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COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT Interim Report on COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT Ordered by the The Committee for Agriculture and Rural Development to be printed 11 October 2002 Report: 01/02R (Committee for Agriculture and Rural Development)
NORTHERN IRELAND ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT: MEMBERSHIP AND POWERS The Committee for Agriculture and Rural Development is a Statutory Departmental Committee established in accordance with paragraphs 8 and 9 of Strand One of the Belfast Agreement and under Assembly Standing Order No 46. The Committee has a scrutiny, policy development and consultation role with respect to the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development and has a role in the initiation of legislation. The Committee has 11 members including a Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson and a quorum of 5. The Committee has power:
The membership of the Committee since its establishment on 29 November 1999 has been as follows:
Mr Billy Armstrong
TABLE OF CONTENTS Appendices Appendix 1 - Minutes of Proceedings of the Committee relating to the Report Appendix 2 - Minutes of Evidence Appendix 3 - Written Submissions Review of issues raised in Inquiries by Councils in G.B Animal Health and consumer confidence Comparative assessment of approaches to dealing with FMD in Developed Countries Review/Scrutiny of DARD FMD Inquiry Import/Export and movement restrictions
Departmental communication and information
AGREED TERMS OF REFERENCE FOR AN INQUIRY INTO THE 2001 FOOT AND MOUTH DISEASE OUTBREAK IN NORTHERN IRELAND The Northern Ireland Assembly Committee for Agriculture and Rural Development has agreed to conduct an Inquiry into the 2001 outbreak of Foot and Mouth Disease in Northern Ireland. Terms of Reference The Committee wishes to make enquiries and report to the Assembly in such a way as to:
Methodology to address the Terms of Reference 1. The Committee wishes, in its deliberations, to take account of recent work, and established practice, on Foot and Mouth disease, both locally based and further afield. The DARD review is to consider, in particular, the work of the Vision Group and inquiries being held in Great Britain. Accordingly, the Committee proposes to:
These aspects will be carried out by desk research (through the Assembly's Research Services) and through scrutiny of the DARD review findings in this area. 2. The Committee is extremely anxious that the causes of the Northern Ireland outbreak and DARD's response to it, including issues surrounding imports and exports, should be fully explored and made public. However, the Committee acknowledges that the terms of reference established for an independent review, commissioned by DARD, suggest that much of this ground should be covered in that review. Committee members have agreed that every effort should be made to avoid duplicating the work of DARD's review. Accordingly, the Committee intends to scrutinise the review closely, with a view to identifying any gaps in its coverage and investigating these areas. Furthermore, the Committee will conduct at least one public evidence session to examine and discuss the review's findings with the Department. This aspect will be carried out by the Committee, with input from the Assembly's Research Services where appropriate, with a public evidence session after the Minister has supplied the Committee with the results of her review. It is possible that organisations or individuals may make written submissions regarding the Department's review. These would be considered and taken into account, either through correspondence with DARD or during the public evidence session. 3. In considering the current position, the Committee will consider, and comment on, current practice in terms of import and export restrictions, movement controls etc., which were implemented as a response to the outbreak and which remain in place. This aspect will largely be achievable through desk research (of Hansard and DARD press releases) and correspondence with DARD. It is also likely that external evidence will be submitted. From consideration of this, the Committee may wish to hold one or more evidence sessions. 4. The Committee intends to ensure that the human aspects of the outbreak are given appropriate prominence in its Inquiry. Accordingly, the Committee will examine the ways in which farmers were treated by DARD and other statutory agencies throughout the crisis. This will inevitably include aspects of the flow of information to farmers. The Committee will therefore examine the general issue of communication during the outbreak period. Written submissions will be sought, followed by appropriate public evidence sessions. This aspect will be led largely by written evidence submitted to the Inquiry, followed by oral evidence sessions as appropriate. Correspondence with DARD, and some involvement by the Assembly's Research Services, should assist with the communication aspects. 5. The Committee aims to identify areas of the agri-business sector that were adversely affected by the outbreak, and to explore how DARD and other agencies responded to that sector's needs. Accordingly, the Committee intends to commission independent external research, addressing:
This aspect will involve an external primary and secondary research programme, use of existing output/income data from the sector (if it exists) and primary survey research which would be robust enough to allow for sectoral estimations. This will require additional and very specific terms of reference, in order to commission the research. It will be important to spend time to ensure that these terms are comprehensive and that the appointment of a Researcher or Advisor meets the requirements of the Assembly and others. Equally important will be the process of ensuring that the appointee is capable of producing the required outputs. The Committee will, for the purposes of this Inquiry, define agri-business as businesses concerned with agricultural produce and services, together with rural tourism accommodation and activity products MINUTES OF PROCEEDINGS COMMITTEE FOR AGRICULTURE AND RURAL DEVELOPMENT FRIDAY 11 OCTOBER 2002 Present: Dr IRK Paisley MP MEP (Chairman) Mr Armstrong raised the issue of the publication of papers relating to the Committee Inquiry into the Foot and Mouth Outbreak in 2001. Resolved: That the Committee ordered the Terms of Reference, Minutes of Evidence, written submissions and research papers to be printed. [Extract of Draft Minutes of Proceedings] MINUTES OF EVIDENCE SUGGESTED CHANGES TO THE TRANSCRIPT MINUTES OF EVIDENCE Friday 20 September 2002 Members present: Rev Dr Ian Paisley (Chairperson) Mr Savage (Deputy Chairperson) Mr Armstrong Mr Douglas Mr Kane Mr Paisley Jnr Witnesses: Mr M McDonald ) The Rural Development Council Mr N Flynn ) 1. The Chairperson: Welcome. I apologise on behalf of the Committee, as it is running late. I believe that you want to make a statement. 2. Mr McDonald: We want to thank the Committee for the opportunity to give evidence. We will give a short presentation, and after that the Committee will have the opportunity to ask questions. With regard to the foot-and-mouth disease review, we want to tell the Committee what the Rural Development Council does, and what it did in 2001 for several communities. We will focus on the human-interest aspect of foot-and-mouth disease - how it affected farmers and others, and the relationship between farmers and other people in rural communities. 3. The council has been a key delivery agent in the rural development programme since 1991. It has 21 corporate members, eight of whom were appointed by the Minister. The membership is broadly based, encompassing community, business, environmental, agricultural and local government interests. Its aim is to help rural Northern Ireland to make a full and balanced contribution to the region through the delivery of funding programmes and by contributing to policy development. 4. The council has been responsible for approximately £9 million under the building sustainable prosperity programme, and £5·5 million under PEACE. Its current round has attracted over 300 applications for total grant aid of £23 million. However, it has only about £2·3 million to allocate. It is, therefore, about 10 times over-subscribed. The third pillar of the council's role is to give policy advice in order to aid rural proofing through the rural baseline report. I want to thank the Chairman for his involvement in that, and for his attendance at launches. 5. At Easter 2001, the Rural Development Council set aside a small sum of money, about £5,000, specifically to aid those areas affected by the foot-and-mouth disease disaster. It retained some temporary staff to facilitate development work in the affected areas, and used a process that it calls "a learning regions framework" - a mechanism to bring multi-sectoral people together, not just farmers. The line that the council took with farmers was that while the crisis might have emanated within the agricultural sector, the solution might not be found there. It was important to start off by stressing to farmers that we needed to talk to tourism providers, to business, and to the environmental sector in order to determine collectively why the foot-and-mouth disease crisis had happened, and how we could find a pathway out of it. 6. The Cushendall group, the lough shores group and the group from the western shores of Lough Neagh invited the Rural Development Council to help them. The south Armagh group declined an offer from the council to undertake the same process there as it had in the other regions, or to train one of the group's development workers. The group decided that it had enough direct support from the Department of Agriculture. 7. Mr Flynn and I will talk you through the work the Rural Development Council has done. 8. Mr Flynn: Good morning. I will pass around copies of my submission to make things easier to follow. 9. In the first step of the process, the Rural Development Council's base-lining unit prepared an area profile. That showed substantial demographic and statistical similarities in both areas; higher than average unemployment; an entrepreneurial spirit; and a high number of commuters. We then carried out some one-to-one structured interviews with key stakeholders in the area, such as GPs, other statutory bodies, farming representatives and community leaders. We commissioned Family Farm Development Limited to carry out individual farm visits to over 30 households in the one kilometre restriction zone in the lough shores area. That approach was unnecessary in Cushendall, because all of the farmers affected there attended our first meeting. 10. We organised focus groups with representatives from different sectors of the area, such as farming groups, non-farming businesses, community service providers such as schools, healthcare advisory services and community groups. At these sessions, participants were facilitated to work through the Rural Development Council's learning communities model, which is a means to identify lists of ideas for action. These were prioritised using a voting process, and focus groups were then drawn together and re-examined at a community conference, where the prioritisation of actions developed so far was completed. 11. The outcome of these activities is detailed in the report, copies of which have been sent to the Committee. As requested by the two groups, nothing was left out. We can say confidently that the level of participation was high, with local communities involved and taking ownership of the exercise. From the slides, you will see that 310 people participated in the Cushendall area and 85 in the lough shores area. 12. I will not repeat the detail of the report, but will mention a few key considerations that arose from our activity. These plans express the thoughts and ideas of local people from a range of different backgrounds and interests in the area who have all, in some way, been affected by the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak. The production of the plans was centred on a participatory approach, which placed emphasis on the views and ideas of local people. The Rural Development Council simply facilitated the process and wrote up the report. The resultant action plan represented local consensus on how the areas can re-build themselves. The communities should be commended for their capacity and ability to respond so quickly and comprehensively. 