Committee on the Wednesday 28 June 2006 Members in attendance for all or part of proceedings: The Committee met at 10.08 am. (The Chairman (Mr Molloy) in the Chair.) The Chairman (Mr Molloy): We will begin our meeting. I remind Committee members to switch off their mobile phones. They interfere with Hansard and make it difficult to pick up what is being said, even when they are in silent mode. Lunch will be here at 12.30 pm, and we will have a short break at that stage. It will be a working lunch, and we will continue right through. Are there any apologies or changes? Mr M McGuinness: Conor Murphy will not be here, and John O’Dowd will be here later. Mr Kennedy: Mr McNarry will replace Mr McGimpsey. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Is anyone coming in from the DUP? Mr Paisley Jnr: There are no apologies from them. Mr Kennedy: They never apologise. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Margaret Ritchie is in for Alasdair McDonnell. Ms Ritchie: John Dallat is in for Mark Durkan. Mr Ford: Apologies from Naomi Long, who is unwell; Kieran McCarthy will join us later. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): We move on to the Ulster Unionist Party Assembly Group (UUPAG) presentation. Mr Kennedy: Chairman, there is a prior issue. Members will be aware that on the BBC’s ‘Newsline 6.30’ last night, the political correspondent Mark Devenport was able to refer to, and produce a copy of, the Hansard report of one of these meetings. I do not think that it would be productive to launch an inquiry into how, and from whom, he received it. However, it is unsatisfactory to the members of this Committee and, indeed, to Members of the Assembly who are not present at these meetings but who are undoubtedly interested in them. Given that the press have been made aware of the reports, we should consider circulating the full text of the Hansard reports to each Member of the Assembly. Clearly the press are in a more advantageous position to assess these matters than the Members of the Assembly. Mr Paisley Jnr: I agree. Mr M McGuinness: I agree with Danny. Sinn Féin was anxious from the beginning that this Committee would try to create circumstances that would see parties engage with one another in a meaningful way around the business of preparing for Government. The vast majority of our people, represented by all the parties here, would like to see that. The fact is that someone went out of this room and gave away a copy of the Hansard report, against the express wishes of the Committee. We all received a note that said: “Please note that the Committee has agreed that the attached Report should not be made available to anyone outside of the Committee”. It begs the question as to whether anybody in this room is prepared to admit that they were responsible for breaking that agreement and giving the report to the media. People are entitled to as much information as possible. I would prefer that we were in a situation where we were able to give as much information as possible about the agreements that are shaping up among us to show that real progress is being made in the important work of preparing for Government. However, if we find ourselves in the situation where these reports will be distributed, then it will undoubtedly work against the prospect of any real engagement taking place in the future. That leaves us in serious difficulty. We must be clear exactly what the ground rules are and whether or not everybody is prepared to sign up to those ground rules. Was the Democratic Unionist Party responsible for giving the Hansard report to the BBC’s political correspondent, Mark Devenport? Mr Paisley Jnr: As Danny has raised the issue, I agree that the Hansard reports should be made available, as should the minutes. There should be nothing to hide in these sessions. The DUP’s consistent position has been that these meetings should be in public. The press should be involved and the public should be allowed in. We have no difficulty with that. However, I am not here to answer questions. I note that Martin McGuinness has run away for three days from answering questions. Now that he is back, he thinks that he is here to ask questions, but the DUP is not here to be interrogated by anyone — and will not be. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): If the Committee decides that Hansard should be made available to the public, should it be the uncorrected version or the corrected version? Members have the right to correct Hansard within 24 hours. It is important that if matters go public, it should be the corrected version. 10.15 am Mr McFarland: It has to be the corrected version; we cannot have an uncorrected version out there. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): What is the view of the Committee as regards making Hansard available to all the MLAs? Is there consensus on that? Agreed? So the corrected version of Hansard will be available to all MLAs. Mr McFarland: Chairman, you were giving us a few days to get all of the Hansard reports because of the weekend business. Perhaps we could decide when they can be released as a block, giving people enough time to read them. The round of questioning should be finished today and, hopefully, that will produce some idea of the way ahead. It would seem to make some sense, notwithstanding the fact that some reports are out there already, to give members 24 hours after issue to confirm corrections. The workings of the Committee so far could then be officially released. The Committee Clerk: Can I just clarify; we will not release any of the Hansard reports from last week yet? Mr McFarland: My understanding was that they have not yet been corrected, and they cannot be corrected because different members received them at different times. We had a discussion yesterday afternoon about this. Some members who might have got them last Friday did not because their post was stuck in their pigeonholes here. We should make absolutely certain that everyone has had the opportunity and the time to make corrections. It would make sense for there to be a control over how we do this, notwithstanding the fact that somebody has dished some of them out already. After the Committee’s business today we would have a package that comes together so that people can actually follow the logic in Hansard. They could sit down this weekend — for those political anoraks among us — and work their way right through the deliberations of the Committee, providing that by Friday we agree that they should be issued, and that people have had an opportunity to correct them. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Hansard would have to be involved as regards the corrections and Committee members having the right to correct. Members have been advised that they can have 24 hours from receipt of the report to make corrections. Mr Paisley Jnr: Does that include the release of minutes as well? The Committee Clerk: Once the minutes are agreed, they are published on the website. Mr M McGuinness: I think that the Preparation for Government Committee will draw its own conclusions from the answer given by Ian Paisley Jnr to my question as to who was responsible for giving the copy of Hansard to the BBC and effectively breaking the agreement that was made at this Committee. Also, it is important to register that none of the political parties in here, bar the DUP, has run away from any questioning whatsoever. All of the political parties have provided very senior leadership figures in the form of leaders and others who are at highest level of the political parties: the Ulster Unionist Party, the Alliance Party, the SDLP and ourselves. None of the leaders at the highest level of the Democratic Unionist Party has appeared at this Committee to subject themselves to the type of questions to which other parties have been subjected. It is important that that be noted. Mr Paisley Jnr: Further to an issue that I raised on Monday: as recorded on pages 1 and 2 of the Official Report, I said that there was a serious unwarranted slander issued against me by Martin McGuinness, that that slander was malicious, that there was no evidence for that slander, and that it should be withdrawn. I understand that there will be some consideration given to that, and I want to know if that slander will now be withdrawn. Mr M McGuinness: I deny absolutely that there were any malicious remarks made by me in the course of any of the meetings. All of my contributions have been, I think, constructive and very honest. Any suggestion that my remarks were malicious is absolute nonsense. Mr Paisley Jnr: If a thing is not malicious, then there must be evidence to back it up. Once again, I cite what was said; that in the last two weeks there had been a concerted and deliberate effort made by certain people, including me, to kill Martin McGuinness. That is what was actually said. If it is not malicious, there must therefore be evidence. I would like that evidence produced. In the past two weeks, how did I try to kill Martin McGuinness? Mr M McGuinness: In a number of recent interviews I have made my position on the Democratic Unionist Party absolutely clear. Vile, despicable and dishonest lies were levelled against me by a number of people. Some of those people are associated with the old RUC; some may be current members of the PSNI, members of the Democratic Unionist Party and other British intelligence operatives. They claim not to be — but in my opinion probably are — working for elements in the British intelligence service hostile not only to Sinn Féin’s participation in this process, but to the entire peace process. I will not be subjected to interrogation by Ian Paisley Jnr. The allegation that my comments were malicious is absolute nonsense, and I refute it. Mr Paisley Jnr: I reiterate the point that if a comment is not malicious, there is therefore evidence to back it up. If you make an allegation, there is therefore evidence. What I am asking for — and there has been a failure to produce it so far — is evidence. In the past two weeks, how did I make a concerted effort to have a person killed? That is what was said. Where is the evidence to show that I made a concerted effort to have someone killed? If there is no evidence for that, just the allegation, then the allegation is malicious of its own nature. If Martin “Malicious” McGuinness cannot produce the evidence, then it is a malicious comment and he should withdraw it. Otherwise, he should go outside and repeat it. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): There has been much toing and froing during this discussion, and, obviously, there has been no change in positions. We will now proceed to the Ulster Unionist Party’s presentation. Mr Paisley Jnr: I simply want it confirmed that no evidence has been produced for what has been said. Mr M McGuinness: I do not have anything further to add. The quicker we get on with the attempt to conduct real business, the better. Mr Paisley Jnr: I simply want it noted that no evidence has been produced. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Hansard is taking a note of all the meetings. Mr McFarland: The past weeks have been the first time that all the main Northern Ireland parties have sat around a table to discuss issues that affect the future of the people whom we represent. During 1997-98, the Ulster Unionist Party went through the talks process without meeting with Sinn Féin. Looking at what has happened in the intervening period, that may seem silly, but it was what was most comfortable at the time and thus the way that it was done. In the most recent talks process, between 2004 and the setting up of this Committee, parties have had meetings with respective Governments and relied on them to transmit views and demands to others. As we discovered in the past, this is a dangerous system, because what a party tells the Government is not necessarily what is being passed on, and confusions, deliberate or otherwise, can arise. My colleagues and I have been heartened by the genuine, although not necessarily warm, engagement over the past few meetings. Speaking to each other across a table allows all of us to identify and clarify issues important to others and to make judgement on their bona fides through attitude and body language. Aside from scoping the issues, this engagement will slowly build confidence and trust. Perhaps we need to examine whether there are ways in which some of the easier issues can be dealt with. It would surely increase confidence throughout the community if the parties around this table could produce solutions, as well as identifying problems. There is no doubt that whatever the failures in implementing the Belfast Agreement, Northern Ireland is a better, safer and more prosperous society than it would have been had the hard decisions not been taken. The Prime Minister has reiterated on many occasions that the agreement is the only game in town, and it is clear that the November 2004 comprehensive agreement is the Belfast Agreement with modifications to hide the DUP’s embarrassing U-turn. It has adopted Ulster Unionist policy, and thus unionism is broadly united on the way forward. Similarly, if Sinn Féin manages to clear the outstanding issues outlined in the past few days, it will be a de facto constitutional nationalist party, uniting nationalism on