COMMITTEE ON THE Monday 7 August 2006 Members in attendance for all or part of proceedings: The Committee met at 10.02 am. (The Chairman (Mr Wells) in the Chair.) The Chairman (Mr Wells): As members will be aware, the meeting will go on until 4.00 pm. I propose that we break at 12.20 pm to enable the caterers to bring in the food; however, after a short break we will work through lunch. I hope that everyone is happy with that. I hope that you all have your diaries cleared until 4.00 pm. We should go through apologies and deputies. Mr Campbell: I am here, Chairman, but I do not know whom I am representing. Mr P Robinson: I am representing whomever Gregory is not representing. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will make Mr Campbell represent Lord Morrow; Mr Robinson will be Dr McCrea. Are you expecting Mrs Foster? Mr Campbell: Yes. Mr McFarland: I am expecting Mr McGimpsey to join me on behalf of Mr Kennedy. Mr McCarthy: I am representing David Ford. Mrs Long: I am just myself. Ms Lewsley: I am representing Mark Durkan. Mr McGlone: I am representing Alasdair McDonnell. Mr Murphy: John O’Dowd is representing Martin McGuinness; Michelle Gildernew will not be here. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We wrote to the Secretary of State about the issue of Chairmen for the Subgroup on Economic Challenges facing Northern Ireland. He has written back to confirm that Naomi Long, Jim Wilson and Alban Maginness have been added to the panel to chair the subgroup’s meetings. The subgroup has been advised of that decision. When those individuals slot in, that should free up the two existing Chairmen to chair this Committee. It has been quite an onerous task this past week or two. Mr McFarland: We have had a difficulty with Mr Wilson’s appointment. I am hopeful that he will be replaced later today, but it is difficult to get in touch with people on holiday. Dr Farren: Are you calling a press conference? Mr McFarland: No, he has other commitments. The Chairman (Mr Wells): You will have to notify the Secretary of State. It would be helpful if Mr Maginness, as the next person on the list, could chair tomorrow’s meeting, so that we are not prevented from adhering to the new schedule. It is either that or Mr Molloy and I are in the Chair every day every week, which is perhaps a bit much. The minutes of the meeting of 31 July have been tabled. I hope that members received them in reasonably good time. Does anyone have any additions or corrections to the minutes? Do members agree that they are a true and accurate record? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): There is one other matter to get out of the way, simply because we do not know when this meeting will end. Members will recall that we wrote to the Secretary of State to ask him to move the first plenaries from 4 September and 5 September to 11 September and 12 September. He has written back to us, in a letter dated 3 August, stating that he is minded to agree to that. The Speaker has been informed accordingly. Therefore, both this Committee and the economic challenges subgroup appear to have a bit more time in which to deliberate. Is everyone content with the Secretary of State’s decision? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I hope that members will inform their Whips and parties that the first plenary is likely to be on 11 September. Mr Robinson had asked for a copy of a report that was prepared following meetings some months ago between Mr Hanson and the parties. The Secretary of State has referred the Committee to the list of institutional issues that we already have. Do members wish to comment on the Secretary of State’s decision? Mr P Robinson: Is the Secretary of State saying that Minister Hanson did not do any work after he spoke to the parties, or that he did work but will not show it to us? The Chairman (Mr Wells): From my reading of the letter, I think that it is the latter. It is clear that the Secretary of State is not prepared to give us anything more than the briefest outline of the issues. What do members feel about that? Mr P Robinson: It is a very poor performance by the Secretary of State. One would have thought that he would have had some desire to assist us in our work; it is regrettable that he does not. The Chairman (Mr Wells): What do other parties feel about that issue, or do they have no views on it? Dr Farren, do you have any views on that? Dr Farren: I think that it is mainly our own responsibility at this stage. I agree with the dates for the first plenaries being changed. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The Secretary of State will no doubt read this meeting’s Hansard, in which he will find Mr Robinson’s comments. Having got those preliminaries out of the way, we now move on to the substantive issue, which is the list of institutional issues that the parties agreed at the previous meeting. The up-to-date list is contained in your papers. Members were given an opportunity to point out any problems with the list and to request additions, corrections or deletions, but we have not had any comments. Therefore we will use it as the basis for this morning’s discussion. The issues to be discussed have been placed under headings and sub-headings within strands one, two and three of the Belfast Agreement, and, as no changes were received by 4 August, I consider the list to be agreed. Both Chairmen gave the commitment that any relevant issues that are raised will be discussed. Therefore, do not feel that we will prevent someone from raising a legitimate issue because it does not fit neatly under one of the headings. Are members content with the list? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will start with strand one, and “The Assembly” and the sub-heading “Accountability/Safeguards”. The items listed have been included because all parties stated that they were important issues; that is the only reason. No item has been given priority, because they are listed alphabetically, and I propose that we go through them in order. Members should feel free to speak on whatever issues they feel are important. I want to avoid a repeat of the material that was raised during the intensive question-and-answer session that we had last month. Do not regard this meeting as an opportunity for a rerun of what has already been said, because that will not achieve much. The objective of these sittings is to dig deeper and expand on what has already been said on the matters. Mr McFarland: Chairman, I understand that the list is in alphabetical order, but it would be logical to discuss the election of the First Minister (FM) and the Deputy First Minister (DFM) before discussing the approval of the First and the Deputy First Minister. It seems illogical to discuss the “Approval of FM/DFM and Executive” before there has been any discussion on their election. It would be useful if we could discuss the election before the approval. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Your point is entirely in order. The alphabetical list does not fit neatly into discussions, so I am happy to take “Election of First Minister and Deputy First Minister” first. Does anyone have anything to add? Mr P Robinson: If we are to discuss the issues in chronological order, “Voting system” should be taken before “Election of First Minister and Deputy First Minister”. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Discussions on “Voting system” followed by “Election of First Minister and Deputy First Minister” would be the obvious order. Mr P Robinson: There is also an issue about the number of MLAs, but I am not sure what that would come under. The Chairman (Mr Wells): “Number of Assembly members” currently falls under the sub-heading “Efficiency/Effectiveness” in strand one. Mr McFarland: On one level, I agree with Peter Robinson that there is logic to tackling the issues chronologically. However, our deliberations will not affect the number of MLAs that there are at present before another election, whereas other issues could be agreed in the autumn, as they are practical measures that could be introduced before the Assembly fires up again. That said, if there is an election before the Assembly returns, the issue of the number of MLAs becomes more urgent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): OK. Mr P Robinson: Chairman, I assume that some of these matters will require little more than a sentence from members when they are giving their opinion, but discussion on some other areas will take longer. Mr McFarland: Some discussions might take days. Dr Farren: I get worried when members start to rearrange lists. We have set out the list alphabetically, and the way in which parties attack or speak to the issues will depend on the importance or emphasis they put on the need for change or the need to keep things as they are. The initial presentations that parties made several weeks ago were not as focused as this agenda invites members to be. Perhaps we will distil our significant points of difference from this exercise, if we do not know them already, but I cannot imagine that we will overcome those differences today. We may come to a greater understanding on parties’ differences, but we should defer the challenge of trying to overcome them for some other discussion. I suggest that we leave that as it is and let parties speak to the issues as they consider appropriate. 10.15 am The Chairman (Mr Wells): That is one view. Mr Robinson’s view is that we should go through the list in chronological order, as if we were sitting down in September 1998. Dr Farren: What is chronological? The Chairman (Mr Wells): We would start with “Voting system”, followed by “Election of First Minister and Deputy First Minister”, followed by “Approval of FM/DFM and Executive”, and so on. Mr McGlone: “Election of Speaker and Deputy Speakers” should come under that list. Mr Murphy: “Community Designation” should come before “Voting system”. The Committee could try to rearrange the list almost by working off Standing Orders. “Community Designation” should be the first item before “Election of Speaker and Deputy Speakers”, followed by “Election of First Minister and Deputy First Minister”. They all fall under one broad topic. I imagine that members will dip in and out of each item as we discuss them. The Chairman (Mr Wells): “Community Designation” should be followed by “Voting system”, followed by “Election of First Minister and Deputy First Minister”, followed by “Election of Speaker and Deputy Speakers”. In fact, the latter would come before “Election of First Minister and Deputy First Minister”. The Speakers are more important even than the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, so that would be the third item. That would be followed by “Approval of FM/DFM and Executive”, so that would get up and running. Mr P Robinson: Yes, but would it be up and running by a voluntary coalition? The Chairman (Mr Wells): “Voluntary Coalition” would be next on the list. There is logic to going through the sequence of events that would occur if devolution were restored. I am loath simply to throw out all those topics and start a general discussion on them, because it would result in an endless series of contributions on disparate issues. Mr Campbell: Many phrases have been used to describe what we are doing — scoping, identifying, defining — Mr P Robinson: Grinding down. Mr Campbell: Apart from getting some order and logic to the way in which we address the issues, does a great deal depend on where the items appear and how we deal with them? The Chairman (Mr Wells): It would have helped the flow of the discussion, but it is clear that we will not reach agreement on it. Mr P Robinson: I have no emotional capital tied up in the order in which we address the issues, except that some items will be subject to the outcome of others. Mr McNarry: I agree. I have participated in other meetings, and it seems that, with all due respect to Seán, members go round the table — it is something that we all indulge in — and then we become confused. We need some sort of order and a strike system, because there are items that we will not spend a great deal of time on. However, there may be serious obstacles and members will probably need to refer to other parts of the list of “Institutional Issues” for further discussion. I wish that we could reach some consensus and approach things in a logical step-by-step way, as it would help me to follow things more clearly. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Could we consider starting with “Community Designation”, followed by “Voting system”, followed by “Voluntary Coalition” — though it is a difficult one — followed by “Election of Speaker and Deputy Speakers”, followed by “Election of First Minister and Deputy First Minister”, followed by “Approval of FM/DFM and Executive”. Mr P Robinson: Presumably the voting system to the Assembly should come before “Community designation”. The Chairman (Mr Wells): “Voting system” means the voting system in the Assembly. Yes, “Community Designation” must come before that. The Alliance Party flagged that up as a major concern. From that point on, the order becomes not quite so difficult because the remaining issues relate to the mechanics of a working Assembly and could come anywhere on a chronological list. Dr Farren: I am happy that members go with the order that you suggest, Chairman. We will not reach agreement if we all put forward our preferred options. Mr Campbell: Seán, do you think that we will abide by any direction from the Chairman? Dr Farren: Let us see how it goes for today. Mr McNarry: Willie McCrea was not buying into that last week. Dr Farren: I will object if I do not find the Chairman’s direction appropriate. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The order is as follows: “Community Designation”; “Voting system”; “Voluntary Coalition”; “Election of Speaker and Deputy Speakers”, which is a most important issue; “Election of First Minister and Deputy First Minister”; and “Approval of FM/DFM and Executive”. Every point after that concerns the workings of the Executive and Assembly. The order in which we put those points does not really matter, because they could come anywhere in the sequence. We have now agreed six topics, and I will throw the rest open to discussion. This could be our tenth consensus in a row, which would be remarkable. Dare I ask whether there is consensus? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Good, I am glad to hear it. As the Alliance Party highlighted community designation as a major issue, it is only fair to give it the opportunity to lead the discussion. Mrs Long: As community designation is almost inseparable from the voting system in the Assembly, it would be almost impossible to deal with one without the other. If members will indulge me, I will probably cross the line between the two at different points. At present, the Alliance Party probably feels the impact of community designation most acutely. However, it is conceivable that any party that chooses not to designate itself as “Unionist” or “Nationalist” in future could also experience the same discrimination that Members from my party have experienced over the term of the agreement. It is an anomaly, and recognised by the community at large, that, in a so-called cross-community vote in this Assembly, the votes of the Alliance Party are discounted, although it is the only cross-community party. That anomaly must be dealt with. One of our main concerns about community designation is that in recent correspondence from the Secretary of State and in discussions about the comprehensive agreement, reference was made to MLAs stating their community designation at the time of nomination for election, as opposed to on arrival at the Assembly after election. That would further entrench the divisions in our society rather than address them. The community-designation system was put in place in order that the voting system could function and to offer protection to minorities in the Assembly. However, the most significant minority within this Assembly is those who are neither unionist nor nationalist, and the voting system affords them no protection. The Alliance Party believes that the voting system can provide protection for minority communities and viewpoints within the Assembly without entrenching division. The voting system should deal with the deeply divided nature of Northern Ireland society and its political system. We accept that there is a need for checks and balances and that a strict 51% majority would not be acceptable, particularly on contentious issues. However, the system must be designed in such a way as not to entrench further the divisions in society. If this Assembly is about anything, it is about trying to bring the community together to work towards a single aim or purpose. The introduction of what the Alliance Party believes to be a discriminatory voting system encourages people to regress into tribal camps. Those who may wish to break through the barriers and cross those lines may feel inhibited because of the voting system. The system must also be flexible enough to accommodate demographic and political change. The current voting system is designed to protect the nationalist minority. However, it is clear that demographics, time and politics will change, and the voting system must be flexible enough to deal with such change. The Alliance Party does not want a system that would allow a minority in the Assembly to hold the entire operation of the Assembly to ransom — that was most starkly evidenced when the anti-agreement minority in unionism barred decisions that would otherwise have been carried by a majority of Members. However, that is not exclusively the case, as other Members have used the veto to their own end. The voting system must be democratic. The votes of all Members of the Assembly must count at the same level as every other Member. It is a basic right that should be reflected in the voting system. It should also be easily understood; therefore, that the way to marry all those concerns would be to remove the designation system — other than for party membership — completely and move to a weighted-majority vote system. The weight of that majority would have to be closely considered. A threshold of between 60% and 70% has been suggested. In cases in which the unionist majority was much larger and stronger, the argument of 70% was very strong. A cross-community vote could meet the 60% threshold, without having the approval of the nationalist minority. Therefore 60% is too low and 70% too high. About 67% would ensure that everyone’s votes are counted equally and would allow every Member to exercise that vote, and that no section of the Assembly, or the community that Members represent, would be excluded from any part of the voting system. In particularly sensitive votes, such as the establishment of an Executive or the election of a First Minister and Deputy First Minister, the cross-community threshold — the percentage of weighted majority — could be set higher than for other votes. It would therefore be possible to have a structure in which, if people felt that there was need for more cross-community support from Members who would have a particular responsibility, the threshold could be set slightly higher in order to ensure that those Members would feel fully included in the system. The number of MLAs has been raised and will be discussed later, but if we have 108 MLAs, the Petition of Concern should remain at the threshold of 30 Members. The Chairman (Mr Wells): You are right, Naomi. There is clear overlap between designation and the voting system, so I am happy to allow members to deal with both. I cannot see how we can deal with one and not mention the other. The Alliance Party has stated its position. Mr McFarland: Designation was brought in because the communities did not trust each other. Have we reached the stage where the communities fully trust each other and that each in turn should have a veto on what goes on? Would changing the percentage to 67% guarantee, in all scenarios, that communities could stop agreement being reached on something that they did not like? Mrs Long: The voting system should not be used by Members to bar something that they did not like: that would be like setting up a series of vetoes for parties, and it would not be a constructive way to move forward in Government. The voting system should protect the rights of minorities to express their views democratically on issues debated in the Chamber and in the Executive. That is not the issue. Building trust and confidence is not enhanced by people having to regress into tribal designations at the very outset. More confidence would be built if people had the freedom to build allegiances across the community, as opposed to along tribal divides. The Alliance Party believes that that would enhance cross-community support and would encourage people to move out of entrenched positions and build across the community. A threshold of 67% would ensure that people’s views were properly taken on board and that the issues of minorities were properly dealt with. The Assembly would need a minimum number of unionists or nationalists on board. 10.30 am You simply could not reach that degree of cross-community consent without the co-operation of unionists and nationalists. Sixty per cent would be too low because it would be feasible to reach agreement without the co-operation of nationalists. Therefore there is an issue around which weighting must be set. In order to build confidence in particular offices, for example the election of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, a higher threshold may be desirable. Members elected to such offices require a higher level of approval and acceptance by the whole community to facilitate them in discharging their duties. The current system may provide a veto for some parties, but it has not enhanced confidence or co-operation — we are sitting around this table during a suspension of the Assembly. The argument that a particular system will build confidence is folly, but it is possible to protect minorities and provide safeguards for them. Weighted majority, without designation, provides such safeguards and avoids further entrenching existing division. Dr Farren: We may consider what happens in other Assemblies, but our responsibility is to address the situation that faces us. The evidence is that most people in Northern Ireland regard themselves as either unionist or nationalist, and they use religious affiliation — Catholic and Protestant — as shorthand to describe their identity. Representation in the Assembly has been like that since Northern Ireland was created: it was the cause of its creation in the first place. However they may be defined and however distasteful others might find it, we have to live with those communities and seek to reconcile each to the other. A clear principle, then, underlies the adoption of designation. Mr McFarland referred to the practical point that each community has to grow and develop confidence and trust across the divide. Members recognise that there are problems with respect to designation, particularly as to the voting system to be adopted and whether designation should be used in perpetuity. Had things worked out otherwise, I would have hoped that, at this point, we might be some way towards changing the form of some of the safeguards for minorities in the Assembly, the Executive and the other institutions. However, we have not been able to achieve that, and we are faced with a task — perhaps all the greater now — of creating trust and confidence between our “communities”, as they have been traditionally described. There is a sound principle of building trust and confidence between our communities that applies not just to how we describe our affiliations but how generally we work the institutions of government. However, that is not without its problems in selecting a voting system. I note that when Naomi talked about weighted majorities, it was essentially with the intent of safeguarding either unionism or nationalism. Therefore in a sense, the same objective was underlined. Mrs Long: Seán has misunderstood my point. The Alliance Party fully recognises the need, in a divided society, to accommodate divisions. However, the party’s main aim is to protect and place on an equal footing those who choose not to be part of that divide. Dr Farren: Naomi will note that I said that I recognise that anomalies and difficulties must be addressed. Therefore the SDLP is prepared to consider voting systems that will ensure that all Members and parties in the Assembly are treated equally and fairly. All parties should set themselves that challenge when exploring alternatives to the current system. However, at this point in time and history, the basic principle of designation is necessary, so we should stick with it. I certainly hope that we can work towards something different and better in the future. The SDLP stands by the principle of designation, although it recognises its operational problems and is prepared to explore options with other parties to see if a different — and perhaps better — means of implementing the principle can be found. Mr P Robinson: The practice of community designation is a Northern Ireland attempt to meet the South African principle of sufficient consensus. Nobody has indicated that we do not want a system that ensures that any decisions taken have the support of the broad swathe of the community, and, as it is a divided community, that the decisions are broadly acceptable to those on both sides of the divide. The difficulty with the community-designation proposal is that it tends to be divisive; it sets the two communities up as two separate communities at all times. On a practical level, the Assembly voting system is fairly complex. However, I am not sure that the two proposals — weighted majority and community designation — are necessarily mutually exclusive. Two different voting mechanisms flow from the community-designation system to provide that cross-community support. It is clear that a weighted majority, if struck at the right level, will require community support as well. Why should we have alternative systems? Why not have the ability to use whichever system? Thus a proposition would be agreed if it met requirements under the community-designation mechanism or the weighted-majority mechanism. We must recognise that a section within the Assembly does not designate as either “Unionist” or “Nationalist” and that, to some extent, its vote is excluded — perhaps not excluded, but devalued. An alternative would be the weighted-majority system, which, if set at a particular level, could exclude the DUP. However, that is democracy and that is politics. If that is the direction in which the vote goes, so be it. However, it would be set at such a level that it would bring both sections of the community — although perhaps not a majority of both sections — along with it. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Regarding the structure for the rest of this meeting, I will be asking the party that feels most strongly about a subject and which required it to be on the list to speak on it. Then members can question that party; when we have finished, the lead party can have its final say and perhaps make a proposal that can be put in the normal way and made subject to consensus. After Mr Murphy and Mr McNarry, we will return to Mrs Long to summarise, then we will put a proposal to the vote. Mr Murphy: The safeguard mechanisms in the agreement are complicated and the designation mechanism can be blunt. However, they are also necessary, given the experience of nationalists in institutions such as this and their ongoing experience in some councils across the North. Stringent safeguards and mechanisms to protect rights in this institution were necessary to get people to sign up to the agreement in the first place. We might wish that that were not the case, but the voting and community designation system that was designed to offset abuse or denial of rights of any sector in the Assembly reflects experience. Designation may be a blunt instrument, but Sinn Féin believes that, unfortunately, it continues to be necessary. One could be flippant and say that because the voting system works through a majority of Members, unionist and nationalist, being present and voting in the Chamber, there are not enough “Others” — if they constituted a majority on their own, they too would have a veto. However, that is the system that we must have. I recognise the difficulty that it creates for those who have not designated as “Nationalist” or “Unionist” and that they feel that their vote is devalued. However, I have not yet heard any alternative proposition, including Naomi’s, which offers the safeguards that we needed to get people to sign up to the agreement. Therefore Sinn Féin is not in favour of any change to the system. Nevertheless, Sinn Féin is willing to discuss the issue. The Alliance Party put this forward in the review of the Good Friday Agreement that took place some years ago, and there was lengthy discussion on it. Parties were willing to explore the Alliance Party’s alternatives with it. Thus far, however, I have not heard an alternative that provides the requisite safeguards; therefore the present ones cannot be abandoned yet. We are moving on to issues such as voluntary coalitions, but we must recognise that one person’s voluntary coalition is another person’s exclusion. I accept the bluntness of the designation mechanism and the difficulty that it poses for “Others”, and we will continue to discuss alternatives to it. However, only the current safeguards protect the guarantees of the Good Friday Agreement. Mr McNarry: Provided that we are still here and working, there are unlikely to be any consequential challenges to an Assembly on the constitutional position for the foreseeable future. Unionists have worries about what might happen if there were no Assembly. The Assembly that we would like to talk about is one that delivers devolved rule in both legislative and administrative forms. 10.45 am Does Naomi think that there is there any difference between voting on legislative matters and voting on administrative matters? Would both matters need to carry the 67% to which she has referred? The utopian position would be that we had matured sufficiently — my colleague Alan McFarland mentioned this issue — for there to be a simple-majority vote on most issues. If we are to reduce the level of difference, will Naomi consider whether the Assembly could have a simple-majority vote on this issue and let us get on with it? The Chairman (Mr Wells): I will ask Peter to come in briefly, after which, Naomi can sum up her case. We will then proceed to a proposal. Mr P Robinson: I had assumed that, whether we were discussing community-designation voting or weighted majorities, they were introduced only when required by a petition of concern or a statutory obligation. All other votes would be by simple majority. Mr Murphy referred to his experience of abuses of the system. I too have some experience of abuses of the system, when designations were changed fraudulently. A particular Assembly vote could not be carried unless there was a fraudulent change. Does Naomi agree that that type of abuse does nothing to commend the system? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Naomi, I suppose your defence is that you were not an MLA at that time. Mrs Long: I do not wish to distance myself, in any way, from decisions that my colleagues have taken. I do not wish to duck the issue, and I will return to it. A couple of issues have been raised. Seán said that the SDLP would be willing to re-examine the voting system; that is important. However, he also said that most people are happy to use the shorthand of “Unionist” and “Nationalist” to describe their position in society or the group to which they belong. Most people may be happy, but a recent Northern Ireland Life and Times Survey concluded that up to 14% of people are not happy with those designations. When people refuse to state a designation, civil servants spend much time examining the religion of people’s referees, the sports that people played at school and, indeed, the schools that they attended to try to force people into community boxes when, clearly, those people are not happy to designate themselves. The fact that, by your standards, a minority is a small minority does not lift our responsibility, as elected representatives, to treat those people with equality. The suggestion is that, because most people are happy with the system, the minority who are not happy should accept the inequality. Dr Farren: I do not think that I used a word such as “happy”. It would not occur to me to use that word to describe people’s feelings about our society. The SDLP wants to ensure that parties do not feel excluded and that no attempt is being made to devalue their vote. In the framework laid down by designation, the SDLP is willing to explore ways whereby anomalies could be addressed. It will not be easy to arrive at a satisfactory situation, but we should try to take that small step forward. Community designation is a reflection of, if not the entire reality, a considerable reality. It is the reality on which a large majority of people are represented in the Assembly. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mrs Long, before you conclude, it would be useful if you were to deal with the issue that Mr Robinson raised about there being three options: a simple majority, a weighted majority, and — Mrs Long: I intend to do that. I am attempting to deal with the issues in the order in which they were raised. I shall not argue about whether the word “happy” was used. I wrote down that word, and Hansard will reflect whether I incorrectly transcribed it. From our perspective, just because equal voting rights are afforded to those who designate as “Other” in the Chamber, that in no way diminishes the rights that other parties around the table currently enjoy. That is the point that the Alliance Party is trying to make. We understand the current realities of our society; we acutely understand the divisions that exist and the protections that communities wish to have. However, we are not dealing only with the current reality but — we hope — a changing reality, in which people increasingly wish to move away from old divides and form new allegiances with one another in order to move society forward. We must have a voting system that can accommodate that change if we are to encourage such change in wider society. I do not believe that anyone at this table believes that it would make one less of a unionist or a nationalist if one did not have to write that in a book in the Chamber when one signs the Roll of Membership. This is not a matter of attempting to diminish anyone’s position, but simply of affording equality of representation to everyone around the table. Peter Robinson raised the idea of a weighted-majority vote being run in parallel with the designation system. We have a fundamental objection to the designation system, but if weighted-majority voting were introduced in tandem with it, that would at least be a step forward, and it would represent progress. Although that would not be our mechanism of choice, it would be preferable to not addressing the issue at all. We accept that safeguards are necessary, and I entirely accept what Conor Murphy said about the necessity of safeguards in order to get certain parts of our community to buy into the agreement. Our argument is not with safeguards but with their current form, which we believe discriminates against our Members. This is not simply a question of the number of Members that we have, because I accept that, as a party, we can cast only six votes. I do not object to that but to the fact that those votes do not carry the same weight in the Chamber as six Sinn Féin votes or six DUP votes. That is the issue at stake, not the number of seats that our party holds, which is a matter for the electorate and for our party to address. When we were discussing that matter, Conor said that the denial of rights of any member of this society would not be acceptable. Surely it can be no more acceptable to Sinn Féin that my rights or Kieran’s rights or any of our colleagues’ rights in the Chamber are in any way more diminished than anyone else’s. That is the point that we are making. We are not arguing that there should be no safeguards but that those safeguards should be designed to protect my rights every bit as much as other MLAs’ rights. That is a fairly simple point. David McNarry mentioned the difference between legislative and administrative functions. The current position is that, unless there is a petition of concern, a simple-majority vote carries. That should continue to be the case. It is certainly our wish that there should be fewer petitions of concern, because, as business becomes more normalised in our society, they should be less necessary. However, when a petition of concern is laid, there is an opportunity for a weighted-majority vote to ensure cross-community support for whatever measures are under discussion. As I have already outlined, that weighted majority does not need to be a consistent majority for all types of votes. The particular weights that would apply to particular types of votes — whether they be administrative or legislative, or, indeed, the election of an Executive and a First Minister and a Deputy First Minister — should be set out in the structures beforehand. It is clear that there is no consensus around the table. Therefore my proposal only exposes that lack of consensus; it does not move the process forward. However, we certainly wish to see the issue of designations and the voting system dealt with in a way that would bring about weighted-majority voting on those matters that require a petition of concern. We propose that the Committee move to that now. However, we are open to the discussions, to which Seán Farren and Peter Robinson referred, about how it could be introduced as one of several Assembly voting mechanisms. We are happy to engage in those discussions with other parties in order to further that objective. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is that a formal proposal? Mrs Long: It is a formal proposal that we change the voting system in the Assembly to weighted majority and that the weighting should be set by further discussion. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Would that replace the present system? Mrs Long: Yes. Mr McFarland: Chairman, we are discussing “Community designation”; we have not reached “Voting system”. Are you taking the two together? I am happy to do so if you are. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I think that we have to, because I cannot see anything new arising when we move on to discuss “Voting system”; we will get exactly the same arguments. There is nothing there that is not relevant to “Community designation”. Mr McFarland: Are we dealing with the topics and ticking them off one by one? Is there consensus to change community designation? My sense is that there probably is not. The question then is: is there consensus that we look at the voting system? You may get consensus if parties are happy to re-examine whether we have weighted majority, etc. Mrs Long: The issue of designation is not simply about people stating whether they are “Nationalist” or “Unionist”; most of us can work that out before people sign a book. The issue is that the voting system should work. The two things are intimately entwined and cannot be separated. That is why I raised the issue of the voting system along with designations, which exist to facilitate the voting system. It would be a pointless exercise unless the voting system actually used the designations. Mr P Robinson: At our last meeting, there was a vision that we kept in mind, which was whether the issues that we were discussing were of such enormity that they were an obstacle to our agreeing to devolution. Is this issue such an obstacle that Naomi would not agree to devolution taking place if it were not changed? Mrs Long: None of the Alliance Party’s proposals is a precondition for devolution; we are making proposals on the basis that I described last week. There will be issues that some parties feel are a precondition; we do not have such issues at this time. Mr P Robinson: Therefore it is not an obstacle to devolution. Mrs Long: No. However, if devolution were restored, it would be an obstacle to good governance and to the stability of the Assembly. Given recent instability and the frustration of the community at our inability to stabilise the institutions, we believe that these are valid issues to raise. Mr Campbell: Chairman, before we take the proposal from Naomi, I want to try to get my head round this. At the end of the series of issues that we have identified, will we have proposals on which there is consensus? What, in effect, will that mean? If we have two or three issues on which there is consensus — “Community designation” and “Voting system”, for example — and a series of other matters on which there is no consensus, what will we have at the end of our discussions? The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will have a report that will go before the Assembly on 11 September, where it will be noted that the Committee reached agreement on some issues and not on others. Mr P Robinson: Then there might be a need for more than one proposal. Naomi could propose that community designation be scrapped in favour of weighted majority. Mrs Long: Which I have done. Mr P Robinson: Equally, I could propose that I am content with weighted majority as an additional voting mechanism. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I would be happy to take that proposal. As I said, we are not excluding anything. The discussion is structured this way to give it flow, and that has worked quite well. We can take a vote if any member wishes to do so; if we do not get consensus, I am willing to take another proposal. 11.00 am Mr McFarland: I was very interested in what Peter said at the previous meeting. When our report goes to the Assembly, it could help the parties, when we hold negotiations in the autumn, if we identify the areas that are unlikely to be neuralgic and the areas on which some negotiation will be needed. It will clear the decks and distinguish between the clutter and the serious aspects, and that will be quite useful. It will assess what is a major problem and what is unlikely to be a major problem. Ms Lewsley: I would like some clarification. I assume that Naomi is proposing that we scrap community designations and go for weighted majority. Is she asking us to return to the Chamber and sign the Roll without designating? Moreover, is Peter Robinson suggesting that we keep community designations but introduce weighted majority, so that we would have both simultaneously? My worry is what the consequences will be if we get the community designations but do not get weighted majority, or vice versa. Mr P Robinson: First, I am content with the Alliance proposal. A weighted majority is a much more understandable system. It is a system that operates in other parts of the world for key votes. For many reasons, it is a more sound system. I made the other proposition because I thought that it was more likely to get a wider degree of support from other parties. However, there would be no difficulty operating it. The Speaker would simply hold a vote. The Speaker could determine from the Members who had voted whether by way of one or both mechanisms the proposition had passed. It is as simple as that. It is a mathematical, computer exercise, which would take no more time than the present arrangements. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We could go down the route of having three proposals: one from Alliance to remove the designation system completely; one to move to a weighted-majority vote; and the third to have the option of any one of three voting systems. Mrs Long: Mr Chairman, we could not divorce the first proposal from the second. Unless designations are removed and weighted-majority voting introduced, the current voting system will not work. For example, if, by some miracle, the first proposal were agreed and the second were not, the Assembly voting system would be in chaos, because the designations are necessary to operate the system as it is. Our argument is that we should introduce weighted-majority voting, which does not require community designations. That is our principal proposal. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I detect that there is some opposition to that. Mrs Long: I detect that also, but it still remains our position. Mr P Robinson: I want to comment on one or two other issues under the joint heading that we now have. In her presentation, Naomi referred to the time when it is necessary for elected representatives to designate. The argument that it should be done at election time seems to me to be altogether reasonable. If candidates are to take a major decision on what designation will apply to them for all Assembly votes, it might be a tad unreasonable for the community not to be aware of it. Designations should be part of the nominating process, so that people know exactly for whom they are voting. It would also stop abuse of the system whereby people designate as one thing on one day only to change their designations on the next. That is not something that many of us would do, but some Members were prepared to do it before. The public would then have a mandate to vote on that designation as well. Other issues arise out of the voting system. Although we have a separate heading for it, one issue would be the petition of concern, which is an integral part of the voting system. We start blending together the various headings on the list. It is a central part of the voting system; indeed, it is an essential part in a community designation or weighted majority system. I presume that there is support for the general principle of a petition of concern. It was referred to, but nobody else mentioned it. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Naomi said that she was happy with the rule that 30 Members’ names would be required to trigger a petition of concern. Mrs Long: That is on the assumption of an Assembly of 108 Members. Mr P Robinson: On the assumption that my party continues to have no less than 32 Members, 30 Members seems reasonable. Mr McNarry: Some big assumptions are being made here. Mrs Long: A point was raised about whether candidates should designate when they are nominated for election. That simply further entrenches division. People are aware of the politics of the candidates for whom they vote; therefore the idea that candidates should have to designate before they stand for election is nonsense. Indeed, the names of at least three parties at this table already give an indication of whether they vote “Unionist” or “Nationalist”. Given that some members of Peter Robinson’s party went to the electorate under a different party designation but have changed party since the election, it seems ironic that the DUP would press for candidates to declare their stance in advance of an election. I would defend the right of a Member to change parties; I would also defend the right of Members to change designation, if they wished. However, it is not something that my party intends to do in any future Assembly session. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Can we move to the proposals made by Mrs Long and Mr Robinson? I definitely sensed a hint of dissention in the Committee on some of those issues. Mr P Robinson: What finely tuned antennae you have. [Laughter.] The Chairman (Mr Wells): We may not get consensus on the proposals anyhow. First, Mrs Long’s proposal was to move to a weighted majority system and remove the present community designation system. We will vote on that. Does everyone support that? Members indicated dissent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I see that there is no consensus on that. Mr P Robinson: Do you want to quantify the dissention? Mr Murphy: My earlier remarks made it clear that Sinn Féin was willing to discuss this issue, as we did at length during the review of the Good Friday Agreement when the Alliance Party put forward various propositions. We are happy to discuss this further, following the reinstatement of the institutions, but I do not support a change to the community designation system at this time. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Not that it is needed, but can parties outline their position on this proposal? Mr McFarland: In previous meetings Mr McCrea got slightly fraught that dissention was recorded. However, if there was not consensus, there was not consensus. In fact, most decisions were four votes to one. Mr McCrea quietly objected to votes being recorded. The agreement was that, where there was not consensus from any one party, the proposal fell. We did not vote on whether there was consensus. I do not mind what we do. The Chairman (Mr Wells): If a party wishes to record its view, it should be allowed to do so. Does any party wish to record its view on Mrs Long’s proposal formally? Mr P Robinson: We consider that we have done so. The Chairman (Mr Wells): It will be apparent from the text of the Hansard report. Mr Robinson’s proposal was to keep the present community designation and use a weighted majority and the current cross-community voting system. Does anyone have views for or against that? Mrs Long: Given that our proposal was unsuccessful, we see Mr Robinson’s proposal as a step forward — albeit a small one — from our perspective. Therefore we welcome the proposal. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Any views against? Mr Murphy: The proposal may need further explanation. Under the current arrangement in the Good Friday Agreement, there are the cross-community consensus and the weighted majority systems. Perhaps there is some difference between Peter Robinson’s proposal and the current arrangements. I am not quite so sure. There are two possible voting mechanisms. One would require a simple majority from the “Nationalists”, “Unionists” and “Others” present at the vote; the other would follow the weighted-majority system for which, to achieve an “Aye” vote, 60% of members must vote in favour of the motion, and, of that 60%, at least 40% of “Nationalists” and 40% of “Unionists” must vote in favour of the motion. Is the suggestion that the designation requirement be scrapped completely, leaving a simple weighted majority, without any reference to the 40%? I would like to be clear that that is the proposition. The Chairman (Mr Wells): It is worth reminding members of the four statutory votes that currently require the cross-community voting system to be triggered. They are the election of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister; the election of the Speaker and the Deputy Speakers; the vote on the Budget; and a vote when a petition of concern, which must be signed by 30 Members, has been lodged. Mr P Robinson: Our suggestion is for a weighted majority, without reference to designations, but set at a level that would require cross-community support. Mr McFarland: It is worth separating the four statutory votes, because the vote for the First Minister and Deputy First Minister requires a 50:50 outcome, while the other three votes need a 60:40:40 outcome. The Chairman (Mr Wells): That is right. They are different votes, but they still require a mechanism to reflect cross-community support. Mr McFarland: Yes. Mr Murphy: This proposition is to do away with the 40:40 element. The weighted majority in that system is 60%. There is no proposition as to what the weighted majority would be in a new system. Mr P Robinson: We have suggested 70%. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Naomi suggested 67%. Mrs Long: We determined 67% as the level at which cross-community support would be required. It would achieve cross-community support; 67% could not be achieved without cross-community support. Mr McFarland: Would that change if the unionist/nationalist weighting of the Assembly were to change? I presume that the level at which cross-community support would be achieved would fluctuate and would, therefore, have to be changed for each Assembly. It might need to be changed repeatedly, whereas, regardless of the number of “Unionists”, “Nationalists” or “Others” in the Assembly, the current system is easily understandable. Logically, if a percentage that would guarantee cross-community support were adopted, each Assembly would have to reassess the necessary level. Mrs Long: Yes. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Such a decision would probably require legislation, or at least a change to Standing Orders. Dr Farren: There should be a mechanism that applies in almost every circumstance. Mr P Robinson: The requirement for 70% would do that. Dr Farren: I am happy to explore the issue in a little bit more detail than it might be possible to do so at the moment. I would not be unhappy if members decided to consider the situation in the context of the review. I am easy enough with either doing that in the next few weeks or after the report has been presented to the Assembly. However, the issue needs further exploration. The exploration should be based on the principle that I outlined earlier and on the recognition that there are anomalies and some inequities in the present voting mechanisms that leave parties unhappy and, in a sense, that devalue their votes. To address that, we should commit ourselves to overcoming those difficulties. However, at present, I do not approve of, or support, any of the changes that have been suggested in Committee. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mr Robinson’s proposal has not achieved consensus. However, perhaps it was a bit stark. Can members agree on the suggestion that further consideration be given to a change to the Assembly’s voting system? I think that it was a Sinn Féin proposal. The Committee Clerk: It was Seán Farren’s. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I am sorry. I noted it as a proposal made by “SF”. Mr Murphy: You need to change your designation. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Could everyone sign up to the proposal that further consideration be given to a change to the Assembly voting system? Dr Farren: I am not necessarily committing myself to change. It may be that we have to live with what we have. I am certainly open to exploring the voting systems in order to remove anomalies, but I cannot make an a priori commitment to change. 11.15 am Mr McFarland: The various scenarios have implications for parties: if the Assembly were to be reduced to 90 Members, or to 72 Members, or if the balance between the communities changed. It might be worth parties having a think. We could revisit it in our discussions when we have had more time to study possible outcomes. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The way to square that circle is for the parties to give further consideration to the Assembly voting system. Mr McFarland: Do we lodge that as part of the report and revisit it after examination or do we leave consideration until the autumn? How do we leave it? What goes into the report — is it that the parties are considering the matter or that we will revisit it to come to a decision? Mr P Robinson: There is another alternative. In the two Governments’ proposals for a comprehensive agreement, it was proposed that there be a standing institutional review Committee. The matter could be referred to such a Committee — as might several others. Mr McFarland: As we said at the beginning of our discussions, it would be beneficial to sort out the issues that need to be sorted before the Assembly fires up again. Clearly, some issues cannot be sorted out, and they may have to go to a review Committee. However, if there are issues that can be sorted out in time for restoration — and if there are more effective and efficient ways of operating — it would be worth trying to get them into action. Mr Campbell: I took it that the proposal amounted to further consideration of possible changes to the voting system in the Assembly. Is anyone saying that there is not consensus on that? The Chairman (Mr Wells): It is a fairly mild proposal. Mr Campbell: I cannot think of a more vague, indefinite proposal. Mr P Robinson: Does anyone refuse to consider this any further? Dr Farren: I am not saying that. Mr Murphy: Is it also clear that, given the suggestion of a formal mechanism for considering this and other issues after the restoration of the institutions, that this is not considered a blockage to the return of devolution? Mrs Long: I have already set out our position with regard to this being a blockage. Mr Murphy: You have made your case clear. However, should there be consensus to revisit the issue, it might be helpful if there were also consensus that we do not consider it an issue that blocks the return of devolution. Mr P Robinson: It might also be helpful to the Alliance Party if everyone were to say that this matter could be considered by a review Committee. Dr Farren: Including the words “should be considered” would make it a little stronger. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is that the way forward? Does anyone have any problems with that suggestion? Mr McFarland: What if it were possible to get changes to the Assembly’s voting system decided before the Assembly fires up again so that it could tackle proposals that would make it more efficient and effective straightaway? The issues were identified in the last Assembly, and we examined them in some detail in the review in 2002. We did not take a decision at that stage, but parties were aware that there might be better ways of doing things. Will it be possible to get a decision on change — if change is the parties’ wish — before the Assembly fires up again? It would make sense to do that, rather than leave a whole swathe of issues to bubble up in the middle of the next Assembly — if there is a next Assembly — because we were still reviewing matters. Some issues will have to be left to a Committee such as Peter suggests. Is this one? Can we deal with it so that it comes into effect when the Assembly fires up again? The Chairman (Mr Wells): There are two suggestions. We can consider the voting system in more detail later in our deliberations; or we can refer it to a review Committee. At this rate we will still be discussing the matter at Christmas. Mr Campbell: Which Christmas? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Exactly. We have spent 45 minutes getting to point 2. We need a quick decision. Mr Murphy: The best-case scenario is that there are issues that we can identify that we can agree on and get out of the way. There are other issues that need further work, but we can agree that they are not a blockage to devolution and, therefore, we do not expect them to be raised in the autumn as issues that have to be sorted out before we can get the Assembly functioning again. Then there are those issues that people want resolved before the Assembly can function again. Whatever the chosen mechanism — an institutional review Committee or something else — this issue could be resolved in an agreed format by the Assembly following restoration of devolution, if it is not possible to resolve it now. Equally, it is not a blockage to the return of devolution. It can be referred to whatever mechanism is agreed for resolving this and any other issues that we decide need to be resolved when devolution returns. Mrs Long: The Alliance Party is not saying that this is a barrier to devolution, but it is a destabilising influence on the Assembly. That must be borne in mind. The fact that we are not placing roadblocks in the way of devolution does not mean that we give this any less weight than those who do attach roadblock status to their issues. It needs to be addressed if the Assembly is to be stabilised. It would be preferable if it could be addressed before devolution, as Mr McFarland suggests. If it cannot, devolution can still occur, but the Assembly will not function efficiently. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I will have to call this section of the discussion to a halt. I will put two proposals — Mr P Robinson: Chairman, may I say one thing, because there is a distinction to be made. It would not be unhealthy for the Assembly, on a continuing basis, to look at improving the way it does business. One of the problems with the Belfast Agreement was that everything was permitted to run along and then suddenly there was a review every four years, or whatever it happened to be. It is better to have a review as part of an ongoing process, rather than happening every four years or after a fixed period. Therefore, there is a need for a standing Committee to look at those issues. If consensus is not reached today, I do not think that it will be reached between now and the restoration of devolution. It is better to identify issues that can be the business of such a standing Committee, rather than pretend to ourselves that we will return to them when everyone knows that we will not. The Chairman (Mr Wells): That leads on neatly to Dr Farren’s proposal that further consideration be given by this Committee to the Assembly voting system, and Mr Robinson’s proposal that voting systems should be referred to a review Committee. Dr Farren: I do not want to prolong this discussion, but are the proposals mutually exclusive? If the Committee has the time and the will to do so, there is no reason why we cannot come back to the matter, and if it is not resolved at that point it can be referred to the type of Committee that Peter suggests. Rather than create division, could not the two proposals be melded together? The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are members content that further consideration be given to the Assembly voting system by this Committee and, if consensus is not reached, that the matter should be referred to a review Committee of the Assembly? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Having effectively parked that issue, we move on to “Voluntary Coalition”. This featured prominently in the evidence given by the DUP in the question-and-answer session in June, as well as more recently when we were discussing the headings for today’s deliberations. I will ask Mr Robinson or Mr Campbell to speak to this issue, and then we will go round the parties as usual. Mr P Robinson: The best kind of Government is one into which all the participants have freely entered because they recognise that those whom they are partnering in Government share basic principles and, therefore, have chosen to work together. It is the system that works in virtually every democratic country in the world; where one party cannot secure sufficient support to be in Government, it seeks a partner. It is a system known to us all. It operates on democratic norms without mandatory requirements and will provide the best form of Government. In Northern Ireland there will, of necessity, be some stipulations, and that is why the weighted-majority issue has been a requirement. However, whether you have a weighted majority or community designations, a voluntary coalition would be unable to get up and running unless it received wide support. Clearly, it would be a voluntary coalition that would have a cross-community ingredient. If the system of voting is satisfactory, why should it be mandatory? If a voluntary coalition can get the degree of support that the voting system requires, let us remove the mandatory requirement. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are there any views on that proposal? Mrs Long: The Alliance Party also raised the issue of voluntary coalition in ‘Agenda for Democracy’. We raised it for the reasons that Peter Robinson has outlined — it provides for stable governance and provides direction to Government. For Government and the Executive, in particular, to function well, there must be a collective view about the future of the Executive. Leaving aside the unionist/nationalist divide, there are other divides in our society. For example, it is hard to imagine how conservative, socialist and liberal perspectives could be melded together inside one Executive on all occasions. There is also an inability to negotiate priorities in the same way as there would be in setting up a voluntary coalition in other societies, because the coalition is mandatory and, therefore, people’s participation in it is not based on whether they are content with programmes for Government. It is actually done in reverse, and we do not believe that that gives stable guidance. This impacts on other issues. The Assembly was set up so that everyone could participate in Government. In a healthy society, it is not Government that everyone should participate in, but governance. It is possible to be part of the governance of a country without being in Government. That distinction is unclear in our current structures. Strong opposition is key to good Government. The current mandatory coalition system does not provide for larger parties to be represented in opposition. In the current Assembly, a maximum of nine Members do not belong to parties that would be in Government. That does not lead to a healthy opposition, notwithstanding that, as one of those parties, Alliance has challenged on the basis of good opposition. There is a role for strong opposition. The corollary of having no opposition is that there is little opportunity for the public to change the Government. They can change the internal make-up and complexion of it, in terms of the numbers of seats apportioned to different members of the Executive, but under the current arrangements for mandatory coalition it would be very difficult to have a wholesale change of Government. That could permit stagnation and many other things to creep into Government that would not happen in a voluntary coalition, where there would be negotiated outcomes. A voluntary coalition allows for good government and strong accountability mechanisms for the public, and it ensures that, ultimately, people have the sanction to change the Government. 