13. Our close involvement soon led us to understand that the main issues for both groups could be summarised by the terms "closure" and "vision". There was a need for closure on the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak experience, with questions like, "Why should it happen here? Why were we affected, and will it happen again?" recurring. A sense of loss remains; not just financially, but as a result of the caring relationship which existed between farm households and their animals. Farming in these areas is not solely based on commercial aims; farmers also have an embedded sense of community spirit and a sense of place. The action plan expressed some obvious indicators of the need for closure and that strong sense of community. Those indicators included: the need to continue the group experience to get an explanation of why the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak happened and whether it could reoccur; a request to give the area priority status; a review of the compensation offered to take account of other hardships in the area, which is past the post now; a request to establish a central organisation to help co-ordinate the use of funds in the area and to draw down additional funding; and, finally, a need to use a range of techniques to help people express their feelings and worries, particularly stress and health related concerns. 14. The last slide details the vision element of the action plan. I will summarise some of the most important issues. There was uncertainty as to whether to restock, and if so, with which type of animal. Insecurity existed as to how to deal with the dramatic changes in households' cash flow, ranging from the arrival of a large compensation cheque, to uncertain future income streams. The farming family required support as it became drained through coping with the substantial change to its lifestyle. In many cases depression was evident. 15. There was a willingness to examine new business proposals to consider diversification as an income alternative, to re-examine the traditional best use of their land and the people who live there and, therefore, to identify where they should concentrate their energies for the future. Community organisations must continue their work in developing a strategy. They have become a powerful collective voice for the farming community. 16. There was an ever-present call for a one-stop-shop approach, which would simplify bureaucracy and procedures for many of those socially excluded households who were struggling to access the complex support funding mechanisms. There was a call for the foot-and-mouth areas to be recognised as special cases, and for the establishment of some form of community support funding programmes specifically for those areas. 17. The report is much more detailed. I appreciate the Committee's time constraints and hope that the work has been of some help. 18. The Chairperson: The Committee's report will mostly concentrate on the preventative measures that can be taken now. Is a preventative system currently operating? 19. The inquiry by the Royal Society had 10 key findings. The inquiry stated that the overall objective of any policy must be to minimise the risk of disease entering the country. How can that be accomplished? 20. Mr McDonald: The responsibility and guidelines for that are outside our control. Controls were placed at roads and railways and general entry points were tightened up. Continued vigilance is required there. However, given our remit and expertise, we are not best placed to advise the Committee about that. 21. The Chairperson: Are preventative controls still in place? Are all the barriers down? 22. Mr McDonald: We do not have any particular knowledge or expertise on that. 23. The Chairperson: How much money would the Rural Development Council need if it were asked to co-operate with others in a preventative exercise? 24. Mr McDonald: From our experience with the two farming groups, it is not so much about having a pot of money to deliver directly to farmers. It is more important to have flexibility as an organisation, so that when a crisis like that arises, we can place staff in a support mechanism to help those affected - be it the farmers or the wider rural community - and to analyse the problem and identify solutions. That should not be a high-cost exercise. 25. The problem with the foot-and-mouth crisis was that we had no one single mechanism to do that. We had to look at what we were doing, re-adjust our operational plan and decide that some flexibility was needed. Any organisation must plan for a crisis. We should learn the lessons from the last foot-and-mouth outbreak so that there is some flexibility. A small sum of contingency money would enable us to recruit new or temporary staff to work with farm groups. 26. The Chairperson: How much did you spend during the last foot-and-mouth outbreak? 27. Mr McDonald: We spent £5,000, which was a small amount of money. It probably cost us more in terms of staff time and expertise. Had the system commissioned staff externally and brought in consultants, those costs could have been between £20,000 and £25,000. It was not high-cost for us because we had in-house expertise, not just in relation to farmers, but with the broader rural community. 28. The problem is that we do not have a particular role in the new programme to do that form of strategic or local work with farmers. There is a gap to be addressed regarding how farmers can get into the rural development programme. It has clearly been shown that there must be some mechanism to work with farmers so that they can engage with the wider community. 29. The Chairperson: Has that link been broken now? 30. Mr McDonald: We established credibility with the two farming groups. Through the learning regions framework we trained some of the people in those communities to analyse problems and articulate solutions if something were to arise in future. We left behind something sustainable. 31. Mr Savage: During the last spell of foot-and-mouth disease there was speculation that three sites for the disposal of animals would be created if it should happen again. Have those sites been identified, or was it only talk? 32. Mr McDonald: The Rural Development Council has had no consultation with regard to sites or their possible location. Were the Government to propose such sites, our rural baseline and the rural-proofing checklist, as provided in the report, would be used to assess the impact of the sites on the environment, on the farmers and on the wider community. A checklist or mechanism is necessary to assess their necessity, location and scale. To date, however, there has been no direct consultation on that proposal. 33. Mr Savage: I hope that it never comes about again. However, if that is to be the means of disposal, surely it would be better to do a bit of groundwork on it now. 34. Mr McDonald: I agree that, if it is the intention of the Government to have clearly-identified disposal sites, there is merit in thinking now about the crisis plan - whatever that will be - and in going through the process of identification. It is probably necessary to do that confidentially, because it could ring all sorts of alarm bells, and it might never happen. However, any crisis management should clearly identify how the sites will be earmarked and where they will be located. 35. Mr Savage: You mentioned Lough Neagh, and farmers on the lough shore are having difficulty with their land becoming bogged down. What are the current water levels of Lough Neagh? How much higher are they this year than in any other year? 36. Mr McDonald: I do not know. That is not in our field of expertise. 37. Mr Savage: Farmers have lost land, and that is being blamed on the water levels of Lough Neagh. I understand that the levels are controlled by the floodgates at Toome. Farmers have been unable to cut their silage, and have lost the crops. 38. Mr McDonald: Enough natural water has come from above to increase the levels, without having to open the gates at Toome. 39. Mr Paisley Jnr: It was horizontal. 40. Mr Savage: If water levels in the lough cannot be controlled, that is important. 41. The Chairperson: It is a good job we cannot control the water levels from above, or there would be an international crisis. The position is that the Rural Development Council felt that it made a very useful contribution, and that currently no real push has been made by the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development to make preventative agreements about the future. Is that a fair summary? 42. Mr McDonald: It probably goes further than if the Rural Development Council had been asked to express an opinion. If asked, the council would say that the Department needs to give us, as an organisation, the flexibility to engage as a crisis arises. We happened to have that flexibility last time. This time, with regard to the number of applications I mentioned in my introduction, several farm groups are not in crisis but are simply applying to the council for help in capacity building and strategic development. The Department needs to identify the possibility of introducing a measure into the programme to provide that sort of ongoing support, and not only in crisis. Farmers are asking how they can collectively target the money available outside agri-rural development for broad, community-based rural development. We have already made that point directly to the Minister and the Department. 43. The Chairperson: Yes, but is it not the case that so far you have had no communication from the Department saying that it is setting up a preventative plan so as to safeguard us more sufficiently and efficiently if this should happen again? There has been no communication between the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development and yourselves about that? 44. Mr McDonald: Not on that subject. 45. The Chairperson: That is important to us. In the United States of America, for example, every second year they have a trial period where they say that they have foot-and-mouth disease and determine how to handle it. They organise as if the disease were present. We have learnt a lesson. We were very fortunate; the good Lord was good to us. The disease did not spread; if it had, what a calamity it would have been. The threat was a big enough calamity. We are eager to ask everyone coming before us what preventative steps they feel should be taken. 46. Mr McDonald: I have personally raised through the ministerial stakeholder forum what we perceive as a gap in the programme to provide this broad level of technical support to groups, not just when in crisis but on an ongoing basis. We await the outcome of those deliberations to see how the Department responds. 