COMMITTEE ON THE Monday 14 August 2006 Members in attendance for all or part of proceedings: The Committee met at 10.03 am. (The Chairman (Mr Molloy) in the Chair.) The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Members, let us begin. I remind members to switch off their mobile phones completely. Hansard lost part of the recording from Friday’s sitting because of mobile phone interference. Are any members deputising for other members from their party? Mr O’Dowd: I am here on behalf of Michelle Gildernew. Mr P J Bradley: I could toss a coin to decide whether I am Mark Durkan or Alasdair McDonnell. I am more like Mark, I think. Mr Ford: Naomi and I are representing ourselves. Mr McFarland: Mr McGimpsey is representing Mr McNarry. Mr Kennedy is due shortly. Mr P Robinson: Gregory and I are representing all three DUP members. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Are members content with the minutes of the meeting of 7 August? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Last Monday, several members, particularly Alan McFarland, asked for a paper to be written that outlines the structure of Committee Bills and the drafting services that are available to Committees. A paper has been prepared. If members have any further queries about that issue, they should alert the Committee Clerk. We shall move to our discussion on institutional issues. Am I correct to assume that members do not need to state any declarations of interest? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): The updated list of institutional issues is before members. We dealt with a number of the issues at the meeting on 7 August, when the Committee decided to resume its discussions at ‘Stability’. Are members content to open with that issue? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): The main issue on ‘Stability’ was raised in the DUP submission. Therefore, perhaps the DUP would like to open the discussion. Mr P Robinson: The aim is to avoid continual suspensions due to the behaviour — usually outside the Assembly — of parties or those linked to them. The Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) has a role in that, but because a veto is available, it cannot exercise that role, as that requires the support of both sections of the community as represented in the Assembly. That means that the only option is to fall back on the Secretary of State, and I do not think that anyone would consider that to be a safe option. Therefore, the IMC requires further power, which is what the DUP asked for originally. The DUP requested that the IMC be given some real teeth, so that, rather than relying on the Secretary of State, and having only the power to make recommendations, it would have the power to take decisions where vetoes could otherwise be used. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Hansard shows that Sinn Féin also has issues with ‘Stability’. Mr Murphy: The ‘Stability’ issue that Sinn Féin raised is the 2000 Act, which brought in suspension provisions. It is no secret that Sinn Féin has stated, both at the time and since, that such legislation is outside the terms of the Good Friday Agreement. The British Government introduced it unilaterally. The suspension mechanism allows parties to jump out of the institutions at the first hint of trouble, and it has been shown, particularly with the last suspension, that issues that have caused people to jump out of the institutions have been found to be huge smokescreens. In Sinn Féin’s view, that legislation contributed significantly to instability. If walking out of the institutions had triggered elections and given the people their say on the issues that had caused the collapse of the Executive, Sinn Féin thinks that more thought would have been given on walking out. The 2000 Act added to the instability. That is not to say that there were no issues of concern or that the institutions did not face any difficulties from 1998 until now but, in our view, the existence of suspension legislation significantly added to the instability and allowed the much easier option of shutting down the institutions at every turn. If my memory serves me correctly, there were four suspensions. We made it clear to the British Government — and they have accepted — that the abolition of the 2000 Act and the ending of the British Secretary of State’s ability to suspend the institutions on a whim should accompany the reinstatement of the institutions. Mr McFarland: It is worth reminding ourselves that the reasons for the suspension of the institutions were the activities of the Provisional IRA and their Sinn Féin colleagues in Government. The whole issue of safeguards has dogged this process right from the beginning, whether Sinn Féin and the IRA were going to decommission, or whether in fact they were seriously intending to play a proper part in the Assembly. The Northern Ireland Act 2000 was introduced as a safeguard. Rather than crash the entire process, it provides for a time out to suspend the Assembly, to examine what had happened and why, and, if that could be put right, to fire it up again. In theory, the Government will not get up and running again until the DUP is happy that Sinn Féin is ready for Government, and that all the outstanding issues are cleared. Technically though, we begin with everyone happy that everyone else should be in Government — otherwise, presumably, we shall not get past first base. The question then becomes: if things have settled down, but one party or another is engaged in some nefarious activity, how do we deal with that? Our view is that the Northern Ireland Act 2000 should remain for a specified period of time. We must ensure that if the institutions are fired up again, and if the south Derry battalion of the IRA — which has just seceded from the movement, with its weapons, in upset at what the leadership are doing — or the group in east Tyrone decides that it is not happy and is messing around, there must be some sanction to suspend the system, examine what has happened, and deal with the culprits. Although we can see that, in the longer term, the 2000 Act could be set aside once stability has been achieved, now is not the time to do that. We must buy ourselves some time with the 2000 Act in place, so that if people are messing around, we can suspend the institutions, examine what has happened and impose the necessary sanctions. Mr O’Dowd: It follows that if the mid-Ulster brigade of the UVF misbehaves again, we should also call into question the role of the Ulster Unionist Party Assembly Group (UUPAG). We must make politics dominant. We must ensure that politics wins the day. As politicians, we must strive to ensure that the institutions are robustly defended against any outside force that would attempt to bring them down. We do not need legislation for that; we need confidence in ourselves and in our communities. Dr Farren: From the outset, the SDLP’s position in this debate has been that if the Executive collapses, there is no reason for all the other elements of the agreement to be suspended. If the problem is the inability to form an Executive, then, after the statutory period to test that has passed, there should be a move to restore the Assembly and the other institutions with the two Governments seeking approval from the Assembly and appointing an Executive drawn from outside the pool of Assembly Members. The SDLP published those proposals a long time ago and we still advocate them in the case of the collapse of an Executive. 10.15 am Mr Ford: Clearly, no one can be satisfied with the Assembly remaining liable to suspension at any time, effectively at the whim of the Secretary of State. There are provisions for the removal — or temporary suspension — of Ministers from office, partly through the IMC legislation that gives that responsibility firmly to the Assembly. The potential for removing Ministers from office for a period of time will apply only if, for example, in the case of misbehaviour by the UVF, the DUP is prepared to stand up to the Ulster Unionist Party Assembly Group and similarly, in the case of misbehaviour by the IRA, if the SDLP is prepared to stand up to Sinn Féin. That was where we ran into problems in the past. However, the IMC legislation allows the Secretary of State limited powers to remove Ministers without suspending the entire Executive. The Alliance Party’s view is that it is preferable to keep in office those Ministers who are democratically elected, accountable to the Assembly and not misbehaving, rather than end up with the potential for replacing the entire Executive with undemocratically appointed commissioners. The IMC legislation provides scope to carry things forward, but the first question is whether the Assembly is prepared to follow through on the IMC reports. Mr P Robinson: Let us be clear that the suspension legislation is mere window dressing. It is a one-day measure in Parliament: the Government can repeal it today, and pass it again tomorrow. Some people may want that fig leaf of cover, which will not exercise anyone too much because people know that, if required, the Government can legislate speedily, as they have shown in the past. It would be more convenient for the legislation to remain, but that is a matter for those who have to find time for legislation at Westminster. People are avoiding the problem that would arise should the scenario that Alan McFarland mentioned come about, wherein a judgement is made that it is possible to set up an Executive. All the available intelligence, the IMC and the general community on the ground may well support that judgement. However, everyone knows that the IRA retains its capacity for criminality and, six months down the road, it could be the Ulster Bank’s turn to be robbed. The outcome of that would be that no unionist would remain in an Executive with Sinn Féin. That would result either in suspension or in the entire Executive being brought down. Clearly, the people who should be punished in those circumstances are the individuals identified as having links with those who robbed the Ulster Bank — not the rest of the community. Why should the community lose its political structures because of the actions of one organisation? There must be provision for those individuals to be expelled or suspended. That cannot happen under the existing legislation, because Sinn Féin would hold a veto in those circumstances. Everyone knows that the British and Irish Governments would not have the guts to act and therefore the whole show would collapse. Is that what people want? Are people willing to face up to that? If Sinn Féin has turned over a new leaf, it will have nothing to worry about, and there should be no excitement in its ranks. If Sinn Féin is so convinced that it is squeaky clean, it will not want to resist any change in this area. Why would an innocent man have anything to worry about in those circumstances? Mr McGimpsey: At the time, the UUP regarded suspension legislation as important, and we still do. We saw it as fail-safe legislation in case things went wrong. The initial institutional set-up was a gamble, and the odds were stacked against its success, so we wanted to be able to get out without much trouble. That issue also locked in Tony Blair. Peter Robinson is correct about the sovereignty of Parliament — Northern Ireland is part of the United Kingdom and Westminster is sovereign. If Westminster repeals that legislation, it can re-enact it tomorrow. However, if Blair and company get rid of the Act, they will never take that power back. They will do everything in their power to avoid suspension legislation, as they did before. Peter is also correct to say that unionists will not remain in Government with Sinn Féin if there is a repeat performance of February 2000, when what was supposed to happen did not happen. Sinn Féin was aware what would happen if it did not do what it was supposed to do, or what republicans were supposed to do. When that did not happen, we were set for a crash. The question is whether we want scorched earth or a crash that can be repaired. Seán Farren said that if the Executive went down, everything else should stay in place. However, that cannot happen, because there is interdependence in the institutions; strands one, two and three are dependent on one another. If strand one goes, strands two and three must also go. Under strand two, North/South bodies are supposed to deal with care and maintenance, because they are dependent on strand one. A great deal is being asked of unionism in entering into an arrangement with no suspension legislation in place. Unionists will not remain in Government if there is a repeat of February 2000, but guess who will get the blame for crashing the democratic institutions? The purpose of the legislation was to avoid that. The British Government also have a role to play. There was clear thinking about putting suspension legislation in place. If the institutions get up and running again — and that is a gamble — they will not be mature enough to continue into the foreseeable future without suspension legislation. I do not see any measures in strand one that would allow the institutions to expel Sinn Féin. Therefore, we will return to the previous situation in which the whole system remains hostage to republican intentions. Mr Murphy: Sinn Féin contends that the system remains hostage to the whisperings of people in Special Branch and other agencies who have political axes to grind. We are confident that there will be no accusations against us, or against anyone associated with us. However, all it