a common policy. Perhaps the future is brighter than we thought. The UUP believes that four main areas need to be sorted out. Our submission begins with the first — the major issues of policing and criminality. As background to that, I will recap briefly on where the last agreement between parties left us. That was the agreement in 2004 between Sinn Féin, the Governments and the Democratic Unionist Party. As you are well aware, the SDLP, the Alliance Party and the Ulster Unionist Party were not directly involved in that and have issues with it. I want to reiterate what was said at the time: Sinn Féin’s statement on policing, in Annex F of the comprehensive agreement, is interesting: “As a result of our discussions we now have a commitment from the British Government and the DUP to the transfer of powers on policing and justice to the Assembly as soon as possible, a DUP commitment to a speedy time framed discussion on the departmental model and the powers to be transferred with a view to agreement by the time the Executive is established”. That is quite encouraging. At that stage, there was some agreement between the Governments, Sinn Féin and the DUP on how policing should be taken forward. However, a stumbling block remains — one that the UUP and the Democratic Unionist Party have already covered — and that is Sinn Féin’s inability to deal with policing. A party that is not committed to the rule of law cannot be in government. The UUP sees policing as a major issue, and tied in with that is the issue of criminality. The Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) reported that there was ongoing criminality among senior republicans. The other day, I noticed an Organised Crime Task Force (OCTF) report indicating that the level of that criminality has dropped somewhat. That could be connected with the Assets Recovery Agency (ARA) and the raid by police on both sides of the border on Mr Murphy’s farm in south Armagh. As far as we can gather, vibes from the IMC suggest that its next report may indicate a reduction in the level of organised crime. Clearly, that is to be welcomed. It must surely reach a stage where the level of organised crime is commensurate with that elsewhere in the United Kingdom and where those involved in organised crime are not connected with the republican movement, although they may be republicans. Under those circumstances, perhaps the police can be left to deal with those who cannot bring themselves in. However, currently that seems not to be the case, and Sinn Féin must examine seriously how it deals with the residual criminality that the IMC reports, and its refusal, so far, to engage in policing. The UUP considers those to be two major issues. The Democratic Unionist Party has made decommissioning a major issue. Decommissioning clearly took place, and the record of Hansard will show that both William McCrea and Ian Paisley Jnr accepted that. The IMC reports that there are some outstanding weapons issues and believes that there may be some weapons out there. It is a judgement call as to whether those weapons have been held back by those who refuse to comply with orders from the IRA; whether they are individual trophy weapons; whether there are lost hides; or whether the republican movement has a serious problem and has lied to everyone about its decommissioning being complete. We will wait to see how the IMC reports on that next time, because at the moment there is a conflict on decommissioning between the Independent International Commission on Decommissioning (IICD) and the IMC. 10.30 am The next major issue is unionist confidence. It can be of little surprise that unionist confidence has taken a battering since the agreement. We need to show that the parties here can agree and produce something forward-looking: but that can only come when republicans sort themselves out. Likewise, we cannot leave loyalist paramilitaries twisting in the wind — out there, uncontrolled, still causing chaos — if we get to a stage in the autumn where there is some form of agreement. As you know, we have been working to provide those who wish to come in from the cold with a way in. Those who do not wish to come in from the cold will have to be left to the police, the courts and the Prison Service, and they can be locked up. There is an unfinished issue on parades. It is well known — because Gerry Adams described it all in a speech in Tullamore in 1994 at which an RTÉ journalist was present — that it had taken the republican movement three years to stir up the parading issue and produce community groups to object to those things. It was a useful war by other means: the movement was supposedly on ceasefire and then in talks, but it was a way of conducting the war by other means and of attacking unionism and unionist culture. It seems to me that it evolved then into a useful tool for beating up the police, because it became a method by which, if you objected to a parade, you caused a bit of a row, the police turned up and you had a ding-dong battle between the police and republicans. Parading got caught up in all of those things. It is clear that there has been some sort of political decision recently that they will back off parading for a bit. I welcome the efforts that have gone into keeping the parades peaceful and keeping republicans back from being offended at a level at which they attack people. I was quite encouraged until last night: I see that we are back into the same old game at Glengormley, where people are clodding stones and golf balls at a parade. That has got to be dealt with. Republicans must allow unionists to enjoy their culture and to have a peaceful parade without being under attack. That must be dealt with before we can have any peaceful way forward here. As political parties, we should have some thoughts on how to deal with the past. It is an enormous issue, and it cannot be dealt with quickly. The police’s Historical Enquiries Team is attempting to provide some closure. It was set up to examine historic cases to see whether families could be given more information as to what happened, and whether it is possible, in the light of new technologies, to bring someone to book for crimes committed over the past 30 years. Hopefully, for some families, it will bring a degree of closure. It is an enormous issue, but the political parties, by and large, have stayed away from it, and it is time that there was more engagement from the political parties on how we deal with the past. Of course, there are issues for republicans. The question of the disappeared remains unresolved. There are still people whose sons and fathers are lying buried in a bog somewhere. It would be clearly advantageous to sort out the issue of the disappeared, and to get those families their loved ones back and some degree of closure. The other enormous outstanding issue is that of exiles. Republicans and loyalists have been exiling people from their communities. Although these are not necessarily things that we can tackle directly, they are all issues that will haunt any future Government here while they are unresolved. The disappeared and exiles must be included in the mix. I want to turn to some issues in the comprehensive agreement that we are uncomfortable with. This is the deal that was nearly done between Sinn Féin and the DUP in November 2004. In particular, I want to look at the issue of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister. The comprehensive agreement said that the two roles should form a collective post. If, as was suggested recently in the Assembly, Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness were appointed to those posts, they should have been voted for jointly, as was the procedure for the SDLP and UUP candidates for those posts in the first Assembly. That was clearly a difficulty or embarrassment for the Democratic Unionist Party. Its negotiators appear to have negotiated an issue that concerns the parties that represent each of the tribes. The lead unionist party would propose the First Minister and the lead nationalist party would propose the Deputy First Minister. Interestingly, the original system allowed each community to have a say in whom the other community elected. For example, if unionism in the Assembly was neuralgic about Martin McGuinness’s being Deputy First Minister, the system allowed unionism to say that it was not happy with him. Therefore unionism in the Assembly, rightly or wrongly, had a veto. Likewise, nationalists might have been uncomfortable with Ian Paisley, and, because the office was a joint one, they could have said no. The cunning piece of negotiation that is the comprehensive agreement, however, will remove any unionist say in whom Sinn Féin appoints and any nationalist/republican say in whom unionism appoints. The joint ticket that everyone bought into in the first Assembly will have been removed. I would not mind if there had been logic to its removal, but it has been removed to avoid DUP embarrassment at having to put its hand up for Martin McGuinness. The system has been further confused by another cunning bit of negotiation to the effect that, having voted for the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister, d’Hondt would be triggered and each Minister would have to vote for all the other Ministers. Therefore if the SDLP or the Ulster Unionists were to object to the First Minister or the Deputy First Minister or to any of the Ministers who had been elected, we could not register our objection. If we did, we would be removed from government for the entire Assembly session. That is, all the Ministers of an objecting party would be removed from the Executive. That cunning piece of negotiation would create what I understand to be a nightmare for the DUP: the DUP and Sinn Féin in government together; and the SDLP and the Ulster Unionist Party being excluded from government. That must be the most amazing piece of negotiation that was ever seen. We take strong objection to those proposals in the comprehensive agreement. Turning to the review, several issues came up in it as a result of parties examining procedures in the first Assembly to see whether they could be improved. It is perfectly logical to examine what happened in the first Assembly in order to make improvements to it. For example, all the parties are agreed that we need some form of ministerial code. Indeed, the Executive were on the verge of producing one during the first Assembly, but it had not reached the Floor of the House before the Assembly was suspended. Such a code would be a good thing, and the Committee might like to consider it. It would be easy to get agreement around this table on the need for, and the details of, a ministerial code. It could be a victory for the Committee if the parties agreed something. In any case, a ministerial code that provides protection needs to be produced. Next, where power is vested may be an anorak issue. However, Northern Ireland is strange in that, when the state was set up in 1921, power was vested from Westminster in the Departments. Throughout the history of the Northern Ireland Parliament, and since, power has never been vested in Ministers. In a way, there is something unhealthy about power not being vested in the Assembly and given to Ministers from the Assembly. That means that we can be stood up, stood down, removed, sacked or whatever, and that has no effect at all on where the power lies. The power lies with each of the Departments and the permanent secretaries. The issue is not a deal breaker, but it concerns what is sensible for Northern Ireland if it is to have a working Assembly. Power should be vested in that Assembly and vested from the Assembly to the Ministers. There are also issues concerning the North/South bodies. We probably would not have any objection to increased reporting back from Ministers and their having much greater interaction with the Assembly on what is happening North/South. Although Ministers did report back to the Assembly, it was not something that the Assembly could do anything about. Therefore, we should examine what to do about making the North/South areas more accountable. We had a great reversal on the British-Irish Council because it did not even have a secretariat, and while the North/South aspect is certainly up and running properly, I am afraid that the east-west issue has been left behind; we must get it up to speed. The reform of public administration also raises issues. This may be a matter for another day, but it affects whether we have seven councils, with or without an Assembly. On a broader scale, those issues go to how Northern Ireland is governed, and they are perhaps worth some form of discussion. Members will know that we have tried to secure some sort of debate on the Floor of the House about the future of the Review of Public Administration (RPA) because it directly relates to how the Assembly would govern Northern Ireland if we ever reached agreement. We have never discussed the issue of the number of Departments. If we are to create a Department — or two — to deal with policing and justice, there would have to be some amalgamation, as the Northern Ireland Act 1998 states that we are allowed 10 Departments. That issue would be better dealt with before we get to another election or set up another Government, if possible, so that we can fire up the