47. Mr McHugh: You are welcome to the Committee. Many farmers may say that we have had a worse year this year than we had with foot-and-mouth because of the weather. Nevertheless, we would not want foot-and-mouth every year either, because of the wider impact, beyond farming. That seems to be overlooked to some extent - even in the submissions from councils and other such bodies. They tend not to consider the impact on tourism in their area. Ramblers were affected, and various other local industries had to close down virtually completely. The massive economic impact has perhaps not been totally taken into account. What was the extent of the impact on the implementation of your projects and on funding programmes? Were people stalled for a year? Was there a problem? I have not really heard about that. 48. I am also interested in the work done by Family Farm Development. Considering your funding now, are farms and farm families a programme target group? Looking at the programme itself, it would seem difficult for them to get into some of the themes. They are probably confined to the tourism theme in some instances. If they are to look at things in a new light and move to new approaches, they must be able to get within that. How many on farms will now have time to get involved in new industries, new approaches or anything else? They are tied up with trying to survive. Often, that is a war that takes place on the farm day to day. Is there room for the upskilling of women on farms, so they can do something different as a second tier? Have you been able to do any sort of research on this? Something can be done with farm families; the impact of foot-and-mouth and the economic impacts of recent years show that there is more willingness for farms to move into new approaches than the old grass-based enterprises of the past. 49. Mr McDonald: There were delays in our programmes during the foot-and-mouth crisis. It affected our PLANET programme, which involved farm groups as well as broad community groups. We simply could not get out to those farmers who were naturally dealing with the crisis. The programme had to be put on hold. So, there were delays in people completing the training course that we had engaged them in. 50. The Chairperson: Are those now back on line? 51. Mr McDonald: Those were subsequently completed. They ran beyond the original deadline, but we had to seek departmental approval to extend the financial deadline for payments to those groups. 52. That was agreed, but it caused a delay for several groups. 53. We have responsibility for about £9 million of the £80 million rural development programme. The Department, local action groups, and natural resource tourism have responsibility for the remaining £70 million, so I cannot speak for that money. 54. We have received 300 applications for funding. I do not have the exact figures, but I can provide the Committee with a breakdown of those. A reasonable number of the applications were from farm family interest groups, but primarily, our programme is not targeted at individual farmers. The other £70 million of the rural development programme may target farmers, as may the £220 million for the agri-rural development programme delivered directly by the Department. However, farm families can become involved as part of a community group. 55. Several applications that are currently under assessment will be successful and will act as good demonstrations of how farmers can become involved in agri-issues in particular, but also in broader rural issues. That takes time, and there is much scepticism. We create a great deal of bureaucracy because we report to the Public Accounts Committee. We must ensure that the correct systems are in place, which is not done easily. The 32-page application form puts people off. However, we have no say in its design, and we must adhere to the rules. Despite that, we have managed to introduce a broad suite of proposals. Those will test several options that will include the involvement of farm families. 56. Mr Flynn: One factor that comes out of the report very strongly is that the two groups - the two examples we talked about - found great benefit in working together. They are very determined to continue that process, because it is a way to access the various sources of funding. They made a determined and continued call for a one-stop shop as a way to ease bureaucracy and make funds more readily available for farmers. That seemed to set a good example. 57. Mr McHugh: Has there been any follow-up help for potential suicide cases and people suffering from depression? Have those people been left to flounder? 58. Mr McDonald: Family Farm Development Ltd, on which I also sit as a director, was involved through the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development's rural stress initiative. The rural stress website was developed by the rural stress initiative and the Armagh and Dungannon Health Action Zone, managed by Eleanor Gill. The initiative was very successful, although I do not know whether it is still operational. 59. The family farm development project is a very useful organisation that brings together farm unions, community development activists, the Rural Development Council and some departmental staff, as observers. Unfortunately, we in the family farm development project faced a crisis ourselves at the time with regard to funding and trying to target the new programmes. The programmes were not open for us to bid for. However, we are still ticking over. An integrated organisation, such as Family Farm Development Ltd, which has all the relevant players, is ideally placed to provide that sort of support to farmers and the rural community. It would be a retrograde step if Family Farm Development Ltd, the Northern Ireland Agricultural Producers' Association (NIAPA), the Ulster Farmers' Union (UFU), the Rural Community Network or any other organisation decided to do this on its own. This requires the joint effort and expertise of all the players. We have been making that point to the Minister, and we will make it again when the rest of the programme opens for bids. Family Farm Development Ltd will bid to deliver that service. 60. Mr Kane: What percentage of applications did you receive from each county, and what percentage of applications from each county was approved? Are you targeting any areas of the Province in particular? 61. Mr McDonald: The first call for applications was open to the whole of Northern Ireland. That seemed right because we needed to test the ground initially to see which areas had a weak infrastructure, and where most applications were coming from. I do not have the figures in front of me, but I will provide those to the Committee. The figures will give the Committee a breakdown of the number of applications received, and the number of applications approved on a county basis, on a district council basis, and on a sectoral basis, that is whether the applications were from farmers and whether they were male or female. Depending on the measure and the programme, there has been a particular shortage of applications from certain counties. 62. We are evaluating the results of the first round so that at the second launch of the programme, which will probably be in spring, we will target those areas from which we received the least applications. We will do that by talking to local councillors, increasing advertisements, or staging roadshows. 63. We must also decide whether, given limited funds, we want to target particular areas and not open the programme to the whole country at the second launch. Those issues are being researched. I can give the Committee any information that will answer any of its questions. 64. Mr Kane: Do you know which areas are being targeted? 65. Mr McDonald: No county or district council is being targeted in any particular way; that is open across the country. Some of the measures showed a gap in County Down and east Antrim, and other measures showed parts of Armagh that submitted a limited number of applications. What we do will depend on our reasons for advertising the scheme. 66. As well as advertising a programme that asks people what they want to do, we also want to take a more programmed approach that initiates certain events for specific areas; for example, north Antrim. Rather than advertise the scheme itself, we would advertise a particular scheme for which a range of activities would be carried out. We are taking a more proactive approach based on the information that we have to date. 67. Mr Douglas: You mentioned the loss and the devastating effect that foot-and-mouth had on families. The loss of stock is difficult to understand when you are not involved. Those who were affected by foot-and-mouth were compensated for that loss, which will stay in their memories to the end of their days. Those who run bed and breakfasts were also affected, because they are dependent on people's ability to move freely in the country. As you support small businesses and so forth, should you have had the flexibility to be able to do something for those people at such a time? 68. Mr McDonald: It is very hard to regain lost confidence. You can compensate for lost animals, you can restock, and you can rebuild your business, but it will take a long time to recover from the depression, lack of confidence and lack of innovation that that causes. 69. Rural development is not a safe bet - it is a risky environment. In business matters, the private sector would choose the safe areas and proposals. Thirty per cent of normal new start-ups fail anyway, but the agriculture industry would probably be looking at a 50% failure rate given that it is a very high-risk group. There is a long learning curve, and it is difficult to encourage people to put their money on the table and take a chance. 70. We are about to launch a programme that will examine the rural retail sector in particular - the small rural shop and the post office that in many instances is the backbone of a rural community and sells more than its goods and services. For example, I may meet someone there and put up a notice selling something. A lot of those businesses cannot survive and compete with the major retail units. 71. We received money from the Peace programme to work with small rural retailers. There would initially be a business-mentoring scheme to help them. Many rural shopkeepers probably do not do a business plan. We want to know how they distribute their products, where they store their goods, if they can buy in bulk, and if there are advantages in collective bargaining and collective purchase. 72. We are also considering implementing a rural-award scheme for rural shopkeepers, which will either let them carry out a small improvement to the shop or display something at the front of the building. 73. Ten years ago, LEDU operated a programme for the rural retail sector, and since then it has received no direct support. We intend to launch such a programme in the autumn. That is a direct response to the particular needs of those parts of the community that perhaps were not supported in the foot-and-mouth crisis. The rural shop suffered because tourists passing through were not there to buy goods. That is one example of how we would try to reshape our programmes in response to particular needs. 74. Mr Flynn: Many of those in the two areas to whom we spoke - farmers and non-farmers - felt that those who had had their animals culled were the lucky ones, and that the people beyond those areas suffered more. 75. The Chairperson: We got that message loud and clear. I think that the next time the British Government will think about inoculation. They have made it clear that they will never spend money. However, that is a topic for another day. 76. We take the point, which is very valid, that the people who culled were fortunate and did well financially. There is only time for a short question from you, Mr Armstrong. We will let you start asking the questions at the next meeting. 77. Mr Armstrong: Mr McDonald asked "why here, why us, and will it happen again?" Foot-and-mouth disease can occur at any time because we are not in control of it. Our borders mean that there are no restrictions on the import of livestock and, although there are controls such as veterinary checks on meat that comes in on the hook, that is how foot-and-mouth disease entered Northern Ireland. How can the Government alleviate that problem? We can have measures such as fortress farming in place, but why should we do that when foot-and-mouth disease initially comes in through meat on the hook? 78. Mr McDonald: That is a difficult question; I cannot answer, because the subject is outside my area of expertise. 79. The Chairperson: You are wise to not know the answer. 