11.30 am Mr McFarland: By way of a philosophical question, suppose that, by the autumn, Sinn Féin has passed all the tests that it has been set and that the DUP considers it to be fit for government — Mr Murphy: And is considered fit for government by the UUP too. Mr McFarland: If we got to the stage at which Sinn Féin is acceptable to everyone, would Peter and the DUP be comfortable with Sinn Féin, the Alliance Party, the SDLP and the UUP forming a voluntary coalition that left the DUP out of government? I wonder whether it is acceptable to the DUP that the major party in unionism would be excluded from government. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Would Mr Robinson like to answer that? Mr P Robinson: I thought that I had answered the question before it was asked. During the discussion on weighted majorities, I pointed out that a voluntary coalition could lead to the Democratic Unionist Party not being in government. That is a fact of life. If the other unionist party wanted to run with the nationalists rather than with its partner in unionism, that would be an obvious outcome. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are we reaching consensus on a voluntary coalition? I have not heard any opposition. Dr Farren: I indicated my opposition to the idea few minutes ago. As with the previous issue, it is a question of where we would like to be and from where we start in order to get there. Whatever the parties’ views on the Good Friday Agreement, I like to think that we all subscribe to the aspiration of creating a society that is “peaceful”, “exclusively democratic” and in which the question of greater understanding, respect and reconciliation between our communities is being addressed. Given the clear and prolonged absence of consensus on the structures of government, we have an overriding responsibility, as political representatives, to ensure that we achieve as much consensus as possible on the new structures. At the end of the day, that is a matter for political judgement. In the initial stages, a clear degree of support for, and participation in, the institutions is required. The level of participation must reassure all sides of the community that they are represented at the highest levels of decision-making and, therefore, that respect for their identities and aspirations is being fully upheld. The whole notion of the inclusivity of the Executive flows from that type of thinking. We do not necessarily have to see ourselves wedded to that for for ever and a day, but the experience of our recent and not-so-recent history indicates the need for a high level of participation in decision-making by representatives from all sides. The inclusive formation of an Executive is not quite as mandatory as people tend to represent it: it is represented negatively rather than positively. Parties have the option of not participating. However, the option is there for the parties that qualify on the basis of their mandate to participate and lend support to building consensus. That is essential in the initial phase, which will be as long or as short as we make it. The greater the degree of consensus, the more fluidity that can be achieved in our political system, and the more rapidly people want to move to different ways of structuring our political system, the better. With respect to the loss of opposition in the Assembly that an inclusive Executive would seem to suggest, a strong Committee system would be the location for much of the challenge that opposition can provide. People should remember that we are not a sovereign territory; we do not have the same responsibilities or degrees of discretion with respect to a whole range of matters that sovereign parliaments have. The consensus that is needed here overrides the issues related to left/right politics that apply in other situations. The inclusivity principle is essential to the successful working of the Assembly and other institutions because of the nature of our society and the consensus required for those institutions. Mr Murphy: As with the community-designation system, the safeguards around the ability to participate in Government according to mandate were a necessary part of the agreement. We are not operating under democratic norms in this state, and never have. Therefore safeguards and mechanisms that allow people to participate as of right in the institutions and the Executive are necessary to get past that experience. The right to participate in Government has the potential to form an inclusive Executive that, ultimately, with people working together on issues — and having to work together in order to make it work — leads in the longer term to better working relationships and ways of addressing issues such as reconciliation, trust, confidence, and other issues that people currently find to be blockages to the return of the institutions. Ironically, the next item on the agenda is the election of the First and Deputy First Ministers. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Correction: it is the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker — a much more important issue. Mr Murphy: I suppose that that should have come before “Voluntary Coalition”. Unless the voting system is changed, the First and Deputy First Ministers require 50% of nationalist votes and 50% of unionist votes, so the only people that would potentially be excluded under a voluntary coalition mechanism would be the smaller parties on each side of the community designation. The votes of the larger parties would be required to elect the First and Deputy First Ministers. Sinn Féin has never been in favour of excluding parties. Whether we like what parties stand for or not, we have always argued that in the system that we have under the Good Friday Agreement it is their democratic mandate that entitles them to be part of the Government — or not, as the case may be. We stand by that. We are not in favour of exclusion at local government level, or any other level. We contend that a party’s right to be part of Government, according to its mandate, is a central issue for this institution and for the Good Friday Agreement as a whole. It should be adhered to. Mr McNarry: We should establish that the principle of voluntary coalition should not be an impediment to good government. Many unionists, myself included, are sceptical of an imposed mandatory Government or an agreed voluntary coalition that includes those who have not yet convinced us of their commitment to good government. I wonder whether that brings us to the role of a formal opposition. A significant party may opt for voluntary exclusion. One of the matters that is not covered here is whether a party excluding itself, and playing the role of the official party of opposition, would be formally recognised as such. I do not suggest that such a role would be totally similar to that played by Her Majesty’s Opposition. Colleagues may have a view on that or wish to consider it either now or later. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Is there any reaction to that? Mr P Robinson: Dr Farren and Mr McNarry have both misunderstood. This is a mandatory coalition. Neither Sinn Féin nor the DUP can choose to be in opposition. If they so chose, there would be gridlock. Both would have a veto under the voting mechanisms that we have talked about. It is not a matter of choosing to be in opposition. It is a requirement to be in government. It is a mandatory system. That answers Mr McNarry’s point. Mr McNarry: That applies only where a party finds itself in the position currently occupied by Sinn Féin or the DUP. Mr P Robinson: Yes. Mr McNarry: It does not apply to a party such as my own. Mr P Robinson: And? Mr McNarry: There is no formal provision for such a party to exclude itself from Executive positions. Mr P Robinson: There is. You do not nominate anyone. Mr McNarry: I accept that. I do not want to get into technicalities. There would then be no formal recognition that an opposition could be posted in the Assembly. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Any other views on that? Again, I detect opposition to this proposal. All the parties have stated their positions, which are in Hansard. Dr Farren: What is the proposal? The Chairman (Mr Wells): The proposal is that the Executive should be formed by voluntary coalition. That is Mr Robinson’s view, and it is supported by Mrs Long. Mrs Long: Mr Murphy referred to voluntary coalition as a mechanism for the exclusion of parties. The Alliance Party has never viewed it in that way. It has always been viewed in the context of inclusive governance, where parties actively participate in governance through the mechanism of opposition. That is a role that the Alliance Party does not diminish in any way, as it is a role that my party has fulfilled. It is an important role in government. It has never been about including or excluding any specific party. That is not where we are coming from. It is a suggested way to have stability and good governance. Mr P Robinson: It also comes from a peculiar view of democracy. There seems to be a view that a vote at an election entitles one to a share in government. That flows from what Dr Farren said. One can support institutions without being in government. I support the institution at Westminster, but I am not in the Government. One does not have to be in government to support the institutions; therefore inclusive government is not a requirement. It is the politicians whom people most trust who form a government, and they are required to meet a certain standard — the rest are in opposition. That is the best way of keeping government on its toes. It allows continual scrutiny of what government is doing and continuing examination and questioning of what Ministers are up to. That is the stuff of democracy, and it is a most certain way of ensuring that there is no abuse in the system. 11.45 am Mr Chairman, you look as if you are dying to say something. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I am. The Committee has received an encyclical from Hansard. Once again, somebody in this room has kept their mobile phone on, and it is causing problems with the recording system. We recently lost a complete section of the Hansard report because somebody had left their phone on. Please turn them off completely; they cannot even be left on silent mode to receive messages. We just cannot afford to lose this important material. I am sorry, Mr Robinson, for interrupting you. Mr P Robinson: I am not guilty on that score; I turn my phone off. I would not like anybody to miss my comments in the Hansard report, so I hope that whoever has left their phone on will turn it off now rather than wait until I have finished. Collective responsibility is also one of the imperatives of government. It is nonsense for one Government Minister to oppose what another Government Minister has brought before the Assembly. That is absurd, and it would not happen under a voluntary coalition. A Minister who moved away from the collective decision of the Executive would be fired. We must also look beyond the immediate. The best that can be said of the arguments that have been presented against a voluntary coalition is that some special, peculiar and immediate need must be addressed because we are a divided society, full of instability and distrust. The argument is that that necessitates an inclusive and mandatory form of government. If that is accepted, the next question is bound to be: will that be the position for ever? A voluntary coalition, however, allows a cross-community system, and it allows us to grow into the norms of democracy and to establish a normal democratic society in Northern Ireland. On the other hand, if we become entrenched in a mandatory system, moving to the next stage means stopping, wrecking what we have, and creating something else. The Chairman (Mr Wells): I will ask Gregory Campbell to speak, followed by Alan McFarland. Rather than simply go round and round, I will then see whether the Committee can reach consensus. Mr Campbell: I will be brief, Chairman. The concept of voluntary coalition, like many concepts in Northern Ireland, suffers as a result of being viewed in completely different ways by those who are either in favour of it — as the DUP is — or those who totally oppose it. The purpose of a voluntary coalition is to ensure that there is not an implacable veto on establishing a government. The DUP believes that the formation of a government should not be prevented because one party is inextricably linked to criminality, gangsterism, terror, the importation of guns, and punishment beatings. Government should not be held up because of that, irrespective of the size of the mandate of those who advocate that type of activity, and, in some cases, take part in it. That is how the DUP views voluntary coalition. Others claim that a