Assembly on the basis on which we wish to proceed. Seán Farren talked about areas that were essential and areas that were desirable, and I can understand that, but I would argue that it is worth spending some time getting the new Assembly right before we fire it up again, rather than firing it up, and then getting into an inter-party wrangle as to what details should change. There is a logic to sorting all of this out first. If we ever get a Government up again here, there is a difficulty about dual and, indeed, triple mandates. Triple mandates have been sorted out in that, under the RPA, one cannot be a councillor and a MLA. However, the idea that one can be in Westminster, the Assembly, and in a council, all at the same time, seems absolutely daft and is inherently unhealthy. In Scotland, the media applied pressure to separate MSPs from MPs, and we need to examine that issue here. I wish to make a couple of final points, Mr Chairman. We have a difficulty in the comprehensive agreement’s setting up of another civic forum on an all-Ireland basis, given that the one that we had here did not perform very well. In fact, its use was extremely limited, and the view of people who sat on it was that it was extremely limited. The issue outstanding from the review about a Bill of Rights needs examination because, at the moment, we have a large number of groups across Northern Ireland who are fired up to believe that they are going to get socio-economic rights included in such a document. That includes the right to particular medical treatment, even should it cost £10,000 a day. People believe that. 10.45 am The agreement was quite clear about the bill of rights: it should contain rights that are specific to Northern Ireland. So what is it that is specific to Northern Ireland? Leaving out socio-economic rights — where the money goes is a matter for the politicians; it is not a matter of human rights — the only right that the UUPAG can think of is the right to parade. That is the only one unique to Northern Ireland. There may be disagreement about whether parading is a right, and we can discuss that, but it is the only one that jumps out as being peculiar to Northern Ireland. Finally, there is the issue of the Programme for Government. There was a drama the first time around. When the Assembly went live in November 1999, we had no Programme for Government. The result was that there was a fair amount of chaos, with individual Ministers taking decisions; there was no collective responsibility because there was no Programme for Government. If we have any hope of getting this up and running in the autumn, we need to start considering shortly, not the detail — that will come from the Departments — but areas that we believe, as parties or as a Committee, should be included in a Programme for Government. As you well know, the time line starts in the summer: by September the detail should be reasonably well firmed up in outline; by November it should be on paper; and then it will go through a process to go live in April. If we sit back and do nothing between now and the autumn, we will find ourselves, as we did in November 1999, with a Programme for Government that has no input from any of the political parties. Therefore it seems to make sense to give some thought to what should go into a Programme for Government. Mr Paisley Jnr: Alan, thank you for your submission and for the interesting revisionism that you have introduced into the discussion, the scoping exercise. I will come to that in a moment. Pardon me for having the cold. I hope you do not regard that as a concerted effort to poison you or kill you. Mr McFarland: Say again. Mr Paisley Jnr: I apologise for having the cold. I hope that you do not regard it as a concerted effort to have you killed or to poison you with something. Nonetheless, I apologise for that. Alan, can you make it clear whether you think that we are here to discuss issues, to negotiate issues or to scope obstacles? Mr McFarland: The remit of the Committee is not to scope obstacles; it is to scope the issues that will be required to be put in place to allow us to get the Government up and running again. If you are dealing with five political parties and you have a Committee, there is a logic in having worked out what each party thinks are the issues, and in having a form of discussion to see whether you can find some sort of agreement. That is not necessarily negotiating — at the high level that will be done, as you have declared, between the DUP and the Government. However, there is benefit in trying to find some common ground. Suppose, for example, that your negotiations with the Government are successful and that even though the other political parties may not agree, the Government decide to impose a firing-up of the Assembly again. You know well from the first Assembly that, in the end, we all have to work with one another, whether in the Executive or in Committees. So it would seem to make some sense that, if we can find some agreement on issues that are glaringly obvious as to how you deal with them, we should perhaps try to do that. The Minister, Mr Hanson, said that he has promised the DUP the comprehensive agreement in the autumn if they are good boys and girls. I presume that your difficulty will be that you do not want this Committee to steal your thunder on any of those issues. From a party political point of view, that is logical. In the end, we all hope to work together for the greater good of our constituents. The Committee should try to produce some positive wins, even if they are minor wins. Mr Paisley Jnr: I am touched by the fact that you are worried about my difficulties. However, let us get over that and assess this issue. You agree that we are here to find common ground in identifying the obstacles to the establishment of a Government. That appears to be a summary of what you have said. Mr McFarland: You use the word “obstacle”, but I think that that is not the Committee’s remit. However, I am prepared to stand corrected. Perhaps the Chairman would read out the Committee’s remit. Mr Paisley Jnr: I have the remit. I am trying to find out exactly, from what was contained in your submission, what you believe we are here to do. Mr McFarland: We are here to scope and identify the issues. Can we read the remit again, Mr Chairman, so we are absolutely clear? Mr Paisley Jnr: If it helps you, Alan, I am sure that we can read it again. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): The remit is: “to scope the work which, in the view of the parties, needs to be done in preparation for Government.” That is from the Secretary of State’s letter of 26 May 2006. Mr McFarland: The remit is to scope the work that needs to be done. It is not simply about issues. The remit is to identify what work needs to be done to get the Government fired up again. Mr Paisley Jnr: That would include obstacles. Mr McFarland: It would include obstacles. However, it is not the remit of the Committee to identify obstacles. Mr Paisley Jnr: I am trying to grasp completely what you believe we are here to do. The remit includes the identification of obstacles. Mr McFarland: Absolutely. Mr Paisley Jnr: It is not a trick question, Alan. Mr McFarland: No, no. However, that is not the remit. Mr Paisley Jnr: From our discussions so far in the Committee, do you believe that legitimate obstacles have been identified? Mr McFarland: Many obstacles have been identified. It would be helpful if the Committee could prioritise those obstacles. I may believe that a certain issue poses an obstacle that should be prioritised, but my belief may not be shared by the other parties. Let me give you an example. Since 1998, decommissioning has been a major issue, and it was the prime obstacle that first crashed the Assembly. We were promised that decommissioning would start in June 1998 and be completed by May 2000. There was a clear time line, but decommissioning did not happen. It was a major problem. We fought the bit out and brought down the Assembly in an attempt to effect decommissioning because we agreed that it was a major issue with regard to the good faith and genuineness of republicans. The bulk of the IRA’s arsenal has now been decommissioned; you and William have accepted that fact, and it has been recorded in Hansard. There are residual issues. Although complete decommissioning is still an issue, it does not have the same priority as it did in 1998. We share the view that the major obstacle to be prioritised is Sinn Féin’s unwillingness to engage in policing. During the past week and a half, there have been some encouraging signs. Sinn Féin has engaged in consultation on the policing issue. The Sinn Féin statement attached to the comprehensive agreement states that the ardchomhairle will call an Ard-Fheis to discuss policing, once the legislation is sorted out. Those are encouraging signs that the party recognises the need to move on the policing issue. However, policing continues to be a major obstacle, and we have not got there yet. Similarly, it is not clear where the IRA stands on the criminality issue. Perhaps we need more clarity from an IMC report. Those are the major obstacles, but the other parties may believe that there are many other obstacles. The Committee needs to prioritise the obstacles so that we can identify issues that we can influence and affect. The Committee can also identify issues that we clearly cannot affect, even though we may wish to do so. Mr Paisley Jnr: Just curb your enthusiasm on decommissioning for a wee minute. We will come to that, I promise, but let us see if we can walk before we run. Before we start prioritising things, let us get agreement. Do you agree and believe that the principal obstacles have been identified over the past week or so of this Committee meeting? Mr McFarland: Each party has identified the obstacles — if you wish to use the term — difficulties, or problems that it sees to the successful firing-up of government. Mr Paisley Jnr: Those obstacles, problems, difficulties — Mr McFarland: Right. The question, I suppose, is can we find common ground, because if all — Mr Paisley Jnr: I did not ask that question. I will come to that in a moment. I want to establish that you believe the principle that the obstacles — or the problems — have been identified. Mr McFarland: We hope so. The difficulty is that, in some later discussion, one that has not been spotted before could come to mind. However, if the parties have had their say, logically the key obstacles should have been identified in broad terms. We may not have identified whether those are the obstacles or whether they are just the areas in which the obstacles lie, because some of them are extremely broad issues. Whether you can say that the whole obstacle identified is the issue, or whether it is a minor part of that that can be solved, is not necessarily clear, because we have not had a discussion on whether we have common ground on those. Indeed, parties may not have been able to have a discussion on what each other — [Interruption.] The Chairman (Mr Molloy): That is somebody’s mobile phone. Mr Kennedy: That is a very attractive tune. Mr McFarland: We have not had a discussion on what we each mean by particular things. Although we have had questioning back and forward, there may be other areas that will come to mind later today. Mr Paisley Jnr: Do you agree that, in its discussions last week, Sinn Féin has made no serious effort to remove the obstacles that so far have been identified by the unionist community: criminality and paramilitarism, and their link to Sinn Féin? Mr McFarland: We were the prime movers in setting up the IMC, which was vigorously opposed by your party as a toothless, useless organisation. It is encouraging that in recent months you have set a lot of store by the IMC reports. The IMC is reporting, as is the Organised Crime Task Force, on what appear to be improvements in Sinn Féin and the IRA’s movements towards normality. Earlier in the year, the IMC reported that the republican leadership — and I do not have the quotation here — was fully committed to peaceful and democratic means and constitutional politics, but that there were outstanding issues concerning senior republicans’ involvement in criminality, and their crime empire was still functioning. The OCTF, which is specifically designed to deal with organised crime, reported last week that there had been a drop in republican criminality. These are things that we will have to judge. Our view is that things have not progressed far enough for us to be comfortable going into Government with Sinn Féin — not that it is our call. As I have said before in this Committee, it is your call whether you go into Government with Sinn Féin. My sense is that, if they are moving in that direction, we can, perhaps, expect to see dramatic improvements in the autumn. Conor Murphy sat here last week and said to William that dramatic improvements could be expected in the IMC reports. However, we do not know that; we will have to wait and see. If that is the way they are moving, there will — eventually — be a judgement call for you as to when the commitment of the republican leadership, its instructions, and the adherence to those instructions by people on the ground, move from being a political issue to a fully criminal issue, so that the people doing it are not republican criminals, but simply criminals who refuse to adhere to republican instructions. That is a call for you at some stage, presumably as a result of IMC reports. 