COMMITTEE ON THE Wednesday 16 August 2006 Members in attendance for all or part of proceedings: Witness: The Committee met at 10.04 am. (The Chairman (Mr Wells) in the Chair.) The Chairman (Mr Wells): When I was sitting in on Monday’s meeting, I heard the odd sound that indicated that some people had their mobile phones switched on. Everyone must switch off his or her mobile phone. The Editor of Debates has informed us that some of the recording has been lost because of mobile phone interference, so somebody was illicitly listening to something. Therefore, please turn off your mobile telephones. Mr Kennedy: Chairman, have you ever considered that that might be in the public interest? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Something may have been said of such importance that it would be a pity to lose it. Can members indicate whom they are representing today? Mrs Foster: I am here for Lord Morrow; Sammy Wilson will be here in place of Ian Paisley Jnr, and Mr Weir is here for Rev William McCrea. Mr McFarland: Mr Cobain is here for Mr McNarry. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I thought that you said Mr Beggs. Mr Cobain: I wish that Mr Beggs were here. Mr Weir: So do we. [Laughter.] Mr Neeson: I am here for Mr Ford. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Alex, who is on your team? Mr Attwood: Am I here as myself? I will take your guidance on it, Chair. The Committee Clerk: Mark Durkan, Alasdair McDonnell and Seán Farren are the three nominated SDLP representatives. We shall work it out. Mr G Kelly: I am here for Mr McGuinness, and Fra McCann is here for Conor Murphy. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Will there be a third member from your party? Mr G Kelly: A third member will not be present today. The Chairman (Mr Wells): At least one new member is present this morning, so are there any declarations of interest to be made? Mr Kennedy: I arrived late at the previous meeting, but I said at the time that I was a member of the Northern Ireland Policing Board. That does not appear to be recorded in the draft minutes. The Chairman (Mr Wells): It is very important that that be recorded. Mrs Foster: Chairman, must we declare interests at every meeting? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Only if it is a member’s first appearance at a meeting, and he or she is a member of the Policing Board, a district policing partnership (DPP), MI5 or the security forces. Mr Cobain: Do not say that or everyone will put their hand up. Mr G Kelly: Welcome to MI5. Mr Kennedy: You said that you would not say that. The Chairman (Mr Wells): If you are being paid by the intelligence services, you must declare it. Mr Weir: It is purely voluntary work. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Members should have had a chance to look at the draft minutes of 9 August. Are there any amendments or additions? I have noted that Mr Kennedy’s declaration of membership of the Policing Board was not recorded. I take it that the draft minutes are acceptable. Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): That is our first consensus of the morning. I now move to matters arising. I chaired the meeting at which these matters were raised, and I recall it vividly. Several members requested that research documents be prepared. Mr Alban Maginness asked for a paper on the functions of the Lord Chancellor, particularly his role in the Judicial Appointments Commission. That was an especially difficult task, but it has been done. A paper was also requested on excepted and reserved matters. From memory, I think that Mr Maskey asked for a definition of national security. Those papers arrived this morning. That was quite a tall order, given that this is the holiday period. I am conscious that it may not be reasonable to ask members to discuss those documents now. We have two options: we can adjourn for an hour, and rooms are available to which members can adjourn to examine the papers, or we can defer consideration of the material until next week’s meeting and deal with the other issues that are listed for discussion. Of course, we can also discuss the papers straight away. We are trying to arrange for Minister Maria Eagle, whom I have not yet met, to attend next Wednesday’s meeting. It may dovetail nicely if we discussed those issues during our meeting with her next Wednesday. That is only for information — I am not trying to steer the Committee in any direction. Mr McFarland: The UUP is happy to defer those issues, as we have been awaiting research papers from London, which have not yet arrived. However, if we have those discussions today, that is fine. Mr G Kelly: My inclination is to take the advantage of suspending the Committee for an hour. Mr McFarland is probably right that we will not refer to the detail of those papers. Some of this material is relevant to the discussion paper, which we started to discuss on 9 August. We will probably return to that material at a later date, but the next item on the agenda is the discussion paper. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Do other parties have a view on that? Mr Attwood: We could begin discussions on those papers today, but some of the matters may soon become irrelevant. Consequently, I suggest that we suspend for an hour, because the papers will crowd in on the conversation sooner or later during the course of the meeting. Mrs Long: Last week, the Committee adjourned because we recognised that the requested paper would impinge on later discussions. Therefore the Alliance Party has no objection if the Committee wishes to defer detailed discussion on those matters until next week. However, I am concerned about what we could usefully discuss today if those discussions were deferred. Our preference is to suspend for an hour. The Chairman (Mr Wells): That is a good point. We could have a general discussion on policing issues, and then we could get discuss the Police Ombudsman and community restorative justice. We could fill today with substantive material, so we will not lose time — it is simply about how we manage that time. Mrs Foster: The DUP is minded to suspend for an hour to read through the papers. We may not go into detail on those today, but we feel that we should read them. The Chairman (Mr Wells): That is an either/or option. Gerry Kelly has accepted that the Committee could resume after the hour and still defer the issue. Mr Weir: I appreciate that a great deal of work has gone into the research paper, and it does contain some comparative material. However, I am disappointed that it seems to only include references to the Northern Ireland Act 1998, the Scotland Act 1998 and the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973. We also received a separate list last week. Part of the reason for requesting a compare-and-contrast paper was to consider whether any issues had shifted between 1998 and now. Has there been any change in the devolution of policing and justice powers since 1998? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mr Tim Moore, Senior Research Officer, prepared the paper, so I will ask him to clarify that. Mr T Moore: In my research paper, appendices 1 and 2 set out schedules 2 and 3 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which deal with excepted and reserved matters. The appendices detail any changes that have been made to schedules 2 and 3. Having examined those schedules to consider where changes had been made, I would be loath to say that there have been significant or insignificant changes. That is for members to decide. Mr Weir: The DUP is happy to suspend for at least an hour. I doubt whether everyone could absorb all the information in that time, but we are open-minded in that regard. The Chairman (Mr Wells): No one is dying in the ditch on this issue, but it seems that there is consensus to suspend for an hour and let members decide whether that is sufficient time for them to discuss the material this morning. If not, we shall return to it at a later date. Four Committee rooms are available if Committee members, or party members, wish to avail themselves of them. Mr G Kelly: Party rooms can also be used. The Chairman (Mr Wells): It is almost 10.15 am now, and we will resume at 11.15 am. Please do not disappear, because we will not resume if one party is missing. Do not take the day off. The Committee was suspended at 10.14 am. On resuming — 11.20 am The Chairman (Mr Wells): We have had an hour to look at the material. I am interested in views on whether we proceed with it or leave it for a week. Mrs Long: The Alliance Party has no strong preference. It might be better to defer in order to allow a more detailed look at the material. However, we are content to deal with the issues today. Some matters could be resolved today, and we could specifically consider more contentious issues in greater detail. There are some issues on which we may find agreement. Others may have strong feelings, but we are flexible. Mr Attwood: Some of today’s agenda items will refer to these papers anyway. Next week, when a Minister comes — I believe that it will not be Maria Eagle — some of the remaining matters from today’s papers could be raised. There is no easy way to handle this, because it all gets joined up, but that might be the most logical way to proceed. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We have made initial contact with NIO, and it could be either Mr Goggins or Maria Eagle. It looks likely that one of them will be available. Mr G Kelly: Sinn Féin is happy to go through the set agenda. The papers are very helpful, but there are a lot of them. There are issues concerning the NIO and national security detailed at paragraph 13 of the Clerk’s briefing to the NIO discussion paper that we could go through, but if the Minister is coming it is probably better to deal with everything at once. My only difficulty is that I will not be here for that. Mr McFarland: We are happy enough. Most of the material is non-contentious, and there are issues that clearly need substantial discussion. We keep reminding ourselves that time is not on our side, so we should have whatever discussion we can have today. I presume that we will discuss the matters contained in the Secretary of State’s letter of 9 August. My impression of the general tone of the letter was that, if we wanted the Minister to answer questions of fact, we should provide questions beforehand so that the Minister could answer them. What is it that we do not have here? The Secretary of State is clearly saying that he will not allow a Minister to be cross-questioned on attitudes and views. If we are dealing with questions of fact, what factual questions do we want answered? There is quite an agenda to get through between now and the week after next, and unless we are going to get something dramatic from a Minister, why are inviting one to attend at this stage? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mrs Foster raised that issue after the Secretary of State’s Glenties speech, in which he outlined what the DUP considered to be new material on devolution, policing and justice, and the DUP wanted to question him on that. Mrs Foster: Indeed. Mr McFarland: I understood that we had agreed that that would be left until our last meeting, so that we could pile in all our unanswered questions. There are several substantive issues that we have not gone into, and we may have questions about those. Next week, we may have questions to ask about community restorative justice. I understood that we were to leave questions for the Secretary of State or the Minister until the final meeting. We would do a wrap-up at that meeting when we would know exactly what we wanted them to talk about. Indeed, I share Mrs — Mrs Foster: Arlene. Mr McFarland: Pardon? Mrs Foster: Arlene. Mr McFarland: Mrs Foster. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Your colleague got into trouble for that last week. Mr McFarland: I have the same trouble. Mrs Foster: I am going to wear a name tag. Mr McFarland: I am suddenly reminded of Dermot Nesbitt doing the same thing last week. I hope that I am not in for a similar week of battling. Mr Kennedy: You need to watch yourself; the meeting is being recorded. Mr McFarland: Yes, it is. I understood that we were going to wrap up the meetings with a visit from a Minister. However, next week is quite soon for a ministerial visit. Mrs Foster: Chairman, you are correct. Alex Attwood and I had raised the issue of a visit from the Secretary of State in light of his speech at Glenties. In view of that speech, I find his letter somewhat puzzling. It suggests that he does not know why he was invited to the Committee. Had he read Hansard, he would have known why. I agree with Alan McFarland — there is no point inviting Maria Eagle, Paul Goggins or another Minister to next week’s meeting. If there is any need to speak to a Minister at the end of our deliberations, so be it. The Secretary of State was, however, specifically invited to discuss the comments that he made about the constitutional and practical aspects of policing — as he called them — in his speech at Glenties. His letter now says that he does not want to come here to be “quizzed”. