clarification. I do not foresee any serious problem.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): We can provide that clarification.

Mr Raymond McCartney: Notwithstanding some of the conversations that we had this morning on the definition of British national security, we will deal with any issues as they arise. However, we have some reservations. We have clear views on national security issues.

Mr Maskey: There is quite a lot in the document, and the NIO has provided notes on the discussion paper. We want to see the maximum powers, as they relate to the whole island, transferred as soon as possible. We covered some of that this morning.

Mr Weir: I was not aware that Westminster could transfer powers to the whole island. I do not know what the member is driving at there, apart from it being a general point of principle.

Mr Maskey: Powers are to be transferred to a Department. Its Minister will be on the Executive, and the Executive and the North/South Ministerial Council are related.

Mr Weir: That is almost a separate issue. It is a step beyond us. When we talk about the transfer of policing and justice powers, we are talking about the transfer of those powers from Westminster to a Northern Ireland Department. If, at some stage, the Executive agreed to work with the Irish Republic on those matters, that would be a separate issue. Initially at least, powers will only go directly to the Department. The level of co-operation is a separate issue.

Mr Maskey: In a way, there is no point in the issue being bandied about. Peter was quick to point out this morning that he was not in agreement. The interdependence of members of the Executive is not really an issue.

Mr Weir: That is not what I am arguing. Policing and justice powers are to be transferred from Westminster to a Northern Ireland Department, and whether that Department shares any of those powers with the Irish Republic is a separate matter.

Mr Maskey: We can agree to disagree, because it is not a major issue. I am merely making the broad statement that Sinn Féin wants the maximum number of powers to be transferred as soon as possible.

I want to put on the record that Sinn Féin is concerned that there seems to be an attempt to plunder the reserved matters and to make a number of them excepted matters. I will elaborate on that concern when we come to discuss those matters.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): I see the point that you are trying to make, Mr Maskey, but it refers to excepted matters, which we are to discuss next. You seem to have indicated that although Sinn Féin is content with the list of excepted matters, it wishes to add to it. There will be opportunity for that when we discuss paragraph 13.

Mr Maskey: Some of these issues are vague. There­fore, for the record, just because Sinn Féin has not challenged specific issues, it does not mean that it supports them.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Hansard has recorded your point. Therefore, if the subject comes up again, you will be covered, as it were.

Mr A Maginness: The Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission (NIJAC) seems to have been excluded.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): If members wish to discuss issues that have been excluded, are they happy that we park those issues that have been included and move on to paragraph 13?

Members indicated assent.

Mr A Maginness: I have not examined the excluded list in any great detail, but is there an explanation for its contents? The Northern Ireland Court Service and the Public Prosecution Service for Northern Ireland have been included, and the omission of NIJAC seems to have been deliberate. Whether it is —

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Would paragraph 13(p) cover that?

Mrs Foster: Perhaps I can be of assistance. I think that Alban is saying that we do not want to place anything from paragraph 13 on to the lists of reserved or excepted matters and that we are happy that everything on that list will be transferred. Is that correct?

Mr A Maginness: Yes.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Can we agree that? If so, we can have a free and unfettered discussion on paragraph 13 and the issues that we would like to be included.

Mrs Foster: Yes.

Mr A Maginness: NIJAC is not on the list; that is a significant omission.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will come back to that. Am I right to assume that no one is dying in a ditch about the current list?

Members indicated assent.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Paragraph 13 includes a list of specific exclusions, which runs to over 20. I suspect, therefore, that the discussion on it will take quite a while. Members may agree with some of the exclusions, but I suspect that some will be the source of quite a bit of debate.

Paragraph 13(a) states:

“the Secretary of State should retain responsibility for offences related to terrorism and treason — these are excepted matters”.

Is treason something that members would like the Assembly to take within its bailiwick?

Mrs Foster: I would be quite happy to try some people for treason.

Mrs D Kelly: That is an internal DUP matter. Leave Jim Wells alone.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): I know the feeling. Some of us have been through that process already.

Mr Kennedy: Your private life is no concern of ours. [Laughter.]

Mrs Foster: As far as the DUP is concerned, offences related to terrorism and treason sit naturally as excepted matters.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Do any of the other parties feel differently about that?

Mr A Maginness: I will reserve the SDLP’s position for the moment. It may be more appropriate for a Northern Ireland Assembly, rather than the Westminster Government, to deal with some issues that relate to anti-terrorist legislation.