80. Mr McDonald: I have complete ignorance of that subject and ask for the Committee's indulgence. 81. Mr Armstrong: Fortress farming saved the farming industry. However, it is difficult to maintain because consumers are keen to visit farms, which increases the risk of diseases spreading. Although Eleanor Gill and Lily Hughes did a good job, a lot of damage is done because so many people have the right to do things that spread diseases on farms. 82. Mr McDonald: I agree with Mr Armstrong. When the foot-and-mouth crisis first occurred, containment in Northern Ireland was the result not just of a dedicated effort by farmers, but by everyone who had access to the countryside and farmland. At international and global level, the problem was that when, for example, people in the States watched the news and saw footage of animals burning, they over reacted. It is hard to strike the right balance. If people are told to stay away from the countryside and six months later they are told that they can come back again, from a PR and marketing point of view the damage is done. We must decide how best we can deliver the message in the community and at a UK and international level - irrespective of what that message is - because if people do not understand whether they have access, long-term damage can be done. 83. Mr Armstrong: It is a similar situation to the bush fires in Australia. The authorities want people to steer clear of those areas but, once the fires have been put out, they want people to return. 84. Mr McDonald: It is like the stories that people hear about Northern Ireland. People assume that we are all killing each other; rather, we are having a good time at the Committee for Agriculture and Rural Development. The press do not always tell the right story. 85. The Chairperson: Your evidence shows that the Rural Development Council coped reasonably well with the foot-and-mouth outbreak. Of course, we did not have the severest test because there was only one outbreak. From talking to others, it is clear that the Department has not suggested that a preventative scheme be implemented immediately. 86. Your evidence highlighted that the training and co-ordination facilities that the council supplied were its best contribution to alleviating the foot-and-mouth crisis. 87. Mr McDonald: I agree. In the council's opinion, throwing money at the problem would not have solved it. The council dealt with the human issue, so that not only farmers but the wider community understood what they had to do to overcome the problem. The council believed that it was important that someone provided that support and did a bit of handholding. 88. The Chairperson: Although the Committee always enjoys your company, your time is up. Thank you very much. 89. Mr McDonald: Thank you. MINUTES OF EVIDENCE Friday 20 September 2002 Members present: Rev Dr Ian Paisley (Chairperson) Mr Savage (Deputy Chairperson) Mr Armstrong Mr Doherty Mr Douglas Mr Kane Mr McHugh Witnesses: Mr D Rutledge ) Livestock and Meat Commission Mr D Ritchie ) 90. The Chairperson: I welcome Mr David Rutledge and Mr David Ritchie of the Livestock and Meat Commission (LMC). Perhaps you would like to make a short statement, after which we shall ask some questions. 91. Mr Rutledge: We are happy to accept your invitation to contribute to your inquiry in any way we can. With regard to the finished livestock products from the beef- and sheepmeat sectors, the outbreak did not cause massive disruption to either industry. In the early days of the crisis there was disruption to the markets for both beef- and sheepmeat, but for beef that lasted only a matter of days. In the case of sheep, the disruption was more prolonged, and those producers marketing early lambs undoubtedly suffered a negative impact. However, only a small proportion of our lambs were brought to finish in the period before the export ban was lifted in early June 2002. 92. From that time onwards, returns on finished lambs in Northern Ireland were at a record high. In anticipation of the ban being lifted, the LMC had a market development executive actively working in France, and the result was that, as soon as that happened, there were quite a number of customers waiting for Northern Ireland lamb. 93. While those comments relate to an overall industry level, and looking at the year as a whole it could be argued that no serious economic damage was done, that would not properly reflect the undoubted hardship suffered in a number of areas. First, those farmers visited by the disease in Northern Ireland or Great Britain who were not responsible for its arrival on their farms through any illegal or unethical practices deserve the sympathy and support of all. 94. Secondly, it is worth mentioning the livestock auction markets, whose businesses undoubtedly suffered a serious impact. It is appropriate to acknowledge that, to the knowledge of the LMC, there has not been any vehicle for mart compensation, other than perhaps some small relief on rates bills. 95. It is also important to remind ourselves that the disruption to livestock auction marts and the ban on private sales and livestock movements had a significant effect on many farms. Some were left with surplus stock which they would have preferred to sell; others were left with a deficit of stock with which they would have planned to carry on their business and make a profit. 96. We cannot give you any quantitative measurement of the impact of those latter matters other than to accept the logic of the assumption that most livestock farmers will have experienced some level of disruption. Those closest to the outbreaks clearly suffered the most direct impact. Livestock was slaughtered and taken from the farms by the Government in their effort to contain the disease. 97. There is also a general perception that the impact of foot-and-mouth disease is past, but that is wrong because the market, particularly for beef, will be significantly affected for some time yet. I shall hand over to David Ritchie, who will give you a little more detail about the overall market effect and mention the lingering impact. Mr Ritchie is our economist and the person responsible for market statistics at the LMC. 98. Mr Ritchie: As part of our written evidence we submitted graphs illustrating cattle and sheep prices over 2000-01. We shall examine the background to those before looking at 2002. With cattle, there was broadly speaking little change in prices in 2001 over the previous year. Over the year as a whole, there was an increase of only 1p per kilo, 156p per kilo being the average. There were fluctuations. In the first two or three weeks of the foot-and-mouth crisis very little slaughtering took place in Northern Ireland plants, and the industry ground to a standstill with an obvious market loss. We then had a month or two with a market gain because the market picked up owing to the initial cutback in Great Britain production. Afterwards the market settled down, and over the year there was little impact. 99. Essentially, there was a shortfall - not a scarcity - of beef in Great Britain, mostly made up from increased supplies from the Republic, which had its own problems owing to BSE. The market was stable. Some felt it could have been better without foot-and-mouth disease, although our forecasts at the start of the year were that the year 2001 would be similar to 2000. In that sense, you could argue that there was no foot-and-mouth disease effect, and we believe that that was owing to a major British beef promotional campaign throughout the year. That isolated the Great Britain market - not from foot-and-mouth disease but from the European BSE crisis - and was a major factor in 2001. 100. However, 2002 is a slightly different picture. The foot-and-mouth disease crisis is over, yet the aftermath is affecting the market. Cattle prices are so far similar to last year but with some fluctuations. We had a good start to the year, essentially because of a good Christmas trade, and stocks had to be replenished. Since March the market has been flat and disappointing, and there is no sign of its picking up. There is a twofold reason for that. First is the aftermath of foot-and-mouth disease. United Kingdom beef production in the year 2000 was over 700,000 tonnes, which has since fallen, and it is falling again this year. The forecast for 2003 is down to 550,000 tonnes as a result of the culls across the water. 101. In the law of economics, scarcity normally leads to a stronger trade, but in this case it has not made up for that. The UK has always imported beef, but it is now importing a bigger proportion. Viewing that proportion against a fairly stable consumption level, the overall volume of imports in the year 2000 was over 205,000 tonnes. The forecast is that in 2003 it will be almost double that amount - 390,000 tonnes - going up from 20% to 40% of the market. 102. Imports occur in two ways. Beef from the Republic is getting into supermarkets; there is a shortage of British beef, and the supermarkets are willing to take Irish beef at a cheaper price. Even cheaper beef is also coming in from third countries, particularly those in South America. With up to 40% of next year's market being imported, imported beef is, to a large extent, dictating the price level and pulling it down. When they had 20% of the market, there was some effect, but you could insulate yourself. At 40% you cannot, and there is a residual effect. 103. Something else is also affecting the market this year. Supermarkets are stocking British beef, but there is no promotional money behind it. You could say this is fallout from political devolution, but the British beef campaign has ground to a halt. It is hard to say how much is attributable to the aftermath of foot-and-mouth disease and imports and how much to the fact that British beef is not being promoted. 104. Sheep enjoyed record prices in 2001. This year has been as good but not better than in the past. What we have not had is as good a second half of the year - prices then were at record levels. It is not a good comparison, but in 2001 the average price was 256p per kilo for lambs, which was £15 a head greater than the previous year, representing an increase of 43%. It is fair to say that the previous year was not particularly good. That £15 had to be offset by the fact that people received a higher market price and reduced yield premium - down £5·25. 105. There was an overall improvement to the lamb trade. In the early months trade was poor, and there were three reasons for that - two major and one minor. The relatively minor reason was that we could not export lamb to the Continent, particularly France, for we did not have a big trade at that stage; it still hit us, however. The major reasons were that we had no live export trade to the Republic, and Great Britain could not export lamb to France. Great Britain was our big market; suddenly that was vastly oversupplied, and the price came down. 106. However, we secured regional status for the second time and advanced it in early June. Within days lamb was exported to France, and the price shot up. The French market was badly undersupplied owing to low quantities of Great Britain lamb. We got another boost to prices in late August when the live export trade recommenced. There was extra competition because the whole of Ireland was putting everything it could into France, and the prices were phenomenal. Those who were marketing in spring and early summer were adversely affected. However, for the greater proportion of the year and the greater proportion of lambs - about three quarters, owing to seasonal factors - we benefited from higher prices. 