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I believe that he is not coming because he is on holiday. Mrs Foster: It would have been more helpful if he had said that. Mr Weir: Correct me if I am wrong, Mr Chairman, but my understanding is that we did not specify a date for the Secretary of State’s visit; the invitation was open-ended. Can he not, because of his busy schedule, find the time to visit the Committee at any stage before it completes its work? I take it fairly thick that the Secretary of State constantly lectures us about getting things sorted out. There is a degree of urgency to our task, yet when he is asked to give evidence to the Committee, he deigns not to because he might get “quizzed”. That is fundamentally wrong. With regard to your initial question on the research material, although some of it has been useful, I am a little concerned that some of what we were given was not precise enough. However, that may be our fault for not explaining clearly what we wanted. The research paper contains tables, and the appendices reproduce schedules 2 and 3 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. However, it is noted that schedule 2 of the 1998 Act, as reproduced in the paper, has not been updated to include amendments that result from the Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2006. It would have been helpful if any changes that that Act had brought about had been included. Perhaps there was none, but I want to be able to see that information. Mr T Moore: The changes are listed in paragraphs 17 and 21 of my research paper. Mr Weir: That is all very well. However, the complication is that we may have too much material. One section contains lists, and paragraphs 17 and 21 cite references. However, the paper does not seem comprehensive. I was specifically trying to establish whether there had been a shift on the reserved, excepted and devolved nature of each of the issues. Those who were involved in the talks will remember that the Ulster Unionist Party, DUP, SDLP positions and so on were clearly laid out in columns on our documentation. I am sure that they found that helpful when we debated matters such as Standing Orders. Ideally, I would have liked to see details on whether each matter was reserved, excepted or devolved in 1921, 1973, 1998 and 2006. That could help to narrow the scope of the discussion. In light of last week’s discussion, more examination is necessary; for example, if a matter was in one category in 1998 and was shifted for some reason in 2006. Frankly, it strikes me as futile to try to bag issues that will never be devolved, have not been devolved since the beginning of the state, and in 1973, 1998 and 2006 were treated consistently as — Mr Cobain: This is not a state. 11.30 am Mr Weir: I do not want to get involved in semantics, so I will change that remark to “since the creation of Northern Ireland”. My point is that it would take an extremely strong argument to convert a matter that had been reserved consistently — one that was reserved in 1998 and remains reserved in 2006 — to a devolved matter. I thought that a historical perspective would help to achieve clarity on that. I know that there are references to the Northern Ireland Constitution Act 1973 and the Northern Ireland Act 1998 in Mr Moore’s paper, but I want to see what the position is — Mr S Wilson: Are we to take it that paragraphs 17 and 21 contain only the changes under the Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2006? Mr T Moore: I will try to explain appendices 1 and 2, which set out schedules 2 and 3 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998. Schedule 2 deals with excepted matters, and schedule 3 with reserved matters. Perhaps the way that it has been presented was not explained properly, but, in schedule 2, appendix 1, anything in square brackets indicates an amendment to the original Northern Ireland Act 1998. All the amendments are listed after the schedules. Mr Weir: Yes, but the point is that at the top of the opening page of appendices 1 and 2, that paper states that: “The schedule provided below is not updated to include amendments resulting from the Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2006.” Perhaps I misunderstood, but my interpretation was that the square brackets contained changes that happened between 1998 and 2006, but did not include changes made in the Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2006. Mr T Moore: That is because there is no available version of the revised 1998 Act. As the Northern Ireland (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 2006 is so recent, as far as I can find, no amended version of the 1998 Act has been produced. Members will notice that the NIO’s paper has made the amendments and provides updated legislation. Paragraphs 17 and 21 of my paper highlight and detail the two changes to schedule 2 and the three changes to schedule 3 that will occur due to the 2006 Act. Outside of that, appendices 1 and 2 contain the schedules as amended. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mr Moore will be with us throughout the discussions. It may help to call upon him to clarify any difficulties that arise as we discuss the papers. Mr Attwood: I want to return to the issue of the Minister coming to the Committee next week. Frankly, I have some sympathy with Alan McFarland’s view that if the Minister is coming merely to exchange factual information, it may help a bit, but not as much as members thought. I would much rather the Secretary of State came, because his letter of 9 August 2006 is intellectually and politically dubious. Mrs Foster: Hear hear. Mr Attwood: The point is not that he does not feel that the PFG should be, as he states in his letter: “quizzing ministers on views they may have expressed.” The key line is: “I hope instead that the PFG will focus on issues that the parties agree need to be resolved between themselves in preparation for government.” We know that the policing issue must be resolved, either through the PFG Committee, once devolution is restored, or whenever. Policing issues appear on every agenda, but the Secretary of State will not come here to discuss what he may, or may not, do to resolve the policing and preparation for Government issues between the parties and himself. That is an intellectually and politically dubious approach. Given that we are trying to resolve the policing issue as part of the preparation for Government, the Secretary of State should share what he is doing to resolve that issue with us. The Committee should reply to the Secretary of State and make that point. The Chairman (Mr Wells): As far as short-term availability is concerned, either Paul Goggins or David Hanson could come on Wednesday 23 August 2006. However, if members want to invite the Secretary of State at a later stage, I doubt that that will happen in August. Mr Cobain: I am becoming slightly concerned about where we are going with this. The Committee on the Preparation for Government (PFG) was set up to consider the devolution of policing and justice and to produce a report. That is its role, yet we are wandering all over the place. If the Secretary of State discusses policing and justice with individual parties, there is no way that he will tell the Committee what he is talking about or reveal his relationships with other parties on the matter. Mr Weir: The Committee’s remit is wider than the devolution of policing and justice. That is just one item on the Committee’s agenda, which is why we are looking at, for example, the Police Ombudsman and community restorative justice. The PFG Committee has been tasked with overcoming obstacles to the devolution of policing and justice. Devolution of policing and justice forms a significant part of our deliberations but not the whole. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We need to decide today whether we wish to have a junior Minister in attendance next Wednesday. It would be either Mr Goggins or Mr Hanson, whose responsibilities overlap. If we want the Secretary of State instead, we must alert him that we want him to attend at a future date. Mrs Long: I am fairly indifferent, because it matters very little who attends. We will not obtain any more information, regardless. If we continue to discuss whom we should invite, it may descend into a battle over something that will not really add to our work. Therefore, I am flexible. Alan suggested that we try to complete as much of the work as we can, in order to identify those issues that we want to raise. We should forward those to the Secretary of State and request that if he does not come himself, he sends a Minister in his place. If we simply set ourselves up to do battle with the Secretary of State, because he has refused to attend the Committee — despite it being the preference of most members that he should — I cannot see where that would get us. We could spend the next hour discussing this, and we could be no closer to getting him into the room. Mr McFarland: Why would we have a Minister here next week? What would that add to our deliberations? We have a substantial agenda and lots of paperwork to get through. Questions may be raised that only Ministers can answer, but I recall that, at one of our first meetings, we decided that we would only get the Secretary of State to attend once. Therefore, in the meantime, it would be worthwhile to store up questions and do as much work as possible. After that, we could have a proper, serious discussion on issues about which we need to speak with the Secretary of State. It is right that he, rather than a Minister, should discuss those issues with the Committee. The Secretary of State has gone on and on about this Committee, and, in the end, for him not to appear before the Committee would be slightly strange, given the importance that he has attached to it. Mr S Wilson: My understanding is that we want the Secretary of State to attend because he has declared publicly his parameters for policing. Those parameters will impact on our decisions. It is important, therefore, that he comes along to justify and clarify his position. Last week, and presumably the week before when I was not here, we scoped the issues that we believe need to be addressed. As Alan said, we do not want to discuss any secret talks that he may be having with individual parties, rather his publicly stated position on what he believes parties must do to show acceptance of policing. His position seems at variance with that of many of the parties around this table. We should have a discussion with him. We have scoped certain issues, and the Secretary of State has said publicly that he disagrees with how far some of us believe parties should go on policing. Therefore, he should be here to talk to us about policing. Otherwise, we are wasting our time. If he sets a completely different threshold from that set by the majority of parties, we will not get anywhere. Mrs Foster: The DUP sees no need to invite a junior Minister; it would be a waste of time. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We must get a view on this from the Committee. Clearly, the DUP wants the Secretary of State to attend. Mr McFarland: I propose that we do not invite the junior Minister next week, but that we invite — and, perhaps, expect — the Secretary of State to appear, probably in two or three weeks’ time, when we will have a substantial list of issues to raise with him. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are there any other proposals? Does anyone have problems with that suggestion? Everyone seems happy not to invite the junior Minister next week, but to invite the Secretary of State to attend in a fortnight’s time. Mr McFarland: Perhaps “encourage” him to attend? Mr S Wilson: Or cajole? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is the Committee happy to invite the Secretary of State to attend and to see how he reacts to the invitation? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will now discuss the issues in the papers and research documents. Table 1 in the NIO paper, which deals with reserved matters and their implications, helpfully sets out the relevant provisions of the Northern Ireland Act 1998; the issues that will, and will not, be devolved; and any outstanding issues. It is a useful basis for discussion, as, last week, there was cloudiness about matters that will, and will not, be devolved, and what matters should be devolved. Alban Maginness raised several important issues. It is unfortunate that he is not present, as his input would have been useful. Is everyone happy to use the NIO paper as a basis for discussion? Mr G Kelly: I have no difficulty with it, as it is a replication of schedule 3 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The NIO paper presents it in a different format. Mr G Kelly: In some ways, it is a clearer format. The NIO paper does not define national security, which gives it carte blanche on that issue. That makes the Sinn Féin position very difficult as regards input from MI5 and whoever defines national security. It impinges massively on the policing issue. Moreover, no protocols are mentioned in the paper. Sinn Féin wants neither MI5 nor MI6 anywhere in Ireland. The fact that there are no protocols deepens the worry that nationalists have — and, I argue, everyone should have — about MI5 interference. The issue, and the role of MI5, should be depoliticised, not extended. I am happy to go through the list, but I wanted to state Sinn Féin’s approach to it. Mrs Long: Last week, the Alliance Party raised a concern about how differing views on what constitutes a threat to national security can impact on how loyalist and republican paramilitarism are dealt with and any potential inequality. The paragraph in the NIO paper that contains the legal definition of national security states: “actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means.” That seems to cover all paramilitary activity, regardless of from which section of the community it comes. That explanation should be further explored, as the Alliance Party would be unhappy if acts of republican terrorism were treated as matters issue of national security and acts of loyalist terrorism were treated simply as criminal offences. That would not be proper and fair. A clear definition of what constitutes a threat to national security might allow a more detailed examination. We wish to reiterate that concern. 