Mr Raymond McCartney: Sinn Féin feels that responsibility for offences relating to terrorism and treason should be transferred.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Therefore one party is neutral, and one party is opposed to its remaining an excepted matter. Do the other parties have preferences?

Mr McFarland: The legislation is quite clear. The agreement, to which most of us signed up, sets out the excepted matters and those matters that could be transferred, and we have acknowledged those matters that could be transferred. The excepted matters tend to relate to national security. I can understand why Sinn Féin would want them devolved, but the Ulster Unionist Party wants them to remain as excepted matters. That is what they should be, as part of the national effort.

Mrs Long: The Alliance Party is content that responsibility for offences related to terrorism and treason remains an excepted matter. However, this morning’s discussion on where terrorism ends and criminality begins needs to be explored further.

Mr Weir: The DUP believes that it should remain an excepted matter.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): It is quite clear that we do not have consensus.

Mr Raymond McCartney: The concept of British national security needs to be defined. That is the sticking point for all these issues. Some parties are comfortable with the concept of British national security, but Sinn Féin is not, which is why it has reservations.

Mr McFarland: We are back to the agreement and whether Sinn Féin accepts the consent principle, which states that the people of Northern Ireland will remain citizens of the United Kingdom until they vote otherwise. My understanding was that Sinn Féin accepted the agreement. Of course, people are free to try to change everyone’s minds, but, for the time being, Northern Ireland will remain part of the United Kingdom.

British national security will take precedence until such times as Northern Ireland becomes part of the Irish Republic, when, presumably, the Irish Republic’s national security interests would take precedence. The agreement set out that process, and I understood that Sinn Féin had signed up to the agreement.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Of course, those terms are repeated in the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which lists the excepted matters.

Mr McFarland: Absolutely.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Therefore, issues in two documents would have to be overcome.

There is a clear divergence of opinion. All we can do is accept that and minute it. We do not have consensus on the matter.

Mr Maskey: That is true. As Mr McCartney said, it is all very well to talk about —

[Inaudible due to mobile phone interference.]

— in some cases, transferred matters are being extracted and placed in the excepted matters category. That is not acceptable to Sinn Féin. Where will it end? As Raymond said, who defines what constitutes national security? We have been discussing criminal law. What does that have to do with national security?

Mr McFarland: The British Government, in the same way as the Irish or German Governments, determine matters of national security. That is what Governments do.

Mr Raymond McCartney: Only within their territories, though.

Mr McFarland: Members need to keep reminding themselves that the Northern Ireland Assembly is a devolved institution, not a sovereign Government.

Mr Maskey: The agreement, the Patten Report and so on identified issues that should be transferred to Northern Ireland. Sinn Féin believes that “national security” is being used as a cover-all to prevent the transfer of certain issues. What does the right to investigate crime have to do with national security?

Naomi discussed the difference between the approaches being taking towards “republicanism” and “loyalism”. It is a mishmash. Under the guise of the national security banner, there is a clear attempt to remove some reserved matters. In effect, that would remove powers from locally accountable Ministers and Departments and the Executive. It is not right and should not be allowed.

National security needs to be defined. Who defines it? Where is the line drawn? It is not good enough to simply say that a matter comes under the heading of national security and, therefore, because of the agree­ment and the principle of consent, it must be accepted. The agreement is a given. Sinn Féin very much accepts the agreement, but it is not prepared to allow it to be used as a spurious banner to remove those powers that rightfully reside with locally accountable Ministers.

Mr McFarland: I am not saying that we should not examine those matters. Paragraph 13(a) of the NIO discussion paper relates to the ability to pass legislation and to decide what offences relate to terrorism and treason. The Government have decided that those are excepted matters. I am not saying that we cannot examine other issues that have been taken away that rightly belong here, but terrorism and treason are excepted matters, and they have been excepted matters from the beginning. If that is incorrect, perhaps some legal eagles could describe whether those powers were going to be transferred but have suddenly been removed. However, I understood that they were excepted matters.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mr Maskey, you are not saying that there are no issues that are excepted matters. There are issues of state security that would remain at Westminster. You are questioning what is defined as those excepted matters.

1.30 pm

Mr Maskey: I do not want anything in respect of this country to be dealt with at Westminster. We are dealing with matters that are currently reserved and that should be transferred as soon as possible to locally elected accountable Ministers. We are also dealing with issues that are supposed to be excepted matters. Sinn Féin believes that there is a clear attempt by the NIO and the British Government to take reserved matters back as excepted matters, under the banner of national security. That is not right; it is spurious and unacceptable.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will not reach a common view on this matter.