11.00 am Mr Paisley Jnr: Let us not worry about what my judgement call will be; let us try to focus on the Ulster Unionist Party’s position and its submission. Am I correct in assuming that what you have just said means that you agree that Sinn Féin has made, and is making, a serious effort to remove criminality and paramilitarism, and their links, from its party? Mr McFarland: That is what the Independent Monitoring Commission has reported. As the organisation that encouraged it and had it set up — against objections from the DUP — there is a degree of requirement for us to accept what it is producing from intelligence reports from America, the UK and the Republic of Ireland. It is not unreasonable that we accept as correct its analysis of these intelligence reports. Mr Paisley Jnr: I am sure that we can ask the IMC, and we can go and talk to them. However, I am not asking them; I am asking Alan McFarland, senior negotiator on behalf of the Ulster Unionist Party: does the Ulster Unionist Party believe that Sinn Féin has made, and is making, serious efforts to remove criminality and paramilitary links from its political party? Mr McFarland: I have just told you that the IMC says that it is, and we accept that. Mr Paisley Jnr: I am not worried about what the IMC has said; I am asking what the Ulster Unionist Party thinks. Mr McFarland: I will repeat it. The IMC says that it is, and we accept that. The IMC says that it is, and we accept that. You can ask the question another 10 times, and you will get the same answer. Mr Paisley Jnr: So I am right to conclude that you believe that Sinn Féin is making a serious effort to remove — Mr McFarland: The IMC says that it is, and we accept that. Mr Paisley Jnr: Given the level of criminality, paramilitarism and other unacceptable actions by republicans and their links to Sinn Féin, do you agree that it would be impossible to form a Government, at present, that includes Sinn Féin and unionism? Mr McFarland: We have said that we do not believe that the time has yet arrived where we should be firing up a Government again with Sinn Féin, because there is no point in trying to produce a Government in which Sinn Féin is not tied to the rule of law and order through the police, and when the IMC is still reporting that its internal criminal organisation has been as active as it is. Notwithstanding that, as we go through the year and have further IMC reports, it may be possible — if republicans are serious and genuine — to get to a stage where most reasonable people might think that the criminality can be tackled by the police, customs and organised crime units. Mr Paisley Jnr: So if the Ulster Unionist Party were fortunate enough to find itself in the position electorally that we are in today, you would not be prepared to form an Executive with Sinn Féin immediately. Mr McFarland: I have said that at the moment too much is unclear about Sinn Féin’s intentions — particularly regarding policing — to allow us to do that. However, as I said before, this is your call. You are in the driving seat, so you call it. Mr Paisley Jnr: Would it be fair to deduce then that you agreed with the position that our party took four or five weeks ago when we said “Certainly not” to an Executive with Sinn Féin? Did you agree with that position? Mr McFarland: This is an ongoing process, and we have to make judgements as we go. You make judgement calls, and we have made judgement calls in the past 10 years — some of which were good, and some of which could have been better. You will have judgement calls to make, and the penalties for getting them wrong can be difficult. However, at this moment I can confirm for the tenth time that the Ulster Unionist Party does not believe that — were it in charge of unionism — it would be comfortable going into Government with Sinn Féin, because of, in particular, policing and criminality. Mr Paisley Jnr: The paper that the UUP originally submitted made little to no mention of paramilitary activity and decommissioning. However, from your discussion today and the answers that you have given, you believe that those issues have not been fully resolved. Your paper may have given a wrong impression that those issues were resolved, as far as you were concerned. You are now saying that the issues of decommissioning and paramilitary activity have not yet been satisfactorily resolved, and therefore we cannot go into Government. Is that a fair deduction? Mr McFarland: You will recall that the DUP said that decommissioning would never, ever happen. Peter Robinson said that it was unimportant. We fought for decommissioning because it was a vital sign that republicans were acting in good faith, because if they were genuinely no longer offering unionists violence, they had no need for their weapons. There is an inconsistency between what the IICD has said and what the IMC has said. We had the IMC’s view read out the other day. It is not sure what is going on here: whether individuals have held some weapons back, or whether the south Armagh brigade has held weapons back to defend its organised crime empire. It is not clear what is going on. It would be helpful if there were more clarity. You know well that there are all sorts of weapons around. We hear anecdotal reports that UVF weapons from 1913 are still sitting about in people’s barns, and such like. There have always been weapons. The question is whether the people with the weapons are trying to kill us. It strikes me that the IICD has reported that the republican movement — the IRA — has decommissioned the vast bulk of its arsenals. Either that is an absolute load of nonsense, in which case quite a number of fairly important people in the IICD, and indeed a couple of clergymen, have been completely hoodwinked and Sinn Féin and the IRA have been lying to us completely, and they have an entire arsenal sitting waiting, or we accept that a substantial act of decommissioning has taken place. You and William McCrea are on record in this Committee as accepting that. There are some outstanding queries, but, by and large, decommissioning should not be resurrected as a hook to get ourselves on again and prevent Government here. Mr Paisley Jnr: Yes. Again, the record shows that you are raising this issue of decommissioning. I am talking generically about criminality and paramilitarism. We will come to decommissioning in a moment, and I will give you an opportunity to talk about decommissioning, but, for the record, Peter Robinson said that decommissioning was not the only priority. I do not think that he made the statement that you have attributed to him. However, we will come back to those issues. If these issues have not been resolved satisfactorily, it begs the question of why you went into Government with them. Why did you make that judgement call? Given that these matters have not been resolved satisfactorily, do you agree that the judgement call that was made here four or five weeks ago not to form an Executive was the correct judgement call to make? I want to establish that. Mr McFarland: I am confused as to why you need this comfort blanket or dummy to chew on that we are not objecting to you going into Government five weeks ago with Sinn Féin. Mr Paisley Jnr: Just answer the question, Alan. Mr McFarland: I have said to you already that, in our view, the time is not yet right for a Government to be formed, but it may be right later on this year. At the moment we do not have the cover, from the reports, to give everyone comfort that they would be doing the right thing. We can keep rephrasing the same question — Mr Paisley Jnr: It is not the question that I am focusing on: it is the answer. Perhaps we could refocus the answer. Do you believe that it was the correct judgement call to make? The answer is yes or no. Mr McFarland: I have already said that, at the moment — Mr Paisley: So the answer was yes? Is that what you are saying? Mr McFarland: I am really confused. You keep on going: “Just for the record, just for the record, just for the record”. What is this about? We are trying to have a sensible discussion here. It was the correct decision, in my view, that when Gerry Adams proposed Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness for First Minister and Deputy First Minister your party did not jump at it. Absolutely: I have said that about five or six times now in different guises, and I can keep saying the same thing. It seems to be some sort of comfort blanket for the DUP that the Ulster Unionist Party Assembly Group agrees with them on this matter. We agree with you. Mr Paisley Jnr: Thank you. If you had given me that answer to begin with, that would have helped — we could have got a little further. Can I say once again that we are not here for a discussion; we are here to ask and answer questions for clarification. Perhaps we can have a discussion at the margins somewhere else. You raised the issue of policing in your presentation. Do you generally believe that the transfer of policing powers should take place as quickly as possible after devolution has been established, or should it wait until an assessment has been made that the public has confidence that those powers should be transferred? Mr McFarland: Well, the transfer of policing and justice is a matter for the Assembly under the agreement. The Assembly will decide when it is comfortable with the transfer of policing and justice. I am heartened by the speed at which, in December, you were busily getting down to discussing policing here. Within a month of the comprehensive agreement you were straight into discussions with Sinn Féin on the modalities of policing. In fact, the comprehensive agreement timetable says, under February: “Agreement reached on modalities for devolution of Criminal Justice”. As we know, although Sinn Féin and the SDLP disagree with this, you have confirmed that, as far as you are concerned, this agreement is the only deal in town. You were straight into that within a month, but the comprehensive agreement says that the aim was to try to get policing and justice devolved within two years: “The British Government will work to promote the necessary confidence to allow such a vote to take place within two years.” So the Assembly needs to decide, and the Assembly will clearly vote on this when it feels comfortable that the place is ready for policing and justice to be devolved. Mr Paisley Jnr: That is how I view it — that it takes the Assembly to have confidence on behalf of the people. As regards the speed with which we are moving — well, after 300 years of a disputed crisis and 40 years of terrorism, I do not think that a couple of years after an Assembly has been established is really a lot of speed. We have seen the discussion paper that the Government have published in terms of the devolution of policing and justice. There are about six permutations of how a Department or Departments might operate. Have you a favourite or preferred option? Would you be happy with one Minister running one Department, or would you like to see two Ministers, or two junior Ministers in the Office of the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister (OFMDFM)? How would you like to see it? Mr McFarland: Chairman, this is wonderful. It is 11.14 am and Ian Paisley Jnr is inviting me to negotiate the future of policing in Northern Ireland in a Committee with Martin McGuinness and the SDLP. Let’s go. If you wish to sit here now and discuss how many Departments there should be, or whether there should be one Minister or two, I am up for that. I just wonder whether you understand what you are doing in this Committee. If you do, and you wish to continue asking the questions, I will get into it, and no doubt the other parties will wish to join in negotiations with the DUP on the future of policing and justice in Northern Ireland. Are you sure you wish to ask that question? Mr Paisley Jnr: Do not get carried away; do not get too excited now. Again, focus on the question. We have accepted that we are not here to negotiate. Mr McFarland: Why would you ask the question, if you do not wish to negotiate? Mr Paisley Jnr: I am not negotiating anything with you; I am simply asking a question. Which of the six permutations do you prefer? After all, you raised it in your submission, so I should be allowed to ask you a question on it. Mr McFarland: I am confused. Ian Paisley Jnr and William McCrea, in particular, have made enormous play today about how they are only here to scope and identify and how there will no negotiation in this Committee. However, you are now moving into some form of negotiation on how many Departments and Ministers there should be when policing and justice is devolved here. That is wonderful, but I suggest that we leave the negotiation until we have finished our questioning. Then we can all get stuck in to negotiating the devolution of policing and justice to Northern Ireland. I am all for that and would like to get into that discussion with you. Mr Paisley Jnr: You appear to be very reluctant to answer a very simple question on clarification. In your submission, you raised the Department of Policing and Justice — Mr McFarland: As issues that need