107. In the latter part of 2001 Great Britain secured regional status and was allowed to export lamb. However, it did not do so until 2002. On about four occasions there were rumours that Great Britain was about to export lamb, and the price fell for a couple of days before bouncing back up. However, when Great Britain started to export in 2002, the French bonanza disappeared. Compared to a normal year, the French market is still short of lamb. Owing to the high prices of last year, demand has fallen, and they are getting more lamb from Great Britain than they got from the Republic and us last year. The market is content; prices are cheaper, and the bonanza has gone. Lamb prices for the first half of 2002 were much the same as last year. However, for the second half so far, and for the rest of the year, they will be well down, for last year was the bonus, and that has disappeared. We are back to a normal trade. 108. The Chairperson: That was a survey of what has happened. Have the Government been in touch with you about maintaining a preventative barrier against a future outbreak of the disease? 109. Mr Rutledge: There has been no specific communication regarding planning future strategies. 110. The Chairperson: The threat has ceased, but preventative measures have not yet been put in place. 111. Mr Rutledge: From the veterinary perspective, we do not have an absolute familiarity with what controls remain at ports, other than casual observation as we travel. We should not worry, unless there is an inadequate level of control 112. The Chairperson: Do you agree with the general thought which seems to be abroad that, if we get the disease again, it will be imported? 113. Mr Rutledge: That is a veterinary question; it is a contagious disease. My understanding is that travel routes would aid the physical transmission of the disease. 114. The Chairperson: We have two doors: the sea could bring it in from Great Britain, and we have a land barrier, so we could be struck from either side. We know the rumours about how it was spread when it came before, and some of those had some basis in fact, as far as we could ascertain. Do you agree that we still have two potential highways along which the disease could come? 115. Mr Rutledge: There are sufficient grounds for us to continue to worry, and controlling the importation of meat and livestock is critically important. I assume that you are referring to the unnecessary and unproductive movement of livestock. That has been curtailed to a significant degree by the controls which remain in place. 116. Mr Armstrong: Can you suggest a good approach to ensure that a disease cannot enter the island of Ireland or the UK? 117. Mr Rutledge: It is easy to say that we must clamp down on every piece of meat or livestock which might cross our borders. On the other hand, the survival of Northern Ireland's livestock production in the longer term depends on export markets, whether for beef or sheep. In that sense, we cannot have free trade in one direction and obstructions in another. That presents us with a conundrum, which can be resolved by examining other major livestock-producing countries. This is anecdotal to some degree, but other countries have a far tighter regime on the control of the movement of meat, for example, through people carrying it in suitcases. Even after the crisis and news reports on it, it is both frightening and appalling that such activities seem to be continuing. Without having any major impact on formal trading and the open market, there should be controls to prevent a disease arriving through illicit trade. 118. Mr Armstrong: If our standards are so high, should products imported into Northern Ireland be of the same standard as Northern Ireland products exported to other countries? How could that be done? 119. Mr Rutledge: There are several aspects to that. It goes without saying that there should be a level playing field so that our industry need not face hurdles which other industries do not. We are strong supporters of that. However, it must be remembered that, as a consequence of foot-and-mouth disease, customers perceive a greater risk from Northern Irish products than products from Australia, New Zealand or some South American countries, although there have been quite frequent outbreaks of foot-and-mouth there. We promote the level playing field through Government regulation and through trying to convince industries and customers to deal with us equitably. 120. Mr Armstrong: Scrapie is another potential problem. Will that affect sheepmeat and other meat imported into Northern Ireland? 121. Mr Rutledge: I am not familiar with scrapie in all countries, but the major competitors in sheep are New Zealand and Australia. My understanding is that there is no history of scrapie there at all. 122. Mr Savage: How are processors coping with trying to regain markets which were lost owing to BSE? 123. Mr Rutledge: We are delighted with this morning's news from France, of which the Committee will be aware. It will be very significant if the French Government confirm that they will accept the advice of their food safety agency and open their markets. From time to time, we have sought opportunities for Northern Ireland to re-engage in beef exports. The most attractive opportunity for the past year and more has been to sell red offal to France. If the ban in France is lifted, it will be the first opportunity to re-engage in export. The currency problem remains in regard to prime cuts, although there are occasional seasonal opportunities to sell prime beef to European markets. The currency is against us, but the offal market has been consistently better in mainland Europe, particularly in France. That is one of the first opportunities which will open up for our industry. 124. Mr Savage: We all know that confidence for farmers and fatteners is very low, having been damaged by events during the last four years. We want to retain an agriculture industry here, but how can we raise confidence? The farmers have been losing money, and that cannot continue. Restoring confidence must involve effort from the fattener, the LMC and the many other players. If we do not raise the fatteners' and farmers' confidence, they will lose interest in livestock farming. 125. Mr Rutledge: That is a complex dilemma. We agree with the point about the fatteners not making much profit. However, there is a problem in that, for several reasons, the fatteners have a shortage of raw material. If you look at what has happened in the marketplace, you will see that all the profit has migrated back to the calf-producers. They have been getting any profits available in the beef sector, and that leaves nothing for the finishers. That problem is being compounded by the payment of suckler-cow premium on heifers. The raw material for the fattener is drying up. 126. There is a big issue about cattle from the Republic of Ireland and beef labelling. The produce which historically came to Northern Ireland farms for finishing and processing found its way into the British meat market. That is no longer possible because of the forceful implementation of beef-labelling regulations. 127. We can all work at the problem, but I do not know how we can move the margin to share the profits better among the farming community - never mind beyond that community. The debate about the apportionment of the profit margin between processors, retailers and farmers goes on. 128. Mr Savage: Finally, the number of cattle coming from the South into Northern Ireland factories seems to undermine the prices paid to our farmers. This week, in one place alone, four double wagons were brought up from the South. The cattle were killed in our factories, and I have the facts to prove it. That practice is undermining our farmers. 129. Sometimes I might disagree with the LMC, but I agree with one thing that it said several weeks ago, which was that Northern Ireland farmers are not getting a good enough price for their top-quality cattle. How can we ensure that the farmer gets a fair price for such animals? When I hear about the other cattle coming in, I think that it puts the LMC on the spot, for those cattle must go through the livestock market, and the Department's officials deal with them in the factories. A great deal of work must be done to address the issue. 130. Mr Rutledge: Our capacity to influence what anyone pays for anything is limited. However, the big contrast between beef and sheep is that the sheep farmers have the opportunity of every market available, including live exports. That is denied to the beef-producer, and as we work past the BSE crisis, we hope that all market opportunities will be open to such people, and that we can therefore have more confidence in payments as a fair reflection of value. 131. Mr Douglas: You mentioned the difficulties surrounding imports at ports and airports. Serious misgivings about the procedures in place were detailed in submissions received by the Committee. What would be required to curb illegal lamb imports, especially those going direct to slaughter? Considering the fact that the outbreak in Northern Ireland occurred because sheep were imported, do you believe that they should be subject to individual traceability? 132. Mr Rutledge: There are two sides to the debate about individual traceability. From the marketing point of view, it would be a good thing in the sheep industry. However, from a practical standpoint, it is a fraught and complex process. The French aspiration to have declarations on sheep over or under six months old has been deferred by the new French Government. If it is introduced, however, individual identification will be a great asset in the marketplace. If it disappears, it is arguable whether the merit of imposing the burden of individual identification on the farming community will be worth it. 133. Mr Douglas: What else can be done about illegal importation? There is no doubt that sheep and cattle are coming in for slaughter. 134. Mr Rutledge: The importation of cattle for slaughter is not illegal if they are properly certified. I cannot say that none is coming in illegally, but for the most part movements of live animals are subject to a certification process. 135. Mr Ritchie: The problem - which one hopes has been resolved - was not that sheep were illegally imported, but that they did not go where they were supposed to go. If they had gone where they were supposed to go, they would have been slaughtered, and we should not have had a case. We do not know; they might have been out of the way before the disease spread. 136. The other problem is the illegal import of meat. The problem starts in Great Britain. Draconian measures would have to be taken to stop it, and I do not think that the public would wear them. It is ridiculous to hear stories about suitcases dripping with blood. 137. Mr Douglas: Australia and New Zealand have managed to curb that type of thing. I have no problem with draconian measures. 138. The Chairperson: It would worry me if preventative steps were not being taken. We are still subject to pressure, and it could easily be amongst us quickly. Once it got a grip, it would be hard to stop. There will be no culling money; it will be a different ball game, and there will be great change. 139. Mr Rutledge: It looks as if the European Commission is moving in the direction which you have described. 140. The Chairperson: That is the message which I am getting. 141. Mr Rutledge: That could have an impact on our export marketing, since several potential customers - 142. The Chairperson: Yes. People will feel that the disease has been cured, but it is not fresh meat, although Argentina, for instance, does not know what has happened. The Argentinians do not know about the meat or what inoculations it has received; they think it is great stuff. 