Mr McFarland: There are reserved matters, and it was recognised at the time of the agreement that those matters could be devolved. There is a list of those matters, relating to the courts and so forth, because it was recognised that policing and justice would be devolved eventually. There are also excepted matters that will never be devolved. It would be useful if Mr Maskey could point out areas that were in the reserved category but that have now been put in the excepted category.

Terrorism and treason have always been excepted matters. There was never an expectation that terrorism, treason and national security would be devolved. It would be useful to know which reserved matters are now excepted. These matters were excepted, and they remain excepted. We are merely acknowledging the fact that they continue to be excepted matters of national security. Does that make sense?

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mr Maskey, you are not expecting matters such as the positions of Russian nuclear submarines to be devolved to a Northern Ireland Executive — or are you?

Mr Maskey: Criminal law is a reserved matter, and there is now an argument that some matters that appear under the heading of “national security” would be excepted. There is a blurring and a vagueness. Under the banner of national security, some aspects of investigations into serious crime and so forth remain excepted matters. Mrs Long discussed that at length this morning, and there are further examples. I am seeking clarification rather than simply saying that we agree that certain issues should remain excepted matters.

Mr McFarland: National security issues are a matter for Westminster.

The investigation of organised crime remains the responsibility of the PSNI. My understanding — and I know that some people will disagree — is that only responsibility for issues relating to republican terrorism and the handling of republican agents will remain with the national organisation, MI5, until the threat of bombs in Great Britain has gone away.

Northern Ireland has seen its first court case and sentencing of an individual operating on behalf of al-Qaeda, and more cases are in the pipeline. As a result of the massively increased threat from al-Qaeda it has been decided, rightly or wrongly, that the examination of worldwide terrorism should remain with MI5. No responsibility for actual crime investigation rests anywhere other than with the PSNI.

Mr Weir: I do not wish to deny anyone the right to argue the case that a previously excepted matter should become a transferred matter, or even that reserved matters should become transferred matters. However, the DUP is extremely unlikely to be persuaded that a previously excepted matter should become a transferred matter.

I am not altogether clear whether any matters listed in the Northern Ireland Act 1998 as reserved matters have since changed to excepted matters — Alan McFarland may have been driving at something similar, and in the light of the lack of clarity, some matters may bear closer examination.

Arguably, although every issue must be examined, those matters that have shifted from being reserved to excepted, or vice versa, are more of a grey area and therefore merit particular attention. However, I am not aware of anything that has changed from being a reserved matter to an excepted matter during that eight-year period. A list of any such changes in status may help.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): That is a good suggestion, because we are getting bogged down, and some of those matters will come up time and time again.

Mr Maskey, if you will provide the Committee with a list of any matters that you feel should be devolved but that remain excepted, that would help point the Committee in the direction of what you feel needs to be changed. Until those matters are identified, we will not get very far.

Mrs D Kelly: Part of the problem is that the definition of terrorism is confusing. There has been a mass exodus of loyalist paramilitaries to England; perhaps they will pose a national security threat and the entire definition will change.

In ‘Devolving Policing and Justice in Northern Ireland: A Discussion Paper’, chapter 5 on ‘Criminal Law and Creation of Offences and Penalties’ states:

“The Secretary of State is currently advised on this by the Criminal Justice Directorate of the Northern Ireland Office.”

Is terrorism defined as financial gain from the proceeds of crime — and is that based on the fact that paramilitaries are engaged in criminality, which goes back to Naomi’s point — or is terrorism defined as blowing places up? Why should the Criminal Justice Directorate not report to the Assembly Minister, as opposed to the Secretary of State, on the legislative requirements for the creation of offences and court procedures?

The Chairman (Mr Wells): We need more inform­ation. We are not going to square the circle, and there are similar issues on the list.

Mrs Foster: May I suggest that we compare the list of transferable, reserved and excepted matters, as it was in 1998 — that is not something that I am often heard to say — and compare it to the list on the discussion paper to see if anything has changed? Some matters, such as judicial appointments, were not up for debate in 1998. That is a key issue for the SDLP and something new that we could discuss.