to be resolved. Mr Paisley Jnr: You obviously raised it as an issue that you want to have scoped. It is an issue that you believe is important, and if there are obstacles they need to be identified. We all agree that there are obstacles here, but I am simply trying to establish for the record which of the six permutations you prefer, given the fact that you have raised the issue. No one is asking you to negotiate anything; we are merely asking you to answer a simple, straightforward question on clarification. Do you want to tell us which permutation you prefer for setting up that Department? Mr McFarland: I am more than happy to get into detailed discussion with the DUP or any other party here regarding how the Committee should take forward a recommendation regarding the number of Departments and Ministers that there should be, and how policing and justice should be handled. We have identified the positions of each party under the broad heading of issues that need to be resolved. The DUP, in particular, has made enormous play of not negotiating, not going into detail and not discussing; you are simply here to list the headings that need to be resolved. You cannot have it both ways. You cannot, on the one hand, say that you will only identify the broad areas and that you will not negotiate or go into any detail or discussion, and then, on the other hand, try to press other parties to get into negotiation with you. If you wish to negotiate these issues, I am happy to do it around this table when our questioning has finished. Mr Paisley Jnr: It took you some time to answer my first question, and it is taking you quite some time to answer my third question, but we will try again. You appear to be confused that we are here to have detailed discussion when we have already agreed that we are here to identify issues. Again, I am asking for an answer to a straightforward clarification question. I am not asking you to negotiate anything or to lay anything on the line, but you have identified the issue of policing and justice. Your submission only contains one sentence on it. Will you elaborate and give us a straightforward answer? Do you favour one of the six permutations for the policing and justice Department? Mr McFarland: Which bit of “we will discuss this after the questioning has finished“ does Ian Paisley Jnr not understand? Which bit does he not understand on the fourth or fifth time of saying it? Mr Paisley Jnr: I am merely trying to find out, Alan, if you will give us a straightforward answer. Mr McFarland: Chairman, which bit does he not understand? Mr Paisley Jnr: I understand everything. I understand that you have not been prepared to answer this question. There is a proposal for policing and justice, which you have referred to in your submission. We know that there are permutations regarding the setting up of a Department. Are you able to tell us which one you favour? 11.15 am Mr Kennedy: It appears from the earlier presentations that Mr Paisley Jnr attaches some importance to that issue. However, as the Committee is scoping and identifying issues, we are presumably leaving negotiation and the practical outworking of such issues for further discussion, after all the parties have been questioned on their initial presentations. Although the DUP highlighted policing and justice as an issue for scoping, it did not indicate its preferred option. Ian, you might accept that having not done so yourself, it is slightly unreasonable to expect that of others. Clearly, the UUP has continued difficulty with that question, but we have provided an answer. Mr Paisley Jnr: Danny, the point is that you could have asked the question. Indeed, you did ask the question and were satisfied with the answers from the Democratic Unionist Party. I wonder why the Ulster Unionist Party is reluctant to answer. I am sure that you agree that policing poses problems and is an obstacle for some people. There are issues that need to be resolved as far as unionists are concerned. The DUP has brought up discriminatory fifty-fifty recruitment and the failure of republicans to support the police. The UUP’s presentation was scant on that, although there was some elaboration today. I want the UUP to clarify that. Mr Kennedy: Let me give you a copper-bottomed guarantee that the UUP will continue to explore those issues in absolute detail when and if there are negotiations or proper discussions within this Committee. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): I am reluctant to intervene in that wee bit of a logjam, but is it possible to involve all parties? The discussion and questioning has been manoeuvred in different ways over the past few days. If Ian Paisley does not mind, can we bring in one member from each other party so that they can ask questions? Mr Paisley Jnr: To be perfectly fair, each party has deployed, without critique, a system of interrogation over the last number of days in which a person has the floor to ask questions. I want to complete a series of questions on policing and other subjects. If people want to come in then when it is their turn — The Chairman (Mr Molloy): I was trying to involve as many parties and members as I could. Mr Paisley Jnr: It is unfair to interrupt a person who is in the middle of in a line of questioning. That has not happened during any other questioning. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): I understand that. Mr M McGuinness: When the Democratic Unionist Party had made its submission, I was first to ask questions. I did so for about 15 or 20 minutes and then I gave way, out of respect to my other colleagues who were sitting around and to give them the opportunity to engage in the discussion. The DUP should consider opening the discussion up to others, because during the course of the day there will be plenty of opportunities for the DUP to continue its discussion or questioning of the Ulster Unionist Party. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): I think that it involves everybody more, if the other parties — Mr Paisley Jnr: I am afraid that there has been a process to this, and if someone has the floor and a line of questioning, it is grossly unfair to interrupt them or to try to prevent that person from getting answers. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): No, I am not trying to do that. Mr Paisley Jnr: If that is the way that business is to be conducted, it is a disgrace. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): I am not trying to prevent that; I am trying to involve people. Mr Paisley Jnr: People will have to wait their turn. Mr McNarry: Chairman, Ian has a point about the approach. It seems to change depending on who is sitting in your seat. It might even change if you changed what you had agreed on a previous day. Could we remove interrogation from the atmosphere? Mr McFarland: Trained. Mr Kennedy: Not so trained, apparently. Mr McNarry: It serves no purpose for us to interrogate each other. I know that there is a line of questioning that is intense; that is acceptable, but if someone is here to interrogate, it creates an adversarial atmosphere about the line of questioning. The UUP just wants to give answers and facts, and not, as William repeatedly said, to be grilled. He must have felt like a fish under the barbecue at times. We should try to remove that adversarial element. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): I do not want to divert from whatever happened before. I just want to involve people as much as possible, and to create gaps in which others can ask questions. Mr Kennedy: Hitherto, custom and practice in this Committee has been for one party at a time to ask full and detailed questions. We do not have a problem with that, and would be inclined not to depart from it. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): It is in your hands. Mr Paisley Jnr: Alan, do you believe that the IRA has decommissioned all of its weapons? Mr McFarland: The IICD has told us that the vast bulk of the IRA’s weaponry has been decommissioned. Mr Paisley Jnr: There is absolutely no doubt that decommissioning has taken place. Everyone accepts that. Mr McFarland: Have you accepted that? Mr Paisley Jnr: Yes. We made that public some time ago. Do you believe that all of the IRA’s weapons have been decommissioned, that it was done in good faith and that we should draw a line there and consider it sufficient? Mr McFarland: The difficulty is that we do not know. Mr Paisley Jnr: Exactly. Mr McFarland: We do not know. The IICD and the IMC have said that it was impossible to know. I have no doubt that there are weapons hides that were under the control of people who have died or were drunk when they buried the weapons and cannot remember where. I have no doubt at all that individual members of the IRA have held back weapons that they have had for years and do not want to give in. I have no doubt that others have held weapons back for personal protection because they or their area may come under threat, or that those involved in serious criminal activity have held weapons back to protect their criminal empires. The question is whether we still think that the IRA has held back an arsenal with which it intends to attack the state. I do not believe that it has, although I have no doubt that there are weapons out there, among them trophies from the First World War and the Second World War. Northern Ireland is knee deep in weapons of various sorts. The question is, do those who have them intend to overthrow the state or not? The notion that every last weapon in Northern Ireland has to be handed in before we can have government is a dangerous one to get caught up on. I caution against that, because it is a no-win situation. Nobody knows what weapons are out there or who has them. Mr Paisley Jnr: Do you think that the IRA may have held weapons back for serious and organised crime? Mr McFarland: I have no doubt that those individuals who are involved in serious and organised crime have held weapons back to protect their criminal empires. Mr Paisley Jnr: Has the IRA as an organisation done that? Mr McFarland: I do not know. The IMC said that the leadership of the IRA is serious about ceasing criminality, but that individual senior republicans are continuing their criminal activities. I understand from the report last week of the Serious Organised Crime Agency (SOCA) that that activity appears to have dropped and that that drop may be linked to the raids in south Armagh. 11.30 am Mr Paisley Jnr: Would it be fair to characterise your attitude to decommissioning as relaxed? Mr McFarland: I have said what I have said, Chairman; it does not matter how I feel personally. Those are the facts. Mr Kennedy: We might also echo Peter Robinson whom you quoted this morning: there are issues other than decommissioning. Mr Paisley Jnr: There is more than one priority; that is right. Everyone agrees that decommissioning is not the only priority. Some people did get rather hooked on it. Do you accept that decommissioning must be done in a way that builds unionist confidence? Mr McFarland: Decommissioning was key to unionist confidence. In its 2002 statement, the IRA said that it would decommission in a way that would maximise unionist confidence. Decommissioning was never about weapons. If we had the money, you and I could be back from eastern Europe tomorrow night with a planeload of weapons. The world is awash with weapons. Mr Paisley Jnr: It is not that easy. Mr McFarland: It is. Decommissioning was about republicans telling the unionist community that they were no longer offering us violence. If they were holding on to their weapons, the possibility remained that they would be prepared to use violence again. That is why the weapons issue was so important: it was a sign of republicans’ good faith and intentions. Their reluctance to give up their weapons raised serious doubts about whether they were indeed committed to the path they claimed to be on. When they did decommission, they managed to make a complete hames of it. They had several opportunities to decommission in a way that would maximise public confidence, but they did not avail of them. It is to be much regretted that they had not the sense to see the importance of decommissioning properly, because they cannot decommission again. That is the danger of getting caught up on this issue — it is not possible to do a rerun with a photograph. Decommissioning has happened. There still are weapons out there but I do not believe that they are there for the overthrow of the state. It would have been better if republicans had decommissioned properly between 1998 and 2000, as they were supposed to. That did not happen, and trying to revisit the issue is a no win. Mr Paisley Jnr: Has decommissioning maximised unionist confidence? Mr McFarland: Certainly not. Unionist confidence has been anything but maximised by the manner and timing of decommissioning. That opportunity has passed; regrettably, it is not possible to rerun it with a photograph to maximise public confidence. Mr Paisley Jnr: Would an inventory of what has been decommissioned be helpful in building unionist confidence? Mr McFarland: From the beginning, we have called for the publication of an inventory. It is most unfortunate that Gen de Chastelain had a private agreement that an inventory should wait until all paramilitary