143. Mr Kane: An abattoir in short supply of stock can ring a source for stock to slaughter. The source may state that he can supply but that the 90-day period of retention stipulated is not up on some of his stock. The owner of the abattoir will reply, "We shall sort that out", and, needless to say, the stock is supplied. Where do producers adhering to the rules and regulations stand? Rules are being flouted right, left and centre. The LMC is turning a blind eye, and that is happening under the Department's nose. 144. As far as I am concerned, the individuals responsible for the farm quality assurance scheme are not carrying out their duties. The Department should actively take on the job of developing a compulsory farm quality assurance scheme, and this Committee should propose that. That is the only way forward for producers who are adhering to the rules and wish to develop their enterprises. The farm quality assurance scheme does not satisfy the requirements laid down, and it definitely does not inspire farmer confidence. Can you gentlemen take action on this, or is it a lost cause? Is your organisation a dead loss? 145. Mr Rutledge: Your last comments may or may not be valid, but farm quality assurance is clearly a big issue in the farming community. There is massive change, and we could occupy the Committee for a full morning going through all the changes on farm quality assurance - not locally but throughout the UK and further into Europe. 146. Regarding the earlier part of Mr Kane's contribution, those circumstances do not imply anything illegal or unethical. There is a massive market for commodity beef- and sheepmeat. The entire catering sector does not require farm quality assurance. A processor buying a product to sell on the commodity market - mainly into the catering trade - does not need farm quality assurance. The implication of something amiss is not necessarily proof that anything is amiss. 147. The Chairperson: What about the 90-day period of retention? 148. Mr Rutledge: There is a 90-day qualification period for eligibility for farm quality assurance, which is triggered on the Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service computer. The number of days from moving onto the farm is recorded, and in that 90-day period the animal will not come to the abattoir. For such meat to be identified and labelled "farm quality assurance" under the beef-labelling scheme, it must be on the farm for 90 days. 149. The Chairperson: That does not apply to the catering business. 150. Mr Rutledge: The catering trade, for the most part, seeks the cheapest product, and that is where the majority of the South American beef is going to. Some major customers, such as the Great Britain multiple retailers, are bringing in a little, which worries us, but at present it is a small part of their trade. 151. The Chairperson: Correct me if I am wrong, but I am clear in my mind that the catering trade does not want anything too expensive - they are not worried about speciality meat and will buy it anyway. If someone wants to slaughter that meat, it can be slaughtered even though it is not up to the standard of quality assurance. 152. Mr Rutledge: There are exceptions. I do not refer to everyone in the catering trade, but the broader part of the catering trade does not require farm assurance. That does not mean that the product is unsafe or unfit in any way. It is not absolutely devoid of controls; it must comply with legal production requirements in whatever state it originated. In general, your statement was correct. 153. Mr Kane: There is no doubt that the cattle had "farm quality assurance" stamped on them. Their retention period was not completed as had been stated. The rules and regulations are flouted right, left and centre, regardless of whether Mr Rutledge wants to admit that. That is a fact, and it happened. I have information from a departmental official, whom I shall refrain from naming, that it happens day in and day out. The LMC does nothing about it. That, to be frank, is the situation. 154. The Chairperson: When you answer that, Mr Rutledge, if you care to do so, perhaps you could explain something important about which I am not clear. We pass judgement, but the farm assurance scheme is not your responsibility - or is it? 155. Mr Rutledge: We seek in our activities, and in our participation in the farm quality assurance scheme, to make a marketing tool available to Northern Ireland. That is necessary if we want to serve the best-paying customers, who are the multiple retailers. The scheme is essentially run by an industry board, which is a mixture of producers and processors with the involvement of retailers, scientific experts and others. Under the EU standard for such schemes, the process of on-farm inspections has had to be passed to an independent body, which is owned by a broad cross-section of the Northern Ireland agrifood industry. The participation of the LMC simply promotes that, both to the farming community and to our potential customers, the retailers. 156. The Chairperson: The Minister said this morning that it is not your responsibility. 157. Mr Rutledge: There is no statutory obligation on our part to do that; however, we are required to ensure that the product is available for the markets. Clearly, the best-paying markets for Northern Ireland beef are those which require farm quality assurance, namely the Great Britain multiple retailers. That is the best market in Europe - probably in the world - for beef. 158. If I might return to the question, from time to time it annoys us that people cite supposed facts without evidence. If there is evidence of the circumstances described in the question, that evidence should be reported to the Northern Ireland Trading Standards Service, who are the official body with the power to do something about it. Certainly, the LMC would do so if the evidence were there. 159. Mr McHugh: The point concerning the catering trade is important, but people are not, in general, aware of that. The caterers use the largest percentage of meat, and they can more or less do what they like with it. They can get around everything, including labelling, and can source their raw product from almost anywhere. We have no control over that. Probably the only way to get around it is for people to ask in hotels or whatever for the exact source of the meat. People tend not to do that, however; it is treated as if it were of the same quality as that stocked by the multiple retailers. That is a mistake. Perhaps there is a marketing fault in advertising which could be corrected by the farmers. 160. It is a major problem for farms trying to produce high-quality beef. As a result, the catering trade, which is the biggest food user, is not using local produce and does not need to. Indeed, the catering trade would rather not use local produce so that it can source produce at the lowest price. 161. Importing low-priced animals was one of the reasons for the outbreak of foot-and-mouth. Farmers had to struggle to make any sort of profit, which made some people inclined to source something from somewhere else, including smuggling, which allowed foot-and-mouth to come here from Britain. 162. Quality has never paid. You are in the business of quality assurance and trying to raise quality standards on farms. Over the last 20 years, it has never really paid farmers to produce quality beef. They have always been confounded, in that Friesian or Holstein beef will still fetch the highest price for McDonald's burgers. That is the reality, whether here or in the US. The end product still fetches a high price, but the farmers do not see that return for the high-quality beef which you force them to produce through quality-assured schemes. 163. Nit-picking by people from quality assurance schemes who look for bars on doors of empty houses which have absolutely nothing to do with the production of beef in an attached shed or farm drives farmers away from those schemes. Along with all sorts of regulations, the pressure is making the industry uncompetitive. Will you consider being a little more flexible in dealing directly with farmers, especially given the current immense crisis in the industry? 164. It is quite an important point that regimes cannot be strictly adhered to when the whole industry and many farms are close to meltdown. That is a major annoyance for farmers about whom we are hearing. We must move towards the vision group's proposals to try to take us to a new point. Unless you are able to deal with the issue of paying for quality beef and driving towards world prices, what is the point in having open markets to France when they want low-priced products? How do we ever reach the open market? 165. Mr Rutledge: There is much to answer. Beef labelling does not apply to the catering sector, but the infrastructure which delivers the product to the catering sector means that it is labelled until a caterer brings it into his premises. However, the caterer does not have to convey that information to the consumer. Labelling applies in a sense, but the information need not be conveyed to the consumer, as retailers are required to do. The catering sector is probably marginally bigger than the retail sector, and that is where beef consumption is growing. 166. I said that we could spend a massive amount of time discussing farm assurance in detail. The fundamental change brought about by the EN45011 standard is that whatever is written into a quality standard must be delivered. If farmers see that as nit-picking and annoying, the difficulty is that it is what the industry agreed as the standard. A farmer will get angry if he does not comply with the quality standard in some small respect, but we must look beyond that. Where bureaucracy is involved, whether through taking a photograph or making some minor amendment, the vast majority of farmers are passing the inspection very satisfactorily. 167. We must remember that this is the first cycle of EN45011-standard inspections. We expect that the second year will be much easier because farmers will already have had an inspection. I agree that there has been great annoyance about the perceived niggling aspects of the scheme. However, an independent structure has been set up to monitor compliance with the standard, so we must comply with it. What is written into the standard is to some degree out of the hands of the Northern Ireland industry. Although we can write whatever we like, under the arrangements in place, our scheme must be equivalent to schemes operated in Scotland, England and Wales. Through our contact with the Great Britain body, Assured Food Standards, we have established equivalence for the Northern Ireland scheme. That equivalence allows us a little leeway to do things differently here and there. However, we must be full square behind UK standards on major issues. 168. Mr McHugh: The industry in England works on a different scale, and the farms are much larger. There have been no grants for farm infrastructure here for several years now, and that infrastructure is falling apart. Many farmers work only part-time and do not have time to carry out all the small repairs necessary. I should like to see the figures for the vast majority which you mentioned. 169. The Chairperson: The figures are important. What percentage of meat is not up to the catering-industry standard and what percentage is quality-assured? 170. Mr Rutledge: Some 80% of the cattle slaughtered in Northern Ireland are eligible for farm quality assurance status and are marked as such. However, the carcasses of those animals are broken down into an estimated 70 different items, which do not necessarily all go to a customer who requires farm assurance. Thus many items are eligible for farm quality assurance status but are not sold to farm quality assurance outlets or customers. 171. I am reluctant to give you definitive figures for the current period. However, I recall that around 30 or 90 days after the inspection, 83% of the farmers were judged to be complying with the standard, although a significant percentage had a few minor non-conformances. The cycle lasts 18 months, and as we only started EN45011 inspections immediately after the foot-and-mouth crisis, it will not end until August. We shall be able to give the industry and commentators a more definitive picture when a full cycle has been completed. 172. The Chairperson: Those figures are important for the future of the industry. 173. Mr Rutledge: We monitor them. 174. Mr Kane: The Committee will not get the true figures. 175. The Chairperson: We shall get figures from the organisation which Mr Rutledge heads. Those figures will be the figures according to that organisation. We shall have to decide whether they are credible. 