If a matter is excepted, the likelihood of Government transferring it in the future is nil. The Committee should get into the realms of reality and deal with reserved matters and those that Government have perhaps moved to except. There is a case for that. If something has been excepted for eighty years —

Mr Weir: Eight years.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Would such a table be helpful? Members could tick off the matters that they feel are in the wrong columns. In the absence of that, the Committee will get heavily bogged down.

Mr Maskey: Members belong to political parties, and our job is to win a mandate and achieve our party objectives, whatever those may be. If members simply say that the Government will not change their minds then — [Interruption.]

The Chairman (Mr Wells): The beauty of such a list is that members can say that x, y and z should move from one column to the next.

Mr Maskey: A fundamental question should be addressed. How do members feel that they can define national security? One need only look at the intention to give MI5 an increased role in policing. That muddies the whole issue, never mind the morality or the correct­ness of the situation. A British security system would interfere in matters that are rightfully the preserve of locally elected and democratically accountable Ministers.

Consider, for example, the relationship between an Attorney General who would be appointed here and the Crown Prosecution Service. That relationship would be fundamentally different here to what it would be elsewhere. Who, then, will define national security? Members seem to be saying that nothing can be done about national security matters, or that they want to do nothing about them. Sinn Féin is asking when the term national security will be defined.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): I have asked the Secretary of State to come along to the Committee, and it may be appropriate for members to ask him to define what he means by national security. The record of that request is in Hansard, and, no doubt, his staff are working on that as we speak.

Mrs Long: The national Parliament will define national security, and therefore none of the devolved Administrations may define the term. The Government of the nation will define it. Members may be able to influence Government decisions on that.

As you have said, Mr Chairman, the Alliance Party has highlighted the potential for anomalies in the treatment of paramilitaries. If, for example, republican paramilitarism were viewed as a threat to national security but loyalist paramilitarism as a criminal issue, my party would be concerned about parity. National security is not an issue that I foresee being reviewed on the basis of what members think. That is not to say that we accept the status quo, but, in the context of this discussion, I imagine that to be the situation.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): I must step in here or the Committee will get bogged down. May we have a view on Mrs Foster’s proposal that we have a list of reserved and accepted matters for guidance? Can we agree that, if the Secretary of State appears before the Committee, one issue that will be flagged up is his definition of national security and how he sees its relevance to this discussion?

Mr McFarland: The Secretary of State is likely to appear at a later stage in the process. It would be useful if, alongside that list, we could obtain the NIO’s definition of national security and who decided it. If this discussion continues, the factual position will be quite useful.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): I like to get at least 10 consensuses in these meetings, so can we have the first?

Mr Weir: It would be helpful if we could have a table with three columns that we could read across. We could then compare lists of transferred and reserved powers, for example, the position in 1998 and the historical position in 1921. I suspect that Sinn Féin’s position will be that almost everything should be transferred; but the rest of us will need to be persuaded that something on the list of excepted powers eight years ago should now suddenly be transferred.

It would be particularly difficult to persuade us that a matter that had never been transferred to Northern Ireland should now be transferred. We need a three-column table that would enable comparisons and contrasts between reserved and excepted matters at different stages, with a separate list for items such as the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission, which is an example of a power transferred since 1998.

1.45 pm

Mr Raymond McCartney: No one here wants to offer their definition of British national interest. However, this matter has practical implications because people have been vetted and refused employment or contracts because they were deemed to be contrary to British national interests. Therefore, if a Minister is running a Department, who decides for him or her what the national interest is?

The Chairman (Mr Wells): I will let Alban speak, and then I will move to the vote because we have been bashing this issue around for some time now.

Mr A Maginness: I want to make a general comment. The list of matters that are being retained at Westminster contains some significant items, while others are purely procedural and quite insignificant. However, reservations can be voiced and arguments raised in objection to their retention.

Members should study the list very carefully, because the powers that be at Westminster could well have an agenda that involves keeping things back for specific reasons that are not consonant with good government in Northern Ireland and that do not help the devolved institutions. I encourage members to take a more sceptical view of matters that are being reserved.

Chairman, you suggested getting advice on matters that are reserved and excepted and so forth, and that would help to inform the debate.

The powers of the Northern Ireland Judicial Appoint­ments Commission should be included in the matters that are being transferred. From more careful consideration of the NIO discussion paper, I notice that it mentions the Lord Chancellor’s responsibility for the appoint­ment of listed judicial offices and that the First Minister and Deputy First Minister, acting jointly, will be responsible for judicial appointments through the Judicial Appointments Commission. According to this text, therefore, that would be a devolved matter.