takes is a leak from someone in Special Branch, MI5 or some other agency, for Sinn Féin to be tried and found guilty within 24 hours. If that is the sort of mindset with which members are heading back into the institutions, it highlights the fact that we are in for an unstable time. We will not allow ourselves to be tried and found guilty by the IMC, or any other such agency that relies on reports from people who were sworn enemies for a long time, and who, over the years, have been interfering in a political fashion in the democratic process here. Our contention is that if we are in Government, it is on the basis of our electoral mandate — people voted for us to be in Government. Ultimately, the people will decide whether Sinn Féin or any other party is fit for Government. Other parties want a safety net of suspension that can be triggered in the aftermath of reports by agencies to the IMC. In fact, we have seen recently that it does not even take the IMC — all it takes is someone to leak a word in someone’s ear and suddenly there is a crisis which must be responded to. That may the type of institutions that other people think they want, but they will soon discover them to be unstable, because there are people in the security agencies who have been working to their own agenda, who have political agendas and who have axes to grind. I am confident that — as has been proved — the accusations do not stack up. However, the difficulty is that every time an accusation is made, unionism goes into crisis and into a tailspin and rushes for the door of the Executive. If that is the type of institution that some members want, they will find that it will not survive very long, because someone will make an accusation in order to destabilise unionism. We must have the confidence in our own ability to sustain and work the institutions; we do not need safety mechanisms from the British Government or from any other agency. I am confident that we can do that. However, relying on the IMC or on other mechanisms for exclusion or soft landings — as some people are wishing for — is an unstable basis on which to start the reinstatement of the institutions. Mr P Robinson: Let us dispense with the notion that the Northern Bank robbery was merely the result of some Special Branch individual’s whispering — it was not a whisper; it was a significant gulder. That robbery was not the figment of the Special Branch’s imagination — the IRA’s responsibility was recognised by the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom and the Prime Minister of the Republic of Ireland. The IRA’s responsibility was also recognised by the police forces and the intelligence services on both sides of the border. However, the republican movement is still in denial, as it would be if it were the Ulster Bank that was robbed next time. That is why these issues must be dealt with. Michael McGimpsey shares my unease about relying on a British Government — present or future. A Government that are not prepared to bring forward a new Act are unlikely to use existing legislation. That is why I put less faith in the suspension-legislation option than in the more secure mechanism of removing a party that was involved in such behaviour. The suspension proposition is one by which everybody will be punished, and that is not fair. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Do we have any proposals on this matter? Mr McFarland: The IMC contains a mechanism to identify what happens when any party is not playing by the rules. Is Peter Robinson suggesting that the Government should have separate new legislation to remove a party? Mr P Robinson: I am suggesting that the legislation be changed so that an IMC report would be sufficient to remove a party. Such a motion will not be successful in the Assembly because there are vetoes there, and we will not get any action from Governments who will be looking at the political rather than the security or criminal issues involved. Mr McFarland: The IMC was established through an agreement between the British and Irish Governments, with accompanying legislation. Therefore, for any modification, there would have to be an acceptance between Dublin and London to amend the legislation in their respective jurisdictions. Is that the outworking of what is being suggested? Mr P Robinson: The legislation that would affect the Assembly would be the United Kingdom legislation. Mr McFarland: Would the legislation in Dublin and London have to be changed to enable the IMC to have the power to remove a party from the institutions? Mr P Robinson: I am not sure, but it would require a change to the agreement. I am not sure whether that requires a change to the legislation in the Irish Republic. A change to the legislation in the United Kingdom would certainly be required, because it is a United Kingdom institution. That is a legal matter. 10.30am Mr McFarland: That mechanism comes from the IMC, which was created by a separate agreement, which was then put into legislation on both sides of the border. Are we now beefing up the IMC’s ability? At the moment the IMC makes its report and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland takes action. The Dublin Government are not involved; there was a long and specific row about that at the time. The logic of what is being proposed, as I understand it, is that, once the IMC says that party A is guilty, the law dictates that there is an automatic suspension, so that process will bypass the Secretary of State? Mr P Robinson: Some formal process might have to be introduced; we would need to speak to the lawyers. The Secretary of State might have to take action, but it would be mandatory for him to do so — in terms of authority to Parliament he may have to do it. Mr Murphy: To correct Alan on one point, the Secretary of State is not required to take action. That is clear because the IMC recommended financial sanctions against the PUP, which is now the UUP’s sister party. However, the Secretary of State, while imposing financial sanctions on Sinn Féin, did not feel that it was necessary to impose financial sanctions on the PUP, despite a recommendation to do so. Therefore he is clearly not required to act under any recommendation from the IMC. I want to make it clear that we do not accept the IMC’s right to judge our party or any other political party in this Assembly. The parties are here as a right of their mandate, and the people who judge their suitability for office are the people who vote. Therefore we would not accept the IMC sitting in judgement on any party, particularly our own. If we were to make proposals, they would be to get rid of the IMC and do away with the 2000 Act. However, I do not presume from the discussions today that there is any sense in making proposals because I cannot see consensus being reached. At the same time, there would not be consensus from Sinn Féin to beef up the IMC in any regard or to retain suspension legislation. We can discuss how the IMC can be beefed up, but I assure you that there will be no consensus from us. Mr O’Dowd: We are getting ourselves into a tailspin about how to exclude parties. The evidence used by the IMC would not be enough for a disciplinary hearing against a member of the Assembly staff, never mind the exclusion of a democratically elected Government party. The ability to deny the democratic rights of a large section of society is very precariously based. If a senior unionist MLA had his offices, including his council offices, searched as part of a fraud enquiry, would Sinn Féin walk away from Government? If, for instance, an Ulster Resistance weapon were used to kill a Catholic or added to the growing list of Protestants who have been murdered since suspension, would Sinn Féin walk away from Government? No, we would not. We would stick in there and ensure that the sanctity of the institutions remains supreme and that we build politics. That is what this process is about. None of the parties who are sitting here can be sanctimonious about the past or the future. Let us debate how we include people instead of excluding them and how we build inclusive institutions and an inclusive Executive. Mr Campbell: I took from this heading of “Stability” that we were talking about circumstances. We have hit the buffers on three occasions in similar circumstances. In some respects, that is why we have been having these discussions in recent weeks. Enduring stability is not about the specific exclusion of any particular political party. However, the stability mechanism is designed to ensure that, when an independent assessor —in the form of the IMC — has identified one or more political parties that are part of the Executive as being party to one or a series of criminal or terrorist acts, that stability is such as to allow the Executive to continue to function, despite that activity. For us and, I know, for others, it would be intolerable that the Executive should continue as though the act had not occurred. The integrity of the institution would be at stake. As Mr Robinson pointed out, one simply could not participate in an institution if an Ulster Bank robbery took place that was a mark II of the Northern Bank robbery. Therefore there has to be a mechanism that protects the integrity of the devolved institution, ensures continuing stability and upholds the right of the people to continue to have that devolved institution. That mechanism must ensure that those who are guilty of being party to certain activities know that those activities have to stop and that their continued participation in a devolved institution is not just threatened but reaches an automatic cessation point because of those activities. Participation would be restored at the point either when those activities cease or when sufficient time has passed to ensure that they do not recur. That is what stability means. It is not about specifically excluding people and walking away from government; it is about trying to ensure that government continues despite the activities that some people have engaged in. It is also about trying to ensure that such activities do not occur again and that if they do, people will have to pay a penalty. Mrs Long: There are a couple of things that I want to pick up on. First, the suitability to hold office is not simply based on a mandate. It is also based on people being willing to take a pledge of office, accept a ministerial code, and live up to both those things. To say that suitability is just about a mandate is simply not correct; it is about more than that. It is entirely conceivable that any politician, or indeed, any group of politicians, might pay lip service to a pledge of office and a ministerial code but not live up to them in practice. In any democratic society there are conditions in which such people would need to be removed from office. However, in other democratic societies that would not mean the collapse of government; it would simply mean the individual or party being removed from office while government continues. In that respect, the Alliance Party would be sympathetic to mechanisms that are likely to be able to address conceivable difficulties that might arise during the term of an Assembly without having to collapse the entire Executive and the Assembly. We certainly would not want that to happen. I am not sure that the British Government would accept giving powers directly to the IMC. The Government agreed to the IMC on the basis that they should retain the power to act at the final decision point. If, for example, the Assembly could not make up its mind about sanctions, or if it failed on a cross-community vote to adopt sanctions that were proposed, it would fall back to the British Government, albeit in consultation with the Irish Government and the Assembly, to make such decisions. Whatever the decision or the outcome of our discussions, the British Government are not likely to cede that power to any other body. I am not really sure that the British Government would adopt a position whereby the IMC would produce information and take the final decision. Dr Farren: We are essentially talking about the confidence that is necessary between parties, particularly those that would form the Executive. They should be totally committed, not only to working the institutions but to doing so within the context of the law —passively and actively — so that all the parties fully support the adherence to and upholding of the law and, indeed, support the agents — in other words the police and security services — who are there to ensure that the law is upheld and implemented. Therefore, parties that fail in that respect are not contributing in any way to the confidence that is necessary to sustain the institutions. Sinn Féin is the only party that does not currently lend its full support to the police and security services. It must cross that bridge and make that major commitment. If that commitment were made and seen to have been actively followed up, it would go a long way to developing the confidence that is essential to sustain the institutions. The current discussion must take full account of commitments to, and upholding of, the law, and support for the agencies of the law. Mr Ford: I shall follow up the DUP’s suggestions about the IMC and add to Naomi’s comments. There must be some mechanism to ensure continuity in the event of illegal activity by those who are linked to parties in the Assembly or, more specifically, the Executive. The DUP proposed that the IMC be given the power to impose sanctions. When the Alliance Party proposed to the two Governments the