groups had decommissioned. The logic is that one small group, such as the LVF, deciding not to decommission — even though the other loyalist paramilitaries had — can hobble the entire process and we will not know what republicans have decommissioned. We have called throughout this process for the publication of an inventory and we call for it again. Mr Paisley Jnr: You rightly identify the issue of consistency and you talked earlier about ensuring that loyalist arms are got rid of as well. There has been comment on your party’s linking itself to the Progressive Unionist Party in the Assembly. That raises the issue of consistency. Do you agree with Sylvia Hermon that that link is wrong? Mr McFarland: You led in with loyalist weapons and moved on to the Assembly. Although those are two different issues, I am happy to take questions on them. Do you wish to move completely to the Assembly issue, to continue on weapons, or to continue on the issue of loyalist paramilitaries? Mr Paisley Jnr: My question was on the issue of consistency. Do you agree with Sylvia Hermon’s assessment? Mr McFarland: I will deal with that in a minute. First, since we are on the weapons issue, let me deal with the issue of loyalism and loyalist weapons. As I said in my presentation, we cannot get to a stage where the DUP and Sinn Féin will form a government in the autumn and while loyalists are still running around, unguided, and fully armed. Broad unionism can take some responsibility to pave the way for those organisations that wish to move from paramilitarism to a political path; to disarm; and for the rest, which do not wish to do that, to be left to the rigours of the courts and the law. We have chosen to take that responsibility. You may disagree with us. We have been at this for some time now, since Sir Reg took over. In one of his early speeches, he announced his intention to do it, and the process is now under way. It is clearly going to be time-limited, and the public and broad unionism are going to need to see some progress. What took place here was quite complicated, but I will run through it for your benefit. Mr Paisley Jnr: Thank you. Mr McFarland: The 2003 Assembly election produced numbers that, if the Executive had been fired up, would have led to three Ulster Unionist, three DUP, two Sinn Féin and two SDLP Ministers in government: a 6:4 unionist majority, which broadly reflects the community. Of course, in the first Assembly, because there were lots of individual unionist independent Members, the Executive did not look like that: it was 5:5. However, 6:4 reflects the proper position of the community in general. When Jeffrey Donaldson and his two colleagues moved from us to you, it gave the DUP four Ministers in the Executive, and we understand that Jeffrey, as part of his deal to move, was promised the fourth Ministry. That fourth Ministry moved with Jeffrey to the DUP, so the relative strengths were 4:2:2:2. The unfortunate activities of Mr Berry last year and his subsequent departure from the DUP moved that ministerial position to Sinn Féin. So it produced a situation, if a Government were to be fired up, of three DUP Ministers, three Sinn Féin Ministers, two Ulster Unionist Ministers and two SDLP Ministers, moving back to the 5:5 ratio — a move away from the unionist reflection of the community. We discovered that if we had one more Member in the Assembly, it would take that unionist Department back from Sinn Féin and restore the Ulster Unionists’ position to what it was at the time of the election — three Ulster Unionists, three DUP, two Sinn Féin and two SDLP — and restore the unionist balance. As a political party we felt that that was quite positive for us in that it put us back where we should have been, according to the electorate, and to where we were before the removal of Mr Donaldson. Also, unionism quite likes the idea of taking a seat off Sinn Féin. What we could not understand in the aftermath was the deep angst of the DUP. We restored the balance, the position that the people voted for and also the unionist majority. The matter was clarified slightly by the television programme featuring Mr Berry, in which Mr Berry had been walking with God, was no longer walking with God and now is walking with God again. There was every evidence that, under the tutelage of Rev William McCrea or Rev Ian Paisley over the summer, he would see the light and be brought back into the fold in the autumn, which would have had several effects. It would have taken a seat off Sinn Féin — a win for the DUP; it would have returned to Jeffrey what he sees as his rightful fourth ministerial position; and it would return the Ulster Unionists down to the floor, from where they should never have risen by daring to get an extra Member in the Assembly. Politically, from our point of view, it was the sensible thing to do. Of course, it kicks in only when the DUP does a deal with Sinn Féin — when the Democratic Unionist Party is in government with Sinn Féin. That is the background to our having an extra Member. Its effect kicks in only when the deal is done. Mr Paisley Jnr: Was that not premature, given that you accept that there was not the slightest possibility of forming a Government five weeks ago? Mr McFarland: It was done then because of time constraints. We discovered that we could do it, according to Standing Orders. Others, including the Northern Ireland Office, thought we could not. People who had not done their homework were taken by surprise. It was time-sensitive because there was every indication that the Secretary of State, having spotted what we were doing, would step in. After all, this is the Hain Assembly, and they are his Standing Orders — he can change them daily. There was a threat that if it did not happen at that time, at the setting-up of the Assembly, we would lose the opportunity. It was a tactical decision, taken for practical and good political reasons. Mr Paisley Jnr: You say that the move was tactical; that it was good for you and the sensible thing to do. You must have given some thought to the person you would try to attract into your fold. Did you approach any other unionist Member — Bob McCartney, for example? Mr McFarland: We are on record as saying that we talked to a number of people. I do not propose to go into who we were talking to, why we talking to them and whether they were happy with the prospects. That is a dead end, I am afraid. Mr McNarry: Chairman, can we have a ruling on this? This is something that could be discussed downstairs in the Members’ Coffee Lounge. Is it really relevant to preparation for government? If one party divulged to another party the tactics that it might engage in when we were close to forming a Government, then we would be in the realms of “Beam me up, Scotty”. 11.45 am Mr Paisley Jnr: I asked a question about consistency. Do you agree with Sylvia Hermon’s assessment that the UUP ought not to have aligned itself with the Progressive Unionist Party? Alan’s answer to that was a five- to six-minute historical explanation. I did not ask for any of the information that he was prepared to give. It is very interesting that he was prepared to spill his soul. The fact that he has put the information out there allows it to be scrutinised. He could have answered the question, to which I will return. Do you agree with Sylvia Hermon’s position that the link with the Progressive Unionist Party should cease? The Chairman (Mr Molloy): I cannot make a ruling on the questions that members ask. Earlier, I did try to speed up the process, and members did their best to follow procedures. For the past few days, all the parties have followed this procedure. It would be beneficial if we continued to identify the obstacles to preparation for government. Mr McNarry: You would not want to give offence to another member by saying that that is none of his or her business. Mr Paisley Jnr: I have a thick skin, so do not worry. Mr McFarland: I know that you have. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): We have had much latitude about what parties ask and what parties answer. Mr Paisley Jnr: I am amazed that Alan believes all this stuff about Jeffrey Donaldson. It sounds like a script from the ‘Folks on the Hill’. Perhaps that is where Alan gets his material from, or perhaps that is where the ‘Folks on the Hill’ gets its material from. Mr McNarry: He might just do you out of a Cabinet position, Ian. Mr Paisley Jnr: It is very amazing. Let us return to the question that provoked such an answer. Do you agree with Sylvia Hermon’s assessment that this alliance with the Progressive Unionist Party should cease? I ask that because of the original question on the issue of consistency. I am sure that you will agree that consistency in issues such as the unionist community’s confidence that violence has ended, and political parties having links to violence and criminal and paramilitary activities, is pretty central to the obstacles that we are scoping. Mr Kennedy: The individual views of any member of the Ulster Unionist Party on any issue, however interesting they may be to you, with your obsession with the views of our party, are not relevant to scoping the obstacles and issues that need to be addressed for preparation for government. The Ulster Unionist Party will continue to examine this issue and will deal with it in its own quarters. Mr Paisley Jnr: Do you disagree with Sylvia Hermon? Mr Kennedy: I have given my answer. I would respectfully ask you not to pursue the issue. That is my answer, and even if you do not like it, we will continue to give that answer. Mr Paisley Jnr: I can understand why she does not like that link, given that she is married to one of Northern Ireland’s most respected former Chief Constables. That link with a paramilitary organisation causes her, and the people who support her, considerable personal embarrassment. Do you agree with her very public assessment that she thinks that that link should cease? Mr Kennedy: We have outlined the background to the decision. Quite frankly, the personal views of any member of the Ulster Unionist Party in respect of a decision taken by the Ulster Unionist Party Assembly Group are not relevant to the work of this Committee. Mr Paisley Jnr: There is also the issue of inconsistency, principally in relation to the IRA and Sinn Féin. According to the OCTF, it is calculated that the Provisionals make over £100 million a year from ill-gotten gains from criminality. Do you believe, Alan, that those benefits are derived from the organisation or from individuals? If they are to the benefit of the organisation, do you believe that Sinn Féin benefits from them? Mr McFarland: I do not know. All we have to rely on are the reports of the IMC, and it is fair to say that unionist confidence in the IMC is growing. In fact your own party has welcomed effusively the last two IMC reports as being major documents. We have only what the OCTF and IMC reports tell us. As I said earlier, we are not yet at a stage at which we can be confident that Sinn Féin and the IRA have moved away from criminality, and we must wait and see what those reports, in which both you and I have confidence, tell us in the next six months. Mr Paisley Jnr: A party with a link to a £100 million-plus criminal empire is certainly not compatible with government; neither is it desirable for any unionist party to want to be in government with it. Mr McFarland: This is about the twenty-fifth time that we have said that issues on policing and criminality remain to be solved; the reason for having this Committee is to identify that those are issues to be dealt with. We agree with that, and we will have to wait and see in the coming months whether republicans are dealing with those. Mr Paisley Jnr: In your presentation you raised the issue of the comprehensive agreement. Do you accept that the Belfast Agreement has failed? Mr McFarland: No. Why would the Belfast Agreement have failed when you have agreed — in fact, you are the only party that is still running around waving this as your Nirvana when in the autumn Minister Hanson will give you all this as your great victory in the world? This is the Belfast Agreement, and a few modifications to make life slightly better, and a few appalling negotiation points, which effectively remove a unionist veto and remove the Ulster Unionist Party and the SDLP from government if they do not agree with Martin McGuinness’s being Deputy Prime Minister. Mr Paisley Jnr: So the Belfast Agreement is a success? Mr McFarland: The Belfast Agreement is mixed, in that some areas of it have been extremely successful. We got our Government up here; Northern Ireland is a better, more peaceful place because of it. We discovered outstanding issues that were not right, and those must be dealt with and modified. I have a copy of the DUP manifesto from 1988; I gaze at it occasionally, just to remind myself of the real world. In it there are three key demands on which the Democratic Unionist Party stood: the consent principle; the removal of articles 2 and 3; and the return of devolved government to Northern Ireland. They were three major platforms on which the Democratic Unionist Party stood for 30 years. The DUP ran away from talks. I was part of the Ulster Unionist Party delegation on the night that the DUP left with Bob McCartney. William McCrea rushed