Mr Maskey: Chairman, I apologise, I know that you want to move to the vote, but, in a way, my comments will colour the entire afternoon session, so please indulge me a little — it is not treasonable yet.

Mr Weir: That is for us to decide.

Mr Maskey: Peter Weir made a proposal that I would like to hear again. He proposed carrying out an exercise to find out what matters were reserved a number of years ago and what matters would now be excepted, and so on. It is important that we can compare what was in the Good Friday Agreement, the Patten Report, the 2006 Act, and the NIO discussion paper.

Sinn Féin is arguing that those in the British securocrat system are trying to emasculate the powers that should be transferred, which Alban just mentioned. Sinn Féin believes that a number of attempts have been made in the 2006 Act, and in the NIO discussion document, to make reserved matters excepted or to split them in some vague way. I would like a list of any regulations or protocols that relate to British national security, and a list of the powers devolved to the Scottish Parliament. That would be a useful comparison.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): That is a fair point. Let us take the proposals in order. The first proposal, from Peter Weir, is to get a list of excepted and reserved matters in read-across form so that we can see exactly where we stand; that the Northern Ireland Office be asked to produce a written definition of national security; and that we should raise that with the Secretary of State. That is purely for information. No emphasis is being placed on these points — we merely want to clarify the position.

Mr Weir: The other matter is Alban Maginness’s point that we should request an additional column to detail the functions that were not mentioned in 1998. An obvious one is the Northern Ireland Judicial Appointments Commission, but there may be other matters that are dated post-1998.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Do we have consensus on that proposal?

Members indicated assent.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mr Maskey has asked for an explanatory text that details the protocols, any relevant documents and, of course, the powers of the Scottish Parliament in relation to national security. I do not believe that the Scottish Parliament has any role in that area. However, it is important that we get that information.

Mr Weir: I presume that one could describe those as Home Office matters.

Mr A Maginness: My understanding was that Mr Maskey was not referring to matters of national security per se, but to justice matters. I understand that traditionally, Scotland has had a great deal of judicial independence over and above any other part of the UK. I could not foresee the Scottish Parliament not having additional powers.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): That information would be useful.

Mrs Foster: Scotland’s legal system is entirely separate from those in England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and the Lord Chancellor does not have as much power in Scotland as he has in those jurisdictions. If we want to be absolutely thorough, we should also find out the position of the National Assembly for Wales.

Mr McFarland: Chapter 18 of the NIO discussion paper details which functions are excepted and why.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): The idea of a read-across table —

Mr McFarland: That idea is fine, but if members want to read up on specific issues before we get that table, they are set out in that chapter.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are we agreed that we should get the additional information that Mr Maskey requested?

Mrs Foster: As long as we get information from the Scottish Parliament and the National Assembly for Wales.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Do members have any problems with that? Is that agreed?

Members indicated assent.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): The research team will no doubt use that, plus Hansard, to track down that material.

We move to paragraph 13(b) of the NIO discussion paper — “Criminal records, checks and disclosures”. Those are devolved matters in Scotland.

Mr Weir: I do not want to cut across this discussion, but I thought that the purpose of getting the paper was so that we could deal with all of those issues. It strikes me that when you have a paper that also details the situations in Scotland and Wales, you are in a better position to put all those issues into context. To be honest, if we work through this list of 15 or 20 separate issues before we get that paper, we will merely be using our insufficient knowledge to rehearse arguments.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): You must be a mind reader, Mr Weir, because the staff are saying exactly the same thing.

Mr Weir: Great minds think alike.

Mr Kennedy: And fools seldom differ.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): When we get the additional information we will be able to have a more educated discussion.

Mr Maskey: Could we get additional information on international human rights obligations?

The Chairman (Mr Wells): How does that relate to matters that are excluded from the remit of a possible Minister with responsibility for justice in the Executive?

Mr Maskey: If we want to be elected and accountable, we will need our own human rights obligations. If some of those matters are excepted, how do we, as elected representatives who are accountable to people here, defend those obligations? Where do they lie?

The Chairman (Mr Wells): It is an interesting point, but I do not see how it lies in paragraph 13.

Mrs Foster: I would not consent to that. We are straying into the realms of trying to find out how many things we can get from this paper. We must be realistic. Rights, safeguards and human rights issues are dealt with by the Preparation for Government Committee that meets on Fridays. If Mr Maskey would like to attend, I am sure that Dermot Nesbitt will give him an exposition on human rights, and we will be all the wiser for it.