11.45 am Mr McFarland: Following Gerry Kelly’s statement, does Sinn Féin accept that, under the Belfast Agreement, Northern Ireland remains part of the United Kingdom until the people of Northern Ireland vote otherwise? If so, the Parliament of the United Kingdom is sovereign and will, therefore, decide — until Northern Ireland is part of the Irish Republic — what constitutes national security. The NIO letter explains that the Security Service Act 1989 defines the protection of national security as: “protection against threats from espionage, terrorism and sabotage, from the activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means.” It seems fairly clear that that means threats to the state. We know from Sinn Féin’s statement that the Provisional IRA is no longer a threat to the state — it remains for the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) to confirm whether that is the case. We are dealing presumably with a residual grouping of dissident republicans; it does not affect Sinn Féin and the main republican movement since they tell us that they have stopped all that. Does Sinn Féin accept that someone must have responsibility for national security and that every country’s security services run agents in organisations that pose a threat to it? The Irish Government are no different, and I have no doubt that if Sinn Féin were in Government in the Republic of Ireland, its Ministers would be happy with that. If we accept that that is the norm throughout the world, why should it not be the norm here? I am confused by the suggestion that no one should investigate threats to the country or place agents inside organisations that are opposed to the Government. Mr G Kelly: Alan should not be confused. It is about accountability. We want anything that involves the island of Ireland to be subject to proper accountability mechanisms. We had a long-drawn-out debate and agreement on what those mechanisms should be, followed by a statement. There is no legal definition of national security. We asked for one, but we got this long, rambling paragraph instead. If we look at the political policing that has occurred in recent years — we do not have to go back 20, 15 or even five years — we can see that there has been political interference. We want to subordinate all that to the accountability mechanisms. MI5 is outside those mechanisms. It is said also that MI5 will consider serious and organised crime. From the list to which you referred, Chairman, it is obvious that that will happen. Where is the demarcation line? Even if I were to take the unionist point of view, which I do not, I would want to know where the line is between what is a policing and justice matter and what is “national security”. Alan asked what Sinn Fein would do if it were in Government in the South and had responsibility for justice. We would be glad to have that power, and we would also like to have it in the North, so that there could be an all-Ireland approach. I do not know what Mr McFarland is confused about; what confuses me is that absolutely no definition of national security is provided. Unionism, in fairness, has always accepted the British state and almost anything that it does. We have an opposite point of view, and we want accountability. MI5’s interference will not help. We do not want MI5 here. Mr Attwood: There is no definition of national security to enable MI5 to define it in whatever terms it wants. Therein lies the problem. Whether here or in Britain, MI5, now or later, can define any matter as being one of national security. It will take the lead on that and have exclusive responsibility for it, whatever any policing organisation might think. That is the problem. We should try to look at it more positively. It is right that questions should be asked of Sinn Féin, but questions should be asked of the unionist parties also. If there were devolution and an Executive, including a ministry of justice, functioning as we hope that it might, what would be the consequences of a MI5 operation in the North, which either led to the arrests or deaths of innocent civilians, or to a community’s feeling that its rights had not been properly protected? Considering the continuing national and international security threats, such an operation is possible. People would be entitled to ask the Executive for an explanation, and the Ministers would be unable to give one; they would have to say that those issues were beyond their remits. That shows a conflict between having the institutions working stably in the future and people’s sense of who is in control and who has responsibility for certain key matters in the management of life in the North. All parties — not only Sinn Féin — have to face up to what might happen over the two, four, six, or eight years of MI5 primacy in the North. For that reason, if there were a preferred outcome from these discussions, it would be to go for one of the Patten options. He offered two options for national security: first, MI5 primacy; and, secondly, the retention of the current accountability of national security through the Chief Constable. We should bear in mind what Mrs Long said about the possibility of MI5’s differentiating between republican and loyalist threats. If, as Sinn Féin claim, Patten is the threshold, and if we are living within the constraints of Patten, would there not be some point in getting members around this table to move to an understanding that the best way to manage this, given the potential fallout for all of us, would be to go with the second Patten option? That is not the perfect model — far from it —and it is not what I would argue for if we had a clean piece of paper. However, that is the argument that Patten makes, and Patten, according to some members, is the threshold for policing in the future. Maybe we should have a conversation around that. The Committee should discuss also the protocols and accountability measures that need to be in place between MI5 and organisations, such as the PSNI, with which it will interface. PSNI officers will be working at MI5 desks, and we must know whether the Police Ombudsman will have the same authority over them as that office has over every other police officer in the PSNI. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We seem to have moved into a full-blooded discussion on the intelligence services. I am happy to do that, so long as members realise where we are on the agenda. Mr McFarland: This format allows us to explore things; we may have to revisit them, but we have a flow going on this. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I am happy to let the discussions continue, but I want to alert members to where we are on the agenda. There seems to be the start of a proposal coming from Alex on how to deal with this issue — we must get some structure. Mr McFarland: Part of the reason that this has arisen is that the SDLP complained bitterly about Special Branch. The Government always listen to the SDLP, so they transferred the responsibility for Special Branch to MI5 at its behest. Now the SDLP is being hoisted by its own petard, and it is trying to backtrack. MI5 is an intelligence-gathering organisation. It does not rush around carrying out armed operations and shooting people. Alex’s vision of what happens in Northern Ireland is not correct. As I understand it, in the rest of the United Kingdom, MI5 gathers intelligence, and, traditionally, its executive or operational wing is its special branch. In Scotland or England, the special branches arrest people on behalf of MI5. Logically, the same system would operate here; therefore, MI5 would not carry out ambush operations. Of course, that scenario would arise only if the DUP and Sinn Féin bury their hatchets, smoke pipes of peace, and make the world lovely. The Chairman (Mr Wells): You keep reminding us of that. Mrs Foster: I do not smoke. Mr McFarland: That scene must be set before any arrangements will be established. We are not discussing a scenario from 10 years ago, when the SAS rushed around on operations and others carried out anti-terrorist activity. This year, the focus is on al-Qaeda and residual republicans in Northern Ireland who feel that they cannot give up and who are busy trying to place bombs in London, Belfast and Newry or at Eddie Haughey’s house or wherever. Therefore, that scenario is for down the line, and it will not be the lurid picture that Alex painted. As Alex mentioned, accountability is a major issue. It would be a disaster if, in order to not destabilise the political situation, the Government influenced MI5 to withhold from the Chief Constable information that showed that a senior member of the Provisional IRA was still active in paramilitarism while Sinn Féin was in the Executive. Therefore, the protocols between the PSNI and MI5 must be extremely robust. I argue that that is the responsibility of Parliament — it is a reserved matter that should be discussed at Westminster. I have had discussions with MPs from a number of parties, and I know that that they are very interested in how the arrangements with MI5 will work out here. The House of Commons Intelligence and Security Committee is particularly interested, as I suspect we all are, in how we can ensure no interference with the normal rule of law. A number of issues are important. Westminster will be interested, so logically, its Intelligence and Security Committee should beef itself up. To ensure that the accountability mechanisms are robust, the protocols should be as foolproof as possible. Mr S Wilson: Alan’s first point is correct. The folks from Sinn are jumping up and down about the security issue, discussions on which were provoked — at least partly — by their incessant demands for Special Branch and “a force within a force” to be closed down. They now have a force outside a force, and they do not like that either. There is not really a great deal that they can do now — it is a bit late for them to start crying about it. The issue of whether this matter should be devolved was raised a long time ago: even in the Patten Report, which nationalists frequently cite. The Patten Report said — and this is mentioned at paragraph 7 of the research paper — that all functions, except for matters of national security, should be devolved. That was highlighted a long time ago and is now being embedded. Alex would know from his involvement with the Policing Board that it is now so embedded that the police have made great advances in setting protocols to allow any intelligence that is gathered to be transferred, when relevant, to police criminal investigations into individuals who might be involved in organisations that present a threat to national security. The police have made it clear that the transfer of national security to MI5 will not be an impediment to the PSNI doing its job. The Chief Constable is on record as saying that if the protocols are not right, he will be the first to complain. Therefore, there are safeguards. 