creation of the IMC, they were not entirely happy about the process, largely because the then leader of the Ulster Unionist Party made a similar proposal at the same time. That proposal included giving the IMC the power to impose sanctions. The British Government were unwilling to give the IMC that power, favouring instead powers of investigation, reporting and recommendation. In those circumstances, we must be realistic and recognise that there is no likelihood that the Governments will have changed their minds. The 2003 Act that established the International Monitoring Commission makes it clear that the power to regulate the IMC’s activities should initially rest with the Assembly, but with a backstop in the form of the British Government should the Assembly fail to take action. Our fundamental problem is that circumstances might arise in which certain Members believe that those who are linked closely to one party are not behaving themselves, and another party that is perhaps on the same side of the community designation divide takes the view that those Members are not that bad. In those circumstances, there is a major problem with any powers resting with the Assembly, if the Assembly is required to act on a designation-led, so-called cross-community vote. Some type of backstop must be found. Clearly, we hope that we do not need it, but experience unfortunately shows that something of that nature is required. Mrs Long: Seán Farren made a useful point about democratic credentials for Government. He also raised the issue of the rule of law and our understanding of it. That plays a role as regards confidence-building because there must be some form of shared acceptance of what the rule of law entails — and it must be much more than simply signing up to policing structures, which seems to be the current focus. A party can sign up to policing structures and at the same time disregard the rule of law. There is something contradictory in that requirement; it would not, of itself, eliminate the potential need for a Member, or a party, to be removed from office in the future. Even with the same understanding of the rule of law, people might break it. An issue remains about what would happen if a party were in default of the underlying principles of being fit for Government. I do not see this simply in a Sinn Féin dimension; it is more fundamental and wide-ranging because it requires all parties — not just one — to sign up to certain standards if they wish to be in Government. Unless the discussion is focused in a more wide-ranging way, it is likely that resistance will come from Sinn Féin, because the mechanism appears to aim for exclusion of Sinn Féin. I prefer to see it as a mechanism for ensuring that Government is in no way sullied or held to ransom by the activities of people who are outside Government but linked to parties within it. The discussion must be kept in broad terms, rather than focusing on particular parties, because any party could potentially find itself in that situation. There could well be circumstances in which parties that feel uncomfortable with the discussion may wish to see this legislation used against parties other than Sinn Féin. 10.45 am Mr Murphy: We are not arguing on the basis that it has an impact only on Sinn Féin. I made it quite clear that we would not accept the IMC sitting in judgement on any party. Attention has focused on us, and I remind people that that is in the context of it being one year on from the IRA disposing of all its weaponry and instructing its volunteers to engage in no activities whatever. We are still in this circular discussion, and the unionists are trying to get a clause included that will allow Sinn Féin to be thrown out at the first sign of trouble. I do not accept the IMC simply on the basis that it has had a negative impact on our party; I do not accept it on the basis that it applies no standards of proof that would be acceptable anywhere else. Its membership has its own political bias, and its recommendations and reports have been shown to be highly flawed. As I said, the Secretary of State can decide to act on one series of recommendations but not on another. For all those reasons I do not accept the IMC. Naomi made the point that it is not just a party’s mandate that dictates whether it is entitled to sit in Government. The Committee on Standards and Privileges can decide whether individuals have breached the Pledge of Office. However, it is not the case that one party can sit in judgement on an opposing political party and decide that it can throw it out of the Government. Parties have a choice about forming a Government in other circumstances; however, these are not normal democratic circumstances. Seán Farren’s point started to creep into the realms of precondition. We have made clear our view about what needs to be done on outstanding policing matters, and our proposed course of action on that has been achieved. It is interesting to note that, particularly when you consider the intelligence-gathering powers that MI5 is being given, the SDLP gives full support not only to the police, but to the security agencies. Having said that, Sinn Féin’s position on policing is quite clear. That discussion could take place here; however, another part of this Committee meets to discuss policing issues, and that discussion would probably be best carried out there. This discussion is in the context of the actions that the IRA took last year. It is amazing that we are having a circular discussion on how to draft a clause from the unionist perspective — forget about how the Alliance Party or the SDLP feel — that will enable Sinn Féin to be excluded from Government. That shows how far we have to go to get the institutions functioning on a satisfactory basis. Mrs Long: In other democratic societies, if parties are partners in a coalition Government, they can sit in judgement on other parties. Mr Murphy: In normal democratic circumstances a party can walk out of a coalition, but these are not normal democratic circumstances. Mrs Long: We are supposed to be trying to move towards normal democratic circumstances; that is the point of this process. If one party refuses to govern with another that it judges for valid reasons to be unfit, it does not necessarily mean that Government falls. That is the difference here. It is a ludicrous proposition that a democratic society, however abnormal it may be at the moment, can have a party in Government that none of the other parties in that coalition have confidence in. That cannot be sustained in the long term. A short-term crisis of confidence is one thing; a long-term lack of confidence is something entirely different. Mr Murphy: We had a previous discussion about the make-up of the Executive. If the Alliance Party proposes to change the Good Friday Agreement and people’s entitlement to be in Government on the basis of their mandate, perhaps that is where that proposition should have been made. Mrs Long: I think it was. Mr Murphy: We had this discussion last week. These are not normal democratic circumstances. People are entitled to be in the Government on the basis of their mandate. That is what the Good Friday Agreement allows for. In normal democratic circumstances — and that is what we are aiming for — people can choose to go into coalition, or they can choose not to go into a coalition. They can also choose who their partners will be in that coalition. Mrs Long: Conor, do you claim that — Mr Murphy: If I may just finish. In that circumstance, people can choose whom their partners in coalition Government may be. In the circumstances that exist here, people are entitled to be in Government on the basis of their mandate. I do not think that in normal democratic circumstances parties could claim to have no interest in sitting in judgement on whether another party is fit for Government. Mrs Long: Is that irrespective of an individual’s or party’s adherence to, for example, a ministerial code or Pledge of Office? You are saying that their entitlement to be in Government is irrespective of any acceptance of democratic norms, that it is an entitlement, fair and square, without anything else having an impact on it. Is that your position? Mr Murphy: No. What I am saying clearly is that individuals who hold executive office have to abide by the Pledge of Office. Mrs Long: If they do not, what are the sanctions? The Chairman (Mr Molloy): One at a time, please. Mr Murphy: The sanctions are there. If you are proposing to change the Good Friday Agreement, perhaps you should have said so last week. There are sanctions in the agreement. People who are nominated for ministerial office must affirm the Pledge of Office and abide by that. If they do not, there are sanctions available to have them removed from office for a specified period. That does not exclude their party; the nominating officer of that party can nominate someone else. If that person behaves in a similar fashion, the same sanctions will apply. I fully support that. It is part of the agreement that I signed up to and that you signed up to. We did not sign up to a set of sanctions whereby other parties in Government could decide that one party and its entire membership, not just those in Executive office, is not fit for government. Mr P Robinson: Let us be clear: the Belfast Agreement — and I am not one of its supporters — also had a mechanism for the exclusion of parties in those circumstances. I find it disturbing that Sinn Féin does not want to have a mechanism that can ensure stability if a party behaves in a way that clearly shows that it is not committed to exclusively peaceful and democratic means. I cannot see why any party would resist the inclusion of such a mechanism unless it intended to abuse the process in the future. Therefore the resistance of Sinn Féin probably makes unionists more suspicious. There are several points that flow directly from that. Of course this is not the normal democratic situation; there are no democratic norms for a mandatory coalition of this type. That is why it becomes all the more important that a mechanism to sanction exists if people abuse their entry into Government through a mandate in order to be in Government while at the same time carrying out such activities that are patently contrary to any principle of democratic government. That was recognised in the Belfast Agreement, although that agreement never had the mechanisms that would have allowed sanctions to kick in. The Belfast Agreement permitted vetoes under the voting system that allowed for exclusion, so it was meaningless. The principle was enunciated, but the mechanisms to realise that principle were not put in place. The IMC scenario does exactly the same thing. It puts in place the principle but does not have the mechanisms that would realistically allow for exclusion. If the principle is right, it must be backed up by the proper mechanisms. Mr McGimpsey: I do not want to prolong this discussion, Chairman — there is not going to be a meeting of minds. If this place gets up and running again, it will be via a political deal. However, we do not exist in a bubble; the history goes back decades and tempers our views as we go forward. The deal in November 1999 that allowed us to go forward was a gamble, and we knew that it was a gamble that probably would not come off at that time. Part of the gamble was to make sure that we were not locked in and that we had an exit if we needed one. That exit was the suspension legislation, the Northern Ireland Act 2000. It seems to me, given three live failures plus a further one that was not quite live and saw the Northern Bank raid, that it is a bigger gamble now than it ever was. We must be aware of that and factor it in. Conor’s view may be to dogmatically adhere to every dot and tittle of the agreement, but I do not believe that that will wash. When the Assembly was set up, internal measures were created to deal with such issues. However, they were not adequate and were never going to be adequate. To proceed without adequate measures could result in scorched earth, a complete collapse of everything: back to square one, year zero. Alternatively, a suspension would allow us to reconsider matters before going forward. That is what we have now. It is valuable and we must hold on to it. It does not help when Conor says, “We have made those arguments and the British Government have accepted them, so that is it — the comprehensive agreement it is.” We do not buy into that. We do not accept it. It may be that a deal is possible, but the London Government must consider that if they take a gamble and repeal the suspension legislation, they could lose unionism. That is a decision that they would have to make. I felt strongly in 1999 that the deal was a gamble; as things stand it is a bigger gamble now than it was then. We must all face up to that. Mr Murphy: If that was the intention of suspension legislation, it has not had the outcome that the Ulster Unionist Party intended. There was no “pause”. The Assembly has been suspended since 2002. That is a long pause during which to assess what can be done in the circumstances. Suspension legislation has raised a huge question mark over the sustainability of the institution. Since 2002, 108 MLAs have been elected and paid their salaries, but they cannot do their jobs. That has caused huge scepticism of the institutions among the general public. Suspension has not had the impact that the Ulster Unionist Party thought at the time that it would have. Instead, it has raised questions about the credibility of the institutions