Mr Maskey: I have heard Dermot’s exposition; I was not terribly enamoured with it.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): We do not have consensus for Mr Maskey’s additional proposal. If the research team produces all that we have asked for, we will have enough material to be going on with.

We are whizzing very quickly through the agenda. We have reached paragraph 13q, so we will have to park this issue for the week and hope to continue that discussion next time.

We do not know whether all that material will be available within a week, but we have plenty to be going on with while that research is being done for us.

The Preparation for Government Committee’s work programme is continually revised and updated, and we like to let members know when we shall be meeting, who will be chairing the sitting, and so forth. The economic challenges subgroup is doing the same. Do members have any practical difficulties with the work programme? Mr Molloy and I will be present through­out, so no problems will arise with the chairmanship of any sittings.

Mr Kennedy: The scrupulous attention of one of the doorkeepers prevented one of our observers from attending this morning. It has now been established that our observer should have been given access. The doorkeeper has apologised to the individual concerned, but, nevertheless, it is important that observers are eligible to attend meetings and that doorkeepers be informed of who will be attending sittings. Procedures should be consistent, and consistently applied.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Normally the parties would inform the staff of who will be attending. The observers in attendance have been here quite often, so we have got to know their faces. The gentleman to whom you refer was a new face to the staff, and they did not know in advance that he was to attend. If he wants to attend our future meetings, the problem has been resolved.

Mr McFarland: Chairman, logic dictates that somebody stick his or her head around a door to check whether anyone else plans to attend. We were told that we could have an observer in attendance. In fact, I raised the issue of observers attending our meetings. Had I realised what had happened this morning, I would have done something. To be turned away in such a fashion is silly.

Mr Maskey: It comes under the heading of “National Security”.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): We shall speak to the doorkeepers about that, but had they known in advance, the issue would not have arisen.

Mr Weir: On a related point, it may be useful if each party were given an additional set of papers in advance of each meeting. That could be made available to the party or to an adviser.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): We discussed that, but the view was taken that, as we are already distributing 30 sets of papers, it was the responsibility of the parties, who receive papers well in advance of meetings, to give them to researchers.

Mr Weir: If that was to be increased from 30 to 35, it should not —

The Chairman (Mr Wells): We would still not have known that this gentleman was coming, so we would have had no —

Mr Weir: I propose that an additional set of papers per party be made available. It would be up to the party to decide whether that went to its staff or to whomever. I do not know whether anybody has a particular problem with that.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): To whom would that pack go?

Mr Weir: It would go to the general office of each party. All parties have general offices in Parliament Buildings. From a practical point of view, that should not prove all that difficult.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): What do members feel about Mr Weir’s proposal that one extra pack, with which parties can do what they feel fit, be provided to the parties’ general office?

Mr Kennedy: It may also be helpful, Chairman, if you could be provided with a register of additional party staff. You would then be able to identify party researchers or observers. Perhaps it would be helpful if the parties could produce a list of names so that party staff could be easily, or more easily, identifiable.

2.00 pm

The Chairman (Mr Wells): The DUP seems to be happy enough, so can we agree that? That will overcome some of the difficulties we have experienced this morning. There is no deliberate attempt to exclude people, I assure you.

There is a letter from the Secretary of State — members will be aware that we wrote to him on 3 August — in which he says that he is minded to move the first plenary sitting after recess to 11 September, a date that we will all recall. That will give the Preparation for Government Committee and the economic subgroup a bit more time to finish their work. I mentioned this to the Speaker today, and she is content with the arrange­ment. The Business Committee meeting will also move back a week. Is everyone content with the contents of the Secretary of State’s letter? It was, after all, this Committee that, by consensus, asked for the plenary sitting to be put back.

Mr Kennedy: Chairman, it was reported in the press yesterday, so it is already a done deal.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): I have to put it formally to the Committee.

Members indicated assent.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Item 6 on the agenda is a letter that the Committee received from Prof Sir Desmond Rea, the chairman of the Policing Board. We have members of the Policing Board here, so he will need no introduction. It is a very helpful and positive letter. The Policing Board is offering to give us any help or provide any evidence that we require. I suggest that we keep this on file, and if any issues arise on which we feel that we need input from the Policing Board, we can ask for an answer or for written evidence, and perhaps reserve the right to call it to give evidence. That is entirely at our discretion.