voluntary coalition will circumvent the need for support across the community — which is why we had a discussion about the voting system and community designation. Peter outlined the issues regarding mandatory coalition. We must grasp the nettle and establish a system that allows government to function. Just as others have talked of their background and their history of resentment about how institutions were governed in the past, some of us remember how systems were run in the more recent past. We want to arrive at some form of voluntary coalition — some system of government — that is not held, almost literally, to ransom by one party that will not budge and that says that there will be no Government without its endorsement. We need a device to ensure that if the operation and interaction of one party is unacceptable, the system of government can nevertheless get up and running and will not grind to a complete halt due to the position that that party adopts. Mr McFarland: In a normal society, Governments operate by voluntary coalition. If a party can form a government, it does so; if it cannot, it joins with others to form it. However, the Belfast Agreement is, rightly or wrongly, the template that we are discussing. The Prime Minister said so, so we are discussing how we can modify and improve it. The Belfast Agreement does not cite a voluntary coalition but a mandatory coalition. Earlier, the Committee heard from the SDLP, which made it quite clear — [Interruption.] The Chairman (Mr Wells): Do you wish to take a point of information? Mr McFarland: Yes. Mr P Robinson: For goodness’ sake, that is a crazy argument. Is Alan saying that we should not consider the Belfast Agreement because it does not mention a voluntary coalition? The Belfast Agreement does not and will not include any of the other changes that we want either. Is he saying that we should not look at making changes because they are not in the Belfast Agreement? Mr McFarland: No. As Peter said earlier, we are here to modify and improve the Belfast Agreement. Mr P Robinson: I do not think that I said that. Mr McFarland: The SDLP made it clear earlier in Committee that it is not prepared to enter into a voluntary coalition. It is an aspiration for us all for when society here allows everyone to be comfortable with discussing their politics and trying to form a Government with those of a like mind. The political reality is that we are not currently at that point. The SDLP has made it clear that it will not exclude Sinn Féin and go into government with the rest of us. That is the only voluntary coalition that is likely to happen, for the reasons that Gregory has just outlined. The DUP finds Sinn Féin not to be acceptable. The only other cross-community way in which the DUP could go into government is with the SDLP; and the SDLP said on the Hansard record at the beginning of the proceedings that it will not do that. However aspirational it may be at the moment, it is not achievable. We would like to see it happen down the line, but it will not happen immediately. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Of course, the eloquence of the DUP is such that it could persuade the SDLP. Mr McFarland: Absolutely. Mr McGlone: Or vice versa. Mr P Robinson: Or something else might persuade the SDLP. I have had private meetings with the SDLP in which it was nuanced, somewhat. It was not saying that there were no circumstances in which it would participate in a voluntary coalition. If, for instance, the IRA were to take off on a terrorist campaign akin to that in 1972, would the SDLP really hold out for Sinn Féin to be in government? Dr Farren: Let us deal with the realities that face us rather than get into hypothetical discussions. Mr P Robinson: That indicates that there are circumstances in which it would be possible. Dr Farren: Many things are possible if the premise upon which we are working is changed. However, we are not changing it; the premise is the premise. Mr P Robinson: Others could change the premise. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The proposal is that the Executive should be formed by voluntary coalition. Do we have consensus? Members indicated dissent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We do not have consensus; one if not two groups are opposed to it. The next issue — a very important one — is that of the election of Speaker and Deputy Speaker. Mr Campbell: Jim, that is twice that you have described that as important business. The Chairman (Mr Wells): This is a big issue. Ms Lewsley: A declaration of interest? [Laughter.] Mr P Robinson: As a first question, do we need Deputy Speakers? Ms Lewsley: And if so, how many? The Chairman (Mr Wells): They are absolutely essential. As members know, the election of Speaker and Deputy Speaker is an issue that requires a cross-community vote. That has not occurred in the Assembly, because both Speakers were — Mr P Robinson: Imposed. The Chairman (Mr Wells): They were arrived at by other means. We have had elections for the Deputy Speakers when three of them were elected in 2000. Several parties, including the DUP, flagged up that issue. It has not featured prominently in cross-examinations. Does any party feel that the issue (a) poses an impediment to devolution or (b) should be dealt with after devolution? Mr P Robinson: Some of us resent the fact that the Secretary of State appoints the Speaker and the Deputy Speakers. The Assembly should elect its Speaker and Deputy Speakers, whatever voting system is used. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Are members content that the Speaker and the Deputy Speakers be elected by a cross-community vote? Members indicated assent. The Chairman (Mr Wells): There seem to be no burning issues about this topic. Mr McFarland: May I raise an issue for further discussion? Who holds the Speaker to account? During the Assembly’s first mandate, questions were asked about the absolute power of the Speaker, with the Speaker having a budget and the Assembly having no input into what it thought the Speaker should be doing. Is there an issue about the Assembly’s ability to advise, influence or control the Speaker? The Chairman (Mr Wells): I clearly remember the day when a motion of no confidence was brought against the Speaker, and Jane Morrice had to take over the Chair. That mechanism exists, as do the Assembly Commission and the Business Committee, both of which the Speaker chairs. Should the Assembly have more control over the Speaker’s activities? Mr McFarland: Ministers must agree a Programme for Government, and so forth, with the Executive. Committees and other areas of the Assembly have oversight mechanisms. During the first mandate, there was no oversight mechanism, and the Speaker could not be challenged, other than by tabling a motion of no confidence, which is fairly high on the seriousness scale. Mr P Robinson: That is the mechanism, and it is also the mechanism that is used elsewhere. Under the Northern Ireland Act 1998, there are several circumstances under which a Speaker can be replaced, one of which is that the Assembly can elect a member to hold the position of Speaker. What decisions does the Speaker take beyond his or her judgement in the Chair during debates? The Speaker is subject to controls on every other issue: he or she is under audit controls; he or she is in the Chair at meetings of the Assembly Commission, but only members of the Commission can vote. Where are the dangers in the system? Mr McFarland: Peter sat on the Shadow Assembly Commission, and, at that time, members commented on the jaunts around the world and the amount of money that was being spent. It may well be that the auditors audited the books, but my understanding is that the Speaker had a budget, and he could decide when and where he went, and what he said about the Assembly. There was no mechanism in place to report back on what he had been doing and why he was doing it. It seemed to be outside the Assembly’s control. Mr P Robinson: Surely the Commission should have controlled that. Ms Lewsley: Or the Assembly. Mr McCarthy: The past Speaker, the present Speaker and the Deputy Speakers have been people of the highest integrity. There is no problem. They have conducted their business impeccably. Mr P Robinson: He really could not say anything else, could he? Mr McCarthy: Absolutely not. Ms Lewsley: Surely the Speaker is ultimately accountable to the Assembly? Any questions about inappropriate action could be raised in the Chamber. 12.00 noon Mr P Robinson: On spending matters, the Speaker is accountable to the Assembly Commission, which holds the voting power to take decisions. As regards adjudicating in the Assembly, the Speaker is ultimately subject to the will of the Assembly. The Chairman (Mr Wells): This does not seem to be a burning issue. Is the Committee content with the present arrangements in Standing Orders for the election of the Speaker and Deputy Speakers? Members indicated assent. Dr Farren: If we could just agree the nomination. Mr Campbell: That is a slightly different matter. [Laughter.] The Chairman (Mr Wells): The next issue is perhaps slightly more complex: the election of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, which several parties, including the DUP, have raised as an issue of concern. This matter brings us back to the earlier discussion about designations, voting systems and so on. Does any member wish to lead the discussion by outlining what they feel is unsatisfactory with the present arrangement? Mr P Robinson: If you want the get the row going, I will start. If there is a mandatory system, with the resultant requirement to ensure automaticity in everything, then why have an element that is subject to something other than a mandatory system? Ministers are automatically nominated by a process, but, from somewhere out of the blue, having recognised that there is a need for a mandatory form of Government, people say that the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister should be elected via a different process. There is a nonsense in that contradiction. If anyone has looked at the difficulty that we had in trying to agree a Speaker, or the difficulties that we had in trying to determine who should chair meetings of this very Committee, they will know the difficulties that there would be in reaching agreement on a First Minister and a Deputy First Minister. On that basis, why put measures into place that will cause, at least, an obstacle, if not gridlock, and why not continue with an automatic system such as the one for Ministers? That is the obvious way forward. Many mechanisms could be used to do that, but I have explained the principle behind our position. Mr McFarland: The essence of the agreement was that parties were pushed, so to speak, into sorting themselves out. The essence of the office of First Minister and Deputy First Minister, which is clear right the way through the legislation, is that it is a joint post, and that the Assembly votes for the pair. Members may not like the people concerned, but the posts are voted for as an entity because the office operates as an entity. It does not operate as two separate entities — there is no separate First Minister or Deputy First Minister. The office comprises both the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. If we are to completely move away from that situation and have a separate Prime Minister and a Deputy Prime Minister, then that is a different matter. However, in the comprehensive agreement, as I understood it, the DUP and Sinn Féin accepted that the office was joint — that is what it says in the agreement — but there was an attempt to have the election of that joint office done separately. Why was that? Why would we wish to do that? One interesting thing about electing the office jointly is that unionists, nationalists and republicans have a veto over who their First Minister or Deputy First Minister will be. If they are not happy with the person nominated, they can refuse to vote. The process continues until such times as a pair that is acceptable is voted into office. If we get to a stage where the DUP accepts Sinn Féin as partners for Government — the only scenario in which this becomes relevant — it could be that the DUP will find Martin McGuinness unacceptable. Under the current system, the DUP could ask Sinn Féin to reconsider its nomination if it were not happy to have Martin McGuinness as Deputy First Minister. It could ask Sinn Féin to put forward Conor Murphy, for example, if it felt it could vote for that option. Similarly, Sinn Féin could be neuralgic about Rev Ian Paisley as First Minister and could ask for someone else to be nominated. Therefore there is a degree of cross-community say in who is nominated. In the comprehensive agreement, it looks as though the DUP was unhappy about public perception if it had to vote for Martin McGuinness. They came up with a cunning system in which unionists could vote for unionists and nationalists for nationalists, so that they would not have to stand up in public with dirty hands, having voted for Martin McGuinness. How would that operate in a joint-office situation as the two people nominated to those posts must operate