and their functions. Michael is correct about one thing: we do not exist in a bubble. There is experience and history behind the politics here. Sinn Féin’s experience is that when unionists have been able to exclude us from having a meaningful role in any of the institutions, they have done so. When people within the security agencies or the Police Service were able to have a malign influence on the political process, they did. That is why we would not leave ourselves in hock to those people’s judgement of our democratic credentials. It is not a matter of our wishing to have a facility whereby republicans can default on anything that is expected of them under the terms of the agreement, and get off with it. It is about our experience of unionists and their abuse of power, and of those within the security agencies who have supported and encouraged abuse of power, and of where that has largely been directed. That is what governs our attitude to the IMC, to suspension legislation, and to placing the democratic institutions under the whim of people within the security agencies and the British Government. Mr McFarland: Does Conor accept that the suspensions were directly related to the activities of the republican movement, or lack of them, and therefore the loss of unionist confidence? That is what it was about. The IRA statement of July 2005 may prove to be a watershed. However, the matter is not about Sinn Féin’s exclusion. The republican movement prides itself on its discipline. Is Conor saying that he does not have confidence in that discipline, confidence that there will be no future incidents? Unionists are still worried about that. If the safeguards that relate to suspension are left, Sinn Féin should be fully confident that they would never be needed anyway, because the republican movement is coherent and its members will all adhere to their instructions. The safeguards are a confidence-building measure for unionists. If Sinn Féin is confident that the republican movement is not going to start wobbling, those measures will never be needed, so what is the problem? Mr Murphy: Perhaps Alan will explain what caused the last suspension in 2002. He says it was republican inactivity. However, who was behind pulling down the institutions? Who was behind the raid on our offices? Who was behind the spoof story that led to the institutions’ collapse? Perhaps Alan will explain that to us. I am confident that no accusation against us will stand up. The difficulty is that our experience of unionism shows that they are prepared to jump ship after any accusation has been made, regardless of how little or how much evidence is produced to support it. Unionism has had a problem with the type of political change that has been underscored by the Good Friday Agreement. It has sought ways and means to frustrate and slow down that political change, and it has used the issues that caused suspension to do so. The difficulty is not about having a mechanism. I am confident that there will be no situation in which any accusation against us will stand up. However, what could happen — and our experience shows has already happened — is that people can make accusations without having to provide any evidence. On the basis of those accusations unionists have jumped ship, perhaps because they are genuinely concerned about the accusations or perhaps because they want to slow down the process of political change. One can make a choice as to which unionist party might act on those allegations, but I am not confident that unionism will stay in the institutions if it has an escape clause. 11.00 am Mr McFarland: It sounds as though Conor is saying that the Ulster Unionist Party was bobbing in and out of the institutions at the slightest whim. Mr Murphy: You were out of them four times. Mr McFarland: We have nearly destroyed ourselves — Mr Murphy: You cannot blame all that on Sinn Féin. Mr McFarland: We have nearly destroyed ourselves attempting to show good faith that unionists could not be accused of not wanting a Fenian about the place. We have also attempted to show that we were willing to test the bona fides of Sinn Féin as to whether it was serious about moving away from paramilitarism and on to the constitutional path. We did that three times. Many would argue that once would have been enough, but the fact is that we cannot be accused of bad faith in this matter. It is wrong to say that we were using excuses: there were good reasons why people needed visible decommissioning, and we covered those at length during the first two months of this Committee meeting. If the republican movement was saying that it was no longer offering violence to the unionist community, why was it hanging on to its weapons? All those things dogged the process from the beginning. The IMC has reported that there has been a clear change. Therefore if Conor Murphy is saying that last July’s statement was a watershed, that there will be no more republican threats or violence and that the movement is turning on to the constitutional path, I am saying that unionists are still not confident that that has all gone away and is done with. In the meantime, the unionist community needs those confidence-building measures and safeguards. I reiterate my point: if the republican movement is absolutely committed and there is to be no more messing around with this process, what is the problem with having a few safeguards? After a specific period they might lapse, but in the meantime unionists could be confident that there would not be a return to any of the nonsense that we had in the first six years of this process. Mr P Robinson: First, I must ditch the idea that 108 people went to the electorate and got a mandate to get the Assembly up and running. That was not my mandate at all; my mandate was that I should not go into Government until certain conditions had been met. I am in keeping with my mandate. Others may be breaking theirs, but that is up to them. Secondly, I dispel the other idea that removing the suspension Act would somehow create an element of fear because unionists would not want to face an election in those circumstances. To take the scenario that I outlined earlier, if an election was forced because republicans had robbed the Ulster Bank no unionist would fear going before the electorate. In those circumstances, if such unionists thought that that was not the kind of action that a partner in Government should carry out, their position would be reinforced rather than weakened. I do not see that fear of an election is a factor at all, no more than I think that if the Government wanted to avoid those circumstances they would not move sharply to introduce a new suspension Act. However, we have missed the purpose of the discussion, which was supposed to be under the heading of ‘Stability’. I have suggested that strengthening the role of the IMC would be a mechanism to bring stability. However, I have not heard too many other suggestions, other than that we allow the instability to continue or that we suck it and see. For the most part, those are the propositions that other parties have been making. Let me pose the question: if the IMC is not deemed to be a suitable body to pass a judgement on such matters as suspension — although clearly its evidence would be important no matter who does — what is? Should a judicial process make such determinations? Clearly, a political process would be unacceptable because it could be vetoed. What about the mechanisms that flow from the ministerial code and the Code of Conduct? They could include — if they do not already — the requirement for those in Government, individually and collectively, to maintain various standards. Is a breach of the Code of Conduct justiciable? Can we ensure that there is a mechanism to punish those who have been associated with the breach of the conditions of Government, rather than the offenders simply saying, “Tough, we have a mandate, and that is how it is going to be”? Mr Murphy: Sinn Féin has always said that it is open to examining how to strengthen and tighten up the provisions of the ministerial code and place it on a statutory footing. Peter Robinson’s point that going to the electorate holds no fear for the DUP begs the question as to why unionism — or the Alliance Party or any other party — requires a mechanism to exclude a party. If an accusation were of such magnitude and made on such a solid basis that it would stand up to any scrutiny, surely the guilty party would be punished by the electorate, who would reward those who were right to walk out of Government. Why, therefore, is a shortcut mechanism required, whereby people can be excluded from office on the basis of an accusation that has not been sustained? If parties are so confident that their own view on this matter would stack up should such an allegation be made, why is a mechanism is required at all? Certainly, we have always said that we are quite open to considering the ministerial code and the Code of Conduct to see how their provisions could be strengthened and tightened. Mr P Robinson: Mr Murphy is being deliberately obtuse. He knows perfectly well that although the unionist electorate would endorse the position of its representatives, there is no guarantee that the nationalist electorate would punish Sinn Féin in such circumstances. Therefore the outcome would be that a new Assembly would face exactly the same problems: nothing would have been resolved and the instability would continue. If the point is to remove the instability, we must consider the mechanisms that are necessary to achieve that. To take this a stage further, if parties are prepared to examine the Pledge of Office and Code of Conduct, I assume that no one objects to those requiring the same kind of standards that we discussed earlier. Are people content that the courts should determine any breaches of either? The Chairman (Mr Molloy): We need to conclude this discussion soon, as it has been going on for an hour and we will probably not reach consensus. Perhaps there should be a proposal to move the discussion on to the ministerial code. Mr Murphy: May I say that Peter Robinson’s remarks on the electorate border on being racist. He said that unionism would consider any breach of standards as a true breach and support those who walked out of Government, but that nationalists would not and would continue to support Sinn Féin. I do not see the scenario that he outlined arising — Mrs Long: May I object to — Mr Murphy: Perhaps I could finish my point. I cannot see a scenario wherein the unionist electorate could make a correct judgement if such a circumstance arose, but the nationalist electorate would not be able to do so. We are prepared to examine the code of conduct, and, if there are proposals on how that could be carried forward, we would like to see them. Mrs Long: I object to the use of the term “racist”. If Mr Murphy feels that Peter Robinson’s comments were sectarian, he should say so, but abusing the term “racist” is a bit rich. Members around this table may have political and religious differences, but we are not of different races, so let us not overplay the differences between us. There is more that unites us than divides us, and let us not get carried away with the situation. Mr P Robinson: What has happened in the past few years is not racism: it is realism. The electorate has been prepared to vote for a terrorist party — that is a fact. That is not sectarian or racist: that is reality. That has been the judgement of the electorate, so it is not a case of my stating that this may happen in the future — this has been happening for decades. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): I am loath to draw this to a conclusion. It seems that unionism has complete faith and trust in the IMC and security forces reports, but Sinn Féin and nationalism in general have complete distrust. We must consider how to achieve the independence of a group that is required to produce a report acceptable to everyone. With regard to the ministerial code, we must consider where the report comes from and how one gains trust and agreement to accept those reports. It is also necessary to get an endorsement from unionism that there is confidence to make the institutions work. Those are the questions that divide us. Mr Campbell: It is clear from the past 70 minutes that it is unlikely — and that is probably putting it mildly — that we will reach consensus on the stability issue. We could get it down to a vague catch-all where everyone agrees that stability is a good thing, but there is no agreement on how to achieve it. I am unsure that further intense discussion would progress this one iota. Mr P Robinson: I wish to deflate the view that unionists have complete trust in the judgement of the IMC. That is not the DUP’s position. We opposed the IMC legislation for two reasons: first, it was unrepresentative — there are no unionists on the IMC — there is a nationalist and plenty of others, but there are no unionists; secondly, it was toothless. Therefore the DUP is not content with all its utterances. We recognise, as have others, that an independent body must be set up; the IMC probably leans more in its representation towards nationalists than unionists. However, we have been prepared to accept the outcome of IMC reports, because, so far, they have been reasonably soundly based. Mr McFarland: The agreement put in some safeguards, and others were added through the IMC. Changes will only be made to the IMC through whatever deal is done in the autumn — each side will get a little of what it wants, either by beefing it up or removing it. In the comprehensive agreement, Sinn Féin won the removal of the “Mandelson” 2000 Act. The question is whether in future dealings the DUP can get a beefing up of the IMC’s role. However, it strikes me that the Committee has probably run as far as it can, as colleagues have said. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Peter Robinson is not necessarily saying that the DUP wants a beefing up of the IMC; it may want it to have a different structure. Mr McFarland: I suspect that a modification of the IMC is only likely to come about as part of a deal. Mr Ford: I disagree with Peter Robinson’s allegations. I am not sure that the presence of Joe Brosnan, an Irish official, alongside that of John Grieve, a British policeman, somehow makes the IMC a nationalist rather than unionist body. People are chosen for their experience of roles that are of a non-political nature, with the possible exception of one member who used to have a political role here. While there is a major distinction between Sinn Féin, which does not want the IMC to exist, and others who have a more or less greater acceptance of the role of the IMC, there may be something in the legislation that set it up that would provide the option for the Secretary of State, by direction, to exclude Ministers, in the absence of an Assembly decision to do so. There might be some way of reducing the power of the Secretary of State and, perhaps, enhancing the power of the IMC by spelling out within its responsibilities that the Secretary of State must have regard for the IMC’s recommendations. That would take it slightly away from the political role, but I suspect that it may not be enough of a change to satisfy Sinn Féin. One must recognise that it is not the legislation that causes the problem. Regardless of the legislation, there have been occasions in the past — and there might be more in the future — when one or more parties have wished to walk from the Executive, so one cannot blame the legislation if the problem lies with the attitude of the parties to one another. We must seek to find some legislation that caters for that. We could talk about making the ministerial code justiciable, for example, but the courts take time, and we would have to go into some sort of temporary suspension while those matters were resolved. Therefore we cannot depend on the courts to deal with what are political problems, and I do not know what we would do for the two or three months that it would take for the courts to get round to hearing the case. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Are members content to look at the ministerial code as a means of dealing with this issue? 11.15 am Mr P Robinson: No. There are many mechanisms that can be used; that is one worth exploring, but it is not the only one. Mr Murphy: Sinn Féin is content to look at the ministerial code. This morning’s discussion is about stability, and it is our contention that the suspension legislation and the IMC have contributed to instability. They have not served the purpose for which they were set up. The IMC — in its make-up and how it conducts its business — and the suspension legislation have added to instability rather than helped resolve it. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): As Gregory Campbell said, we need a wide- reaching statement. Everyone agrees that the Assembly must have stability in order to work and to be maintained. How do we go forward to create that stability? Does anyone have any proposals that can take us to the next stage? Mr McFarland: If we get to the stage where the DUP and Sinn Féin agree to go into Government, that will bring with it a degree of stability. However, we must also talk about safeguards. Mr P Robinson: It did not bring stability when the Ulster Unionists went into Government. Mr McFarland: There were different problems at that time: the republican movement and Sinn Féin were unsettled; and, within unionism, the DUP was most unsettled about the situation. The logic of getting to a stage where the DUP and Sinn Féin do a deal is that both traditions — in their entirety — are settled except for any necessary tweaking. There will be a residual problem of confidence on both sides. Therefore safeguards are needed — whether in the voting systems or in other mechanisms — to hold to account any party that defaults. This discussion is not only about stability — and our best chance of stability will come with that deal — but about the implementation of safeguards, which will ensure that those who are not playing the game can be held to account. Mr P Robinson: I hope we are agreed that we need to explore further mechanisms to ensure that there is stability, at least at a low level. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): We need greater detail on what those mechanisms are. Mr O’Dowd: Stability is best achieved by making politics work. Mr McFarland: That would be the deal between the DUP and Sinn Féin: making politics work. Mr P Robinson: First, history has recorded that the DUP was right not to be settled, because conditions were required. The danger is that those conditions could be met today but all might change tomorrow. That is why you require some mechanism for stability. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Can we park it there for the moment, with the general heading that we need a mechanism to deal with it? Agreed? Members indicated assent. Members asked for two new items to be put on the agenda. One is accountability mechanisms: broadly, the Assembly and the Executive. The other is the voting system. It was suggested that parties might want to put forward papers on those matters, or they may prefer to discuss them today. Seán, you had put forward the idea of a paper. Dr Farren: Are we addressing the issue of collective responsibility or general accountability? The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Accountability of the Executive and related issues. Mr McFarland: I think we agreed that accountability in the Executive would be left to our next major discussion on the Executive; however, the concern is the referral of matters between the Assembly and the Executive. Is that correct? The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Yes. Do you want to continue that discussion today, or do you want to prepare papers? Mrs Long: The Alliance Party hopes to circulate tomorrow a paper with its views on those matters. However, if others wish to discuss it today, we are happy to do so, but it may be better to have sight of other parties’ papers beforehand. Mr McFarland: Chairman, I thought it was agreed at the beginning that, in general, we would not get into swopping papers. There is a time factor with regard to preparing them; people tend to wave them around if anyone wishes to modify their views as they go through; and the entire purpose of this Committee was, for the very first time, that five parties should sit around a table and discuss the ins and outs. Hearing other people’s points of view and discussing them has the potential to achieve modification of thoughts. If we get into papers that is OK, parties can do that, but the essence of this Committee was that we sat and discussed the matters. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): One proposal concerned papers; not that each party would present them, but the option was there. Mrs Long: I was just going to make that point. The option of circulating papers never closed down. The parties retained that option, but papers were not a prerequisite for discussion. I say only that we are willing to circulate our paper tomorrow; if you do not wish to read it that is fine. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Do Members wish to continue today, or set the matter for a particular day, once they have read the papers? Mr P Robinson: I am happy to read papers from anybody, and I promise not to wave them. [Laughter.] Dr Farren: Issues of accountability have been widely discussed and aired in all kinds of fora, so I see no reason for us not to discuss it. We are not unfamiliar with the subject. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Who wants to open? Mr McFarland: This started off in the comprehensive agreement, so Peter and the DUP may want to cover those proposals and say why they were there. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): It was also part of the DUP written submission. Peter, do you want to open up? Mr P Robinson: No, not really; I could do with a bit of a rest. The accountability mechanisms in the comprehensive agreement were not the first choice of the DUP. I outlined at the previous meeting that the best option is for power to be devolved to the Assembly, rather than to the heads of Departments, which is the arrangement under the Northern Ireland Act. If power were devolved to the Assembly, it would have authority and primacy, and its support would be required when there is contention. That is the best proposition, and it is the one that I favour. It would mean that Ministers would have to have the support of the Assembly at all times, and it would stop off-the-wall decisions being taken by Ministers and Departments. The Executive would need to have a high level of collective decision-making, and Ministers would be sure that their ministerial colleagues in other parties would have to carry their Members along with various proposals. In effect, it would be the normal democratic situation and would be the best option. If we are not to have that, and I prefer that we do, the only way forward is to give some level of accountability to the Executive and to have powers in the Assembly to refer or to negate decisions. Those are the options, and there may be permutations. The comprehensive agreement moved more towards giving the Executive authority but with a requirement that there be a level of support within the Executive before major decisions could be taken. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): I remind members that there is some commentary in their papers on this matter. Mrs Long: Part of this issue was discussed last week and is already on the record. The Alliance Party believes that additional accountability mechanisms are required because there is a deficit in collective responsibility within the Executive. Our preferred system is one in which there is collective responsibility, and that would not require the same degree of additional accountability mechanisms. In the current situation, we differ from the DUP inasmuch as we do not believe that ministerial decisions should require the support of the Assembly. However, there are some circumstances in which the Assembly should be able to negate a ministerial decision. Mr P Robinson: What do you mean by that? A Minister must have the support of Parliament for every decision he takes. Parliament would not call a Minister in unless it disliked a decision and therefore it became contentious. It would not be a case of Ministers coming to the Assembly with every decision. Mrs Long: The Alliance Party would make that distinction — there would not be a vote on every ministerial decision in the Assembly. Where, for example, a petition of concern is raised by Members — and I went into that in more detail last week, when there was a debate around the numbers concerned — and is judged not to be vexatious, but where a substantive issue is involved, it would be possible in such circumstances for a cross-community vote to negate the decision of a Minister. We see that as the situation which provides additional accountability between the Executive and the Assembly — and that is our proposition. However, it is our proposition in default, because our preference is for collective responsibility within the Executive. Mr McFarland: We are into a number of topics, one of which I raised last week — where power lies. The UUP was thinking along the same lines as Peter about whether power and authority can be devolved to the Assembly rather than to the Departments. The paper prepared by the devolution and legislation division of the Northern Ireland Office suggests that this does not matter. The issue of where power lies, according to that paper, appears to have been settled, and whether it is with Ministers or the Assembly would seem to be neither here nor there. I will move on to the part of the comprehensive agreement that deals with referrals to the Executive, because it would be useful to tease this out a bit. The proposal is that if 30 Members have difficulty with an issue, they can raise what amounts to a petition of concern. Presumably, and I assume there would be an Assembly debate although paragraph 6 in the comprehensive agreement is not clear about that, the Speaker would have to decide whether the petition were vexatious; the Assembly would have a debate; and the matter would be referred back to the Executive. Difficulties would arise if a Minister made a decision on an issue in the middle of August. That issue could not be referred to the Assembly within seven days, as the Assembly would be in recess. Does that mean that, during a recess, any 30 Members can make a request for a referral from the Speaker, who then decides in the absence of the Assembly whether the matter should be referred? I am unclear about the detail of the mechanism that is suggested in paragraph 6 of the Annex B proposals on strand one of the comprehensive agreement. Can anyone shed any light on that? 11.30 am Dr Farren: Some discussions on accountability seem to be based on the assumption that the accountability mechanisms