The last issue today is one that was raised by Mr McNarry at yesterday’s meeting of the economic subgroup, which some of you will have attended — Mr Maginness chaired the meeting so he is aware of it.

The first thing Mr McNarry has asked us to decide upon is:

“whether it is appropriate for a substitute to attend specifically in place of the nominated PfG member representative”.

My view — and I am sure that it is the view of many others — is that it has been extraordinarily difficult to keep this Committee going during the summer period. In fact, the turnout has been quite remarkable. The full Preparation for Government Committee has never been in a position where it has become inquorate. Even today the attendance is in double figures. The economic subgroup has found it more difficult. There have been times when it has been hard to achieve the seven members that are required. Indeed, on one occasion we did become inquorate, and that evidence was lost.

We have had a fairly flexible attitude to this —members have come and gone, but it has not disrupted the flow of the Preparation for Government Committee or the economic subgroup. As someone who has had to chair these meetings, I feel that that flexibility has helped enormously in enabling us to keep going. We get our daily lambasting from the press —usually when we turn to the front page of the ‘Belfast Telegraph’ — but a lot of hard work has been going on during the past six weeks, and that is because members have been able to get capable substitutes to cover for them. However, other members of the Committee may feel that we need a more rigid approach.

Mr Weir: Chairman, I was at the economic subgroup meeting yesterday. From a practical point of view, it would not have been able to function, to be brutally honest, if you had said that we must have seven out of the same 10 people there at all times.

There is a slight degree of irony. I do not want to be disparaging towards the member who raised the issue, but I think that the economic subgroup and the Preparation for Government Committee have become inquorate on only one occasion. As it happens, it was when Mr McNarry left the room.

From a practical point of view, a bit of common sense must be adopted. It would be a different matter if the Preparation for Government Committee and the economic subgroup were meeting in the middle of October, when we could reasonably expect most MLAs to be available. In most places, seven out of 10 members would be considered a pretty high quorum. From a practical point of view, I doubt that more than one or two meetings could have functioned if a quorum of 10 named members had been stuck to rigidly.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Alban, you chaired the meeting, so it is important that we hear from you.

Mr A Maginness: I did, and Mr McNarry raised the point. I asked the Committee Clerk for advice on the matter, and the position is explained in the aide-memoire.

It is my view that flexibility is the most important aspect of the Preparation for Government Committee and the economic subgroup’s functioning well. If a situation arises that restricts membership, the Committee and the subgroup will run into all sorts of difficulties, not least becoming inquorate. I hope that I am right in this, but, by and large, there is consensus that the rules governing the membership of the Committee and the subgroup should not be too strict. They should allow the Committee and the subgroup to work, and let the parties get on with the job of presenting their views. That is my opinion.

It seems to me that there should be no problems with members chairing the Committee or the subgroup. Those members will act independently and will have no voting rights.

Mr Neeson: For an Assembly that is supposed to be in recess, it is incredible that such a good attendance record has been maintained at the Committee and the economic subgroup. Yesterday, I made the point about the role of the Assembly’s Deputy Speakers. When they are not in the Chair, the Deputy Speakers can participate normally in Assembly debates. I see some similarities between that and the role that Naomi is performing. Also, I think that it is incredible that she has been able to attend so many meetings during recess.

Mr McFarland: This is specific to the economic subgroup because it alone remains under the Secretary of State’s rules. The Secretary of State ruled that the subgroups should comprise one member of the Preparation for Government Committee from each party and A N Other expert from each party. The UUP nominated two members plus a substitute. It is the middle of the summer and members are away all over the place; they can attend one week but not the next. Essentially, the UUP took a sensible approach to the Committee. Members have subbed as best they could and, on a week-by-week basis, have identified the member whom they were to replace.

The logic is to take that approach to the economic subgroup. I can understand why the larger parties might be slightly confused as to why more members of their teams were not permitted to attend the Committee and the subgroup. However, the Alliance Party may well have problems over the summer. Am I correct to say that, with the Speaker out of the equation, the Alliance Party has five available members?

Mrs Long: Yes.

Mr McFarland: Therefore, perhaps it would not be unreasonable to take a relatively easy approach to Committee and subgroup membership.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): The rules are silent on the issue. Therefore, it is up to us to decide whether we wish to continue in this way. Another issue is that the way that the Committee and the subgroup have worked has allowed each party to field a specialist team for the Preparation for Government Committees dealing with institutional changes and policing and justice. That is why a plethora of MLAs who sit on the Policing Board is here today: they are the experts on that issue. Such arrangements would not have been possible if we had stuck rigidly to Mr McNarry’s suggestion.