jointly? That seems to be a bit of a smokescreen in order to avoid voting for the opposition. There was another strange system suggested in which the Ministers all went out, and there was a wrap-up vote. The difficultly with the comprehensive agreement, which was negotiated by the DUP and Sinn Féin, was that if the SDLP and the Ulster Unionists did not support the candidates for First Minister and Deputy First Minister, they would be excluded from government for the entire life of that Assembly, leaving the DUP and Sinn Féin in government together. As I understand it, it is the DUP’s worst nightmare to be left in government with Sinn Féin and with no other cover. Therefore the system negotiated in the comprehensive agreement, and which was within a hair’s breadth of implementation in December 2004, seems slightly daft, and negotiated for all the wrong reasons. Mrs Long: We are not exercised about the decoupling of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister — having them coupled did not show that they had a good working relationship. However, we do believe, having lost the argument this morning on voluntary coalition, that we should now examine how to increase coherence and collectivity in the mandatory coalition. We want to move from a situation in which there is power dividing among parties in the Executive to one in which there is power sharing. At the bare minimum, that requires all members of the Executive to be willing to support the collective responsibility of the Executive and to recognise all other participants as equal members. At the sharp end, that requires parties to recognise those who are sharing power with them in that Executive and, indeed, in the Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. It should be part of a collective vote in the Assembly to approve the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. We would prefer to see that vote coupled, because it would enhance collectivity. We realise that a vote will not make people work together, but it would indicate a willingness to take the first steps towards working together. If people are not willing, at a bare minimum, to endorse other peoples’ positions in the Government, yet will go into government with those same people, there is something inherently unstable about that. Our argument is that there should, therefore, be a collective vote on electing the First Minister and Deputy First Minister. The office should remain coupled in the way that it is at present. Mr McNarry: The discussion so far says to me that we need to redefine the role of the Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM). My experience in the First Minister’s Office told me that “jointery” between the Ulster Unionists and the SDLP simply did not work. I cannot recollect that I could compile a list of great successes. With regard to redefinition, it was inappropriate that, apart from other duties of little consequence, the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister had — and the Civil Service and the back-up team wanted to prove “jointery” more than anyone else — responsibility for community relations. Consultation documents came out of that office as if paper had just been invented and was something novel to play with. In effect, nothing of any substance or benefit to the community came out of it. The First Minister and the Deputy First Minister spent their time fire-fighting community disputes. I thought that it was menial that the two titular representatives of the Government of Northern Ireland — and I am not belittling community relations as a departmental issue; it is very important — had that responsibility but could not make a decision between them. The First Minister — and what is the point in calling him that if that is not what he is? — could say or do nothing without the approval of the deputy. In one instance, the First Minister could not visit a Protestant area, because the Deputy First Minister would not go with him. The First Minister was told that he could not and must not go — it was not “jointery”. One would have thought that the relationship between the two parties at that time and the personnel involved would have been pretty amenable to sorting things out. Given who we might have as First Minister and Deputy First Minister, I see a crazy situation arising; obstinacy would kick in, and that would be that. There is an interpretation of the working of this office in which “jointery” is key. If asked, the last First Minister would not agree that he operated a joint office, and that is the problem: the First Minister is the First Minister, and the deputy is deputy. The First Minister should always have a deputy, but it might be better if he or she chose the person rather than have the crazy “jointery” with which the office is bedevilled. Unless we agree and recognise that, we are going nowhere. We need to redefine the workings of that office. Mr Campbell: My contribution is a variation on what David said. It is clear that, under the old system, the Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister was not just about the establishment of a Department. It was also about the perception of the “representatives” of the two communities and of the two largest parties acting in unison, and that gave out a particular message, whether said or unsaid. It was said many times, and left unsaid some times, but that was how it was perceived. Its practicalities under the old system were as David McNarry said. My party knows less about it than David does, but if that was the case under the old system, will anybody claim that under any new system such a projection would be anything other than a pretence? Any system that we agree must acknowledge and allow for the difficulties of the past; it must be sufficiently fluid and flexible to permit Government to continue and to permit the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister to be elected. It must not perpetuate the urban myth that this is a joint office with the two Ministers acting only after prior consultation and agreement with each other with neither able to do anything without the consent of the other. Either we accept that that did not work or we do not, and most people accept that it did not. 12.15 pm The Chairman (Mr Wells): Mr McNarry has provoked much interest. Mrs Long, Dr Farren, Alan McFarland, Peter Robinson and Mr Murphy wish to speak. As there is quite a lot of debate forthcoming, members will please try to keep it as snappy as possible. Mrs Long: The issues concerning the functions of the Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister need to be resolved later. This debate is specifically about how that office is elected. The Alliance Party has some firm proposals as to how the office should be shaped. We oppose Members simply being put into those positions — particularly such responsible positions within the Executive — on the basis of simple mandatory coalition rules, where Members are placed in positions and that is the end of the line. There should be a joint election for the posts of First Minister and Deputy First Minister, in the context of the Executive also being subject to an Assembly vote to endorse it. It is important that that should take place. The DUP has said that it would not be in favour of a joint election of First Minister and Deputy First Minister. The position between that and simply adopting a mandatory template is to choose a First Minister and a Deputy First Minister, fill the remaining Executive posts and endorse them on the Floor of the Assembly. Is the DUP suggesting that position, or does it propose that those posts should simply be filled on a mandatory basis with no endorsement from the Assembly? The Chairman (Mr Wells): The DUP can either interject with a point of information or wait until its next turn. Mr P Robinson: I have other things to say, so I will take Mrs Long’s views on board as well. Dr Farren: Experience has much to teach us in this matter as in others. I am not sure that all the bedevilment of the Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister that has been mentioned can be attributed to the joint nature of the office. Indeed, it is a challenge to the principle on which the joint nature of the office is based. I also recognise that we can point to anomalies, as Peter has done, in respect of the operation of the election of Ministers under the mandatory principle. Let us look at what we expect of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister and why we would have two such Ministers on a coequal basis. In a sense, it comes back to the underlying objective of what we are trying to achieve: reconciliation; respect; and co-operation between our communities. The Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister is not, therefore, a functional set of responsibilities for each office-holder, whereby business of the Executive is managed. However, there is a clear representative function on behalf of the Assembly as a whole and, indeed, on behalf of the entire enterprise — the people of Northern Ireland. Therefore, for the Assembly to jointly elect both posts goes some way to endorsing that particular representative responsibility, in that representatives of each community have confidence in the Minister from the opposite community who holds one or other of the two offices. There is no doubt that, if two people and two parties are involved, more than two parties will be involved in any decision-making process. Before we get too tied up with the problems that arose in the past and directly attribute them to the joint nature of the office, we should recognise that reaching a decision in this case will necessarily be a little more complex and lengthy than if there were only one person and one party. The most efficient form of Government might well be one that is run by a dictator, who simply tells the rest of us what to do. However, when parties and their representatives are involved in the decision-making process, we must accept that there will be some inherent complexities and, if nothing else, delays in the way in which decisions are reached. That is part and parcel of that type of process. Indeed, in this society, it is probably an essential part of building consensus and ensuring that reconciliation will flow from that consensus. Therefore, before we rush to address the practical difficulties, let us not lose sight of the underlying principles that have informed some of the procedures adopted in the Good Friday Agreement. I have some fairly close experience of the way in which things operated. Decisions were reached, meetings were held under joint chairmanship, and the process of government was conducted in such a way that gave at least the prospect of matters improving. However difficult, complex, tedious and lengthy some of those procedures and processes, we must weigh them against our ultimate goal. The Chairman (Mr Wells): Gentlemen, ladies, it is 12.21 pm, and the food is about to arrive. I am looking for your guidance. Mr Campbell: The food wins the vote, Chairman. Dr Farren: On this one. The Chairman (Mr Wells): The next members to speak will be Alan McFarland, followed by Peter Robinson. Are members happy to break for lunch now, or would they rather conclude the meeting first? Dr Farren: How long will it take to finish the meeting? The Chairman (Mr Wells): At the rate we are going, we will be having food in about two hours’ time. Dr Farren: Let us have the food. It will be sustenance for the battle that lies ahead. The Chairman (Mr Wells): We will take a 15-minute break. The Committee was suspended at 12.23 pm. On resuming — 12.47 pm The Chairman (Mr Wells): The Clerks arranged a very pleasant lunch. If that trend continues, it will be very welcome. We broke after Dr Farren’s contribution; Mr McFarland is next, followed by Mr Robinson and Mr Murphy. After that we want to move quickly on to the next topic. Mr McFarland: The joint nature of the Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM) was a core safeguard in the agreement. David McNarry has highlighted various problems. There were major problems with the personalities involved in the first Assembly. That does not mean that the actual joint nature was wrong; rather, it did not work particularly well because those involved were, shall we say, not comfortable with each other. Many issues were assigned to that office that perhaps should not have been. There are issues that are outside the office, but that might reasonably be put in. There is a whole discussion to be had about what OFMDFM as a Department should contain. There is also an issue about the oversight of that Department, but it is hard to see how we can move away from the essential safeguard of the joint nature of the office. It is not ideal — in many ways it is far from ideal — but it was put there because the communities did not trust each other to operate independently. It is difficult to see how one could interfere with the joint nature of the office, which is in the legislation, without having a complete renegotiation of the entire agreement. I do not think anyone is suggesting that; it would take years. The chances of us getting agreement on anything similar ever again are nil, I should think. |