across to Jeffrey Donaldson, asking him where his Hibernian sash was, as they stormed out, leaving us to deal with our political enemies on our own. The Ulster Unionist Party achieved devolution, the removal of articles 2 and 3, and the consent principle: the three key DUP points for the past 30 years. If you say that that is failure, that is your view; my view is that it is success. It did not work out as it should have because others, as Seán Farren said yesterday, did not meet their commitments. There was a clear commitment in the Belfast Agreement for republicans to disarm within two years and to stop their paramilitary and criminal activity. Those things did not happen, and as a result the Ulster Unionist Party brought the Assembly to a close on three occasions to try and make them happen, and finally they have stopped now. As you have heard from the parties round the table in this review, there are many issues that must be sorted out. There are areas of effectiveness and efficiency, and we have outstanding questions over dealing with policing and criminality. If those are dealt with, we stand some chance of getting a Government up and running again, and there is a penalty for not doing so. We are faced with a repartition of Northern Ireland later this year under the RPA. I have been speaking to members of your party from Tyrone who are getting extremely exercised that Tyrone and Fermanagh are facing what the unionists in Cavan and Monaghan faced in 1922 — the redrawing of the border on the River Bann and a harmonisation of big councils with their counterparts in the South. I know that your supporters in the west of the Province are not at all happy about that. According to the Secretary of State, the only way to head this off is for a Government to be set up here. That is a serious issue that must be dealt with, and there is a high penalty to pay if it is not. Issues such as education and rates are sitting there, and if we do not get Government back, then we get into all sorts of trouble sorting them out. There are issues that must be sorted out for effectiveness and efficiency and for the future of Northern Ireland, particularly the future of the unionist community. Overall, the signing of the Belfast Agreement was the right thing to do, but it was difficult and there were hard decisions to be made. Some people did not meet their commitments, and the safety nets promised by our Government were not provided when required. There have been failures, but it was the right thing to do, and I think that history will prove that — although it seems a bit strange now. Mr Paisley Jnr: I am a bit of a historian myself, Alan, and I have collected some Ulster Unionist Party manifestos. I have some from the 1950s and 1960s, but I have a more recent one in which Jim Nicholson says “No guns, no government”, shortly after which a government with guns was formed. But I digress. Do you accept that the Belfast Agreement has failed to attract unionist support? Mr McFarland: It attracted the majority of unionist support initially, although that support has leached away for the reasons that I have just described. People who were supposed to meet commitments did not meet them, and this has resulted in a reduction in unionist confidence in Government here. However, it could be argued that the issues that caused that reduction in confidence — mainly decommissioning — are largely solved. There is an issue over Sinn Féin supporting the police. You made the deal with it in 2004 — I refer you again to the comprehensive agreement — wherein you had a deal over policing. If Sinn Féin meets that commitment to policing, then clearly unionist confidence will rise again. These are all cause and effect, but they are not things that the Ulster Unionist Party Assembly Group can deal with. We can only try to do good and push this forward where we can, and our current mission on this is to try and bring a closure to loyalist paramilitarism. The contribution made by the Democratic Unionist Party to any of this has been virtually nil. What we are getting from it at the moment is catch-up, because this comprehensive agreement is the Belfast Agreement with a few skirts to hide the embarrassment of the party’s U-turn. The DUP comes along to this 10 years later. It is good that you are coming along; it is good that you are engaging; it is good that you have examined issues in the comprehensive agreement — which is the Belfast Agreement with a few improvements. Hopefully when you get round to doing the deal we will get ourselves back on track. Unionist communities take their lead from their politicians. If their politicians are constantly telling them that they are being sold down the river and that the whole thing is a disaster, then that is what they will believe. The moment you do this deal you will be out telling your communities about it, in the same way as republicans, when they decide to do policing, will be out telling young republicans that it is acceptable to join the police. If you ever get round to doing a deal, you will no doubt be out extolling the virtues of whatever agreement you make. However, that agreement, as Tony Blair keeps telling us, is the Belfast Agreement. It may have modifications, but it is the Belfast Agreement. At that stage you will have to go to your followers and tell them about the wonderful deal you got, and how they should support it. 12.00 noon Mr Paisley Jnr: That is very helpful, Alan. Do you think that one of the reasons why the agreement failed was because unionists believed that it was a process to something else and not a settlement? Do you think that it is a settlement? Mr McFarland: That is an interesting question. What is a settlement? There is nothing else in life that does not move. We all get older. We go through our jobs and our personal lives and gain experience. Nothing stays still. There is a strange view — particularly in unionism — that somehow, and at some stage, we will reach a political nirvana where the world will stop and all political parties will accept that they know their place and are willing to stay there, wherever that place may be. Nothing else in life works like that. Do we expect republicans, for example, to stop being republicans? I certainly do not. I expect them to stop attempting to kill me and make me into a republican, but I accept their full right to battle on with their political views in whatever way they see fit, as long as they do not try to force others to believe the same things through violence. It is not a settlement; there is no such thing as a settlement in political life, and to expect that is a slightly weird view on life. Do we think that the Conservatives believe that life in England should be settled and that the Labour Party should be in government from here on in, and that Conservatives should accept that they are in opposition? “Settlement” is a slightly strange word to use. You cannot get any settlements in life, because life changes constantly and politics changes constantly. You fight your bit; you win some battles and you lose some, but you keep battling. Mr Paisley Jnr: That is very interesting. The reason that I used the term — [Interruption.] Mr Kennedy: It flows from that that the work of the Ulster Unionist Party and all pro-Union parties is ongoing, and that we continue to want to uphold and maintain our link with the rest of the United Kingdom and reject even the peaceful political aspirations of others who would see us in a united Ireland. A settlement, as Alan said, does not end things. We may view a negotiation, or the end of a negotiation, as a settlement, but the work of maintaining and protecting the link with the rest of the United Kingdom is ongoing for all of us who are committed to it. Mr Paisley Jnr: I will stick with Alan’s answer for the moment. If it were not a settlement, that would be a weird view. In Dean Dodson’s biography, in Frank Millar’s extended interview/biography, and in Henry McDonald’s biography, the former leader of the Ulster Unionist Party, who was the principal negotiator of the Belfast Agreement, described it as a settlement. One of the principal obstacles is the question of whether we get a settlement or whether we have a process to something else. That obstacle must be addressed, and I am glad that you have helped us to identify that. Mr McFarland: I want to clarify what I have already said. Issues are settled. The issue of the principle of consent is settled, as is that of articles 2 and 3. We are trying to settle the issue of whether there should be devolved government here. In my view, that issue should be settled because it is in the interests of the parties and of the Union to have devolved government here. Whether politics is settled is another matter. It is clearly not settled whether a majority of the people of Northern Ireland will decide that they wish to join the Irish Republic. The principle of consent allows for that, but I do not believe that that day will ever arise, either demographically or in terms of people’s general will in Northern Ireland. That is not a settlement, and to somehow expect politics to stop and nobody to have any aspirations other than the ones that we hold is not a very sensible approach to life. Mr Paisley Jnr: You believe that the link with the OFMDFM under the Belfast Agreement was a success then? Mr McFarland: It was not a success in that it suffered greatly from personality problems. I am almost certain that if there had been different personalities in there, it would have operated differently. The concept of “jointery”, as with all the safeguards that were negotiated, is necessary because people do not trust each other. Safeguards are necessary; that is the reason for the voting systems in the Assembly — so that people who feel that they are being disadvantaged can get 30 signatures, raise a petition of concern and have a cross-community vote because they are worried that the other team are trying to pull a flanker on an issue. Therefore, the “jointery” of the office is a good idea because it stops any one or other. We have to be slightly careful here, because there is a danger, the DUP might find, that if the Ulster Unionists have a bit of a renaissance and unionism splits fifty-fifty, or more than it is at the moment, that we could have a DUP Deputy First Minister and Martin McGuinness as the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland. Our belief is that that safeguard of “jointery” is quite useful. Although it might be attractive to Rev Paisley or Peter Robinson — or whoever the First Minister would be under the current system — to separate that out, if we reach a stage where Sinn Féin is the lead party in Northern Ireland, the DUP may be glad of having some form of “jointery” and control. It is very short-sighted of the DUP to be trying to split these things and to want to operate separate fiefdoms at the top of Government. Mr McNarry: From a practical point of view, it would be worth mentioning the link that Ian mentioned in OFMDFM. It is important — particularly when preparing for government, as this Committee is remitted to do — that we ensure that the Committee has an agenda of which it is fully aware; that is, a political agenda. There is a lesson to learn because there are great contradictions with civil servant interference in the running of OFMDFM — and there was great interference in the running of OFMDFM, to the extent that it was perhaps a major contributory factor to some of the personality clashes that have been alluded to. In preparing for government, the UUP can relate to the DUP in that it, too, is cautious about the civil servants’ agenda and its clear and distinctive methods of trying to interfere, because civil servants in general do not agree with devolution in Northern Ireland. We should all bear that in mind. I will finish by saying that I know that my colleague Alan was being factual, but he was stretching it when he suggested that Martin would be a Prime or First Minister. That would be a terrible thing, and I wish to put that on record. Mr M McGuinness: That would be your worst nightmare. Mr Paisley Jnr: I understand why Mr McNarry wishes to put that on record. I thought he was making an argument about why there should not be an Ulster Unionist Party renaissance. You described the issue of “jointery”, or collective responsibility. If you believe in the principle of collective responsibility, do you agree that colleagues in any Executive should support one another? Mr McFarland: Absolutely. It is key to the success of this enforced coalition that the Executive operates as a sensible entity and that there is agreement before policies go forward. The whole idea of having a Programme for Government is that it is agreed in the Executive and then individual Ministers work out how they do what they do, but the authority for the money and the policy of what they do is agreed by the Executive. That is the way it should operate. Mr Paisley Jnr: You also said that you have strong objections to the changes in the comprehensive agreement. Does the Ulster Unionist Party object to the changes because it does not want to be in government? Mr McFarland: I said that some of the comprehensive agreement is obvious. Everyone is agreed on the ministerial code; the Executive had agreed on it by and large before the Assembly was suspended. My point was that the DUP managed to negotiate some daft outcomes, and it has agreed to some other slightly odd things, such as a North/South parliamentary forum and an all-Ireland civic forum. We managed to stay away from some of those things in the first round of negotiations, and now the DUP seems to have committed everyone to them under this comprehensive agreement, which, as far as we can gather, the Government will give to the DUP in the autumn as some sort of sop for how well it has done, even though the other political parties disagree with some of those outcomes. Mr Paisley Jnr: I turn now to three final issues that have been raised during these discussions. The first goes back to the desirability to be in government with people. If someone believed that a party had made a concerted effort to have them killed in the past two weeks, do you think that it would be amazing if that person wanted to get into government with members of that party, or do you think that it just proves that the allegation is fatuous and wrong? Mr McFarland: I am reluctant to get involved in Ian Paisley Jnr’s court case, so I will pass on the question. Mr Paisley Jnr: You raised the issue of the triple mandate. Perhaps that is not a problem that is going to confront the Ulster Unionist Party for a while. Mr Kennedy: It will be all right in about three or four years’ time. Mr Paisley Jnr: Will you elaborate on the issue of a bill of rights? You said that this was an obstacle. Is that a serious obstacle that has priority in these discussions? 