176. Mr Rutledge: We should not treat the Committee with contempt by giving it figures which we do not believe to be true. 177. Mr Kane: It has happened in the past. 178. The Chairperson: We cannot get into that now. The Committee meeting has lasted 25 minutes longer than planned. We have heard Mr Rutledge's views, which have given us much food for thought. The questions asked today probe matters essential to the Committee, especially the farm assurance scheme. 179. We feel that the farm assurance scheme, rather than doing what it was supposed to do, has become a liability to farmers. They are carrying something that is of no benefit to them. Given all the trouble which they have had, they are not getting the price which they should compared with others who do nothing and still get their beef sold. 180. Mr Rutledge: Remember that South American beef struggles to make £1 a kilogram. We are not at that price level. Our average price last year was £1·56 a kilogram. We are not currently competing with those commodity suppliers. People who say that there is no benefit must carefully examine the alternatives of going for the commodity markets. 181. The Chairperson: Many farmers are telling us that they are worried that they are going to all that trouble while there is another entrance into beef sales where people do not know the standard of the meat. On the Continent, there is a change. When I went to the Continent, there was cheap meat. Today, its buyers want quality-assured meat. There is a far bigger market on the Continent for quality-assured meat than there has ever been. 182. Mr Rutledge: The biggest single customer whom the Northern Ireland industry ever had was the company which set up farm assurance in Northern Ireland. 183. Mr Armstrong: How many tons of meat do the caterers take a year? 184. Mr Rutledge: Of the 930,000 tons of total UK consumption, about half goes to the catering trade. 185. Mr Armstrong: How much of that is imported? 186. Mr Rutledge: As Mr Ritchie said, about 40% of the total is expected to be imported next year. It is building up from about 20% in 2000. 187. Mr Armstrong: More imported meat is being bought every year. 188. Mr Rutledge: That is because of a major deficit in the UK supply base as a consequence of the foot-and-mouth disease culls. 189. The Chairperson: The meat cannot be supplied because there were so many animal deaths. By culling so many, we opened up the market to other suppliers. 190. Mr Rutledge: There is a major dilemma when we talk about the promotion of British meat. If there were to be a major campaign, would it simply promote the product of another country? That was debated in the industry and affected the restructuring of the Meat and Livestock Commission in the UK. 191. Mr Armstrong: What age is the meat which is coming from other countries? Is it over 30 months old? 192. Mr Rutledge: Inevitably, much of it is. 193. Mr Kane: Farmers can only be bluffed for a while. They have had enough of being bluffed. 194. The Chairperson: We have had a full discussion and look forward to receiving those figures. Thank you. PLEASE NOTE THAT THE MINUTES OF EVIDENCE HAVE NOT BEEN EXAMINED BY MEMBERS AND WITNESSES MINUTES OF EVIDENCE Friday 27 September 2002 Members present: Rev Dr Ian Paisley (Chairperson) Mr Bradley Mr Doherty Mr Ford Mr Kane Mr McHugh Witnesses: Mr T Hearty ) Newry and Mourne District Council Mr N Patterson ) Ms J O'Hare ) Mr C Burns ) 195. The Chairperson: The Committee welcomes the representatives from Newry and Mourne District Council. 196. Mr Patterson: I am Martin Patterson from the economic development section of Newry and Mourne District Council; my colleagues are from the rural area of Newry and Mourne. I apologise for Cllr Pascal McDonald and Séamus Crossey from the council offices, who could not attend. 197. The foot-and-mouth outbreak curtailed the tourism, agriculture and business sectors. Members will be aware that the Newry and Mourne area is very active in tourism; it has two areas of outstanding natural beauty that were greatly affected by the outbreak. Newry and Mourne straddles south Armagh and south Down, and the business sector of that area was greatly affected. Many recently opened business parks suffered, and major events had to be cancelled. Some of our representatives are directly invovled in agriculture and have their own views on the foot-and-mouth outbreak. 198. The Chairperson: What is required to curb the illegal importation of livestock and beef products? Australia and New Zealand have a very good system that has proved successful. Do we need a similar system? 199. Mr Patterson: We should have an all-Ireland animal and plant health policy. Cattle and fish do not see boundaries. They cross borders through rivers and fields, so an all-Ireland animal and plant health policy would be beneficial. 200. Mr Burns: There are farms in our district that straddle the border. 201. Mr Hearty: We had serious problems with that. Small farmers who had land on both sides of the border could not move or use machinery on one part of their land. Those who had only one tractor were particularly crippled. They were not allowed to take any machinery across the border - even their cars were thoroughly washed. It was a huge inconvenience to farmers. 202. Ms O'Hare: The policy of keeping animals out of the island must be tightened on an all-island basis. We could use the Australian system, but we could also develop a better one. As the area first hit by the disease, we want to see a comprehensive plan put in place that can be brought into operation right away, because everyone was caught flat-footed when the disease broke out. 203. Mr McHugh: The Veterinary Service, farmers and the Department must work more closely together on biosecurity. Several issues must be addressed, particularly the distrust that has grown along border areas. 204. Mr Hearty: Because of Newry and Mourne's situation, it is vital that the Departments of Agriculture, on both sides of the border, work together more than they have. It is vital for the survival of the agriculture industry. 205. Mr McHugh: Was there a failure to move quickly on the foot-and-mouth outbreak? 206. Mr Hearty: Definitely. There must be a more hands-on approach by the Departments on both sides of the border. 207. Mr Patterson: Meigh, which is in Newry and Mourne District Council, was the site of the original outbreak in Northern Ireland. Although Department officials were fantastic, and the council was briefed at the time, there was no contingency plan. It hit us suddenly, and although measures were carried out rapidly, we must consider developing a contingency plan. 208. Mr McHugh: Has it improved since? 209. Mr Patterson: Absolutely. 210. Ms O'Hare: PricewaterhouseCoopers said that it was good in theory; however, we wonder how well it will work in practice. We have been told that there will be co-operation and that it will be dealt with, in theory. However, there is nothing in place to develop it. 211. The Chairperson: That is how the Committee feels. We want something tangible; we want to know how quickly that will swing into action. I do not believe that there are contingency plans; there is talk, but there are no structures, and that is important. 212. Ms O'Hare: They probably exist on paper, but we need more than that. 213. Mr Doherty: To what extent did the council's lack of awareness of a contingency plan affect its reaction to the evolving situation and the daily changes? 214. Ms O'Hare: The council's first reaction was to close as much as it could. The public health sector came into its own with the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development and worked very hard; it worked flat out during that time. The Chief Executive got everything up and running as quickly as possible. It is important to know who to speak to; contact names are necessary so that if it happened again a council could have a contingency plan. 215. Newry and Mourne District Council could not have reacted any faster. It was the first council to be affected by foot-and-mouth disease and it reacted by closing everything as quickly as possible, reviewing everything as it went along. The council handled the situation well, but there is always a better way. With hindsight, there was probably a quicker way of handling it, mainly involving co-operation between all the organisations. 216. Mr Doherty: If, God forbid, it happened again tomorrow, would the council react differently? 217. Mr Hearty: The council would react better. The council was very quick to act and gave all the help that it could to the Department, and it looked to the Department for advice. However, the Department itself was caught out; it had no contingency plan. On several occasions, the Department had to consult another body before getting back to the council; that cost vital time at the beginning of the outbreak. 218. Mr Doherty: There could not be awareness of a plan if there was no plan to begin with. 219. Mr Hearty: No. 220. Mr Bradley: I must go easy on my colleagues from Newry and Mourne District Council in case they exact their revenge in the council chamber. I pay tribute to the council's officers and its agriculture committee for their well-prepared response document. 221. How did the outbreak affect tourism in Newry and Mourne? 222. Mr Patterson: Enquiries to the council's tourism offices halved during 2001 compared with 2000 and 2002. All major events were cancelled. The council's area covers two areas of outstanding natural beauty and it thrives on tourism. All sporting events were cancelled; all pitches, soccer and Gaelic, were closed, as were hockey pitches. Newry Agricultural Show, which is a major event in Newry and Mourne, was cancelled. 223. The number of bed spaces decreased. The St Patrick's Day parade is a major event for Newry City, but it was cancelled. A new business park at Flurry Bridge had just opened and had difficulty gaining occupancy because it was right on the border with Jonesborough. 224. Mr Burns: Slieve Gullion Courtyard was closed for four months as a result of the outbreak. The council depends on rural tourism, fishing and hill walking, all of which shut down completely. It was a great pity that smaller tourist businesses did not receive any compensation for the outbreak. 225. Ms O'Hare: Newry and Mourne District Council is not one of the Northern Ireland Tourist Board's regional tourism organisations, which was the only mechanism that was used to obtain compensation for tourism providers. 226. Because Newry and Mourne District Council is not part of that, it was excluded from compensation packages. Newry and Mourne decided not to become one of the Tourist Board's regional tourism organisations, and therefore tourist businesses in its area were excluded from compensation. That was discrimination. Many providers received no compensation, whereas providers and groups in areas that were affiliated to the Tourist Board did. That affected some rural operators very badly, especially those who were trying to promote farms; a few open farms had started up in our area, but they had to close. They received no compensation. 227. The Chairperson: Excuse my ignorance, but why are you not in the group that was entitled to compensation? 228. Ms O'Hare: The council decided that being a regional tourism organisation was not the best way of marketing the area's diversity. The nearest group was Kingdoms of Down, but because half the district is in Armagh, the council felt that it would not be marketing the area properly. For a while, it tried to market the area as having two different identities; however, it decided that that was too expensive and that this was the best way. 229. The Chairperson: It seems very unfair that because the council decided on a different way of doing business it did not receive compensation when the disease spread. 