laid down in the Good Friday Agreement for the Assembly were weak to the point of non-existence at times. That was not the case at all. After all, ministerial responsibility must be discharged with respect to the law in general, legislation applying to a Minister’s departmental responsibilities in particular, and the Budget. The Assembly has complete authority with respect to the Budget, the Programme for Government and the pledge of office. The discharge of ministerial responsibility is subject to quite a range of requirements and parameters already. We can consider ways to refine those, of course, but we must be cautious about the suggestion that the Assembly should have authority over ministerial decisions to the point where all ministerial decisions are potentially subject to Assembly approval. That seems, at first sight, to be well founded. However, if decisions are made within the parameters that I indicated, they are made in a responsible manner and with the appropriate authority. Problems could arise if ministerial decisions that had been taken with regard to those parameters were challenged to the point of gridlock. Government decision-making would be slowed to an unacceptable pace, and the operation would no longer be smooth. In her capacity as Minister for Agriculture and Rural Development, Bríd Rodgers took significant ministerial decisions during the foot-and-mouth crisis. Taken in isolation, some of those decisions might have seemed inappropriate or incorrect to some Members. However, in those circumstances, to circumscribe that Minister’s discretion by challenging some of those quite significant decisions, which she felt that she had to take, would have had a serious impact on how we responded to that crisis. We want to be very careful about seeking to enhance authority over ministerial decisions in cases in which that would certainly not contribute to the smooth operation of Government. Mr P Robinson: Either Alan has misread the advice, or the advice has not been sufficiently clear. The advice begins by properly indicating that, whereas statutory functions are collectively devolved in Scotland and the UK as a whole, that is not the case in Northern Ireland. Indeed, such functions cannot be devolved collectively because the Belfast Agreement required that they should not. The last paragraph, to which Alan refers, answers the second part of the question. The paragraph is accurate where it says “subordinate”, as opposed to the heading, which says “subordinates”. The question was whether the fact that the power is in the Department does subordinate ministerial authority. There is no argument about that. That was not the question that was being asked. Someone has taken a new question to himself. The question asked was: “Are Ministers, therefore, unaccountable as a result of that?” and the answer to that is “yes”. Nobody is suggesting that Ministers have fewer or different powers or that they exercise their powers differently — it is that they are doing it in a way that is not dependent on the collective view of colleagues. In Scotland and the UK that is under the authority of the First Minister or the Prime Minister. All of us know from practice that Ministers took decisions that did not require their colleagues’ support in the Executive, and many decisions were taken that were not even brought to colleagues in the Executive. Some of the decisions that were brought were ones that the Ministers were capable of taking anyway, irrespective of the views of their colleagues. The Assembly could not overturn the decision of any Minister. On one occasion it tried to but clearly failed. Assembly Committees had no power or authority over ministerial decisions, so we had the ludicrous situation in which a minority decision was taken that did not have cross-community support, and that clearly meant that we had an unaccountable Minister. That does not mean that we require every Minister to come to the House with every decision, for example, on whether a new streetlight is needed at the corner of Edgcombe Gardens. I am not unhappy with the mechanism for a call-in power, be it a petition of concern or whatever. However, there must be a requirement for Ministers to be accountable to someone. It is better for them to be accountable to the Assembly, but they should certainly be accountable to the Executive, which is accountable to the Assembly. Mr Murphy: The paper correctly shows that a key principle in the Good Friday Agreement was that Ministers were to have executive authority in their respective areas. It was one way of ensuring that there was proper power sharing and that one set of Ministers was not subject to majority rule in the Assembly while another was able to carry on as it pleased. There was a key recognition of the fact that if there were to be power sharing, it had to be genuine — people had to have some degree of authority within the areas of responsibility that they received as a result of their mandate. There are significant accountability mechanisms within that: if a Minister wants to take legislation through the Assembly, he requires the support of the Assembly. There are other mechanisms, and there is responsibility within the Executive itself. Also, 30 members of the Assembly can submit a petition of concern and have a debate on any issue. A balance is required between what is genuine power sharing and what could be seen as abuse of office. We have always been happy to explore accountability mechanisms but with that balance in mind. A majority in the Assembly cannot be used to effectively police one or two ministerial Departments and allow the rest to act as they would under the terms of the agreement. It is about getting that balance right. I do not see the same lack of accountability that Peter Robinson sees. I see potential difficulties if a number of Ministers were to vote against a proposal from an Executive colleague. Things such as that undermine the Executive’s collective responsibility. We have always been quite happy to look at propositions to enhance collective responsibility and to improve accountability. However, that is on the basis of a recognition that there must be genuine power sharing; one set of Ministers cannot be subject to control while another is allowed to carry on as it pleases. Mr Ford: Conor Murphy put his finger on it when he talked about “genuine power sharing”; what we have at the moment is power division. Any proposal that enhances collectivity within the Executive would be beneficial. I have had a quick skim through Hansard, and I see that last week Naomi talked about accountability within the Executive, which is where it should be. We believe that there is still the need for a potential backstop within the Assembly. Clearly, what we have suggested is very different from what I understand the DUP’s position to be, which is effectively that no Minister could do anything unless he gets a cross-community vote. Our proposal attempts to take account of some of the concerns that Seán Farren raised: the Speaker’s role in scrutinising any motions to negate to ensure that they are not vexatious; the requirement that there be sufficient signatures; and the requirement that a ministerial decision could be overturned only by cross-community vote. That would give the right level of ministerial responsibility and independence and at the same time ensure that Ministers do not go off on a complete solo run without any support at all. Ideally, it would all start with greater collectivity within the Executive to ensure that we have genuine power sharing in the first place. Mr P Robinson: Before anybody else builds up more straw men just to knock them down, I must point out that the DUP has never put forward any proposal that the Assembly, or indeed the Executive, should decide on every single decision that a Minister takes. That would be a recipe for disaster. You could not do it; you would not have the time. It clearly has to be on a call-in basis. That has always been the argument so let us just dispel that nonsense. Mr Ford: My point concerned the difference in the requirement of the vote to overturn a decision as opposed to the circumstances in which call-in would be made, where, I understand, there is a difference between the DUP position and ours. Mr P Robinson: The call-in that we suggested is the same call-in power that is available with a petition of concern in the Assembly. With regard to the Executive, is a call-in power is recommended by the comprehensive agreement — I think that three Ministers are suggested. Mr Campbell: That is not the same as saying that no Minister could do anything without getting cross-community support for any decision he or she might take. Mr Ford: As I understand it, the DUP’s requirements for call-in require that a Minister could in those circumstances only have his decision carried provided that it was endorsed by a cross-community vote. Our proposal is that it could be negated only by a cross-community vote. Mr P Robinson: Why? Mr Ford: I am trying to establish what the point of difference is between us. Mr P Robinson: There is a massive difference. You know well that there is a difference between us. Mr Ford: You seemed to be suggesting that there was not. At least now you agree that there is. Thank you. Mr P Robinson: The obvious reason is that for a proposition to go forward, it needs to have the support of the Assembly. Your argument is that a veto can be used in the Assembly and that a proposal can therefore go forward that does not have the support of the Assembly. Mr Ford: No, our proposal is precisely that there is not a veto. The collectivity within the Executive should have resolved matters in the first instance. Mr P Robinson: You are suggesting that there should be a call-in power of the Assembly — a backstop, as you referred to it. Therefore, irrespective of the views of the Executive, it would come to the Assembly. You could have a proposal going forward that is vetoed by Sinn Féin or the DUP, in present circumstances, but that may not have the support of the Assembly as a whole. 11.45 am Mr McFarland: I sense that there will not be consensus on changes to the Belfast Agreement as regards Ministers having authority within their own bailiwicks. The question is, therefore, how to have safeguards at Executive level to ensure that there is control. Perhaps I am being dozy, but I am somewhat confused. My understanding is that if a Minister proposes to put through legislation or secure money, it requires the Assembly’s agreement because it is in the Programme for Government. If a Minister does something outwith that, a petition of concern can be put forward that has been signed by at least 30 Members, and the matter can be debated in the Assembly with all the ensuing media coverage. How are these proposals different from that? Mr P Robinson: Why were you not able to stop the closure of the Jubilee Maternity Hospital? Mr McFarland: The only reason that the Jubilee Maternity Hospital closed was because the decision was taken during the period between the setting up of the Assembly and the first Programme for Government the following April. Without a Programme for Government, nobody had signed up to anything and Ministers could do what they wanted. Had the closure of the Jubilee Maternity Hospital been proposed after April 2000, it would never have got through because it would have been stopped in the Executive. The Minister was able to do that because no one had signed up to a Programme for Government. In theory, all key decisions normally require legislation or money. If a Minister is doing something strange, a petition of concern can raise a flag to say that the Assembly — or at least 30 of its Members — are not happy about it. If that power already exists, what will the proposal provide in addition? I understand that we need to beef up ministerial collectivity and accountability, which we will consider when we discuss the Executive. When there is a beefed-up ministerial code, pledges of office, a Programme for Government and when everyone operates properly, what scenario would not be covered by a petition of concern, a debate in the Assembly and the waving of flags? The proposals do not go much further than that. Dr Farren: Section 11 of strand one of the agreement — the special equality measure — seems to strengthen the basis on which decisions could be challenged. The special equality measure allows the Assembly to appoint a special Committee to examine and report on whether a measure or proposal contravenes the bill of rights or the European Convention on Human Rights. While the Good Friday Agreement says, “examine and report” on a measure, Standing Orders restricted that to Bills and legislation. The SDLP suggests that we revert to the original intention — that any measure that the Assembly feels is in breach of equality should fall under that provision. Along with the petition of concern, there is a set of safeguards that will allow challenges to be put to decisions in ways that do not push us towards what I cautioned against earlier. Mr P Robinson: I will respond to some of the points raised. The Jubilee Maternity Hospital proved that the system did not work. The Assembly voted in favour of the Jubilee site, as did the Assembly Committee. The Executive was not able to stop it, neither was the Assembly, so something was clearly wrong with the system. Mr McFarland: The system was that nobody was signed up to anything. In November 1999 this thing fired up and there was no Programme for Government. No Minister had signed up to anything at all, so