Given the fact that it is the middle of August, I cannot see any other way round the issue. However, Mr McNarry insisted that it be raised, and, therefore, we were obliged to deal with it. It would be useful to have consensus one way or the other on whether Mr McNarry’s suggestion should be taken forward.

Mrs Long: I do not wish to discuss the detail of my participation and the consternation that it caused yesterday — [Laughter.]

At least three of the parties around the table today have fielded teams at the main Programme for Govern­ment Committee that have not included one of their formal members of that Committee. Therefore, to suggest that parties should not be allowed to field substitutes to be their Programme for Government Committee representative on the subgroup seems ludicrous.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): There seems to be consensus. Are members agreed that we should retain the flexible approach that we have had up to now and allow parties to field substitutes as and when necessary?

Members indicated assent.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): A separate issue, to which Naomi referred, is the fact that she has been made a Chair of the economic subgroup, but is attending meetings of the PFG Committee also.

Mrs Long: I have attended one meeting.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Sean’s point is that Deputy Speakers can attend the Assembly with no problem. I suspect that it would cause great difficulties for the Alliance Party if that were not the situation for the Committee and the subgroup. The party’s numbers would be reduced even further.

Mr Cobain: I see that Alex has arrived. It is OK, Alex; we are finished. Hurry up, Chairman.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): If you would just sit down, Alex, I will mark your attendance.

Mr Attwood: I have important matters that I want to raise.

Mr Cobain: Some chance.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is the Committee content that Naomi — and it also applies to Alban — can continue to adopt both roles, unless there is an obvious conflict of interest, which I doubt?

Members indicated assent.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): That is good. Thank you, Mr Attwood. I will just put your name on the record. [Laughter.]

The date of the next meeting will be 11 August, at 10.00 am in room 144. Mr Attwood, have you any comments? We will be discussing rights, safeguards, equality issues and related matters. I alert members that the meeting could last a full day.

Mr McFarland: It will last a full day. Last week, the Committee voted for an all-day meeting.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): The meeting on Wednesday 16 August could also be for a full day. Would that cause difficulties for anyone?

Mr McFarland: I understood that we had decided that, until the back of the business is broken, we would be meeting for full days. We will have three more meetings, with the last meeting to finalise what will go into our report. We will have a couple of Wednesday meetings before we start hitting the buffers.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): That meeting will deal with policing, intelligence services and the Police Ombudsman. We will not roll this format into that one. It will be a separate meeting. We will return to the matters raised today after the research team has prepared the paper.

Mr McFarland: Can a paper not be prepared in a week? If that is the case, we are in deep trouble. The idea was that we would have an agenda and an order. Some issues have been parked until the end because they are difficult and need further discussion. Does this issue also need to be parked or are we waiting for information? My understanding was that we were seeking information. If we cannot get information within a week, we are in deep doo-doo.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): We cannot guarantee that, Alan. Remember that one of our researchers has been redeployed to the economic subgroup, which has an awful lot of work to do.

Mr Maskey: There is no reason why today’s discussion cannot be put off for two weeks.

Mr McFarland: There is no problem with that.

Mr Maskey: The Committee needs the relevant documents that it has asked for today, and a little time to absorb them.

Mrs Long: Surely if next week’s meeting is on issues such as the security services, the issues that we have raised today about where the power over national security is vested will be pertinent to that discussion? We could run up against the same brick wall.

The Chairman (Mr Wells): I have spoken to the Committee staff, and it is a needs-must situation. We will have to get the information. It will be difficult, but we will do it.

Mr McFarland: It occurs to me this is recurring issue. We had this at the beginning with Hansard. We have sat in abeyance for a number of years. We are now functioning for the first time within the last few months and are back in action. You would have thought that the team would be very keen to get fired up to produce the information.

At one stage, we were told that Hansard could not produce the Official Report for a week.

This is the only show in town. The parties are all here around the table, and staff difficulties should not be an issue. I could rustle a report out in a couple of days with the documentation that is available in the Assembly.

Mr Weir: Do we subcontract the work?

The Chairman (Mr Wells): Alan, your eloquence has convinced us. We will provide the material to you; with difficulty, but we will do that. Then we will be able to continue the discussion.

Adjourned at 2.15 pm.