230. Mr Doherty: At the Committee for Enterprise, Trade and Investment's tourism inquiry on 26 September 2002, regional tourism organisations - how they operate and who was involved or excluded - was discussed as a matter of real concern. 231. Mr Patterson: Newry and Mourne District Council is not the only council that is not in a regional tourism organisation: our neighbours, Banbridge District Council and Armagh District Council also chose not to go down that route. 232. The Chairperson: That is an interesting matter that must be highlighted. 233. Mr Kane: The European Union is to review foot-and-mouth disease legislation with a view to updating it. Given the lessons that were learnt from the 2001 outbreak, the wide range of legislation, the cumbersome disposal of carcasses, animal health, welfare and compensation, what changes to the legislation do you recommend that the Department press for in Europe? 234. Mr Hearty: There must be an entirely new plan. For example, during the outbreak in Meigh dead animals lay in a field and carcasses were burnt less than a mile from a primary school. The review should come up with an effective plan. 235. During the first outbreak of the disease in the South of Ireland, all culled animals were burnt on farms. Afterwards, however, culled animals were taken to abattoirs to be disposed of there. We must develop a similar strategy rather than depend on what we have now. 236. Mr Burns: Had it not been for strong local opposition, animals would have been buried in Slieve Gullion Courtyard. 237. Mr Patterson: The report makes the point that the centralised recorded livestock identification system could be vastly improved. Much legislation comes from Europe, and therefore councils should consult regularly; Newry and Mourne District Council has an integrated rural and agricultural committee that meets every two months. Any consultation will come directly to the council for comment. 238. Mr Hearty: The council would then reply. 239. Mr Ford: We have focused on what the Department has not done and on what it should do. What could district councils have done that they were not asked to do during the outbreak? 240. I have noted your concerns about refuse collection, for example, on which the environmental health service had a different view from the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development. Should district councils have a role in improving communications and in developing an emergency plan? 241. Ms O'Hare: The council must develop a plan - perhaps a central refuse collection if outside vehicles are being kept out of an area. Leaving refuse for a long time creates health problems. That was simply not foreseen at the time, and we did not know how to solve the problem. Such a plan would have to be put into action if there were a place to which people will be obliged to take their rubbish. Other proposals must be considered too. 242. Mr Patterson: Every council now has an emergency action plan, and it is our own fault if we fail to review it regularly. As a middle manager, I took part in a review some 12 months ago, yet I have not returned to it since. Councils should examine that in more depth and perhaps meet more regularly. 243. Mr Ford: What consultation was there between the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development and your environmental health department over carcass disposal? 244. Mr Patterson: It took place directly through our Clerk and Chief Executive; it started as soon as the outbreak began in May 2001 and continued throughout. 245. The Chairperson: Signals from Europe and Westminster seem to suggest that if there were another outbreak of foot-and-mouth disease, it would be dealt with by vaccination rather than by slaughter and burning. What is your attitude to that? 246. Ms O'Hare: It depends on whether vaccinated meat would be acceptable to the consumer; after all, part of the germ is being introduced into the animal. Much depends on how the European Union would deal with the matter. 247. The Chairperson: There was a serious reaction to the burnings; people will ask: why burn all those animals when they could have been vaccinated and spared? There are difficulties. 248. Ms O'Hare: Vaccinating animals means that they cannot enter the food chain, which sort of defeats the purpose of producing them in the first place. It all depends on whether, after vaccination, the animals can go back into the food chain. 249. The Chairperson: They would have to go back into the food chain. 250. Ms O'Hare: Not if the European Union prevented them. 251. The Chairperson: But will people buy them? 252. Mr Hearty: May I briefly raise the issue of brucellosis. I know that it affected other areas, but farmers in Newry and Mourne were particularly badly hit. Farms tested in our area were saturated with brucellosis, which was a serious loss to the farming community. Prices were low at the time, and cattle were valued at only 75% of their normal price. Something must be done urgently, for there was 100% compensation for TB reactors. 253. Our area, which was saturated with brucellosis, took a severe blow. Cattle above 30 months were not allowed to move. Some farmers in the Newry and Mourne area will never recover, given present livestock prices. People in the beef sector who bought in cattle and slaughtered them at the same price got nothing for their work but the premium. The industry suffered a severe blow, and the Committee must give a major push to come up with a plan to help. 254. The Chairperson: The Committee is also inquiring into brucellosis. Thank you for your helpful evidence. The Committee Clerk will give you a copy of the questions that we did not have time to ask; please send your replies as soon as possible. 255. Mr Patterson: Before I leave, I apologise on behalf of Cllr William Burns who was unable to attend the meeting. 256. The Chairperson: When I see him, I will talk to him. Thank you. MINUTES OF EVIDENCE Friday 27 September 2002 Members present: Rev Dr Ian Paisley (Chairperson) Mr Bradley Mr P Doherty Mr Ford Mr Kane Mr McHugh Witnesses: Mr J O'Kane ) Mr S Hugget ) Mr H Andrews ) Fermanagh District Council Mr R Forde ) 257. The Chairperson: I welcome Mr John O'Kane, Mr Stephen Hugget, Mr Harold Andrews and Mr Robert Forde from Fermanagh District Council. 258. We have a quorum today, but I cannot chain people. 259. Mr Forde: We are pleased to give the Committee our views on how the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak of 2001 was handled, and, more importantly, our opinions on how any future outbreak could be better dealt with or prevented. 260. We make our comments against a background in which we acknowledge that the Assembly and the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development gave the best leadership of any region in the United Kingdom during the 2001 outbreak. We further congratulate the Assembly for carrying out a review specifically for Northern Ireland. Although Northern Ireland had a limited number of outbreaks - three in total - we must take the view that one outbreak is one too many. Hence, we must take on board measures that ensure that Northern Ireland has no more outbreaks in the future. 261. I shall summarise the points that we wish to make. The councillors with me today are representative of the three wards of Erne North, Erne East and Erne West in Fermanagh District Council; they will provide further details. 262. First, there is an urgent need for a unified national emergency plan that recognises the role and expertise of district councils. I am sure that there was a plan, but it would appear that it was largely unknown outside the Department's veterinary service. The plan, including the contingency arrangements, would need to be regularly tested. It would determine where animals are slaughtered and whether they were to be buried or burned. Communication is a key concept; there is a role there for the Food Standards Agency. The information provided must be timely, for farmers and the general public alike. 263. The district councils' role in giving advice on matters such as pollution control, statutory nuisance, private water supplies and contamination of land was not recognised in a UK context. The delays in the slaughter of sheep came in for a great deal of negative comment. If a proper plan had been in existence, the risks associated with the delay could have been avoided. 264. Our second concern involved the movement of animals and the control at ports and airports. The movement of animals from a foot-and-mouth disease identified area, namely the UK mainland, to Northern Ireland, was totally unacceptable. Any incidence of disease on the mainland should have resulted in the automatic closure of the ports to such imports, and an action plan to prevent the transmission of the disease should have been triggered at all ports and airports. The experience of the foot-and-mouth disease outbreak of 2001 would prove that that is applicable to animals destined for slaughter as well as other animals. 265. The introduction of the single European market in the early 1990s has resulted in the scaling down of import controls and has increased the risk of spreading disease that can have an impact on animal health. The controls at ports and airports of the importation of live animals and meat and meat products should be examined. The incidence of illegal imports of products for consumption by ethnic minorities in mainland UK is well documented. Northern Ireland ports and airports must guard against becoming a back door entry for such goods, if the UK authorities step up their policing at ports and airports. 266. The effective practice of import controls in Australia and New Zealand, and examples of best practice everywhere, should be examined and adopted here. 267. During the outbreak, there was good co-operation between the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development in Northern Ireland and the Department of Agriculture and Food in the Republic. However, people in border areas often commented that it would have been easy to provide disinfection mats at the entry into Northern Ireland as well as the entry into the Republic. 268. The adoption of agreed animal disease prevention controls for Northern Ireland and the Republic should be a future priority. Prior to the foot-and-mouth outbreak, some animals were illegally transported across the Republic of Ireland border. The Minister may need to be given emergency powers to authorise the destruction of stray livestock. There were some stray sheep on a mountain in Fermanagh, and it took a long time to capture them, but I know that one of the Committee members is well aware of such things. 269. Thirdly, food-and-mouth disease has had an effect on the agri-food and tourism sectors. The agri-food sector had to cope with many additional restrictions and regulations, and requirements were continually changing with regard to documentation. Notification of the requirements to industry, councils and environmental health departments was poor. The confusion caused major problems for many food exporters. However, better communication with district councils, environmental health departments and the Department of Agriculture and Rural Development improved the situation. In one case, different forms were required for meat and milk products, and one factory produced both products, which caused confusion. It also caused confusion for Fermanagh District Council. The agri-food and tourism business has suffered considerably. 270. The EU was discussing vaccination recently. The pros and cons should be fully considered now, rather than having the debate when the disease is at its height. Scientific fact and public opinion must resolve the issue, but many people remain to be convinced. An article in 'The Times' on 9 September stated that Nestlé had serious reservations about accepting milk from vaccinated cows. 271. Mr Kane: The EU community will review foot-and-mouth disease legislation with a view to updating it. Given the lessons learned from the 2001 outbreak, and also given the wide range of legislation encompassing the di |