12.00 noon Parliament is accountable, as Mr McFarland said. Therefore, if a matter is reserved to Westminster, that is where accountability for that matter should rest. Are we going to have the same argument about the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), which is a national body that deals with serious organised crime? Are we saying that SOCA’s role in policing should also be devolved? Are we saying that SOCA and MI5 should be subject to the same accountability mechanism, which can happen only through the devolution of the oversight of their powers? We have not heard a word about that matter, yet SOCA has made it clear that it will be just as involved in dealing with organised crime in Northern Ireland — at national and international level — as MI5 is in intelligence gathering. Where we are going with this issue? Given the parameters that were set down in the past, mostly by nationalists, the Government have taken the view that one way to avoid charges being made against the PSNI is to take functions out of its hands. That makes sense, because we are talking about a national threat. That is in keeping with other parts of the United Kingdom, because no other police service or devolved institution would be handed control of the body that gathers national intelligence. Therefore, this is a sterile argument, and we could spend the rest of the day talking about it. Mr G Kelly: This is not a sterile argument. It is condescending of the British Government to refuse to devolve or transfer that power. As members of other parties have said, this is an issue of accountability. We must not be naïve. It has been said that Special Branch is an arresting arm of MI5, and that is quite true. However, MI5 and the SAS were involved in killings. MI5 is not accountable. Members have talked about national security, and, from a unionist point of view, that is fine. However, no one has stated what is meant by national security, except that MI5 will take that decision. Therefore, MI5 is self-accountable. We have not seen any protocols. We are asked to put faith, which I do not have, in MI5’s saying that it will introduce robust protocols, or in members saying that there must be robust protocols. We can be cynical about the effectiveness of MI6 and the intelligence agencies if we consider the solutions that they came up with to deal with the situation in Iraq, and the damage that that caused. That elective accountability ended up in a massive war over false information, which involved intelligence agencies, not only in Britain, but in America. Those are the fundamentals of this matter. That is how intelligence organisations operate. If there are no accountability mechanisms, any party will abuse that power, no matter who they are. The island of Ireland, including the North, should have accountability mechanisms, regardless of what happens elsewhere. Sammy Wilson referred to SOCA and the Assets Recovery Agency (ARA). He said that those bodies had not been mentioned. However, I will mention them, as we continue our discussions. Responsibility for those bodies should be devolved, and there should be accountability mechanisms. To this day, MI5 informers are being allowed to carry out crime. They work for MI5 and other intelligence agencies. Informers are allowed to commit crimes that have, in the past, resulted in deaths. If I may make this criticism: Sinn Féin — and probably the SDLP — took up the cases of people from the unionist community who suffered at the hands of informers and were ignored by the other political parties. The other parties took the blind view that everything in the garden was OK, thinking that MI5 would not use informers against unionists, as they were used to gather information only on republicans. In fact, members of the unionist community were killed, and unionists who went to the unionist parties for help had to approach the nationalist parties because only they would give them the necessary help. Robust protocols are one thing, but in order for what happened in the past, and for what continues to happen, to stop, the maximum number of those powers must be transferred. Mrs Long: Although we were not given a legal definition, because none exists, the NIO paper does provide a generally accepted working definition of national security. Last week, my party highlighted — and I reiterate — that we accept that, because each can be used to support the other, it is difficult to separate terrorism from organised crime. Their links are such that it is difficult to find a clear dividing line. We accept that it is a grey area: one impacts on the other. As we expressed last week, there is some concern about the lack of accountability in the UK-wide structures and the way in which they relate to the situation in Northern Ireland. Part of the solution to that lies with a more generalised reform of the UK structures and accountability for matters such as terrorism, defending national security and dealing with organised crime. However, although we believe that reform is necessary, it is not within our remit to address that. It may be that the Committee will want to draw that to the Secretary of State’s attention, because it is a matter that he can examine. I am not trying to stifle the discussion, but I want to highlight that the Secretary of State makes clear his opinion of the Committee’s role clear in his letter of 9 August 2006. He said that: “I do not see the role of the PFG as scrutinising Government policy on reserved or excepted matters”. The Committee is discussing at length those matters that parties think should be reserved or excepted, but the Secretary of State makes clear in his letter that although the Committee may get consensus about changes to those matters — though I doubt it — he does not accept that as part of its role. I have flagged that up because, although we are discussing what should be reserved or excepted, there is no guarantee that the Secretary of State will have any interest in addressing those issues. Mrs Foster: Naomi has made a good point. Sinn Féin raised a concern about an accountability mechanism for national security. It is not the role of a regional devolved institution to scrutinise issues of national security. That goes to the core of the consent principle, which Alan mentioned earlier. Does Sinn Féin accept that Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom? That is the issue. If it does accept that, its members must accept that Northern Ireland will have a regional Assembly, and, as such, national security will remain an excepted matter. That is, and will remain, the position of the DUP. The protocols for accountability, which are outlined in the Assembly research paper, are not yet in place, but that work is ongoing. In Enniskillen recently, Assistant Chief Constable Sheridan gave a good presentation on the primacy of MI5 and its relationship with the PSNI. I understand that his presentation was made during a public session; I am sure that the Committee could get copies of his slides, which could prove to be useful and instructive. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will return to that suggestion. Mr Cobain: Everyone accepts that terrorism is an international phenomenon and that much of it is linked to criminality. Naomi is right in that respect. Police officers find it difficult to divide terrorism from criminality because that is how it works. The two are interlinked, and it would therefore be impossible to divide the remit, whereby MI5 would tackle terrorism and ordinary police officers criminality. During an MI5 operation, its officers may gather information on criminality that should be passed on to the police. Hopefully, the protocols that will be agreed between the Chief Constable and MI5 will allow for such arrangements. We have been discussing this for almost an hour. There is no possibility of national security being devolved to the Administration — none. The best that we can do is to ensure that the agreed protocols are as robust as possible, so that information will be shared between the police and MI5, and that that information will solely concern criminality, not national security. I am disappointed that we must continue to make that point. We can continue to discuss this matter, but there is no possibility that national security will be devolved. I understand that members have political positions on security. However, the only way in which MI5 will be accountable is through the protocols. Whether Sinn Féin or Alex has a problem with M15 makes no difference. We should deal with matters over which we are entitled to have some influence, of which the protocols are one. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We are not making a great deal of progress. Mr Cobain: We are not making any progress. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The only proposal seems to be Alex’s suggestion to adopt the Patten model. I am not sure whether it is a proposal. Mr Cobain: Alex and Gerry Kelly spoke about MI5. Are their parties saying that the devolved Administration should be in charge of national security? Mr Attwood: I am prepared to answer that question. If we had a blank piece of paper, there are ways that that could be the outcome. However, we do not have a blank piece of paper. We have the Patten Report. Mr Cobain: Would we be in charge of running agents? Mr Attwood: If you would listen, Fred — Mr Cobain: I am listening; sorry. Mr Attwood: I know that you do not like the Patten Report. Mr Cobain: At times, you do not like it either. Mr Attwood: The Patten Report recommended either that MI5 had primacy over national security or that the current approach be retained, where the Chief Constable is responsible for, and accountable to the British Government in respect of national security. I wish that the Patten Report had outlined a third option that would have kept accountability within the North for the activities of any and all intelligence services. You might think that that is poppycock; it is not. That approach was adopted in Canada. Following a crisis in its national security functions about 20 years ago, Canada developed a range of levels of accountability within and outside of Parliament for the intelligence services. However, that is not where we are. We are where Patten put us, and Patten said that the Chief Constable could retain responsibility for national security. I believe that that option is in the best interest of everybody around the table. Perhaps some will not agree and will prefer the other Patten option of MI5 primacy. If so, we should take up a few of the suggestions put forward. First, we should ask the British Government to clarify the protocols that will be in place at the interface between MI5 and other agencies. MI5 deals with revenue and customs matters, SOCA, the Organised Crime Task Force, the Police Ombudsman, the PSNI and so on. We must gather further information on the protocols. Secondly, irrespective of what I think, we need to know what the accountability measures will be with regard to MI5 primacy in the North. We may get an insufficient or neutral answer or, more likely, be told that it is a work in progress. Nevertheless, it will give us a better understanding. I want to correct a point made by my unionist colleagues — it was probably more mischievous than genuine. Patten recommended that there be a Special Branch. The reason that so much time was spent getting Special Branch right was that, if it complies with best international practice on the recruitment of agents and the gathering and distribution of intelligence, the police service will have the ability to access intelligence in the community in a manner consistent with all proper standards. As we know from the Bishopsgate incident, intelligence-led policing is crucial to being able to, on one hand, deal with the terror threat, and, on the other, maintain public confidence. 12.15 pm Ensuring that Special Branch reached the point at which it began to comply with best international practice, which the Oversight Commissioner has said it does, enabled it to access more and better intelligence, meaning it can inform the police about all levels of threat in the North, including that from international terror. That is why all that work was done, as well as to create greater confidence in policing — a confidence that was lacking for generations. That is why the PSNI is now best placed and fit for purpose to be the primary agency responsible for gathering intelligence in the North. The new standards and procedures mean that it can gain much more intelligence. To conclude, if someone from the police intelligence community were here now, I guess that they might suggest that the police were getting backed-up with intelligence. As confidence in policing grows, the flow of information increases, and with that comes the ability of the police to counter any threat, from wherever it comes in this part of Ireland. Mr G Kelly: I do not think that we will come to a conclusion on this. The argument appears to be at cross-purposes. Unionist members arrived wanting to talk about national security, which has not been defined. Our purpose is to find an accountability mechanism. The lack of a division between crime and terrorism has been mentioned. Who decides where the demarcation line lies? How can that demarcation line be drawn, and where is the accountability mechanism? As an example, I will take a different point of view. A member of the PSNI is under the control of various accountability mechanisms, which include the Chief Constable and, depending on the issue, the Police Ombudsman and others. If MI5 decides to use that member of the PSNI in an operation, he is no longer accountable, and any arguments about accountability go straight out the window. The worst part of that scenario is that MI5 decides on which matters it will act. For instance, MI5 might decide that the recent incident in Derry is its responsibility, dispense with all the normal mechanisms, and go completely over the top in trying to deal with it. There is significant evidence that it has done so previously. Sinn Féin wants accountability mechanisms. The maximum amount of accountability should remain in the North through a new justice Ministry. That is the best way forward until the interlocking institutions, as mentioned in the Good Friday Agreement, are established. Thereafter, there would be an all-island approach to any actions, policing or otherwise, taken on the island of Ireland. The Chairman (Mr Wells): There is a series of proposals. We will start with the easy one and work our way up. Mrs Foster suggests that it may be useful to request DCI Sheridan’s briefing material on the linkages between MI5 and the police. Mr McFarland: It is ACC Sheridan; he would be most annoyed to be described as a deputy chief inspector. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I do not know the gentleman. Mr McFarland: He is an Assistant Chief Constable. Mrs Foster: He is a Fermanagh man; he will be all right about it. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Now that I have given him his proper title, would it be useful to request that information from the PSNI? Mrs Foster: It would come from the Policing Board. Mr G Kelly: Does that mean that we will receive documentation? The Chairman (Mr Wells): There is no commitment; the documentation will be requested out of interest to see if it will help with our deliberations. Are members content to ask for that information? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The next issue for consideration is Alex’s proposal that we support the Patten model, which states that the Chief Constable should continue to have ultimate responsibility for matters here that involve national security. You may want to put what I have said into your own words, Alex, because your proposal has changed slightly. To be honest, I am not even sure whether you made a proposal. Mr Attwood: I will leave my proposal on the table, because if we adopt my other proposal and ask at what stage the protocols are and what the accountability mechanisms will be, the answers will be that we have neither the robust safeguards nor the accountability that we require, and, as a consequence, the Chief Constable of the PSNI must retain responsibility for matters that involve national security. My proposal would be better tabled when people hear what I suspect will be inadequate answers to those two questions. Mr McFarland: Alex knows that I have not been a member of the Policing Board since 1 April. He is still on the Policing Board, so he knows fine well that it is updated regularly on the protocols. It was my understanding, as at April 2006, that the protocols were to be produced in November 2006 and are still under development. Therefore, people will not be able to tell us anything other than that until November, no matter whom we call or how much we grill them. Those protocols will go the Policing Board for discussion, but that will not happen before this Committee is due to report. We should not get excited at not being able to see or amend protocols. Sammy or one of the other MPs may be able to find this out, but I believe that MPs at Westminster, particularly those who are on the Intelligence and Security Committee, are also considering whether protocols between MI5 and the police are necessary in Great Britain as a result of the al-Qaeda threat. As I have said, those issues are under development, so we will not get an answer, no matter whom we call. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Alex’s proposal is that we ask for them. Are you saying that we should not? Mr McFarland: He is a member of the Policing Board, so he knows the answer. Indeed, colleagues on the Policing Board who attended last week’s briefing will be able to tell us that answer without the staff having to go off, ask the police and come back to us. The answer would be the same as the one that ACC Sheridan no doubt gave to the Policing Board last week. I was not there, but someone will be able to tell me. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Alex, in view of that, do you wish to continue with your first proposal? Mr Attwood: I do. We receive quite useful information in those papers, because some issues are developed within them. The papers refer to protocols. It may be that we are told that the protocols are a work in progress; however, given the live nature of the issue, it is incumbent upon us to ask. Let us see whether we get something more substantial back. For example, somebody will report to the Policing Board with something more in September, not in November. Therefore, it may be timely to ask. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Lunch is imminent, so this may be an appropriate time at which to break. Alex has insisted that he wants to make this a proposal, so we are duty bound to table it. Do we have consensus that we request that information from the Policing Board? Is everyone happy that we ask for it, even though Alan believes that we will not get it? Mr McFarland: Our colleagues who are on the Policing Board will tell us that they had a briefing last week. From their most recent meeting, do they think that we will learn anything new? The Chairman (Mr Wells): It may make an exception for as important a body as ours. Are members content? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We shall reconvene at 12.45 pm. The Committee was suspended at 12.24 pm. On resuming — 12.48 pm The Chairman (Mr Wells): Could we return to table 1 on the NIO paper, which deals with reserved matters and their implications for devolution? As Mr Kelly said, the table repeats what has already appeared in earlier papers, but it is in a format that is much easier to follow. Given the complexity of the matters at hand, perhaps the best way to proceed is simply to go through the table. I am sure that Mr Moore will be delighted to help us with any technical questions. I am also conscious that we have a plethora of experts in the form of Northern Ireland Policing Board members and those who are involved in district policing partnerships (DPPs). I shall just let the conversation flow. We agreed to start the discussion with schedule 3 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998. We are trying to tease out whether parties are content with what has been suggested for devolution, or whether they wish to add to the list of powers and functions to be devolved to Ministers for policing and justice. Mr Weir: I am not suggesting that it will be the case, but we may not be happy with what we get. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Several parties have stated that there should be maximum devolution, and I detect that most of the discussion will be at that end of the scale. Since parties have not had a chance to prepare submissions, I suggest that we go down the list, one by one, and that parties give their views accordingly. If there are no views, we shall accept that parties are happy with the level at which a power has been pitched. Paragraphs 9(a) and 9(b) of schedule 3 deal with criminal law and the creation of offences and penalties. According to the table, it appears that everything will be devolved, with no issues remaining. If the table states that there is nothing more to devolve, we must accept that we have considered 100% of those matters. Does anyone have any comments on paragraphs 9(a) and (b)? Mr G Kelly: The paper does not cover the law governing treason or terrorist offences. Our earlier conversation referred to those matters. What is listed for devolution is OK up to a point. The paper mentions only a “devolved category”, and Sinn Féin supports the maximum transfer of powers. What are “terrorist offences”? I note that the discussion on Diplock courts will be over shortly. I accept that part of the paper up to a point. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are you happy that treason remains a central Government responsibility? Mr G Kelly: I do not know. Can one define treason? We have not formed a view on that. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mr Kelly has proposed that terrorist offences should be the responsibility of a devolved Assembly. Is there any view on that matter? Mr S Wilson: As many terrorist offences will be matters of national security, I would not expect responsibility to be devolved. Mrs D Kelly: The difficulty lies in national security and the lack of a definition. Even in its broadest context — such as in the earlier paper, which mentioned industrial acts — it could be concluded that industrial strike action, for example, was a terrorist act and a threat to national security, given the very woolly definition and the understanding that was articulated earlier. It is very difficult to agree to this without a clear definition of terrorist offences. Mr McFarland: Fred Cobain said earlier that matters are as they are, and that this Committee will not be able to persuade the Government to change their mind — unless particular parties wish to make matters a deal-breaker in negotiations. In that case, I do not doubt that those issues may resurface. We have no remit to demand the devolution of matters that the Government have deemed excepted. We must agree to disagree. The Chairman (Mr Wells): It is important in all of our discussions that parties indicate whether they simply have a problem with certain issues or whether they perceive them as major impediments to devolution. We must test the strength of opposition. Mr G Kelly: If Alan is anticipating that, as we go through table 1 unionism will take one view and nationalism another. I do not know whether we can test the strength of opposition, to be honest. Mr McFarland: In December 2004, the comprehensive agreement allowed a time frame of two months for all this to be completed. It set out what policing and justice powers would and would not to be devolved at that stage. Presumably, the DUP and Sinn Féin accepted that. This information has been available for a chunk of the year in the NIO discussion paper. We have known since 1998 that certain matters would be excepted and that other matters would be reserved but devolved in due course, so none of this should come as a surprise to any of the parties. We can discuss whether some reserved matters should be transferred; for practical reasons, it might be better if some of those were dealt with at Westminster. Excepted matters such as national security are not going anywhere, no matter how long any party howls and shouts. We shall not solve that issue in Committee. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I think that Mr Kelly would disagree. Mr G Kelly: Sinn Féin has a very strong view on who has responsibility for the Assets Recovery Agency (ARA) and the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA), but I am willing to go through all the matters in table 1. The British Secretary of State and the British Prime Minister have said many times that certain matters are not up for negotiation, only to change their mind. If we do not get consensus here — and I sense that we will not — we will take it up with the British Government, because we hold strong views on the issue of MI5, and its powers and role in protecting national security here. Not all its powers are to do with national security; that is someone else’s interpretation. Mr Cobain: May I make a relevant point? These are all nationwide issues. The ARA is a nationwide issue — Mr G Kelly: Do you mean that is an all-Ireland issue? Mr Cobain: In this context, it is not all-Ireland. The Irish Republic has its own version of the Assets Recovery Agency. We are talking specifically about matters to be devolved to an Executive. We need to be clear that some of the issues lend themselves to nationwide agencies and cannot be dealt with only in Northern Ireland. We cannot separate serious crime here from serious crime in England, Scotland and Wales. Everything is becoming more centralised in order to improve the exchange of information. Therefore, it makes no sense to devolve responsibility for those agencies. If that happened, we would be out of the loop. We need to consider it in the context of policing. It is much easier for police services throughout the United Kingdom to work together centrally. Some people are trying to lift Northern Ireland out of the UK when it comes to crime prevention and detection. However, some powers do not lend themselves to being devolved, such as the devolution of responsibility for those two agencies. Mr McFarland: It would make much more sense for the Republic of Ireland to rejoin the United Kingdom on those issues and have an island-wide — Mr G Kelly: You should try for consensus on that one. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I do not think that we will get consensus on that. It was a good try. Mr Attwood: We have long argued that there should be an all-Ireland agency. Mr McFarland: A United Kingdom and Republic of Ireland-wide agency? 