every Minister could do his or her own thing. The only surprise at that stage was that we did not have more Ministers crashing around with their favourite topics. [Interruption.] The Chairman (Mr Molloy): One at a time, please. Mr Campbell: The education decision on the final day was at a point when the Programme for Government was in place. Mr McFarland: The education decision on the final day was a total nonsense and remains so. Mr Campbell: But it was still taken; it was not stopped. Mr McFarland: There was no possibility that, had the Executive or the Assembly continued, that decision would have got through. Mr Campbell: It went. Mr McFarland: It had to; it required all sorts of money and legislation. It was able to go forward only because the civil servants, for reasons best known to themselves, bashed on with it even though the Assembly was suspended. Mr Campbell: But it went. Mr McFarland: It would not have done if — The Chairman (Mr Molloy): I have to allow PJ Bradley to speak. Mr P J Bradley: It is obviously difficult to get one set of rules to fit all. Of the two situations that have been referred to, the Jubilee Maternity Hospital and the foot-and-mouth crisis, the former could have been considered non-urgent. At the time of the foot-and-mouth crisis the Minister and the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development often met through the night in emergency session to deal with the situation. Some situations can wait for debate, but Ministers must have the power to make urgent decisions. The foot-and-mouth crisis was a prime example of that. Mr P Robinson: First, there is a view that the Programme for Government is such a detailed and far-seeing document that it incorporates every decision that a Minister may be required to take over the following 12 months. That is not the case. It is a very general document under which Ministers can move with considerable flexibility, as has been seen. Secondly, it is assumed that the spending plans are so rigid that a Minister has no flexibility. That, of course, is not the case either. The spending plans are largely based on headings under which, I can assure you, a Minister can move from one point to another. Those two assumptions are not safeguards in themselves. They might put some restraints on how clever a Minister has to be, but they certainly do not constrain him from taking a decision of his own. Legally, there is nothing that stops a Minister from taking a decision. We took the advice of a very well-respected senior counsel — who was not of my political persuasion — on that issue. There is no question that we need to have a change. This is not about waving flags: that only draws attention to the issue; it does not stop it from happening. The referral system ensured that if, under the comprehensive agreement proposals, something got through the Executive net, it would have the ability to ensure that only genuine power-sharing decisions could be made. My views of power sharing and Sinn Féin’s ideas of power sharing are completely different. Sinn Féin seems to believe that power sharing is power allocation. That is not my view. My view of power sharing is one in which Ministers collectively take shared responsibility for the decisions that have been made. That is very different from saying, “We have the cards and we will dole them out. You take the decisions on this and we will take the decisions on that, and it does not matter what decisions either of us take; that is the way it is going to be.” That is not power sharing; that is simply an allocation of power. That is very different and is what can happen under the current circumstances. However, the comprehensive agreement ensured a collective decision-taking process and that any decisions that were contrary to the views of one section of the community or another had to be dealt with and agreed by the Executive. If a decision went unnoticed because Members’ attention was elsewhere, the Assembly could throw it back to the Executive to ensure that that decision was taken collectively. Dr Farren: I mentioned the safeguards that are provided by the special equality procedure. Peter Robinson highlighted decisions that he feels should, or could, have been challenged on equality grounds because they concerned the fair treatment of the two communities. In what respect would the special equality procedure not provide the type of safeguard that he mentioned? Many of those matters are essentially political decisions that Ministers must take. If two hospitals bid for a particular service, a decision must be made about which one will win that bid. If it were felt that a decision breached equality provisions and was not based on the Minister’s best judgement — albeit that that judgement may be described as political — would the special equality procedure not provide a safeguard? Mr P Robinson: Special equality provisions would certainly be a factor, if equality were the sole concern. However, a range of political issues is involved, where political ideologies and other factors will come into play for an extended period long into the future. A division may be on an ideological, rather than an equality, issue. Is it right that, contrary to the wishes of the rest of its colleagues in the Executive and Assembly, a party in Government takes a decision that is based on, for example, its Stalinist approach to life? An issue may not be one of equality, but it certainly might affect the way forward for Northern Ireland. Dr Farren: We must focus on enhancing the nature of collective responsibility within the Executive to ensure that we can agree on the best form of such responsibility. Ministers, and the Assembly as a whole, could then be assured that the Executive have the support of all colleagues. Mr P Robinson: I had hoped that that is what we were doing. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): We will deal with that under the next topic, which deals with decision taking within the Executive. Mr Murphy: There is a balance between collective responsibility and exercising a veto. Interestingly, the two examples given by unionists related to decisions taken by Sinn Féin Ministers; one on education, the other on the Jubilee Maternity Hospital. That latter decision stood, despite being subject to several judicial reviews. The issue concerns whether parties want to use a majority to veto the actions of any Minister whom they consider unsatisfactory or whether we want power-sharing. I do not see power-sharing as a mere allocation of power, but as a genuine sharing of power. That is why issues such as agreeing the Programme for Government, prioritising the Executive and legislative proposals exist — they are all the collective responsibility of the Executive. However, in Sinn Féin’s experience, and given the examples cited by unionists, the decisions that members targeted seemed to be those that were taken by Sinn Féin Ministers. Interestingly, when one senior unionist commentator was asked what turned unionists off the Good Friday Agreement, he said that it was the prospect of Martin McGuinness exercising ministerial power in the Department of Education. Therefore, in our experience, accountability measures would be used to exercise control over decisions taken by Sinn Féin Ministers and, perhaps, by SDLP Ministers. While we are in favour of collective responsibility — and there are accountability mechanisms in the agreement — there is a balance between accountability and exercising a veto over Ministers and ministerial decisions that Members may be unhappy with. 12.00 noon Mr McFarland: What is the difference between the proposals in paragraph 6 of Annex B to the comprehensive agreement and a petition of concern? They both require a minimum of 30 Assembly members, and both result in an Assembly debate. In paragraph 6, the matter would be referred back, but you would be a brave Minister if you lost a cross-community vote in the Assembly, which presumably would have the same effect as referring it back, or would it? Mr P Robinson: You have just answered your own question — the matter would be referred back. As you said, it would be a brave Minister that would want to defy the Assembly. Mr McFarland: I said that it would be a brave Minister who would want to defy a cross-community vote in the Assembly as a result of a petition of concern. Therefore the matter is likely to end up back in the Executive anyway, because the effect of the system is the same — you have 30 Members, and you have won a petition of concern or a referral. Presumably, there is also a debate in the Assembly. The only difference is that a referral must be initiated within seven days. During suspension, in the middle of August, can 30 Members send something to the Speaker, which she can adjudicate on? Can there not be a vote in the Assembly without referring a matter back to the Executive? I have not yet had answers to those questions. What is the system tied in with the Assembly referral, which would allow that to happen in the middle of August, with no Assembly?. The Executive could not consider it within seven days. For instance, at Christmas, or on Boxing Day, could 30 members decide that they are upset about something? Mr Murphy: Under Standing Orders, 30 members can call for a meeting of the Assembly at any stage. Mr McFarland: What notice is required for that? Mr Murphy: I am not sure what notice is required under Standing Orders. The Committee Clerk: Three working days’ notice is required. Mr McFarland: If the Assembly is suspended, that cannot apply. The Committee Clerk: Are you talking about recess? Mr McFarland: Yes. I am merely seeking clarification to ensure that everyone understands, because members can get confused about the matters under discussion. At any stage during the year, 30 members can exercise their right, under Standing Orders, to call an emergency meeting of the Assembly at which there would be a petition of concern, and there are rules for that. No vote can be held until at least 24 hours after the petition has been presented, is that correct? Mr Murphy: No vote may be held on a matter that has been discussed under a petition of concern until at least 24 hours after the petition has been presented. Mr McFarland: The Assembly, therefore, can be called back from recess and have a cross-community vote. That vote can be the quorum of the Assembly, and as long as there are 60% of those present and 40% of each tradition voting, a cross-community vote challenging a ministerial decision could be passed. Dr Farren: Is that not the consequential effect on the ministerial decision that is absent in the normal application of a petition of concern? Mr McFarland: No, because what happens then is that you flag up the fact that cross-community concern is challenging a ministerial decision. Presumably, the press would be there to record the fact that the Assembly objects to a ministerial decision. While there is no obligation to reconsider, there would be an obligation to re-examine a ministerial decision through the Assembly referral provision. The only difference is the obligation to re-examine. However, Ministers representing the parties that voted for the ministerial decision by cross-community vote would re-examine it in the Executive. Apart from the obligation to re-examine the decision, there is no difference between the two systems as regards public relations, press and the parties involved. Mr P Robinson: I could hear the cogs turning as we laboriously went through that. Mr McFarland: Sometimes, it is important. Mr P Robinson: The position is simple: the Executive would have the ability, under the comprehensive agreement proposals, to take collective decisions, and such decisions would be required to be collective. As I said earlier — though it obviously was not picked up — there may be occasions when Ministers’ eyes are elsewhere and something goes through that has not caught their notice. The proposal gives the Assembly a power to send a decision back to the Executive so that it is given proper attention and a collective decision is taken. It is a belt-and-braces approach. Mr McFarland: Would a cross-party petition of concern from the Assembly not have the same effect of alerting the Minister? As Peter said, the proposal would only come into operation when Members noticed that something had slipped through. Therefore, would a petition of concern and a cross-party vote not have the same effect of alerting the Executive? Mr Murphy: It would be better to ask these questions of someone from the British Government, which drafted these proposals. However, the only point that I would dispute with Peter Robinson is that an Assembly referral does not turn a decision that was not considered as taken collectively into a decision that was taken collectively. That is not mentioned in paragraph 6 of Annex B to the comprehensive agreement. However, whoever devised those proposals may be able to give a better explanation. My understanding is that the proposal allows an issue to be referred to the Executive for the Ministers’ reconsideration; it does not re-designate the status of that decision in the first instance. If an issue has not been agreed under collective responsibility, a referral does not re-designate a decision into a collective one. However, the people who are best placed to answer questions on these proposals are those who authored them. Mr P Robinson: I was unaware that there were separate designations for decisions. The proposal is simply a mechanism to ensure that decisions are taken with the knowledge and approval of the Executive. That is all there is to it; I cannot see anything harmful in that proposal. Dr Farren: Is that type of referral mechanism necessary if, from what Peter has said, the essential concern is to ensure a greater degree of collective responsibility? Surely we need to consider collective responsibility rather than providing another mechanism in the Assembly that seems to indirectly aim at collective responsibility. Mr P Robinson: The difference is that the proposal in paragraph 6 refers to a decision that is already past the post and knocks it back onto the track. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Would a petition of concern not do the same thing? Dr Farren: Yes. Mr P Robinson: It would not, because the decision would already have been taken. Dr Farren: I agree with Alan McFarland’s suggestion: it would be foolish for a Minister, or, indeed, the Executive as a whole, to proceed with a decision that did not have a significant degree of approval, or at least acquiescence, in the Assembly. Mr P Robinson: A Minister may feel strongly about an issue and, irrespective of what colleagues might think, he or she may want to pursue it. That is not unknown. Dr Farren: The Assembly can be wrong. Mr P Robinson: So can Ministers. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Do members wish to make any proposals or would they rather deal with this issue under ‘Collective responsibility’ and ‘Ministerial Code’? Mrs Long: Are there not, however, two distinct issues? One is the right of the Assembly to refer something back to the Executive; the other is collectivity in the Executive. Although, with proper party discipline, it is hard to envisage, it could happen that the Executive were happy with something and the Assembly was not. The two issues must be separated. Mr P Robinson: There are two issues there for the Assembly: should it have the power to send something back or should it have the power to negate? Another issue that was mentioned earlier is whether it is a requirement of the Assembly to get the cross-community support to do either of those two things, or whether it is the responsibility of the Minister to get the support of the Assembly for a proposal. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Are there any proposals to move the matter on, or to see if we have consensus? Mr P Robinson: I think we know that we do not have consensus. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Sometimes these things need to be clear. Mrs Long: We put our proposals last week, and they were not agreed. I do not detect any change of heart around the table from any party. I am not sure that putting them again this week will add any clarity to the situation. Mr P Robinson: I detect that people are coming closer to agreeing my proposals, but they have not quite reached that stage. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Do we want to park that or can we conclude on it? Mr Campbell: The car park is filling up. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): We will need traffic wardens. We will move on to the next item, which is “Voting system”. This is an issue mainly for the Alliance Party. Mrs Long: Our position was presented in a fair degree of detail last week, and I do not wish to take up time by repeating it. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Are there any other issues? It was requested that “Voting system” be put back on the agenda, so it is there for discussion. Mr McFarland: There was a great deal of discussion, and I sensed at the time that we probably would not get agreement to move from the present system, unless particular parties have had a Damascene conversion somewhere along the line. Mr Ford: It was agreed last week that this was an issue to be considered at some point, but that there was no agreement as to how to consider it at this stage. If that is the case, it may simply be an item — Mr P Robinson: That is why we are considering it now. Mr Ford: Yes, but if there is nothing further to consider at this stage it may be something for the ever-expanding car park. Damascus may yet be reached by some of you. Mr McFarland: This became an issue in the first place because of the mistrust between the communities. It seems a reasonable aspiration that, somewhere down the line, we could move to weighted-majority voting. When all this eventually settles, we could reach a stage where we were not so traumatised about particular communities being disadvantaged, and a weighted majority would give the same result without the designation issue. My sense is that we are not there yet, and, as a result of the previous week’s discussion, we will probably not get agreement on it. Mrs Long: I find it particularly traumatic when the community I represent is ignored in these votes. It is still an issue for the Alliance Party, but we accept that it is unlikely to be resolved. I understand that the DUP made a proposal last week to include a weighted-majority system in addition to the current system but that that was knocked back. If parties were to give some indication that they were willing to move in that direction, that would be something tangible, but that was not the case, so I doubt that people have moved to a position where they can embrace it entirely. 12.15 pm Mr P Robinson: I agree — there was an opportunity. If a proposal were made that it cannot happen immediately the Assembly gets up and running but that we are all committed to moving towards a weighted majority system in the future, then it would be different from the other proposal and would represent some progress. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): OK, have we taken it as far as we can? Mr P Robinson: We could look at it later. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Back to the car park again. Mr Ford: There is a point in what Peter has just said. As I read and understood the comments of the parties, two seem to say that there is merit in a weighted majority as effectively being a third option alongside parallel consent and 60:40:40 — if that is a correct interpretation of the DUP’s position. Others seem to say that we should consider when it may be appropriate to move to that point. That is an emerging degree of consensus, if I have correctly interpreted the positions of the three other parties from reading last week’s Hansard. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Are there any comments? Mr Murphy: The voting mechanisms in the agreement were to deal with the situation in which we found ourselves then. Everyone has said that they would prefer at some stage to move to a different type of voting mechanism in which the safeguards provided by the current voting mechanisms are not needed. I do not think that it is necessary to get into prescribing that voting system at this point, but there is an agreement in principle that the voting mechanisms — whether people agree with them or not — are necessary to provide safeguards at the moment. The desire by all parties is to get to a situation whereby such safeguards are not seen to be so necessary and the voting system can be looked at again. Mr Ford: We might be potentially looking at the day when we wouldn’t need any safeguards at all and 50% would be an adequate majority to carry a vote in the Assembly. Our proposal recognises that this is a very long way away and that is why we have looked at having a two-thirds straightforward weighted majority as a step in that direction. Dr Farren: Do not jump too fast. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Last week, the Committee decided to refer this matter to a review Committee of the Assembly, if that were in place. That is probably as far as we can take it. The consensus is along the lines that people are prepared to look at the issue some way down the line, but that it is not an obstacle at this stage. The Committee was suspended at 12.18 pm. On resuming — 12.48 pm [Proceedings between 12.48 pm and 1.19 pm were not recorded due to technical problems.] Mr Campbell: — I hope that there is nobody here — although there may be some — who is saying that that prospect would have to be spearheaded by this manifestation of the election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister because that is the way we did it before. Our community drew many negative things from that — it was a farce; it was show; it did not work and no matter how many times it was set up it simply fell apart. I do not think there would be much support in the wider community — certainly there would be none in ours — for the prospect of a four-year term with a functioning Executive and the First Minister and Deputy First Minister at its head being jeopardised because the door to it had to be the joint election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. I find it difficult to understand how the wider community would give consent to the prospect of embarking on an election that allows the four-year term to transpire — hopefully, without any interruptions, bank robberies or antagonistic and illegal activities on the part of one or more parties, or those associated with them — but which might be jeopardised because of a particular method of electing the First Minister and Deputy First Minister which was not agreed eight and a half years ago. They do not have to carry out their offices as they did before. That does not mean that we have to have some underhand ‘Blue Peter’ type of mould under the table that we can say we prepared earlier. It does not have to be the way it failed before: there can be a better way, which is more likely to succeed next time. Ms Lewsley: For the record, I am deputising for Mark Durkan. Like everybody else, I am a bit confused now. On the one hand, Peter says that it really does not matter how the First Minister and Deputy First Minister are elected; if there is a clash of personalities then they are not going to work together anyway. On the other hand Gregory said that the election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister and the way they worked in some way caused suspensions, when, in fact, it did not. Other issues caused suspension. Mr Campbell: I did not say that. Ms Lewsley: You did — you said that we have reached this point because of the way they worked and because of the on/off nature of the Assembly. Mr Campbell: I was not saying that the on/off nature of the Assembly was a direct result of the way in which the First Minister and Deputy First Minister were elected. Ms Lewsley: You said it was because of the working of their office; you said it did not work. Mr Campbell: The election and the functioning of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister did not work. However, it was not that they did not work because the Executive was up and down, although that was a contributory factor; the two things were not part of the same thing. One was a portion of the other but one was not directly related to the other. The First Minister and the Deputy First Minister did not work from the very start, before the first time the Executive collapsed; they were not working together even though the perception was that they were. Ms Lewsley: Then Peter said that he would surmise from what was being said around the table that if there were not consensus on this matter, that we would have to take the responsibility for any deadlock, which means that we will have a pre-condition to restoration. Naomi talked about the community. I think the community is important. I have met people from both sides of the community who are telling us to get elected and go back and do the work. They say that if it worked last time, and the Assembly was up and running for the longest period of 18 months, then there is no reason why they should not have that back. People are crying out for proper government. I know that the election of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister has always been an issue for the DUP; but now it is talking about changing the roles of the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. That would be very serious. Mr P Robinson: I think that there has been a misunderstanding. I will be frank: if I must choose who I would be in Government with, I would not choose Sinn Féin. If such a proposal were a matter of choice, I would not propose a Sinn Féin First Minister or Deputy First Minister. That is why a mandatory system is preferable; it indicates that there is no choice in the matter, and sets down a mandatory mechanism whereby those posts are filled. It is as simple as that. The role of the office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister is defined by existing legislation, which allows the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister to designate particular functions to Ministers, including themselves. Mr Murphy indicated that one of the difficulties with the Government’s December 2004 proposals was that the DUP was talking to the Government, Sinn Féin was talking to the Government, and the Government have an agenda of their own. Therefore, not every nuance of what the DUP said may have been passed on to others, and vice versa. I have no doubt that that was the case, because I have heard things said publicly since 2004, which Sinn Féin indicated that it made it very clear during the negotiations. Those points were never put to us; in fact, quite the opposite was clearly put to us during those negotiations. I can tell members that throughout those negotiations in the autumn of 2004, we made it very clear that there should be changes to the Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM). We made |