12.15 pm Mr McFarland: No. As I understood it, we were trying to identify areas in the agreement where changes or difficulties have arisen, or may arise. The agreement clearly stated that there should be a bill of rights for Northern Ireland, but that it should include rights specific to Northern Ireland. All human rights already enshrined in law are not specific to Northern Ireland. Therefore, the task was to identify which rights are specific to Northern Ireland. The only one that the UUP came up with was the issue of parading. Recently, the Human Rights Commission, under its previous chief commissioner, was busy trying to empire-build and encouraged a lot of Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) to get involved in identifying areas that should be included in a bill of rights; health is one such area. There is an ongoing debate about whether socio-economic rights should be included in a bill of rights. For example, if I take ill and my treatment costs £10,000 a day, do I have a right, regardless of cost, to have that treatment? Traditionally, in relation to all socio-economic rights, politicians decided how much money went to each Department and the Minister operated within that budget. If the Minister for Health then decides that it is a priority that I get my £10,000 per day, or whatever it may be, for treatment, that is what I get. However, it is a political choice for the Minister and the Department as to where the money goes. The moment that those become human rights, and, regardless of cost, the Government are obliged to pay for them, first, politics goes out the window. Secondly, no country in the world could operate like that because there is not enough money to pay for that stuff. My point is that there is an issue relating to that bill of rights that the human rights world is trying to push forward. Not only that, but the Human Rights Commission went way beyond its remit by suggesting an examination of a bill of rights for the island of Ireland, and it was considering that. As you are probably aware, about two years ago it suddenly produced an all-Ireland bill of rights for consultation. The question of a bill of rights for Northern Ireland is an outstanding issue within the agreement for Northern Ireland. It is probably a fairly low priority but one that we might need to examine. Mr Paisley Jnr: Thanks, Alan. Mr Ford: My line of questioning will probably not be quite as long as the last. I was slightly baffled by part of the Ulster Unionist Party Assembly Group’s written paper. Specifically, in the second paragraph, highlighting the fact that the DUP and Sinn Féin are now the majority parties on either side of the divide, it says: “Thus the deal needs to be done between the DUP and Sinn Féin.” The attitude of the SDLP is the same as that of the Alliance Party. We are here with a mandate, regardless of the fact that we are currently the fourth and fifth parties respectively. We are keen to have our say in negotiations and put forward policies that we believe would provide for better governance. Yet that statement suggests that, having witnessed a series of failed side deals in recent times and having been participants in some limited deals in the slightly more distant past, for example in the setting up of the Departments, Ulster Unionists are now effectively saying: “We do not want any part in these negotiations. Over to you.” Will you explain the logic of that, given that you are sitting here and participating? Mr McFarland: The UUP has maintained, from the beginning of the present process, that all parties must be brought into the process. At the beginning, under the agreement, four of the five parties were here. Then, for reasons that seemed sensible at the time, that evolved into the Governments and two parties, the UUP and Sinn Féin, trying to get a deal up and running. At the beginning of this process, we strongly recommended the need to get back to basics, and, since the only success that we had was the agreement, we should attempt to include all the parties in any discussions. That is what is so heartening about this Committee: for the very first time, all the parties are around the table. However, the Government has steadfastly refused to do that. Even when they say: “That is a good idea, we will do that”, you then discover that there is a revolving door at Downing Street with Sinn Féin in the back as the DUP leave the front and vice versa. This is a recognition of the reality of current Government policy on this issue. We disagree with it, but that is the way it is. The point I am trying to make is that if either the DUP or Sinn Féin will not deal, there is no deal. We would be willing to move on with the SDLP etc; the SDLP is not prepared to move on with unionism without Sinn Féin. There is a political reality that if the two main parties do a deal, they have the ability to fire up the Assembly, because only they can do the 50%. If we were on sixty-forty-forty, it would be an entirely different world in getting the Assembly up and running, but the fact of the matter is that Sinn Féin and the DUP hold the cards when it comes to electing a First Minister and a Deputy First Minister, and that is what triggers any form of Government here. If either of them refuses to do the deal, then there is no deal. Mr Ford: And yet, in the face of that, you have not proposed any change to the fifty-fifty-fifty parallel consent rule for electing a First Minister and a Deputy First Minister. You have, in fact, endorsed that. Mr McFarland: Mr Ford knows, because he was involved, that we had discussions about how other systems might be found. However, there was no agreement among the parties to move away from that. I cannot see the two larger parties, who have a veto in that regard, agreeing to move away from that. Mr Ford: But you are not even making the case for that, never mind the fact that you think others might not agree on it. Mr McFarland: As I said to Ian Junior, we have not actually got into negotiations yet. Mr Ford: I am sorry, but you have not highlighted that in your paper as an issue that you think might merit change. Mr McFarland: It has not been a priority in terms of getting stuff fired up, but if we want to go into negotiations and be persuaded that we should move away, and we can persuade the other parties, then we would not have any particular objections to trying to do that. Mr Ford: I should have perhaps clarified that before, although what you have said is slightly at variance with what is in your paper. The UUPAG is a coalition — I prefer not to use the term that Ian Paisley Jnr used earlier of an alliance between two parties. In his previous guise when attending some of these meetings on his own, David Ervine would have made a case broadly similar to the one that I am making for involvement of all. I take it that your submission is on behalf of both wings of your coalition? Mr Kennedy: It is on behalf of the Ulster Unionist Party Assembly Group. Mr Ford: Both wings? Mr Kennedy: It is on behalf of the Ulster Unionist Party Assembly Group. Mr McNarry: There are no wings. We only have legs. Mr Ford: I see. So we are now a single body. That is interesting. Mr McFarland: That is what it says. We have to be, in order to operate. Mr Ford: OK. Going on to your verbal presentation, you talked a lot at the beginning about matters of policing and criminality, and of the lack of confidence that unionists have in republicans — a concern that has been well highlighted by other parties around this table. Is there not also a case that other people need to be providing confidence to the wider community — indeed, to decent people who may vote for parties other than the UUPAG? In the light of your current UUPAG coalition in this place, and of the arrangements between one section of that party and the Ulster Political Research Group (UPRG) in Belfast City Hall — which extend to the nomination of a UPRG member onto the Belfast DPP as an Ulster Unionist; in the light of the withdrawal of Ulster Unionist members from the Belfast DPP while participating in bodies such as the North and West Belfast Parades Forum; in the light of your party leader’s comments after the Whiterock riots last September, which appeared to blame the police and the Parades Commission rather than the UVF, who fired shots at policemen; what can the Ulster Unionist Party do to provide confidence to other people in your position on respect for the rule of law? Mr McFarland: When the leader of our party first took on his task he said that we would attempt to help loyalist paramilitaries to get off the necks of their communities and go out of business. That is sensible because it is easier for us to attempt it than for the SDLP or Sinn Féin — although it would be easier if the DUP joined in. There is a sort of preciousness about dealing with people who are associated with paramilitaries. Correct me if I am wrong, but the Alliance Party represented David Ervine and Billy Hutchinson on the Assembly Commission all the way through the first Assembly. I saw no great neuralgia from your party then about whether it should represent David Ervine and Billy Hutchinson on that body. The DUP and the Ulster Unionists have been in groupings for at least 13 years, if not longer, in Belfast City Council with the PUP, the then Ulster Democratic Party (UDP), and the UPRG. That is practical politics. There is nothing unusual in that. Republican paramilitaries are leaving the stage. What is new is our attempt to engage with loyalist paramilitaries to persuade them that, as they claim to exist only as a reaction to republican paramilitaries, they should now stand down. It is sensible for us to try to make that happen. Mrs D Dodds: May I offer a point of information? The DUP in Belfast City Council has no alliance with any other party or coalition. Mr Kennedy: I understand that for several years an informal arrangement has existed to allow representatives of parties such as the PUP to be elected as lord mayor and to other senior offices. That has been done with the assistance of the Ulster Unionist Party and the Democratic Unionist Party. The arrangement was entered into enthusiastically and has continued almost unabated. A degree of co-operation has been extended from both the Ulster Unionist Party and the Democratic Unionist Party to groupings such as the PUP, the UPRG and the former UDP. Mr McFarland: Recently — and this was in the newspapers, so it is no secret — the DUP did a deal with a senior member of the UPRG so that he could be deputy mayor of Newtownabbey Borough Council. However, when this issue arose in the Assembly the DUP suddenly told the chap that it would no longer support him. There is much pretending that nobody ever had anything to do with paramilitaries. We could go into the history of the DUP with up hills, down dales and third forces if we wished to. Mr Ford: I hoped that in this session we could explore the attitude of the Ulster Unionist Party Assembly Group to building confidence, rather than the history of the DUP. Mr Kennedy: Or the history of the Alliance Party in electing the first Sinn Féin lord mayor to Belfast City Council. Mr Ford: However, the Ulster Unionists seem determined — Mr Kennedy: We can explore that — The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Let Mr Ford answer. Mr Kennedy: We can explore that, Mr Ford. Mr Ford: Since — Mr Kennedy: And your virtuous record on those matters. The Chairman (Mr Molloy): Please do not be disorderly. 12.30 pm Mr Ford: I notice, Mr Chairman, that Ulster Unionist Members had little to ask about such matters when I was answering questions. However, if they are in some difficulty, I will happily take that opportunity now. The matters of who sat on the Commission and the limited number of places on it — there were certainly peo |