1.00 pm Mr Attwood: There should be appropriate relationships with the agency in Britain. Some matters can be dealt with on an all-Ireland and an inter-Ireland basis. That is consistent with the Good Friday Agreement, and it is in the interests of all the people of these islands. Secondly, it may to useful to enquire about certain aspects of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). On one hand, we are being told about everything that will be reserved, excepted or transferred; on the other hand, we are being told to reach decisions about what aspects of RIPA must remain reserved. I want to know precisely what is being asked of us. I presume that that distinction is due to the cross-cutting national security issue, but I would like confirmation that that is what is meant. Thirdly, regardless of the previous understandings that were reached as part of the comprehensive agreement, SOCA is a new development, and it is one of the most anonymous new public bodies that has been created in recent times. It is very difficult to arrange a meeting with that body, which is still trying to work out what accommodation and full role it will have in the North. We know that an agency exists, but no one knows much beyond that. Regardless of whatever may have been agreed already, we must get a detailed briefing on SOCA because it is new and is in the process of being defined. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Alex, are you proposing that we seek information about the role of SOCA? Mr Attwood: I am seeking A, B, C stuff, not just about SOCA per se, but particularly about SOCA in the North. The Chairman (Mr Wells): About its role in Northern Ireland? Mr Attwood: Yes. The Chairman (Mr Wells): That seems to be a reasonable proposal. Mr McFarland: Colleagues on the Policing Board have had a detailed briefing on this matter. In some respects, SOCA is the British equivalent of the FBI. It is a UK-wide, multi-agency body, and naturally enough, it exists in Northern Ireland because it is part of the United Kingdom. What is strange about that? Mr Attwood: There is nothing strange about that logic. The question is: what is that agency actually going to do? That has not yet been confirmed. The Policing Board has been seeking a meeting with SOCA, which has not yet been granted because that agency is still getting up and running in the North. Mr Cobain: Could we try to resolve the two issues at hand before we — The Chairman (Mr Wells): We have drifted from the first issue to the second. Mr Cobain: We can talk about SOCA, but can we try to get through the first issue so that we can get to the next page before 4.00 pm? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Before I call Mr Kelly, are there any proposals on schedule 3(9)(a) and (9)(b) or should we just accept it as it is, and move on? Mr G Kelly: I do not accept it as it is. The Chairman (Mr Wells): You do not accept it, but do you have a proposal? Mr G Kelly: As we have already discussed, the document lacks definition. I do not wish to rehearse this morning’s conversation, but the document has an impact on this matter. The table in the NIO paper pushes the point that matters are excepted, and, therefore, they will not be devolved. I do not accept that. We must look at those matters one at a time. I was going to talk about the second aspect of the matter, but I have said all that I need to on the first aspect of it. Mr S Wilson: I am seeking clarification, so that we do not waste time. I get the feeling that we are moving to a situation where — regardless of which area we discuss — if matters are reserved or excepted, Sinn Féin will not be happy. Let us just cut to the chase and agree that as long as there is something on that list that will not be devolved to a Northern Ireland Administration, Sinn Féin will have reservations. That means that we need not go through the farce of discussing each matter in turn and seeking consensus. That might save us about four hours. The Chairman (Mr Wells): There will be matters that members may agree should eventually be devolved. Mr S Wilson: I get the impression from what has been said — and perhaps this can be clarified — that there is nothing that Sinn Féin will accept should remain with, or be reserved to, Westminster. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is that your view, Mr Kelly? Mr G Kelly: I thank Sammy for interpreting my view. Could I ask whether that means that the DUP’s view is that everything set down by the NIO is acceptable? Mrs Foster: There are a couple of matters that are intended to be reserved that we believe should be devolved. However, I agree with Sammy that there is no point in going through each of those points if we are not going to reach consensus on anything. The ultimate conclusion will be that this is a matter for negotiation in October and November. The Chairman (Mr Wells): It strikes me that there will be issues on which everyone is happy with the status quo. There will be matters that the DUP believe should be transferred, and there might be agreement on that. This matter is not quite as black and white or as stark as it may seem. Mr McFarland: Sinn Féin is not comfortable with fundamental issues around national security, and that impinges on our discussion of such issues. Clearly, we will not change Sinn Féin’s view. Notwithstanding that, I suggest that the Committee considers the remaining issues, because we shall not solve the question of whether we should have responsibility for national security. We should look at “Issues remaining” — those on which a decision on whether they are to be devolved has yet to be taken. It might be worth hearing some thoughts on them. That may be the best that we can achieve today, given the stances that have been taken. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are folk willing to work down the column of issues remaining and see whether we can agree some of them? Mr G Kelly: In case there is some confusion here, Sinn Féin is in favour of all these powers being devolved. I left the meeting last week at lunchtime, but it says in the minutes: “It was agreed that the powers listed at paragraph 3.2 of the NIO discussion paper should be devolved within policing and justice.” That means that there was consensus. What we are dealing with now appears to be a list of NIO exceptions. Therefore, we seem to be being told that, although everyone agreed that the maximum number of powers should be devolved, here are a number of issues that refer back to everything in paragraph 3.2, which we have already agreed should be devolved. There is probably no other way to do this other than to go through them. Sinn Féin has strong views on ARA and SOCA. It is not contradictory to have a flow of information between North and South, between the two islands, and, indeed, between the two islands and the EU. However, that does not preclude our having an accountability mechanism — and that is what devolution would involve — that deals with the all-Ireland aspect of the powers contained in paragraph 9(c) of schedule 3 to the 1998 Act. We would still take an all-Ireland approach, but we want the maximum amount of power to be devolved. As we work down the column of issues remaining, Sinn Féin will argue that. Arlene Foster said that the DUP wants to see several powers devolved. Let us hear what those are, and then we can go back over the list. Mr McFarland: There is no point in Gerry having that view. We have a Government plan in front of us. Parties will take up with the Government the matter of whether they agree with that plan. There are issues that have not yet been resolved. Notwithstanding any party’s objection to the plan, it would seem to be profitable to discuss the issues that the Government have not yet finalised, as they may listen to the parties’ views on them. To continue an argument about whether the Government plan should be followed, or about who agrees with the plan, will not solve anything in Committee. The Chairman (Mr Wells): There certainly will be issues about which members will not feel particularly strongly; we might reach agreement on those. Mr Weir: To pick up Alan’s point, it would be helpful to concentrate our efforts on the “Issues remaining” column. If parties wish to state their case as to what should move from the “What won’t devolve” to the “What will devolve” column, I do not mind. Ninety-nine times out of 100, we will not reach consensus on the issues, so, in those cases, there is no point in a great deal of debate. “Issues remaining” seems to fall into the category of issues in which there is a grey area. In some cases, the power was going to be devolved, but it was unclear as to which Department it would go. It strikes me that that is where the margin of opportunity for a degree of discussion lies. We may reach consensus on some of the issues; on a lot of them, we probably will not. That is where the discussion should be concentrated. However, that does not preclude, for example, Sinn Féin calling for responsibility for ARA to be devolved. I have no problem with Sinn Féin’s saying that; however, there will be no consensus on that issue because we will oppose it. The Committee should not waste an enormous amount of time discussing issues that will run into the sand very quickly. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mr Kelly, is that a way forward? Mr G Kelly: It is helpful. It is set out quite well in the column, so we have agreed what will be devolved. However, I am looking through the document now, and we have general difficulties with what will not be devolved. The column that lists what will not be devolved simply takes parts of the previous column, which lists what will be devolved, and infers that these aspects of those matters will not be devolved. Therefore, the assessment is right, and if you want to hone the conversation, I have no difficulty with that. Mr McFarland: Topics for a major discussion on the relationship between the police, the Policing Board and the Assembly are listed in the NIO discussion document. This will probably be the most vital discussion that we will have on policing, so it would be useful if we could move the conversation towards that. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Parties can use a single-transferable objection to keep the discussion moving forward if they do or do not want a matter to be devolved. It is quite clear that we will not reach agreement on ARA or SOCA. Mr McFarland: The third column shows what will not be devolved. Obviously, parties will want to lodge their fiver’s worth, which is fine, but Alex asked what we are talking about in relation to the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 (RIPA). It is necessary to discuss vetting, criminal records and disclosures and so forth and how they are handled. Those are sensitive issues. Mr Weir: I agree with Alex’s suggestion. Some aspects of RIPA are referred to, but it would be helpful if we had clarification on precisely what is meant by that section. Mr McFarland: With regard to criminal records and checks and disclosures, as members probably know, the new paedophile laws mean that we are moving to a centralised system for checking people. It is correct to say that there have been recent developments between the Republic of Ireland and the UK to put a better system in place so that people who have molested children cannot flee one or other of those jurisdictions. The increased threat from al-Qaeda and international terrorism may mean that such records will go to a much more centralised database. Again, it is probably not at all sensible to divide that into little bits, depending on where you are in the country. Therefore, my sense is that this will go to some sort of central agency into which the police services, either in the UK or the Republic, can tap to find out whether person A, B or C is fleeing justice or has a record of abusing children or whatever. That is how that process seems to be going, and to suggest that it should all chalk down here, and that we should have a little computer in Belfast that stands alone, is not the way that this is going. Mr G Kelly: The last column asks whether some: “aspects of RIPA that are currently reserved will need to remain so.” Let us find out what those are. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is there consensus on that? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are we agreed on Alex’s proposal to seek clarification from the Northern Ireland Office on the role of RIPA and SOCA in Northern Ireland — Mr Attwood: I was referring just to SOCA. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Just to SOCA. Are members agreed? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Good. We can get that sorted out. Is there anything else that members feel that we can usefully discuss? Mr Attwood: Although this is not a matter for discussion, members might have some comments to make. I invite the unionist parties to consider accepting the principle of making arrangements, which would be regulated on a Northern Ireland, UK-wide or island basis, to deal with criminal records. The Attracta Harron case is an example. She had gone to church in the Irish Republic and, obviously, was abducted thereafter. The risk from offenders does not respect borders. Therefore, our thinking should be broadened from a Northern Ireland-wide basis to a UK-and-Ireland-wide basis. 1.15 pm Mr G Kelly: It has recently become clear that the South does not have great child protection controls in place, and they do not hold comprehensive sex offender lists, etc. Therefore, our discussions here, and what we decide, will have an impact in the South also. Mr Weir: The DUP believes that the list, should it be produced, should be on a British Isles or European-wide basis. The Attracta Harron case was mentioned; the media covered a case in my constituency also. The person committed offences in Northern Ireland, and then in the Republic of Ireland. The person was jailed initially in the Republic of Ireland, but was moved to a prison in Northern Ireland where he was entitled to benefit from the remission rates. When the person left prison, he immediately went to England where he committed more offences, for which he has been convicted. Far be it from me to promote Europe, but this subject should be looked at on a more international basis. Many people have second homes abroad or are retiring to places such as France or Spain. We must ensure that people are not able to slip between jurisdictions to avoid being tried for offences: child protection is the most obvious reason, but the need applies to other matters as well. People should not be able to move about without the local police being at least aware of the threat that they pose. This problem is not confined to geography. The Chairman (Mr Wells): It seems that we agree that there should be clear co-operation between all states on this important issue. We will proceed to paragraph 9(d) of Schedule 3 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998, which deals with prosecutions, where there is already a wide degree of devolution. This subject — including the role of the Advocate General for Northern Ireland — is one that is close to Alban’s heart, but he is not here. Mrs D Kelly: Given that we will be discussing justice next week, could it not be deferred until then in order that Alban could participate? The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will do that. Paragraph 9(e) of Schedule 3 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 deals with the treatment of offenders, including children and young persons. Does anybody have any views on that? Mr G Kelly: There is no reason why that provision should not be devolved. The theme running through this paper is one that suggests a lack of trust in the Assembly and other interdependent institutions. Why should responsibility for sentence review commissioners and the remission of sentences not be devolved? Mr Attwood: In the negotiations up to and since the Good Friday Agreement, the SDLP has expressed its belief that many areas retained by the British, should be devolved. I will not go through it all; it is recorded elsewhere. I presume that the British Government feel that the release of prisoners is an emotive subject. For instance, the release of prisoners could end up being a divisive area that is difficult to manage, and a situation might arise where there would be some perversity with respect to what the Sentence Review Commissioners might or might not do. I am sure that informs the British Government’s thinking on this. The principle should be accepted that hard issues, such as the Sentence Review Commissioners, the renewal of fifty-fifty recruitment, the Parades Commission, including the Chief Constable’s right to appeal to the Secretary of State in respect of any determination, should be devolved, subject to agreement on all appropriate community safeguards, which would legislate against any group in the Assembly or any party from any background imposing its views in ways that would be against the public interests. Similarly, we believe that that matter should be devolved, but it requires some safeguards that might govern many other matters outlined later in the schedule. Mr G Kelly: I do not disagree with any of that. One of the biggest arguments about policing involves the protocols and demarcation lines that must exist between a justice Minister, the Policing Board, a scrutiny Committee, the Sentence Review Commissioners and so on. That argument is part of the wider discussion on the devolution and transfer of those issues, but we are dealing, in principle, with their devolution. Mr McFarland: The powers within the Northern Ireland (Sentences) Act 1998 and the Northern Ireland (Remission of Sentences) Act 1995 will not be devolved. It is correct that matters connected with terrorism or residual matters remain excepted. Presumably, they have been held back because the Government wish to have a broad UK-wide policy on sentencing, remission, and so on. It may be possible to re-examine those issues further down the road, but it makes sense to let them sit for the moment. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is there consensus on paragraph 9(e)? Members indicated dissent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The pattern will be to do a quick poll round the table, and, if there is no consensus, we will have to move on. Paragraph 9(f) is repealed, so we move on to paragraph 9(g) of Schedule 3. Mr Neeson: What did paragraph 9(f) concern? The Chairman (Mr Wells): I will just check in case something significant has been missed. Mr T Moore: Paragraph 9(f) deals with the surrender of fugitive offenders between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Paragraph 9(g) deals with compensation. The compensation scheme provided for in the Terrorism Act 2000, which is due to end in 2007, will not be devolved. Do members have any views on that? Mr G Kelly: This is an equality issue. That part of the Act has been abused. Sinn Féin believes that the compensation scheme should be transferred. Mrs Foster: The compensation scheme should remain an excepted matter. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Do we have consensus? Members indicated dissent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The next matter is community safety partnerships (CSPs). This matter will be devolved in its entirety, with no issues remaining. Many of us are involved with CSPs at council level and have experience of them. What is the view on the present situation? Mr McFarland: There are issues around CSPs, of which colleagues in the Policing Board will be aware. There has been a long-standing row about CSPs since their inception, as the Criminal Justice Review recommended that CSPs and DPPs should become a type of conglomerate that would give a much better service. For reasons that no one can figure out, the NIO has resolutely held its face against this. Originally, we thought that that was because of some deal between the NIO and Sinn Féin. However, if control of CSPs is devolved, the Assembly can perhaps take a more sensible view. Mrs Foster: In relation to the Review of Public Administration, the Policing Board is considering how CSPs and DPPs can have a more effective relationship with local communities. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will just leave that as it is, noting the suggestions, unless somebody wants to make a proposal. Paragraph 9A of schedule 3 provides for a chief inspector of criminal justice for Northern Ireland. All related powers are to be devolved. Are members happy with the status quo? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Public order is a more complicated matter. Remaining issues include certain aspects of parades. Mr Attwood: At least three issues remain. First, we do not accept the note in the schedule that states where responsibility lies for determining which weapons may be used in public order situations. There is a legal argument that responsibility resides with the Policing Board, in spite of the assertion to the contrary therein. Secondly, we need clarification from the Secretary of State or the MOD about how future powers will develop to enable the Army to operate in support of the police. One interpretation is that there will be garrison strength, and that that will be it. The note asserts that there will be garrison strength with Army powers, in support of civil power. I would like to know more about that. I can imagine what that would mean for public order issues and for providing a technical capacity to policing. There may be other issues, but a note needs to be added to detail the broad ground rules, and that is without prejudice to the SDLP’s view that the Army should have no role whatsoever. Thirdly, I mentioned the principles that should govern sensitive powers being devolved to the Assembly, including the power of the Chief Constable on determinations of the Parades Commission. He has not used that power to date, but he may wish to do so in the future. Nonetheless, if that matter is devolved, there must be community safeguards, because a Minister for justice cannot be given a unilateral power to decide on appeals from the Chief Constable. That is not an acceptable outcome. Appropriate safeguards must be built in to ensure that, if a situation were to arise, a decision would be made that would reflect not just one party or one community interest. Mr Neeson: The operational independence of the Chief Constable is important. During my days on the board of the Police Authority, decisions were taken by the then Chief Constable that I did not agree with. However, by the same token, when we deal with such sensitive issues as parades, the operational independence of the Chief Constable is vital. Mr Weir: The DUP believes that the power to appoint members to the Parades Commission should be devolved. The detail is vague, because certain aspects of appointments to the Parades Commission and its operation could remain reserved, if that were the wish of the Assembly. The default position is that all aspects of the Parades Commission would be devolved, unless the Assembly decided to the contrary. Is that the case? Is that in legislation? Mr T Moore: As far as I know, that is not in legislation, but again, clarification is probably required. Mr Weir: Did that statement come from the NIO? Mr T Moore: That comes from the NIO discussion document. Mr Weir: Our view is that appointments should be devolved in that regard, but we would like clarification on that matter. The example of appointments to the Parades Commission comes back to the earlier point about “certain aspects of parades”. We should seek clarification on what that means. Mr McFarland: The PFG Committee dealing with rights, safeguards, equality issues and victims has been discussing parading, and the DUP submitted a detailed document on the make-up of the Parades Commission. It would make some sense if the detail of that were allowed to run as a major issue with the PFG Committee dealing with equality, rights and safeguards, which meets on Friday — as has been happening — and we can agree or disagree with it here. My understanding is that that entire issue will be devolved, unless we think that it is of such concern that it should remain an excepted matter. However, the Friday team can discuss that. 1.30 pm On the military side, we will end up with a garrison here, where families live while the soldiers are in Afghanistan or Iraq. The soldiers will return only occasionally and then return to their posts. At any one time, a battalion’s-worth of soldiers would be here, and that is exactly what happens in other parts of the UK. It would be useful to get the protocols that govern that. It would also be useful to examine the protocols: first, in respect of Military Aid to the Civil Power (MACP), which deals with riot situations and assists Ministries with events such as the BSE crisis; and secondly, in respect of Military Aid to the Civil Community (MACC), which is used, for example, when a helicopter has to help a farmer lift a cow out of a bog. Defence is, of course, an excepted matter. Three of the excepted functions that will remain at Westminster are defence, foreign affairs and Treasury matters. If defence became devolved, the Government here would have to ask the Ministry of Defence for military aid, for which it would be expected to pay as part of the Budget. It would be useful to get all that clarified, but the well tried and trusted protocols that exist in the rest of the UK can assist in that. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are we agreed that we will pursue Alex’s request for information? Without prejudice, we can look at that information and decide whether it is useful. Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): There is a proposal that we defer to the PFG Committee dealing with equality, rights and safeguards in respect of the reference to the Parades Commission contained in the NIO paper on national security. That Committee has had quite a long discussion on parades but has failed to reach a consensus. However, we agreed to consider further the DUP’s proposals for changes to the Parades Commission, and those proposals might fit neatly into that discussion. There is a fair degree of overlap between the two groups, so I am not trying to hide anything from anyone. Are members happy that we do that? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): OK. We are making some progress. Mr G Kelly: We are giving work to somebody else. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We have parked less today than we parked on Monday. I do not know whether that is a victory. Mr G Kelly: With regard to the Parades Commission, the community safeguards are clearly important, but we are passing the issue to the PFG Committee dealing with equality, rights and safeguards, so I will leave it at that. We believe that it should be transferred. You will not be surprised to hear that we are against the British Army backing up the police. We went through a long period in which that was a common occurrence, and we do not want to go back to that. Hopefully, we are entering the final stages of demilitarisation. We are opposed to British Army involvement, and we believe that that remaining issue should be transferred. The Chairman (Mr Wells): If that was a proposal, I do not think that we will get consensus on it. [Laughter.] We will note that and move on to the policing accountability framework. There is quite a bit to this matter. As it is so important, I will ask each party to have its say. I suspect that there will be a divergence of opinion. Mr Neeson: As you say, Mr Chairman, this issue is very important, particularly where fifty-fifty recruitment is concerned. My party has always believed that that would not solve the problem and has always felt that through time, and when there was confidence in the institutions, a police force comprising all races and religions would develop naturally. However, my party strongly believes that, although this remains a reserved matter, it should be devolved. Mr McFarland: We are on record as saying that fifty-fifty recruitment should be removed pronto, so we will not get into a discussion on it. However, I want to talk briefly about the point that is under the issues remaining column that concerns paragraph 11 of schedule 3 to the 1998 Act. It discusses: “The detail of the relationship between the Policing Board, the Northern Ireland Minister for policing and an Assembly policing committee.” If this Committee does nothing else, it should determine how that relationship will come about. The Policing Board was set up as a result of the Patten Report. Alex Attwood has described how inviolate that report is — except, of course, if the Secretary of State decided, with the click of a finger, to abolish the provision to have 10 elected members. It seems that one can move away from Patten if one so wishes. Patten set up the Policing Board to deal with a particular set of circumstances. However, if we end up with a Minister and an Assembly Committee for policing and justice, we will be in difficulty. Ten Assembly Members who were elected by d’Hondt would sit on the Policing Board, and the Assembly Committee would have 11 members who were also elected by d’Hondt. That means that 21 MLAs would be committed to policing. Colleagues will be aware from previous discussions that it can be difficult to fill Committees. A few weeks ago, we had an energetic discussion with Naomi Long about the difficulty of securing Committee quorums when the Assembly was up and running. It is obviously silly to tie up 21 elected representatives with policing. How do we deal with that? The Policing Board has many roles. For example, it secures money for policing from the NIO. Presumably, that money would come first to the Minister, who would then pass it to the Policing Board to dole out. The board is also responsible for the police’s manpower and equipment. Therefore, it has operational, hands-on concerns. It is also charged with holding the Chief Constable to account. There is confusion in that the board does not simply have a watchdog role; that would be the role of the Assembly Committee. The board has a combined role. Therefore, how would the Policing Board, with its many functions, operate, yet have a useful, supervisory relationship with the Committee? One option is to use d’Hondt to replace elected representatives on the board with party nominees. Those who are chosen to serve on the board would, therefore, be non-elected representatives, and the essential political input that the Patten Report requires would be retained. The Assembly Committee could then operate properly. It is uncertain whether the Assembly Committee would, under normal circumstances, call the chief executive of the Policing Board to appear before it. The Policing Board would hold the Chief Constable to account, and the Assembly Committee would hold the Policing Board to account through its chief executive. I am sure, however, that the Committee would want to reserve the right to call the Chief Constable if circumstances dictated, given that it has the power to summon people and papers. The Committee would oversee the Minister’s work. Matters that concern justice and prisons would be much more straightforward if the Committee had direct access to the relevant agencies. The issues are complicated and impinge on all kinds of areas and sensitivities. However, if we achieve nothing else, I hope that we at least have clarity of thought about how to proceed. Mr Attwood: I agree with Alan that the Committee’s work on the Policing Board could be some of the most useful that it addresses. However, the basis on which we progress must be that, although it is accepted that the Assembly and Minister would like to have as big a role as possible — since that is the nature of Parliaments and Ministers — all of the institutions established by Patten need to be ring-fenced and their independence protected to the highest possible degree. If we work from that principle, I believe that our efforts will be successful. Parliamentarians and Ministers may not end up with the authority and role that they want, but given the nature of the policing issue, it is the best way to proceed. Therefore, save as is outlined in Patten, the role of an Assembly and any Minister or Ministers should not extend beyond what I have outlined. Ministers would have responsibility for setting long-term objectives, deemed to be three to five years. Working from that basis, the principle of maximum dependence of the policing structures can be established. I am concerned about some members’ views on this. Perhaps some still yearn for a return of the days when there was a Minister of Home Affairs with far-reaching powers. Mr Kennedy: Hear, hear. Mrs Foster: Bring back John Taylor. [Laughter.] Mr Attwood: On the other hand, other parties feel that it has taken so long for us to get our hands on policing that now we are close we must grab it all. Perhaps I am over-characterising one or two parties round the table, but we must be mindful of such tendencies. In principle, the Policing Board, the PSNI, the District Policing Partnerships (DPPs) and the Police Ombudsman should be ring-fenced; as far as possible they should not be encroached upon. As a consequence, an Assembly Committee or Minister will feel that their function in relation to policing matters is not what they would like it to be, but that is definitely the best approach. Views on some elements of that may converge over the next two or three weeks. The SDLP supports the devolution of fifty-fifty recruitment, but it must be subject to safeguards. Given the likelihood, or otherwise, of the Assembly being restored by November 2006 or May 2007, the subject of its being devolved may become academic, as the British Government are about to go out to consultation on the renewal of fifty-fifty recruitment because its three-year provision runs out next April. I remind members that Patten said that there should be fifty-fifty recruitment for at least 10 years. The SDLP is working from the basis that the recommendation of 10 years is a minimum and argues that it should extend beyond that. Mr Cobain: Do you think that there will be a Prod in the police force if fifty-fifty recruitment runs for 10 years? Mr Attwood: By the time fifty-fifty recruitment has run for 14 years, the police force will probably be about 55% Protestant — or non-Catholic, to give the proper legal definition. Finally, I put down a marker about the appointment of a new Police Ombudsman in September or October of next year, when Nuala O’Loan’s seven-year tenure ends. Mr S Wilson: Are any more of your councillors’ wives looking for a job? Mr Attwood: I understand why Ian Paisley Jnr comes out with that kind of comment, but Sammy should know better. Mr Cobain: You are right. Mr Kennedy: There is no point appealing to his better nature. Mr Weir: What better nature? Mr Kennedy: Exactly. Mr Attwood: Sammy should be mindful of the company that he keeps. Mrs Foster: Sammy, I would leave now if I were you. Mr Attwood: The SDLP also wants the appointment of a new Police Ombudsman to be devolved. However, I am worried that, given the time frame, offering advice to the Prime Minister on the appointment of a new Police Ombudsman is a heavy power to give to OFMDFM. Mr G Kelly: If the SDLP had had that job in OFMDFM, I wonder whether it would have had the same opinion. Sinn Féin supports the transfer of fifty-fifty recruitment, but with community safeguards. There is almost paranoia about what will happen to the Policing Board in those circumstances, so let us try to balance it out. The Policing Board has powers that should be protected. However, we are not talking about a Minister or Ministers with no powers at all. Some of the ambience of the conversation suggests that there will be a lame duck Minister; that would assist no one. The Policing Board does not legislate — the Minister may. A Department for policing and justice must have a scrutiny Committee. Other Departments will have a scrutiny Committee with powers or limitations, so why would a policing and justice Committee not operate on the same basis? That Committee might not have the power to legislate, but it would certainly have the power to offer assistance in creating helpful legislation. 1.45 pm Bearing in mind that even this Committee has almost accepted that policing and justice matters would not be covered by two separate Departments, it is crucial to remember that discussion of a single Department for policing and justice involves more than policing and the Policing Board. We are talking about the entire policing and justice issue, which is much more wide ranging; that should be reflected in the power that a Minister or Ministers would have. Some of the powers are already ring-fenced, and I have heard no one argue that the Policing Board’s powers should diminish. That said, a scrutiny Committee is essential. I have not yet given any thought to what Alan has said about political parties replacing their elected representatives on the Policing Board with party appointees, but I suppose that it is worth looking at, given that the board might have problems getting a quorum. There is also an all-Ireland dimension to policing and justice, and I would like that dimension to be very robust, whether that be achieved through one or more implementation bodies or areas of co-operation. That would help to strengthen some policing and justice issues on which we have already had some sort of agreement. That is all that I have to say on that matter at present. I think that we can go some distance with it. Table 1 on reserved matters and their implications for devolution states in relation to paragraph 11 of schedule 3 to the Northern Ireland Act 1998: “The Secretary of State would retain power to issue statutory guidance to the Ombudsman (the Minister for policing would also have this power).” I am not sure what that means exactly. Would the Secretary of State and the Minister both have power or would it transfer from the Secretary of State to the Minister? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mr Moore will seek clarification on that. After Sammy has spoken, our round-robin contributions will be complete. I shall then seek proposals. Mr S Wilson: Like the Ulster Unionist Party, the DUP believes that fifty-fifty recruitment has been discriminatory and has damaged the police’s credibility in the unionist community. It has also been damaging to individual police officers, because they are considered to have been selected on the basis of their religion, not on the basis of their ability to do the job. Therefore, fifty-fifty recruitment should be ended as quickly as possible. I hope that that happens before policing and justice powers are devolved. I suspect that those who want fifty-fifty recruitment to be devolved to Northern Ireland want it so that they can use their veto powers to ensure that discrimination exists for a considerable number of years. That worries me. Alex has talked about fifty-fifty recruitment lasting for 14 years or more. That in itself is a warning sign for people from the unionist community. They would simply see the devolution of policing and justice as a means of institutionalising discrimination, because nationalists could use their veto to prevent any change to the fifty-fifty provisions. The relationship between the Policing Board and the Assembly is not such a big issue. Any MLA who has been involved in the Policing Board will know that a policing and justice Committee that would have other policing and justice responsibilities could not possibly do the job of the Policing Board, or, indeed, supersede it. The Policing Board’s job is more to do with the minutiae of policing. It is best to see the Committee’s role as an overarching one, perhaps in relation to legislation and long-term strategic issues, with the Policing Board micro- |